Values in Nature

This is a little essay I did concerning the idea that values are natural features of the world! Just looking to promote some interesting discussion!

Values in Nature

Mackie’s question regarding values as features of the world, like natural features, is a meaningful question. Man initiates values from within given to them by nature, which is then applied to the world. What we consider to be true contributes to human good over the longest course of time. Humans are obligated to the pragmatic process to sustain values through everyday induction. It is therefore meaningful to talk about undetectable objects and properties.

Values are very much features of the world. One uses values in everyday practical reasoning. Values are created when a rational person witnesses an event, communicates with others, internalizes such events, and reflects upon them by putting oneself into the shoes of the negative outcome. From that, a value is created based on self preservation. Values are created after a collection of inductive experiences. Mackie theorizes:

Although logical positivism with its verifiably theory of descriptive meaning gave an impetus to non-cognitive accounts of ethics, it is not only logical positivists but also empiricists of a much more liberal sort who should find objective values hard to accommodate. Indeed, I would not only reject the verifiability principle but also deny the conclusion commonly drawn from it, that moral judgments lack descriptive meaning. The assertion that there are objective values intrinsically prescriptive entities or features of some kind, which ordinary moral judgments presuppose, is, I hold, not meaningless but false. (Mackie 112)
These experiences are then applied to the world in such a way that ensures sustenance; becoming a “feature” of the world in a most profound way whereby values can be considered as natural features. Considering this information, it suggests that the pragmatic test is true nor false, it merely has meaning.

Values are simply old truths that grow into new ones. If we deny our own thoughts, if we do not have the will or desire to pursue meaning, then we fail to achieve any meaning of truth in the first place. Those contributions we accept to be true do the most human good over the longest course of time. It has been widely suggested by Menand that pragmatism took form long ago in the works of Charles Darwin, where evolution was deemed an ongoing process . Today we hold Darwin’s theory of evolution to have some practical meaning. If we create a reality where pragmatism holds true then it is meaningful. “Pragmatism is melioristic” (The belief that improvement of society depends on human effort.)

Humans are geared to continued tasks of trial and error in order to sustain human values as features of the world. Thomas Kuhn presents his "Structure of Scientific Revolution" which has practical application in the study of epistemology. When applied to epistemology the theory suggests that there are steps in the development of truth. The first step is known in science as the "pre-paradigm" period. In the case of values this is a period in human thought where we have not yet developed a specific value. Once someone has discovered this value it becomes tested in the period known as "normal science". In this period values are applied to everyday life, and philosophers draw consensus with each other about whether the value is true. The next stage of "anomaly" determines that the value has proven to be invalid under a certain circumstance. "Crisis" occurs when there is a consensus among philosophers that the old paradigm (or value) no longer applies. A "crisis" may be solved within the old paradigm and return to "normal science". Sometimes it is realized that a new paradigm cannot be accomplished due to a lack of necessary tools, and is left for future generations to solve. In terms of values, philosophers would wait for a new method of thinking to come along. Eventually, a new paradigm (in this case a value) may be established and the problem is then solved. The process then returns to "normal science" to continue the process of validating the proof through induction. (Kuhn 23-34) The "Structure of Scientific Revolution" derives and or reforms a value that becomes or is redefined as a feature of the world. Similarly the "Structure of Scientific Revolution' is a pragmatic test that encourages a process of ongoing inquiry and transformation of knowledge and truth.

It is important that we talk about undetectable features in nature since they apply in the real world and affect us. If we do not consider undetectable objects or properties, we would have to deny our own thought and senses. We would therefore be left without any understanding of truth. There is value and worth in the pragmatic theory making it meaningful. The pragmatic theory allows us to test undetectable objects or properties in the real world. If the pragmatic method was invalid our society would be devoid of many things. There would be an absence of law, science, religion and politics. All of these institutions are dependant on values and as values evolve so do these inventions of civilization. 

The idea the values occur as features in the natural world passes the pragmatic test in most respects. The only problem with values being features of the world is that we cannot empirically prove that they exist. The thought that values exist as features of the world pass in the sense that they posses many of the characteristics of empirical proofs. Values have real world application which is part of the criteria for useful truths. Values also tend to do the most human good when they are proven to be true for a long period of time. We are encouraged by discussion to believe that Mackie's question is both meaningful and significant.

