What is "value" and what does 'good" ean?

Philosophy Forums Philosophy
1

Having written about this extensively here, I will now simply quote from one of my References - the last one listed below - because it bears repeating and there seems to be some interest in the topic. This is from Ch. 2 of the document ETHICS: A College Course.
All of this I learned from my mentor, the polymath genius (whose bio you can find in Wikipedia), Robert S. Hartman. [He also suggested in his magnum opus, The Structure of Value, how a systematic Ethics could be generated from the Axiom.]

The first chapter of The College Course explained what a concept is. And the subsequent chapter, which you may study for yourself, delineates three major dimensions of value, akin to wavelengths on a spectrum. These dimensions have many, many applications that help us comprehend the universe in which we live!

Thus I quote what I scribbled previously:
Value is a relation of a concept’s meaning to its referent’s
properties, and is always a matter of degree. Let us say that an item being evaluated falls under a concept, “C”, where “C” is understood to be the name of the relevant concept.

Specifically if the attributes in the mind of the judge match
the properties the judge perceives in the item, s/he will
correctly, by this definition, say the item has value – as a C.
If, in the mind of the judge making an evaluation, the set of
attributes to some degree corresponds to the set of
properties possessed by a referent, bijectively (one-to-one),
then one may safely predict that the person will designate
the item or thing s/he is judging to be “valuable.”

The ‘matching’ process often occurs as a gestalt, instantaneously. Many judgments are snap judgments. They occur in ‘the blink of an eye.’ At times the rating, prizing, grading or evaluation can be quite deliberate and qualify as a considered judgment.

To sum up, value is the relation of a concept’s meaning to its referent’s properties. Let us formalize this, give it a more rigorous treatment, and dub it “the axiom of value.” The axiom (or basic premise) for value science is the definition of value. It reads as follows: Something, X, has value to judge J, at time t, if and only if J perceives a one-toone correspondence between the meaning of X (as J
understands it) and the properties of this actual X (as J conceives of them, senses them, or experiences them.) If that correspondence holds, even partially, J will call X “valuable.” X may be a situation, a person, a thing, a symbol, a model, a theory, a myth, a technicality, a category, anything at all.

The correspondence is between two sets. The first set is the meaning of the concept under with X is subsumed. For purposes of analysis, and theory construction, meaning is here understood as a set of conceived attributes in J’s
concept of X. The second set is the set of properties which J experiences in this X, where X is the topic of the evaluation. When the term “good” is defined in a later
chapter, all this will become quite clear. The student will note the close relationship between the valuable and the good.

These notions serve as quantifiers for value theory, in this
case value-quantifiers. They are quantifiers of qualities. To
say something has value is to imply some correspondence;
to say it is good is to imply full or total correspondence.
This is isomorphic with the discipline of Logic which
defines the logical quantifiers: some and all. (The t in the
formula reminds us that a judgment might change over
time. The evaluation is only a snapshot, not something
“etched in stone.”)

In summary, a thing has value if it even partially fulfills its concept. This will depend upon the concept held by the one who is doing the evaluating. The beauty of this definition is that it directs us to be explicit about what intension that judge has in mind to determine if it is at all like the one some other judge may have in mind (with regard to a concept with the same name) which s/he might
hold. This will reduce confusion and could obviate the incidence of violent arguments and disagreements.

Hence if an instance, or a specific example, of the class-concept posseses properties that match, one for one, the attributes of that concept to some extent, the example is said to have “value”; and if it completely corresponds (matches) the description (the property names: the attributes) then is is “good,” that is, good as a C. {Under another name put on it, it could be “bad.”
The name (designator, label) sets the norm. Value is a partial match; good is a complete match."

I hope this helps…

2

It did not help. It seemed like you’re repeating yourself. And you’re indeed unnecessarily repeating (though not necessarily yourself) since you’re quoting something I already read.

