What is Dasein?

Philosophy Forums Philosophy
481

Really, what on earth does this mean?

All I can do with folks like you is to note how obtuse, how abstract it is.

Then back to this:

Choose a set of conflicted behaviors out in a particular context that we are all likely to be familiar with. Which particular points will be made regarding which particular behaviors? What [in those points] can or cannot be demonstrated to be “good”?

Then we can discuss more descriptively, more substantively what it means to be a “functioning objectivist” in regards to our actual interactions with others. In particular, when they precipitate conflicts as a result of value judgments out of sync.

That’s basically my point. I describe the manner in which I construe the meaning of “objectivist” out in the world of conflicting human behaviors. But: How can this description be any less an existential contraption?

All others can do is to note the manner in which I stray from the official, technical understanding of the word by “serious philosophers”.

Or, if they are willing to accept my understanding of it, note why they are not themselves an objectivist out in the is/ought world.

Please, let’s bring this down out of the scholastic clouds and explore the words that we use in relationship to the world that we actually live in with others.

What words pertaining to what actions?

Instead, it’s straight back up into the stratosphere of analyzing language itself:

In a word: Huh?

482

Trust me, my friend…

You’ve recovered before, you’ll recover again. :wink:

And, in the interim, you still retain that which I no longer have: the comfort and the consolation of whatever it is that I think that you are comforted and consoled regarding.

Though I’m still utterly at a loss in understanding exactly what that is. Either on this side or the other side of the grave.

483

This and the whole scholastic accusation is not connected to my posts or criticisms of you. I have no problem at all with the type of discourse you use and this would be the wrong forum for me if I wanted scholastic posts - which I am not sure I am capable of myself and certainly haven’t made any here. NOr does this fit Phyllo. It is loopy that you posit yourself as a victim of serious philosophers. Prismatic does take this kind of approach with you, but I sure haven’t. This is just sloppy rude not really even noticing what people are saying.

And positioning yourself in some weird way, in a binary fashion, a victim of scholastic posters or Durant ‘epistemologists’…philosophical bureaucrats. Rather than dealing with a range of different, primarily not ‘serious philosophy’ type criticisms.

‘All others can do…’ Well, no. If you cannot tell the difference between say Prismatic’s criticism’s of your position based on Heiddiger and definitions of specific terms
and my posts
dealing with criticisms of your behavior and positioning of yourself (of Phyllo’s responses with his not scholastic approach to criticising you)

you are very confused, and conveniently one is left to guess.

And Once again you request concrete examples around how I deal with conflicting goods. I did this, weeks ago.

It is like communicating with a bot. Sometimes one not quite passing a Turing Test.

484

Note to others:

Are any of these “general descriptions” of me true? Well, let’s take the components of our respective philosophies – those variables that revolve around identity and value judgments – and wrap them around a discussion that wraps around this:

Choose a set of conflicted behaviors out in a particular context that we are all likely to be familiar with. Which particular points will be made regarding which particular behaviors? What [in those points] can or cannot be demonstrated to be “good”?

However one might define the meaning of a scholastic discussion or a serious philosopher, my aim is to bring the words out into the world of actual conflicted goods. And to examine the extent to which “I” in such contexts is rooted more in either existential or intellectual contraptions

What on earth does this mean?!! And over and again both you and phyllo will ignore many of the points that I raise in my posts to you, focus in on just one point instead [as you do here], while ignoring altogether my requests that we do bring the discussion down to earth.

Yet again, I’m the issue here. It’s not my attempts to yank these “differences” down out of the clouds – to situate them in actual existential contexts. No, instead, it’s my refusal to focus on the technical distinctions between the criticisms being leveled at me.

Well, if you had, I must have missed it. Please try again. Though I suspect the problem here revolves around very different interpretations regarding what it means to attempt this.

My concrete examples are rooted existentially in my abortion trajectory above. The intertwining of experiences, relationships and ideas.

Let’s examine what yours is embedded in.

485

I just Googled Heidegger Dasein Ethics

This review of Michael Lewis’s book Heidegger and the Place of Ethics was near the top.

Consider:

That Heidegger’s text displays a certain ambivalence toward being-with in relation to authenticity suggests that he does not yet have the right idea of being-with. To help him along, Lewis argues that there is a second form of being-with in conscience. Since conscience involves the call of being, Lewis maintains that conscience entails a relation between being and beings and so, a relation of being with beings – in other words, a thought of being-with that is related to the ontological difference. Since conscience plays a role in Dasein’s authenticity, this form of being-with is located squarely in the place of ethics, and so we find that authenticity does or could have something to do with being-with and the ontological difference. But the site of this differentiation remains Dasein, and thus occurs within the limits of Dasein’s finitude.

Am I even allowed [in a philosophy forum] to ask, “what on earth does this mean?”

This sort of philosophical “analysis” can go on page after page after page after page; and not once is there any actual references to particular men and women “being with” others out in a specific context out in a specific world; such that an examination of particular behaviors in conflict allow us to discuss that which might be construed as either authentic or inauthentic behaviors.

What did Heidegger’s own conscience tell him about authentic and inauthentic behaviors? And how is that related to the manner in which he construes the meaning of “being with” others as a manifestation of Dasein?

In my view, it is one thing to grapple technically with understanding Dasein as a component of Heidegger’s “serious philosophy”, but eventually we need to get around to understanding how a true understanding of that can be integrated into a discussion of how Heidegger intertwined Dasein as he understood it and the manner in which my own understanding of dasein here – viewtopic.php?f=1&t=176529 – allows us to shift the discussion to an examination of Heidegger’s political narrative re fascism and the Nazis.

What here is to be construed as either authentic or inauthentic choices in “being with” others?

486

From…

“The Limits of Authenticity”
by Ben G. Yacobi in Philosophy Now magazine

Ironically enough this all commenses with “I” being “thrown” historically and culturally [fortuitously at birth] into a demographic smorgasbord such that “I” has absolutely no choice whatsoever regarding the manner in which “reality” is contrued. And this is applicable with respect to both nature and nurture.

So much for “authenticity” here, right? For literally years “I” is shaped and molded by others to go in particular directions in order to accumulate [oftentimes conflicting] sets of rewards and to avoid [oftentimes conflicting] sets of punishments.

How then is a particular narrative to be construed as either authentic or inauthentic — other than as an existential contraption? We all die. But the actual lives that we live propel/compel us in any number of different directions when reflecting on death.

So, you tell me: How does one die “authentically”?

Are those who believe in God “inauthentic” because they refuse to accept death as the literal obliteration of “I”?

Can a “noble” death be described such that “authentic” men and women are able to embrace and then embody it at the grave?

Can we capitilize Death as we do Dasein such that a philosopher – or a Heidegger scholar – is able to link the two?

Epistemologically?

And how is what any particular one of us think we know about death here and now in sync with how the death of “I” may or may not be within reach ontologically? Or, perhaps, even more enigmatically, teleologically?

Of course my point revolves less around how complex this all is and more around the extent to which the complexity itself will always be embedded largely in an “existential contraption”.

What, in my view, makes “authentic” and “inauthentic” both “complementary and interdependent” is grounded in the fact [historically, culturally, experientially] that “I” here is ever a constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed constellation of particular existential variables evolving from the cradle to the grave given a sequence of wholly unique experiences, relationships and access to knowledge and information.

On the other hand, really, just how “authentic” is this “assessment” itself?