Although Mackie has concluded his own question to be false, we can resolve through the pragmatic test that the question regarding values as features of the world has meaning. We have discovered that even though values are not objective or universal, they play an extremely important role in all aspects of society, and primarily the individual. This is grounds enough to accept values as entities that cannot be dismissed. Throughout the essay we learned that values are simply old truths that grow into new ones, and as humans we are geared to continued tasks of trial and error. The "Structure of Scientific Revolution reveals how values are created and can be proven like an empirical scientific theory or formula. Kuhn's theory serves to support the pragmatic test, as well as things we readily consider credible in the physical sense. If we are to reject undetectable objects or properties, we would then have to reject the credibility of empirical proof; this then leaves us to question our reality.

and if you have no idea what I’m talking about please respond and be as evil as you want!

if one mentions the term “apple”, there is an idea formed about fruits that fit into the category… (leave the computers out of this one)

it could be an objective truth about certain pieces of fruit that they fit the classification “apple”…

it could also be objectively true that some fruit, eg oranges, do not fit the category of “apple”

it is never the case that a non object is objectively true

from dictionary.com:

ob·jec·tive ( P ) Pronunciation Key (b-jktv)
adj.
Of or having to do with a material object.
Having actual existence or reality.

Uninfluenced by emotions or personal prejudices: an objective critic. See Synonyms at fair1.
Based on observable phenomena; presented factually: an objective appraisal.

values are non objects… they cannot by definition be objectively true…


“Values are very much features of the world”

no, they are not…

“Values are created after a collection of inductive experiences”

it would have been better to say values are about the world, not in the world…

and since they are not in the world outside of human thought, they can have no objective truth… they are not objects…

“even though values are not objective or universal, they play an extremely important role”

“This is grounds enough to accept values as entities that cannot be dismissed”

values are not physical “natural” entities - the non-acceptance of contradictions leaves your conclusion flat…

(it isn’t “grounds enough”)

“If we are to reject undetectable objects or properties, we would then have to reject the credibility of empirical proof”

this is a non sequitur… the conclusion doesn’t follow from the premises…

-Imp

But Imp, I didn’t say that values are objective…

If I did please quote me on that, I am a bit tired and I didnt get a chance to read it through. I would have hated to have contradicted myself!

To argue your first point Imp. I would say that your definition of objective is a little sketchy. I would argue that values have " actual existence or reality". Values are very much a part of my reality and if they cease to exist then there would be no values in the first place. I suppose what you meant to say is that values are not objective in the sense that we cannot feel, taste, touch, smell, hear or see them.

Your next argument also depends on your definition of “natural features”. I believe that values are features of my world, (which is the only one I have substantial evidence to argue for), and therefore I would consider them to be natural. They are in my world. I cannot begin to describe whether or not they are within, lets say trees, since I am not a tree. But I can deduce that I am natural and values are within me therefore they must also be natural. I would say that this argument is valid, although you may argue that it is not sound, and that is left to opinion.

What I am trying to say for my last point is, since values and empirical proofs have a similar process, “the structure of scientific revolution”, they cannot be rejected since they have practical application like empirical proof. Therefore they cannot be dismissed as meaningless.

My main point is that values are not objective, they are meaningful since they follow the criteria for pragmatic truth.

no, they do not follow that criteria at all…

-Imp

Reality (as described by the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy): That which there is. The question of how much of it there is forms the dispute between realists and anti- realists. Does it include: numbers, possibilities, the future, the past, other minds, colours (yes i am canadian), tastes, the external world, mind as well as matter, or matter as well as experience?

I can define realsim/anti-realism for you but that would be alot of typing and I’m sure you understand the differences. These are debatable.

This is my point of argument, and will also help answer your first question:
Naturalism (ditto): Most generally, a sympathy with the view that ultimately nothing resists explanation by the methods characteristic of the natural sciences. A naturalist will be opposed, for example, to mind-body dualism, since it leaves the mental side of things outside the explanatory grasp of biology or physics; opposed to acceptance of numbers or concepts as real but non-physical denizens of the world; and opposed to accepting moral duties and rights as absolute and self-standing facets of the natural order.

Ethical Naturalism (ditto): The attempt to place ethical properties and ethical thought in the natural world. In the form discussed and supposedly refuted by Moore, this is the view that the meaning of an ethical predicae (‘…is good’) is identical with that of a predicate displaying the features in virtue of which the object is good, e.g. ‘…is such sa to create happiness’ if one operates a utilitarian standard. Moore attacks this with the open question argument. Other positions calling themselves njaturalism may abandon the claim about identity of meaning, but still hold that ethical properties, rather as we hold that water is H2O, even if the two terms mean something different. Most widely, naturalism includes any belief that the nature of ethical thinking is exhaustively understood in terms of natural propensities of human beings, without mysterious intuitions, or divine help.

