All fields of academia still have unanswered questions, but what are the most prevalent mysteries still remaining?
This is obviously a very wide topic, but I fully expect there also to be a wide range of opinion on different areas.
After your thoughts on that, I’d like to know if there is anything that you think isn’t at least in principle knowable.
I expect this one to run deep.
Even common energy is still a mystery.
The only things that aren’t knowable are the immediate.
Interestingly those are also the most important to be aware of.
You can’t know what number I’m thinking of right now.
Are our individual senses apprehending the same objects?
There could always be something just outside the periphery of perception.
i think we are each individually confined by the matter that makes up our brain. i think that we our brain cells have a maximum density of sorts… knowledge per cubic centimeter.
if you can narrow down any one thing enough, perhaps everything is knowable… but if we require some quantity of information that is greater than the capacity of our minds to know a given thing, then that thing is by some means unknowable
yeah i’m comparing a brain/mind to a 3d hard drive that defragments very well
Well, yes, but let’s not get too Socratic about this guys.
I mean, obviously I know that in the strictest sense almost nothing/ nothing is knowable, depending on how you look at it. But if we put that to the side for one moment, what other sort of prevalent questions are still ongoing? In terms of being a collective society, striving to navigate the world in the best possible way - building our ‘knowledge’ of the ‘big’ questions.
I cannot know what number Uccisore is thinking right now, but it isn’t really something I wish to know. But the question ‘Is everything in principle knowable’ is really aimed at simply understanding how the world works.
If you still think I am approaching this wrongly feel free to try and set me straight!
The principles concerning how things work is not merely knowable, but known.
The problem is…
… not by you.
It has already been proven that there exists some things that are true and can’t know that they are true. This is because when we combine both propositions that “Everything that is true is possible to know they are true” & “Somethings that are true and not known that they are true”.
Rules of Inferences:
(DR) Distributive Knowledge: K(p&q) implies Kp & Kq
(KT) Knowledge Truth: Kp implies p
(MP) Modus Ponens: If p implies q and p, then q
(RN) Necesitation Rule: Proven p implies p
(ND) Necesitation Definition: ~p implies ~<>p
Proof
(1) p–><>Kp [Hypothesis]
(2) p&~Kp [Hypothesis]
(3) (p&~Kp)–><>Kp [by Substituting the p in (1) with (2)]
(4) <>K(p&~Kp) [by (MP) by (2) and (3)]
(5) K(p&~Kp) [Hypothesis]
(6) Kp & K~Kp [by (DR) and (5)]
(7) Kp & ~Kp [by (KT) and (6); Contradiction]
(8) ~K(Kp&~Kp) [from (4)-(6) by Reducto Ad Absurdum, discharge (5) as Contradiction]
(9) ~K(p&~Kp) [by (RN) and (8)
(10) ~<>K(p&~Kp) [by (ND) and (9)
and this eventually proves
(11) p–>Kp
This forms Fitch’s Paradox, or the Paradox of Knowability, for the most part.
The final conclusion is that if something is true then know that it is true.
We can combine (KT) and (11), which forms a biconditional [(p–>q)<–>(q–>p)]
(12) (KT) (Kp–>p) <—> (p–>Kp) (11)
The only way to escape Fitch’s Paradox is to either reject (1) or (2).
Either not (1) or not (2). If you not (1) then you reject if true then possible to know true. If you reject (2) then you reject something is true and don’t know true. Therefore, either it is not the case that if true then possible to know true or it is not the case something is true and don’t know true.
Main conclusion is you have to reject either (1), which we can call Principle of Knowability, or reject (2), which we can all Principle of Fallibilism. Either reject Principle of Knowability or reject Principle of Fallibilism.
So either ~(p–><>Kp) or ~(p&~Kp). Which would you want to accept or would you want to accept the biconditional that is (12), Kp–>p if and only if p–>Kp
Egads! Flashback to Algebra classes! I have to have more coffee before my brain can fully comprhend that but, it does feel right.
For me on the OP
I have to say it has to be our personal brain ability. From start we stuff data in this organ but, there is no real education on how to fully use the brain. It is more than just a databank. You know how to drive a car but, do you know how to fix it or make it better?