Let’s start with this:

What exactly does the author mean by “a concept’s meaning”? I understand what a referent is. The first chapter was clear about that term. But I’m not sure what the author means by “meaning”. I can guess but I do not want to guess.

If you allow me to say it, the first chapter is very poorly written. The author tells us that every concept has an intension and an extension. He tells us that the extension has members. (The exception is “a null class”. He does not explain what that is. I can guess, and probably do so correctly, but still, it’s bad writing.) But what are these members he’s talking about? Well, members, he says, have properties detectable by the five senses. He also tells us that these properties can be named and that a collection of property names is also known as a set of attributes. He then tells us that the word “attribute” means “property name”. I have no words to convey how messy this is. He then proceeds to talk about the intension of a concept. He tells us that the intension is a description (of what?) that is often accompanied by a connotation (which is exactly what?) He then forgets about the two concepts he just attempted to define – the concept of intension and the concept of extension – and tells us that every concept has three components: a name, a meaning and a class of application. It’s obvious what the name of a concept is (it’s a symbol the concept is attached to). It’s also clear from the rest of the chapter what he means by “a class of application”. But what exactly does he mean by “meaning”? Where exactly did he explain that?

I only have this hint right here:

Since “round, bouncy toy” is an intentionsal definition of the word “ball”, I take it that when he says “meaning” he refers to the intensional definition of the word.

An intensional definition of some symbol S refers to the set of conditions that a thing must meet in order for someone to use the symbol S in reference to that thing. In order to use the word “ball” in reference to some physical object, that physical object must be round, it must be bouncy and it must be a toy. Otherwise, it can’t be used (it’s against the rules of the language).

So, when the author of the book says the following . . .

. . . he’s basically saying what I said in that other thread of yours (the one pertaining to what makes a good government.)

He’s literally saying that “X is a good C” means “X is a C”.

3

And there is this:

Meaning, he says, is “a set of conceived attributes in J’s concept of X”. In the case of a ball, these attributes are “round”, “bouncy” and “toy”. So if a physical object is round, bouncy and a toy, it follows that it is a good ball.

4

Concepts have descriptions… A description consists of a definition, an exposition, and, often, a connotation [also known as: the atmospherics.]

  When I described “a good government” here:

ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=198252
in the first sentence there, I mistakenly used the word “definition” when when I should have instead used the word “exposition.” This led to confusion, for which I apologize.

  Magnus,  I want to congratulate you for doing some outside  reading. You did your part, but some further confusion  arose when I gave an illustration employing the concept “ball.”  [size=85]It is easy to see how someone could get hung up on the illustration while reading that since I gave a bare definition, and yet spoke of it as  If it Were the  the entire concept.}  Once more, [i]Mea culpa[/i].[/size]

In a correspondence with Dr. Robert S. Hartman, he explained all this to me. He gets the full credit. He is the one who made the breakthough, who came up with the definition of “x is a good C” where C is the concept x falls under.

Goodness is full value. There are three requirements for a specific x to be " a "good x ”:

  1. It is an x: … it fulfills its definition.

  2. x’s are (described as) a, b, c, d, etc. (They have those attributes. In Logic they’re called ‘predicates.’)

  3. This x is a. This x is b. This x is c. This x is d. Etc., etc. (This particular x posses these matching properties.)

If those three requirements I met, one is likely to speak of this as “good” ; and is Justified in doing so. In other words, x is ‘all there’ under its concept! It is everything it is supposed to be - in the mind of the judge.
If it even has a few more features it is “excellent” or “outstanding.”
If it is a human being we are talking about, or some x you are Intrinsically valuing, then “unique” is the proper adjective. …a lot more details are to be found in the References listed below.

Queestions? Comments?

5

I don’t understand how ( 2 ) and ( 3 ) can be said to be requirements.

There is a possibility that all you’re trying to say, in a rather convoluted and ineffective way, is that X is valuable to judge J to the extent that it is similar to what judge J considers to be ideal X. In other words, a ball is said to be valuable to John to the extent that it meets his notion of an ideal ball. In that case, “X is a good C to J” means “X is what J thinks is an ideal or perfect C”.