I argue that there is no need to look beyond human thought. Human thought exists within the world.

I explained that I can’t determine that there are values in trees. I am a human, part of the world, there is at least single occourence of values in nature.

I gave evidence in my paragraph about scientific revlutions with reference to Kuhn… where is yours! Please read what I have wrote and give some explanation for your “not at all” statements, unless you can be considered an expert in the field.

This is all besides my point that values have meaning.

Szpak

-Imp

Imp, thank you for pointing out my contradiction! Now I wish to rephrase it to say what I really meant!

“The only problem with values being features of the world is that we cannot empirically prove that they exist.”

becomes…

“The only problem with values being features of the world is that it is difficult to distinguish them from the world using normal human faculties of smell, taste, touch, hearing and sight, making us more skeptical of their existence.”

Values have meaning in the sense that they are used in everyday life. They are not absolute but are part of the natural order. DON’T ACCEPT THEM! Re-establish them from the ruins of former values… progress

Szpak

"“The only problem with values being features of the world is that it is difficult to distinguish them from the world using normal human faculties of smell, taste, touch, hearing and sight, making us more skeptical of their existence.” "

I am the Lorax, I talk to the trees- do as I command

I am x, I talk to god -follow this religious tenant

ect ad nauseam

which values “in the world” do you choose?

the amazon river is in south america regardless of ones choice, …

which is the “feature” of the world?

-Imp

Szpak,

In my understanding, values are how things are measured. They are not simply given to us by the world. Rather, they are an aspect of our invovlement with the world. Furthermore, they are an aspect of any involvement in nature, in so far as the invovled entities can be said to make measurements. Any event which makes a difference in the world is an act of measurement. So, values exist as aspects of that which matters in the world.

This is just values in general, and not specifically what you and Mackie are referring to with the term “values.” What you call “values” I generally call “beliefs.” More on this later.

I’d drop this idea completely. It counters logic, science and common sense.

I don’t agree with your notion of pragmatism. If there is such a thing as “everyday induction,” it is a mark of stupidity, not pragmatism.

Not as far as I’m concerned. If it is undetectable, you cannot meaningfully describe it. If you cannot describe it, you cannot talk about it. As it so happens, we can describe values (and beliefs, too). We can talk about them, because they are detectable.

You are talking about a very elaborate process. Observation, communication, empathy, imagination . . . and you’re calling the product of this process “values.” So, values, as you are defining the term, would appear to involve two aspects: first, values can be described in terms of what a person thinks is true; second, values can be described in terms of how a person will react in a set of circumstances.

In my understanding, what you are calling “values” are more commonly referred to as “beliefs.” Beliefs are detectable. As I noted, they can be described in terms of propositions as well as behavior in general. The act of uttering a proposition is, of course, a sort of behavior. So, in general we can say that beliefs are detectable aspects of behavior. This places beliefs (or, in your parlance, “values”) squarely in the realm of that which is detectable and open to empirical study.

Beliefs are system states which define the likelihood that a being will speak or otherwise behave in a particular manner.

There is no need to assume that self-preservation is the motive force. Check out Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene for a broader perspective on human motivations.

There is no need to bring induction into the picture, either. It seems much more likely that beliefs are formed through a complex process which involves:

  1. genetically programmed potentials for action
  2. positively and negatively reinforced behavioral adaptations
  3. learned speech patterns
  4. social and familial pressures to conform and rebel
  5. appropriations (and malappropriations) of ideas
  6. creative play of words, images and signs in general

I’m probably leaving something out. In any case, none of these processes implicate induction. I suppose the second process, more generally referred to as “conditioning,” might be confused for a sort of induction. However, there is a difference between reinforcing a behavior and inductively reasoning that a behavior is “good.” After all, if I keep hitting a door until it breaks, did I use induction to decide that the door was broken?

My criticisms up till now have only been with your own words. Now I’ll comment on Mackie. (Note that I’m not terribly familiar with Mackie. I’m only going to discuss the Mackie presented in your essay).

You quoted Mackie as saying,

An ordinary moral judgement is a judgement. The words “ordinary” and “moral” don’t add to his point. So, the question, then, is this: do judgements presuppose beliefs as entities or features of some kind?

I agree with Mackie that this is a meaningful question. However, I disagree with his answer. The answer is yes, moral judgements presuppose beliefs, and beliefs are real features of human beings. Beliefs are organizational patterns of our brains. They may be “fuzzy,” in that they can only be measured indirectly. Yet, they can be detected and studied scientifically. There is no sense in claiming that they don’t exist, nor is there any sense in claiming that they cannot be detected.