A bet is an implicit statement of belief. You bet the sun will rise, why? Because you believe something about the probability of the sun rising. You believe that why? Because, surely, of things you’ve inductively reasoned about.
It’s not independent of context. This is a context. My sense of the context is you are communicating with another human in a philosophy forum. You seem to be defining ‘conclusion’ to mean something that must be 100% correct and the person drawing that conclusion can demonstrate 100% certainty. But that’s not writing in the OP. Conclusion can mean a range of things.
You have drawn the conclusion, it seems, that we have no information about the future. Please demonstrate that to 100% certainty.
So, what is possible for the physical universe can be determined by what I cannot rule out? You seem to be conflating ontology with epistemology. And you are not demonstrating things, you are simply claiming them. Prove your assertions which are presented, it seems as conclusions, which it seems means 100% certainty.
So, you don’t have to prove any of your assertions, including this one.
This is confused. No one is arguing that the laws are causing matter to behave in certain ways. This thread is focused on induction. The problem with induction. But deduction and abduction and feel free to introduce other -tions are all fallible. As I said quantum mechanics was ruled out via deduction either implicit or explicit until induction won that battle with tons of evidence. We are in a context where we have no infallible way of gaining knowledge. So, when we use the word conclusion, we use it about ideas we are very sure are true but not 100%. That’s the central defense of induction. Given our situation, without access to infallibility, even with deduction, we do our best.
So, if we are going to use the word conclusion then we must be using it in situations where we are not 100% certain and/or can’t be. Unless your argument is we can never draw conclusions, because that is how you are defining conclusion. Context always plays a role since we are using words in specific situations and about specific problems. We are sentient entities in the midst of life. To say that drawing the conclusion that the sun will rise tomorrow is illogical, especially in the context of a discussion of induction (not that the sun rising tomorrow is only based on induction since there are models and deduction involved also, but yes, even this does not give 100% certainty).
If we relied solely on deduction, we would have ruled out the Double Slit experiment as “illogical” because a particle “logically” cannot be in two places at once and a bunch of other assumptions. Deductive logic is only as certain as its premises—and if your premises are based on a flawed understanding of reality, your “certain” deduction is just a confident mistake.
You’re using 18th-century rationalism to argue against 21st-century empiricism, though implicitly. You’re essentially saying that if you can’t deduce the sun’s rise from a “First Cause,” treating it a regulatory, your conclusion is invalid. But science flipped that centuries ago: we found that observation (induction) is a more reliable guide to reality than abstract deduction, precisely because our “logical” intuition is so often wrong about how the universe actually behaves. Or is there something other than deduction you are suggesting we should rely on? What’s that?
None of this would be true if you could say that conclusion must necessarily be 100% or you should use another word. And if you could admit that we don’t have a better replacement system. But you don’t do this.
You asked What is the best defense of induction? Not that I did it especially well, but I think this is the best defense.
You are promoting an ideal: conclusion are or should be 100% certain. Induction isn’t so don’t ever use that word conclusion and perhaps even don’t draw any conclusions. But one, in most contexts we don’t use conclusion that way. Two, it implies that this is a problem with induction since we must ‘defend’ induction. But the only reason to defend deduction in the global way is if there is some infallible system for knowledge. Haven’t seen that produced. I think there is an implicit contrast between induction and deduction in your posts, but deduction isn’t infallible.
That is the best defense.
And let’s take this a step further, again in our context. Let’s say you found an epistemology that seemed to you to be perfect…..well, that might just be that, it seems to you that way.
So, unless you want to withdraw the word conclusion from English and can somehow prove to 100% certainty that some other knowledge gaining approach has perfect certainty (how do we test that?), I think induction is safe from intra-personal attack and safe from interpersonal attack and quite logical to use and arrives at logical conclusions, even if fallible.
Not really, you don’t need belief to bet. As much as I’m aware, I don’t believe things, I may suppose things, but I’m not against them being the case. For example, you can bet contrary to what you guess will happen.
Defining conclusion? I lost track from there onwards. If I wrote about concluding before, I didn’t say that. You can erroneously conclude stuff, for sure.
We have no information about the future, since precisely there are no measurements there. We can guess about the future, but the universe can end at any moment - it’s not a given, as much as the universe existing at all is not a given, it just happens to be the case. You can’t have any measurements about the future, for example.
Yes, what is possible and what is not is a matter of what you can’t rule out. The universe just is. I agree, for you, that’s not enough. But you can see that because we cannot rule it out, something is a possibility. And that’s enough.
I don’t know about that stance on Quantum Mechanics, what do you mean by that?
