Is moral relativism (or its consequences or effects) morally wrong? If not, in what way is it wrong. You say it is “philosophically wrong”. What do you mean by that?
You say: “It hurts us all.” In what way? What kind of hurt does it inflict on all of us?
I don’t really know what I’m talking about, I just feel it in my bones that moral relativism hurts us…meaning it hurts me.
Because it hurts me…i mean us, i therefore consider it evil and wrong and something we should all stand against as moral beings.
As Neil Peart puts it: We can only grow the way the wind blows
I don’t think moral relativism is harmful. It would be better to have one set of morals that everyone agrees on, but since we don’t have that we should take what we can get. If you think we should replace moral relativism, that’s different. Good luck, though.
I don’t like moral relativism in the sense that people will defend awful claims with the statement, ‘its my opinion’. I don’t believe in any kind of objective basis for morality, but I do think there are better and worse positions.
There are no such things as “morals”. There is only economical relations, and these relations are objective. They are real despite anyone’s “opinion.”
Modern “moral relativism” is symptomatic, a side-effect, or conflicting social relations, which are resulting directly from economic relations.
Every moral conflict can be traced back to negligent politics. Name one moral conflict and I will show you how it is reducible to an unstable economic praxis. I will show you how a person’s “feelings” are developed by a specific consumer context that is inherently coercive.
There is no mystery why 4.8 billion consumers who are alienated from each other argue about morals. It is because the very system itself is conducive to competition, individuality, and exploitation. “Relativism” is just another useless theory that has evolved from bourgeois philosophy. It is another philosophy that consumers can make a fetish out of and pretend to be philosophers.
Moral relativism is scientific: there is no evidence of an inherent morality (a “moral world order”).
Philosophy, in the narrow, Socratic sense at least, holds the middle ground between science and religion, between moral relativism and one specific moral code (the moral code with which the philosopher in question has been brought up: in Socrates’ case, Athenian piety). The philosopher knows that he does not know whether that moral code or moral relativism is right. He therefore remains impartially in between.
Moral relativism is philosophically wrong in this sense, because the philosopher knows that he does not know whether moral relativism, the idea that all moral codes are arbitrary, is true. For the same reason, any moral code is philosophically wrong in this sense: for the philosopher knows that he does not know whether the code in question, the idea that this is good and that is evil, is true.
Peharps there is something in common amongst us that separates us from pure madness. I am starting a research on madness and madmen with the expectation that I can define madness as incomunicability. There’s a certain degree of it within each of us, but even we try to talk about it using a common language.
Maybe, communication and fondness for the other is our logos, in the sense that we can be outside it, but we then would be mad. Becoming null, drugs, fantasy, other things like those, would be a degree of madness, needed to us, after all.
Interesting. Are you suggesting moral relativism may be overcome by distilling the common elements from all known moral codes? Like distilling the common elements of all known (verbal) languages?
Madness as incommunicabity - very good. I had already linked madness with the absence of the logos, but with the added sense of absence of self-consciousness. Now Nietzsche believed self-consciousness “developed only under the pressure of the need for communication” [The Gay Science, section 354].
In the light of that section of The Gay Science - which I recommend you read -, you might want to look at the etymology of “idiot”: