What of differance?

[Trotter]

I have spent a little over a year fighting through Derrida and I am still not sure whether I get it or not. I read his work through a Merleau-Pontian lens and while I have come to understand Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger in profound ways, I still feel lost in the Derridean text, especially in my understanding of differance.

I will present here a short paper I wrote on differance, which seemed to work for me when I wrote it, however, looking at it now I realize I am still kind of lost.

“I fear we are not getting rid of God because we still believe in grammar” (1)

Differance, a name which does not name? A mere spelling mistake? Or perhaps, the site of a grammatical transgression? We are in the midst of a transgression, an error, a graphic mistake, a misapplication of the rules of a proper grammar. It is grammar which rules, or at least provides the rules, which governs its correct usage. All articulations must conform to its rules, to its syntax, to its metaphysic. With this graphic mistake, the “a” of differance, can we not hear the Nietzschean laughter? Perhaps Nietzsche’s laughter would be the only sound which might indicate the site of the grammatical transgression, the site of the graphic “a.” If the “a” does not lend itself to a hearing, to an ear which might be so attentive, does the graphic error have any import in speech? Would the erroneous “a” not simply be passed over in silence? How can Derrida make the in inaudible mistake audible? Or perhaps, how can Derrida speak the unspeakable? Derrida’s treatment of differance is therefore strategic, in the sense that differance is not, and cannot be given to a present glance, or a glance in general. Differance, is not a concept, nor a name, eludes the order of the namable, the visible, or the hearable; is not given to the as such of its non-name, but rather, threatens the possibility of the as such in general. Perhaps, scariest of all, Derrida claims that: “there is neither Being nor truth to the play of writing, insofar as it involves differance.” (2) Shall we be fearful in the wake of differance? Derrida seems to proceed playfully (3) in a Nietzschean manner, in a dance at the end of philosophy, armed with a kind of laughter (4), perhaps at our expense.

How do we proceed in the wake of this silent spelling mistake, this differance? Or is everything, perhaps, merely the wake of differance? Differance, at once a “sameness,” which is not identical to itself, and a “unity” which defies all unification, does not purport to rule, but rather subverts all rulers. Differance at once means to differ as spacing, as non-identity, and to defer as sameness, delay and temporalization. Although given in the form of a sign5, differance is not of the order of signs. Signs represent the present in its absence, differance has never been present, it is therefore of a different type. It is differance which allows the going forth of the sign which represents the present. The differences, at the heart of Saussurean diacritics, are the effects of differance. This non-concept, which opens up the possibility of all signification, refers to an order, which is not the order of western metaphysics, not the order of decidability. Signification becomes possible, only insofar as each present presence retains a “trace” of something other than itself, which is in turn emptied of its sense by its relation to a future element. In this movement, the movement of differance, everything is divided and indecisive. The infinitive “ance” of differance seems to textualize the indecision, between the active or the passive sense. In Derrida’s treatment everything is strategic, tactical, if differance can appear as a sign, yet at the same time remain relegated to silence, to invisibility, what does this say about the sign?

The silent mistake, the “a” of differance, would have been missed in a speech, it can only be rendered graphic. In the relation between speech and writing, if we are attentive, we can see the difference between differance in writing and differance in speech. One differance, the graphic one, can be accounted for, or reckoned with, the other cannot. Is this not the difference of differance? Does the movement of differance not hold us in relation to what appears as merely accidental, to what seems to be beyond the opposition of presence and absence? Difference maintains a relation to a certain alterity, which is neither present nor absent, in the sense that an absence might be rendered present. The trace of a certain other, an unconscious in the Freudian metaphysic, is maintained by differance; but neither the trace, nor differance, is given to a present or to a past. We are left with mere traces, which are self-effacing, which disappear in appearing, which cannot be made present and are not part of the regime of presence. The trace must efface itself in its “issuing forth”:

"The effacement of this early trace (die Fruhe Spur) of difference is therefore “the same” as its tracing within the text of metaphysics. The metaphysical text must have retained a mark of what it lost or put in reserve, set aside. (6)

Is this perhaps the site of the difference between Being and beings? Are we at the site of a profound forgetfulness, a forgetfulness which has animated the entire history of western philosophy?
“Being has always made ‘sense’ - has always been conceived or spoken of as such, only by dissimulating itself in beings; thus, in a particular and very strange way, difference (is) ‘older’ than the ontological difference or the truth of Being.” (7)