There are a number of parts of QM that were ruled out using deduction. Waves and particles are two different things. So, nothing can be both. So, the things that got measured there in the double slit experiments were mismeasured or in some other way the protocol failed becase the conclusion must be false. The objections to QM, until it finally became consensus because of the overwhelming, inductively arrived at evidence, were mainly deductive. Point being that deduction is fallible, even when use by experts, even brilliant ones. So, there is no infallible epistemology. And I used this as part of that post’s defense of induction. As to the other parts of your response, you don’t interact with what I wrote, you simply repeated your positions.
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Not really: the point about particle and wave depictions is that both were good enough ideas in order to get the measurement relationships up to a useful way. Particle are ideas obtained from abstracting balls, and waves are ideas obtained from abstracting waves in a pond. Nobody said ‘it’s balls all the way down’, nor waves, nor turtles, unless it that someone was really misguided.
Science can’t tell what it is but say ‘if it is like this, then this measurements match up’. Suppose you see a tree out of the window, go to sleep and get up and the tree is white. IF it snowed overnight, then it makes sense that opening up the window shows you a white tree. That’s as much as the science can go.
As much as I can relate to the topic: people that use deduction over false premises can arrive at false conclusions, for sure. Consensus and expertise make no difference here.
I didn’t reply to what you wrote that seemed to go on tangents about who are the people involved, context and so, since all of that is independent of the point, but if I missed something that had to do with the topic here, please do tell me. I told you I lost you at that particular word, so if I didn’t respond to something after that, you can clarify it so that I can answer you
This has nothing to do with what I wrote, shows no understanding of the history of science on this issue and comes close to word salad in that last sentence.
As for the rest, I think I’ll respond to others who can interact with post they respond to.
Yes, there is no perfect epistemological method. But we do the best we can with all available methods. Including deduction and induction.
I don’t think either needs a defense. They are what they are and they work well enough. A thing does not need to be perfect to be useful. The idea that anything imperfect needs a defense seems weird to me.
And when induction and deduction agree, and this agreement agrees with what we still experience and perceive around us in the world AND agrees with the consensus of most others AND we have no reasonable logical or practical reasons to doubt it (radical skepticism is not a reasonable reason for doubt) then I would call that as good as it’s going to get.
So what else is there to say or argue about it?
Are you sure? Could you be wrong about that? Apart from all your subjective opinions about the writer, is that false or not?
Now, no worries, you can avoid the subject, but I supposed you care for it.
@ProfessorX why would skepticism not be reasonably logical?
Skepticism is fine, but needs reasons backing it up. Just like with belief. A belief without anything backing it up is not logical, same goes for a doubt without anything backing it up.
Therefore we can see the issue of “skepticism vs belief” is really a false issue, what actually matters in either case are the reasons backing it up. Are there good or at just reasonable reasons for a belief, or for a doubt? If not then it would be a mistake to support that position of belief or doubt.
And skepticism is just the other side of belief anyway. Both of these would not be justified:
“I doubt the sun rill rise tomorrow”
“I believe the sun will not rise tomorrow”
..because the reasons backing up either statement are not there. There is no actual reason backing up either statement other than the radical skepticism of the fact that it is technically not impossible for the sun to not rise tomorrow.
Hence we see that radical skepticism mistakes as a reasonable reason (for doubting something) the sole fact by itself that something is not impossible. Yet this fact BY ITSELF is insufficient to justify doubt (since lots of things are technically not impossible, that doesn’t mean we should believe them) and this is especially true when there also exist reasons on the side of belief.
Belief vs doubt is sort of a false issue anyway, what really exists is belief. The affirmative statement is always behind skepticism and doubt too. “I believe you are wrong about…” or “I believe that X is not the case.”
To doubt X is really to be saying: I believe or I claim not-X. Affirmation is impossible to get away from. That is probably another reason why radical skepticism by itself is unjustified, although I hadn’t really thought about it from that angle before.
You see this a lot in online philosophy discussions. When I used to be in various discord philosophy groups this was insanely commonplace. How do you know you are alive? What if the things you see are not real? How do you KNOW though? You cannot know, therefore it is all an illusion, blah blah. This sort of radical skepticism approach seems to be rolled out at the point where the argument fails. By invoking the fact that it is technically not impossible for the other person to not be right, this is misused to justify a supposed skepticism about them being right. It’s as if I were about to throw a baseball to you and you say “I bet you can’t throw it over 50 mph” and I am like yeah I bet I can, but we don’t have a way of measuring the speed so we just go back and forth until one of us says “well speed is relative anyway and you might not even exist”. Like, what a waste of time. We could have used that time to go buy a radar gun and see which one of us was correct to begin with.