What if it becomes mandatory to take classes on how to use the brain, starting in 1st grade through 12.
Instead of just stuffing data in we teach how to explore, access and use the brain’s full potential. Some are natural in this, most are not. Imagine if the majority could.
If you break that down into proper English, I will explain away that “paradox”.
There is no principle that is unknowable, despite the fantasies and wishes of dreamers and religions.
Well James, you can’t explain the away that “paradox” without getting rid of the rule of double negation, i.e. ~~p implies p. That’s the only way to explain the paradox, and even that doesn’t work out. Not to mention this was actually proved by logician Alonzo Church and logician Frederich Fitch, in symbolic logic peer-review journal in the 1960’s.
Rules of Inferences:
(DR) Distributive Knowledge: If Know that both p is true & q is true then Know that p is true & know that q is true.
(KT) Knowledge Truth: If know that p is true then p is true.
(MP) Modus Ponens: If p is true implies q is true and p is true, then q is true.
(RN) Necesitation Rule: If p is true is a tautology then necessarily p is true.
(ND) Necesitation Definition: If necessarily isn’t true that p is true then isn’t true that possibly p is true.
Proof
(1) If p is true then possibly know that p is true [Hypothesis]
(2) p is true & isn’t true that know that p is true [Hypothesis]
(3) If p is true & isn’t true that know that p is true then possibly know that p is true [by Substituting the p in (1) with (2)]
(4) Possibly know both p is true & isn’t true that know that p is true [by (MP) by (2) and (3)]
(5) Know that both p is true & isn’t true that know that p is true [Hypothesis]
(6) Know that p is true & know that isn’t true that know that p is true [by (DR) and (5)]
(7) Know that p is true & isn’t true that know that p is true [by (KT) and (6); Contradiction]
(8) Isn’t true that know that both know that p is true & isn’t true that know that p is true [from (4)-(6) by Reducto Ad Absurdum, discharge (5) as Contradiction]
(9) Necessarily isn’t true that know that both p is true & isn’t true that know that p is true [by (RN) and (8)
(10) Isn’t true that possibly know that both p is true & isn’t true that know that p is true [by (ND) and (9)
and this eventually proves
(11) If p is true then know that p is true
And by your response, you obviously accept one horn of the dilemma. You accept Principle of Knowability, i.e. If p is true then possibly know that p is true. You can only accept this at the expense of rejecting the Principle of Fallibilism, i.e. Both p is true & don’t know that p is true. So you reject that there are things that are true and don’t know that they are true. We are, in other words, omniscient beings. So you know all the things that are true James.
Pointless names and assertions.
Merely more pointless names.
Even more pointlessness. If p is true then “possibly p is true” is a bit of an understatement.
Fault.
Logic forbids contradictory premises.
A != !A
The rest would be non-sequitur if dependent upon a faulty premise.
2) If p is true and not believed to be true.
Second fault.
A != !A
Game over.
The rest is irrelevant.
3) If P is true and not believed to be true, but not disbelieved either; “unknown”
It is pointless in the sense is that it is a necessary truth, it is a principle of logic. But it isn’t pointless in the sense that it also means, “If p is true then it isn’t true that necessarily it isn’t true that p is true”. This indicates that “p is true” isn’t necessarily true. It is possibly false. That is why there is another principle of logic, which states that, “If necessarily p is true, then p is true”. So it isn’t an understatement. Necessity implies actuality and actuality doesn’t imply necessity and actuality implies possibility.
As the proof goes on to show, it is found that the Hypothesis you highlight does eventually lead to a contradiction. That’s why premise (7) shows a Contradiction. But the Contradiction only comes about when we combine the hypothesis (5) with the rule of inference (DR). You can’t obtain the contradiction otherwise.
You appear to have confused two distinct statements as one and the same.
(S1) p is true. [symbol: p] p is true
(S2) Know that p is true. [symbol: Kp] know p is true
The negation of these two statements:
(S1*) it isn’t true that p is true. [~p] p isn’t true
(S2*) it isn’t true that know that p is true. [~Kp] Don’t know p is true
As you can see, (S1) doesn’t have any logical operator working upon it. (S2) has a logical operator working upon it, i.e K or Know that. (S1) is contained within (S2), but (S2) isn’t contained within (S1). It is a logical asymmetry. They can both be true, but they can’t both be false. In other words, Some ravens are black and Some ravens are not black, i.e. subcontraries.