How are we to think the outside, beyond the text of western metaphysics? If Derrida’s treatment of differance has been strategic this is due, no doubt, to the fact that there is no outside, only an inside. The inside of grammar, the God, whose eradication Nietzsche feared would be delayed, or deferred, perhaps indefinitely. The shadow looms large in the wake of the death of God. Does it make any sense to live in the hope of a name, which would render the graphic mistake thinkable? Would this quest, the quest for a name, which Derrida calls Heideggerian, not make of grammar an absolute God? If we affirm differance, the permanently provisional, which seems to question the grammar of the question, which seems to omit the possibility of a name which names, we must do so in a playful manner, perhaps with a laugh or a grin.

ENDNOTES
1 Freidrich Nietzsche. Twilight of the Idols and the Anti-Christ. Trans. R.J. Hollingdale. Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1974. p. 38.

2 Jacques Derrida. Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs. Trans. David B. Allison. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973. p. 158.

3 The concept of play here taken in the sense Derrida gives it as a unity of chance and necessity.

4 “Laughter.- Laughter means: being schadenfroh but with a good conscience.” Freidrich Nietzsche. The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 1974. p. 207.

5 Signs, taken in the Saussurean diacritical sense, as arbitrary and differential.

6 Derrida. Speech and Phenomena. P. 156.

7 Ibid., p. 154.

[Impenitent]

very nice paper… and yes, for Nietzsche at least, grammar (the structure, use and essence of language itself) provides an umbilical cord of sorts to the dead god. so god is dead outside of language, then again, what isn’t dead outside of language?

-side track- dead langauges are filled with dead ideas and concepts… sure they may be repeated in another language (not exactly repeated, so my own objection eliminates itself)

-Imp

[Gobbo]

I liked it.

I’ll admit i haven’t gotten ‘in’ to Derrida as I simply haven’t read any of his books but I’ve wiki’ed googled the hell out of him at various times so in that regard I get what you’re saying even if I can’t offer too much in the way of critique.

and very strange way, difference (is) “older” than the ontological difference or the truth of Being.”7

Was this supposed to be difference or differance here? It makes sense for me both ways…

Also, now they are you are looking back in heinsight, what is it that you do not like about it?

If I may, I think perhaps your usage of the term ‘grammar’ is either a weak point, or needs to be expounded a bit more. For me, the perspectivist ghost is not something which hides behind the grammar used to indicate it, but rather a rather unique outlet of something greater, found within that said grammar but also in things like the psychological, and the scientific. Something quite ubiquitous which only seems to shimmer into the mirage Derrida stumbled upon after the structuralists.

Derrida’s treatment of differance has been strategic this is due, no doubt, to the fact that there is no outside, only an inside. The inside of grammar, the God

This is but a glimpse at what this God entails. It is perhaps the most narrow section of the chasm of meaning, God lies just beyond the other side of the provisional bedrock, but the negational sides will always seem to narrow to a point before we reach the other side. At least, through text. All Derrida’s dual narratives and eccentric styles couldn’t drill through this – and maybe that’s the point.

I think Neitzsche got it, he got it all too well in fact. Instead of venturing down the analytical road he refrained, realizing the futility. I don’t think so much we need to regard this fundamentally flexible, almost anorexic God with laughter or jest but perhaps with the newfound revitalization of a man now blind. After the foot stomping and existential stagnancy which resulted from this blindness, deep within the chasm, we must navigate it by grammatic touch. Perhaps if we back up and take it back to a Neitzsche-like artistic rhetoric we can start making some progress again.

Blind, sure, but one that ‘trains’ (this is the best word I could think of) us to see beyond the gramatic barrier Derrida ventured close enough to outline, but one he died pursuing. Neitzsche stole the will to power from a bhuddist derivative and so it seems we are moving back to the Eastern trends once more. Schopenhauer may be pissed, but the static from that cosmic inexpressable silence seems to be a coded message if you listen carefully enough.

I’m fucking ripped… there’s a good chance the above made little to no sense. Danger.

[someoneisatthedoor]

Trotter,

@Trotter

I have spent a little over a year fighting through Derrida and I am still not sure whether I get it or not.

You do. Stop worrying about it. I know that Derrida is an obscurantist par excellence but really, you seem to be right on the money.