And of course this kind of extreme skepticism or doubt for its own sake is just the other side of extreme ideological belief, believing something for its own sake without any real or justified reasons for the belief. Most likely this is a psychological-emotional phenomenon related to anchoring the self into the ego or the value to oneself (and to society) of having or appearing to have a solid position on a subject either way. This is true, or that is not true… rather than dig honestly into it people would often just find a position, plant a flag and call it a day. Makes life easier I suppose, at least in some ways. Definitely not philosophy though.
The clever radical skeptic would not try to argue their case. Because if they do they have given tragets for their own skepticism.
Repeatedly saying ‘I am not convinced’ is the safer approach. (I mean, if the idea is to be consistent, not lead yourself into contradictions and perhaps with ‘winning’ as a value - I’m not recommending it. I mention the strategy because I think it highlights the limit on that kind of skepticism you write about further down.) Of course, I suppose you could respond to the radical skeptic: How do you know you aren’t convinced?
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Of course, everything has reasons for being what it is. Not least of all, a belief or affirmative position on something. And recall that every doubt is an affirmative position in disguise.
That sort of approach you mention is as common as it is anti-philosophical and dishonest. I tend to go one or two iterations into it with people like that on a given issue, but if they show no signs of improvement it makes better sense to move on elsewhere.
Yes, I wasn’t suggesting it’s useful, more using as a thought experiment to show the problems with radical skepticism. You really don’t get to say much. You can’t really draw conclusions, even about the arguments of those you think shouldn’t claim to know.
Right, it is a tactic of misdirection and a dishonest sophistry. Keep in mind that ALL radical skepticism is like this. Everything is affirmative, so nothing escapes the logical necessity of… having reasons for being what it is (and not rather something else).
Why would skepticism need reasons?
Good enough reasons to be open to something not being the case is that such something can be not the case - in particular, that we cannot legislate upon the world but rather depict it. Those are strong reasons.
For example, all the swans that you recall are white then you say precisely that. There are no good reasons to say anything else there.
“I recall the sun having risen every day until today” is enough. To overstep it would be going to belief with no good reasons. You don’t need to actively doubt it, just simple humility.
You see that as radical, I see it as just skepticism. Skepticism of some things and not others looks like someone that says “I’m vegan between meals”.
How come the possibility of something not being the case not be enough reason to hold that there is a possibility of that something not being the case?
How come belief is what exists? Not really, you can simply lack belief. Belief is the inclination to disagree to the situation being otherwise. Say you believe magicians can make bunnies appear from thin air, then you are inclined to disagree when someone tells you it’s a trick. You don’t need to have any inclination.
Well, you seem to be more against an avenue of talking rather than it in itself. Could that be so?
Well, not everything has reasons, like existence itself (I wrote it here becuase you repeated it)
You demonstrate how doubt is really belief. To doubt something is to believe it not to be the case. And all belief is affirmative by its very nature, and has reasons for being what it is.
It is not so much that “skepticism” needs reasons. It is that it already has them. Everything has reasons for being what it is, otherwise it would not be what it is. Principle of sufficient reason.
You seem to agree that radical skepticism is justified, or rather you think that merely because it is possible for something to be the case (or not be the case) that is a good enough reason to ACTUALLY BELIEVE it is the case (or not the case). I am saying no, that is false.
If you have literally no other reason to believe something (believe X, or believe not-X) than “it is possible” then you have no real reason to believe it. But I would go further and say you are probably ignoring reasons that do exist one way or the other. Can you really think of any thing, any belief that has no reason at all for or against it other than “it is possible”? I can’t. Because everything we think or believe is rooted somehow in the reality around us, in this existence we are part of and experience for ourselves. Reasons exist, even if we don’t want to think about them.
But merely observing that the sun has risen every day until today is not the kind of belief we are talking about here. We are talking about beliefs about things we have not directly experienced, like if the sun will rise tomorrow.
Stating already experienced facts is great. But that is only a subset of what is being discussed here. It is not radical, not skeptical. It is simply not what we are talking about right now.
It’s not. You just repeated the same thing twice. You are not talking about beliefs about things yet unknown, which is what this topic is about.
Do I demonstrate that? You don’t need to even doubt something to be skeptical, just be humble with what you know. Some beliefs have reasons, and some ways to back up beliefs are illogical. Just be aware that the situation can be some way, and not too.
Not everything has reasons for being what it is. The universe existing at all doesn’t have reasons (it can’t - it doesn’t have causes). I know the example is branching way way out, but it’s one I can think of that you can see for yourself clearly.
What you point out as ‘radical skepticism’ looks just like skepticism to me. Because something can be some way, you cannot rule out that such something can be that way. Belief is innecesary there - and I’d say it’d be odd to find a situation in which belief is necessary. Not even belief in X nor in not-X.
Why would I need to ignore stuff to come to that conclusion you pointed out?