6

Again, what matters here is the definition of the term “meaning” which, as I noted, wasn’t provided in the first chapter ( even though it should have been. ) There is something that looks like a definition in Chapter 2 ( “meaning is here understood as a set of conceived attributes in J’s concept of X” ) and in Chapter 4 we are told that “meaning […] is in the mind of the individual”. That’s pretty much everything that is said about the word “meaning” in the entire book. Which is surprising considering it’s the central concept. Nowhere is it mentioned that “the meaning of the word violinist to person P” refers to what person P considers to be the ideal violinist. If that’s what is meant, then we have a case of a very bad writing. Most human concepts do not denote something ideal. The concept of a ball, for example, can be used in reference to both ideal and non-ideal balls; it’s not strictly a reference to ideal balls. But no such awareness is displayed in the book.

7

Value and good are self-explanatory concepts. We know what they mean definition-wise, categorically speaking. The tricky parts can be when we try to apply this understanding to specific things in the world. Is this specific thing valuable, or good? How and why? In what ways? According to who, and in what contexts? With regard to what means or ends? etc etc.

Everyone knows what value and good MEAN. Because the words self-define themselves. They are pure truisms. So get past all that nonsense phil 101 pseudo-intellectual stuff and start doing the real work.

8

That’s not true. Read the thread.

Well, you will have to tell us what “self-define” means. I have never seen anyone use that term. But regardless of that, it’s pretty obvious that you’re trying to push the idea that we do not have to define the word “value”. Why? Because we already agree what the word means. Yet, this thread tells us that we don’t.

You’re trying too hard to be smart. In reality, you’re pretty dumb.

9

It is true, and no.

It means everyone already necessarily knows what the concept means by virtue of possessing that concept in their mentality. The same way you don’t need to explain the fact that you literally see stuff instantly and know what it is. Instant, immediate, UNmediated understanding. Value and good are concepts like this. We just KNOW what they mean, because they mean literally what they are. What is good? Whatever is good for us. But what is that? It’s whatever happens to be good. But why? Because it is good. Circular ad infinitum for people like you to cope and pretend like you have no idea what it means :laughing:

Didn’t ask.

Cope seethe skill issue touch grass post physique

10

Have you ever heard of equivocation? It refers to a faulty process of reasoning where two distinct concepts are treated as one and the same concept. Here’s an example:

  1. All jackasses have long ears.

  2. Humanize is a jackass.

  3. Therefore, Humanize has long ears.

The word “jackass” is used in two different ways here. In premise #1, the word “jackass” is used to mean “male donkey”. In premise #2, the word “jackass” is used to mean “annoying person”. The mistake lies in forgetting that the second instance of the word “jackass” means “annoying person”. In other words, the person doing the reasoning forgot ( i.e. didn’t know at that time, even though he did a moment earlier ) what concept he attached to the second instance of the word “jackass”.

The purpose of definitions, among other things, is to ensure that the mistakes such as the one above do not occur. They have many other purposes, of course, such as ensuring that people understand each other.

But of course, anti-intellectuals such as yourself, who are trying too hard to be smart, unique and special, know absolutely nothing about that.

11

So I scanned your post. Why the long ears?
janecarlilebaker.com/2023/04/03 … day-after/

12

lol

13

Sorry but did you expect me to read this? If so you expected wrong.

14

Burn!

Magnus tends to be on fire regularly though, so not much an accomplishment…

15

Imagine not even knowing what “good” or “value” mean. Smh

16

You aren’t the only person reading this forum. Right now, we are observing how much of a clown you are. Will you, once again, tell us that you did not read my latest post? It’s super important for us because, if you don’t tell us you didn’t read this post, we won’t know whether or not you read it. Don’t make us wait.

You’re embarrassing yourself.

17

Try to make sense and you might get a better response. Just some friendly advice

18

Passive aggression detected.

19

nou