Since your second fault you find in the proof is based on the same mistake you made with the first fault you find in the proof, the response to you confusing two logical statements as equivalent overrides both points you make. Your own highlighting indicates this as well. You highlight the operator “isn’t true that” and never the statement it operates on. While you highlight a proposition “p is true”.
And it appears to me that you have ignored what the processes that was going on here. It was a logical Reductio Ad Absurdum. It showed that a contradiction could be arrived from combining certain hypothesis, which implies their negations are necessarily true. It is not possible that they are false. And each point of your criticisms have been over premises that contained p&~Kp, which in turns moves back to the hypothesis of Fallibilism. Your criticism fits with what I stated, which is that you reject Principle of Fallibilism, or that there are things that are true and that don’t know true.
[Edit]
You make an attempt at logical statements to show where I was wrong, but your criticism shows your own confusion when spelled out. Your confusion is that of having a conditional without a consequent, which is like being a bachelor with a wife.
(1) carries no logical content. It isn’t a WFF, or Well Formed Formula for logic to handle. You use (1) to make an analogy with (1*) which is obviously a WFF, or a Well Formed Formula for logic to handle. You present conditional statements with only antecedents and no consequents, or antecedents with no logical implications (i.e. consequences). What I presented, however, has logical implications.
(1)-(3) all have the problem of not WFF, or Well Formed Formulas, and are logically meaningless. Logic can’t handle them or make a determination on it. Now you can modify them by adding consequences, i.e. if p and q, then r (Aristotelian Syllogisms), or drop the conditional and just make them into conjunctions, i.e. p is true and believe that p is true.
So my proof contains WFFs and your examples or criticisms aren’t WFF. Your examples need to be modified into conditional or conjunction.Since your criticisms aren’t even WFFs, they can’t be contradictions.
Zen, it is a language issue.
The way you have it stated is ambiguous.
Get the language straight and the rest will all work out.
There are no actual paradoxes concerning knowledge.
The way it is stated isn’t ambigious at all, it is precise. Through the precision we can see how a contradiction is obtained from the hypothesis and rules of inferences, and find that both hypothesis can’t be true since the combination is a contradiction. And from this prove, which means it is necessarily true, that if p is true then know that p is true, or if don’t know p is true then it isn’t true that p is true.
You got both the symbolic and semantic versions. Neither are impresices, your criticism’s aren’t even valid. All you have is principle no actual paradoxes in knowledge, in other words, no true scotsman. As the proof shows, can’t accept both principle of knowability and principle of fallibilism, and also have a proof of principle of necessary ignorance & necessary knowledge.
Known by what/whom?
What is your definition of knowledge?
Love this. In what ways can the brain function differently to every day processes? Would you include different experiences (eg meditation/ psychedelic drugs)?
I would have to read a little more logic to be able to understand that I think. I’ve only done a years course on logic, and that was a few years back. Though what you say in that first line sounds instinctively flummoxing, to be honest.
Others.
Were you expecting a list of all of what all people throughout the entire world know?
Knowledge is formed by a conscious entity’s measure of relevance, value, perception of hope and threat, “PHT”. Knowledge is formed throughout all levels of a mind, from the most rudimentary to the most sophisticated. The cognitive portion of the mind receives only a very small portion of all that is known throughout the mind and often not the most relevant part.
Each portion of the mind attends to its relevance and from its democratic ability to discern hope from threat, it makes choices of favor and disfavor and each with its own flavor. The combination of the many efforts doing that forms remote recognition, or “consciousness”.
Thus the consciousness is presented with identities, associations, and forms relating to assessed relevance. In effect, each has a name or label which becomes the language of the mind and voice.
What the cognitive mind then declares as “knowledge” is merely the categories of the associations;
“The thing called ‘dog’ is seen as brown and is biting our ankle.” = knowledge.
So you are saying that everything concerning how things work is known? Everything?
I can’t think of anything that isn’t.
…but then maybe that should be left on the list.
… for now.