Well, people tend to make up ad hoc excuses for beliefs. Some people believe the universe is finite, some people believe the universe is infinite. They can make up explanations on the spot, for sure, but that doesn’t make the explanations the causes of such beliefs. Maybe reasons or causes don’t exist, but just explanations.
Yes, we can belief (or lack) because we exist and we can think and belief, for sure. That’s where those are tethered.
Exactly: I pointed out that ‘I recall the sun having risen every day until today’ doesn’t depend on beliefs or the like. Exactly! That’s why it doesn’t fall into belief, as you saw. The question is if it is logically valid to overstep that, and then, yes, fall into belief.
I didn’t say the same thing twice. Let me put it shortly: “How come A being the case is not enough reason to hold that A is the case?”
Purely pragmatic predictive power. In other words, it’s not that induction is the best method or produces the most accurate conclusions, but that it is incredibly useful.
Also, wouldn’t an argument against induction rely on induction? The best evidence against induction would be examples wherein the conclusions are incorrect. From those specific examples, we would extrapolate a larger conclusion that induction doesn’t work, or can’t be trusted, or whatever.
Without induction, we wouldn’t have much reason to assume or expect much of anything. Every fresh breathe would be a relief.
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This is patently false. To doubt is to consider the possibility that something (X) may, or may not be, the case. Doubt is a question, not a statement. To believe X is not the case is to believe it is false, which amounts to a disagreement. Not an outright refusal to believe.
These are just levels of confidence. Obviously, belief is on one end of the spectrum and assumes X is true. In the middle is skepticism, which entails doubting the truth or falsity of X. On the opposite end of the spectrum is disbelief, which assumes X is false.
You can be in a state of doubt, waiting for better data, undecided, or just plain ignorant of all the facts. Any of those stances could be considered skeptical.
- Belief (convinced true)
- Agnosticism/Skepticism (unconvinced)
- Disbelief (convinced false)
Do you know of other options I am unaware of? Because one can doubt disbelief, or doubt the falsity of a proposition just as easily. If you doubt your disbelief in Odin, do you become a defacto believer?
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Or very likely to be true. I don’t think most people use belief to mean 100% certainty, not in philosophy not in everyday speech. With the latter one can see people contrast believe and know. In the former, philosophy, you have distinctions between degrees of belief and also things like justified true belief which is for many in philosophy a description of knowledge - and note that it is justified, but not proven. There would be beliefs that are viewed as even less certain than the justified beliefs.
In everyday speech there is a kind of sub-pattern that treats ‘belief’ as things held as 100% certain often without evidence - often aimed at what are called superstitions by those using the word critically. ‘Belief’ is a pejorative term there. But here in a philosophy forum I see no reason to assume that when belief or I believe is used, this means the person means with 100% certainty.
And this also allows one to use induction and belief without some fear that one is not humble or is heading for some kind of beating or is problematically resistant to anomalies or counter-evidence. And changing words does not eliminate potential shock, disappointment and resistance.
So, I wouldn’t go along with this schema as related to how I use belief or even how it is generally used, especially in philosophical contexts.
I believe that my lowest attendance of students will generally be on Fridays. That’s a belief about what will happen based on induction (with a dash of deduction (weekend coming). I may as a teacher be pleasantly surprised if the whole class comes on a Friday, but induction has led me to a very useful heuristic in planning. I don’t resist acknowledging the presence of those students on a particular Friday if they all come. I can revise my belief if it becomes a more popular day for some reason. But it helps with lesson planning and the exercises I prepare to have a belief there. If I pretend I haven’t noticed this pattern - I will likely be slightly less effective as a teacher. The belief is helpful.
It’d be hard to plan anything without use of induction. In fact I’m skeptical anyone can function without it and what most people would word as I believe X, however unconscious they may be of their use of induction.
We don’t walk randomly when we go shopping for groceries. I believe the nearest grocery store is just the other side of the park. I walk that way. I might arrive and find it burned to the ground. Surprise!!! But that’s ok. For something to work, it doesn’t have to work every single possible time. Let alone in the history of the solar system - with the sun may not rise example in other posts.
We have degrees of believing, which is common for epistemologists to look at. (Bayesianism, for example).
And even in science knowledge can be revised, given that it is a subset of beliefs.
You weren’t critical of induction, but it seemed like you were taking belief and I believe to mean certainty. Others in the thread seem to be critical of induction to the degree that we should go without it and not form any beliefs about the future.
beliefs, and presented as timeless, covering the future also.
belief, covering the future also.
Again a belief about the future.
More beliefs and covering the future also. The whole thrust of the post is that these patterns have led to, do lead to and will lead to problems. Notice the prediction in ‘you are inclined to disagree. This is a belief based on induction and while presented in present simple, present simple covers the future also. It’s a timeless assertion based on induction.