I read his work through a Merleau-Pontian lens and while I have come to understand Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger in profound ways, I still feel lost in the Derridean text, especially in my understanding of differance.

I take it that you’ve read his essay Differance? You’ve cited Speech and Phenomena (second book I ever read by Derrida, and one of his shorter, more specific ones) but I recommend reading that in conjunction with Differance and Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences or whatever that chapter of Writing and Difference is called. You’ve probably already looked at these, but as a triplet I think that they cover about as much ground as the whole of Of Grammatology, which takes 4 times as long to read. Nonetheless, I think that you’ve got a lot of things right, that is to say, I agree with your understanding of Derrida.

I will present here a short paper I wrote on differance, which seemed to work for me when I wrote it, however, looking at it now I realize I am still kind of lost.

Hopefully I can help you become found again.

“I fear we are not getting rid of God because we still believe in grammar…”1

Differance, a name which does not name? A mere spelling mistake? Or perhaps, the site of a grammatical transgression? We are in the midst of a transgression, an error, a graphic mistake, a misapplication of the rules of a proper grammar. It is grammar which rules, or at least provides the rules, which governs its correct usage.

If we’re being strictly metaphysical (which Derrida both is and isn’t, from paragraph to paragraph and sometimes within a single sentence) then grammar is not only that which provides the rules and means of correct usage, it is also what makes correct usage possible at all. Differance, again if we’re being strictly metaphysical, is what make grammar possible. The question ‘what makes Differance possible?’ makes no sense, or at least leads to circular set of arguments from which no theoretical break has been made. Some would argue that no break from this can be made.

All articulations must conform to its rules, to its syntax, to its metaphysic. With this graphic mistake, the ‘a’ of differance, can we not hear the Nietzschean laughter? Perhaps Nietzsche’s laughter would be the only sound which might indicate the site of the grammatical transgression, the site of the graphic ‘a.’ If the ‘a’ does not lend itself to a hearing, to an ear which might be so attentive, does the graphic error have any import in speech?

The neologism itself, the hybrid between difference and deference (or to differ and to defer, and so on throughout the various contructions), poses a question about speech that can, at present, only be sensibly asked about speech via writing. We could invent a new spoken sound to signify the change, but that would be a subordination of speech to writing (which happens all the time, which is part of Derrida’s point) which throws into doubt speech’s primacy, its being originary in opposition to the bastard child, writing. The opposition between speech and writing is of great concern to Derrida, he saw phonocentrism (the ranking of speech over, above, beyond and before writing) as dangerous, and fallacious. That certain things are only possible because of writing means that, in those instances, writing is originary in opposition to speech.

This is the strategic nature of deconstructing binary oppositions (which is how most philosophy conceives of speech and writing, with privilege being accorded to the former) can be extrapolated from one simple neologism.

Would the erroneous ‘a’ not simply be passed over in silence? How can Derrida make the in inaudible mistake audible? Or perhaps, how can Derrida speak the unspeakable? Derrida’s treatment of differance is therefore strategic, in the sense that differance is not, and cannot be given to a present glance, or a glance in general. Differance, is not a concept, nor a name, eludes the order of the namable, the visible, or the hearable; is not given to the as such of its non-name, but rather, threatens the possibility of the as such in general.

Well, it simultaneously makes possible the as such in general and threatens the possibility of a comfortable understanding of it. Oppositions are always found together.

Perhaps, scariest of all, Derrida claims that: “there is neither Being nor truth to the play of writing, insofar as it involves differance.”2 Shall we be fearful in the wake of differance? Derrida seems to proceed playfully3 in a Nietzschean manner, in a dance at the end of philosophy, armed with a kind of laughter4, perhaps at our expense.

Or, he’s trying to find a new role for philosophy, one which embraces rather than suppresses the comic aspects of ‘doing philosophy’. As was Nietzsche, arguably. Both men can be very funny, in my opinion. In the movie about Derrida he’s seen in the library at his home, hundreds of books litter the shelves. The interviewer asks him if he has read all of them. Derrida replies No, only four of them. But I read those four very carefully.

