danchoo, if you’re out there. I think we (I) sort of got away from the intent of the animal rights post. In doing so, danchoo touched upon a complex point. Not that it was his point. But it is one I have been avoiding trying to make. Since I am currently avoiding some other bit of writing I must do, this seems an opportune time to make it here.
What do we do, as philosophers, when the prevalent moral system does not allow us to live well? Is that enough, by itself, to reject the system? I mean, the moral system we find ourselves living with, or one that we examine. Can Kant be rightly rejected merely because living that way would be unacceptable to us? Can we reject a Job-like scenario merely because it is so, well, Job-like?
Sure, Hume can “reject” his own epistemology in order to live on a day-to-day basis. But could he reject the moral implications as easily? Does the philosopher, if he has some notion of eudaemonia, need to think in two directions at once, when moralising?
I think he does. Traditional, systematic moral thinking must begin at the level of society. Even Kant does this - despite that he often speaks otherwise. But “living well”, which, for me is the sole purpose of philosophising, may require that we begin our reasoning with, well, whatever it takes to acomodate living well - living our own lives well. Kant has no problem sacrificing any human individual’s happiness - or the happiness of all of them, in order to serve some moral principle. The principle comes first, for him. Duty must be served, despite consequences, or any feelings we have about it.
I think that many have rejected the very study of moral theory because of this conflict between the “right” and happiness, however defined. Most moralists seem to be absolutists - which precludes any conflict - what is right is right, and happiness be damned. Rationalism does not take as its basis human happiness, but pure reason - which there is no a priori reason to think will serve happiness. Despite the claims of rationalists to the contrary.
But even if it did, there is the notion of what is a social good, and a separate notion of what may be good for me. Often, at least. How do we solve this conflict, if we hold, as I do, that my own life is the proper focus of philosophy to begin with? I believe that Nietzsche has resolved this conflict, in a way that causes him to abandon the notion of morality. But I don’t think he has truly done this - he just says he has. He has adopted the stance that morality begins within each of us - and stays there.
I think that this approach can rightly be called a moral one - that is to say, it is of the topic of morality. Many seem to disagree - that morality must serve the whole. Some would call Nietzsche, or my version of him, relativism. But it has usually been called perspectivism. I call it contextualism. And my claim is that, for anything but the absolutist view, moral principles actually transmogrify when the context is changed. That a moral principle looks, smells and acts different within different contexts, even though the principle itself does not change.
Gotta get smokes.
Be back. Hopefully, someone will slam me in the meantime, so I don’t have to keep on babbling like this. Trying to get a long point down to post size. Anyway, danchoo, this is where your comments have led me. Make any sense?
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