How do we proceed in the wake of this silent spelling mistake, this differance? Or is everything, perhaps, merely the wake of differance? Differance, at once a “sameness,” which is not identical to itself, and a “unity” which defies all unification, does not purport to rule, but rather subverts all rulers. Differance at once means to differ as spacing, as non-identity, and to defer as sameness, delay and temporalization. Although given in the form of a sign5, differance is not of the order of signs. Signs represent the present in its absence, differance has never been present, it is therefore of a different type. It is differance which allows the going forth of the sign which represents the present. The differences, at the heart of Saussurean diacritics, are the effects of differance. This non-concept, which opens up the possibility of all signification, refers to an order, which is not the order of western metaphysics, not the order of decidability. Signification becomes possible, only insofar as each present presence retains a ‘trace’ of something other than itself, which is in turn emptied of its sense by its relation to a future element. In this movement, the movement of differance, everything is divided and indecisive. The infinitive “ance” of differance seems to textualize the indecision, between the active or the passive sense. In Derrida’s treatment everything is strategic, tactical, if differance can appear as a sign, yet at the same time remain relegated to silence, to invisibility, what does this say about the sign?

That the same thing that makes signification possible is what threatens the possibility of signification ever working ‘purely’. Perhaps. I like this paragraph a lot.

The silent mistake, the “a” of differance, would have been missed in a speech, it can only be rendered graphic. In the relation between speech and writing, if we are attentive, we can see the difference between differance in writing and differance in speech. One differance, the graphic one, can be accounted for, or reckoned with, the other cannot. Is this not the difference of differance?

It’s one of them. The ‘difference of differance’ (rather than the deference of differance) is widely thought to be from Saussure’s used of differance being what makes any single word distinct and therefore meaningful.

Does the movement of differance not hold us in relation to what appears as merely accidental, to what seems to be beyond the opposition of presence and absence?

And speech and writing, which is a subset of the above.

Difference maintains a relation to a certain alterity, which is neither present nor absent, in the sense that an absence might be rendered present. The trace of a certain other, an unconscious in the Freudian metaphysic, is maintained by differance; but neither the trace, nor differance, is given to a present or to a past. We are left with mere traces, which are self-effacing, which disappear in appearing, which cannot be made present and are not part of the regime of presence. The trace must efface itself in its “issuing forth”:

“The effacement of this early trace (die Fruhe Spur) of difference is therefore “the same” as its tracing within the text of metaphysics. The metaphysical text must have retained a mark of what it lost or put in reserve, set aside.6

Is this perhaps the site of the difference between Being and beings? Are we at the site of a profound forgetfulness, a forgetfulness which has animated the entire history of western philosophy?

Yes. Though how one would begin to delimit such a thing, i.e. know whether or not it is present, past, or yet to come, at any given point in time, is probably not a question that we can readily answer.

"Being has always made “sense” has always been conceived or spoken of as such, only by dissimulating itself in beings; thus, in a particular and very strange way, difference (is) “older” than the ontological difference or the truth of Being.”7

How are we to think the outside, beyond the text of western metaphysics? If Derrida’s treatment of differance has been strategic this is due, no doubt, to the fact that there is no outside, only an inside.

Or that we appears to be perpetually on the cusp, the border, the boundaries, the hymen, so on and so forth. Derrida uses a lot of metaphors, some of which are more fun than others.

The inside of grammar, the God, whose eradication Nietzsche feared would be delayed, or deferred, perhaps indefinitely. The shadow looms large in the wake of the death of God. Does it make any sense to live in the hope of a name, which would render the graphic mistake thinkable? Would this quest, the quest for a name, which Derrida calls Heideggerian, not make of grammar an absolute God? If we affirm differance, the permanently provisional, which seems to question the grammar of the question, which seems to omit the possibility of a name which names, we must do so in a playful manner, perhaps with a laugh or a grin.

Excellent stuff. This is an impressive essay, and I get the impression that you could say a lot more about this but don’t because of a lack of confidence in your understanding of the material. I think that you’ve got nothing to worry about.

[Twilight_of_the_Idol (Twilight of the Idols)]

@someoneisatthedoor

This is an impressive essay, and I get the impression that you could say a lot more about this but don’t because of a lack of confidence in your understanding of the material. I think that you’ve got nothing to worry about.

My thoughts as well.

[Trotter]

Imp,

While I do not post that often, I do read through almost everything here on ILP and have come to hold your posts in high regard. I have often been impressed by your uncanny ability to disregard the detritus and get right to the point you are trying to unfold. In fact your posts have inspired me to attempt to undertake a reading of Hume. I may have some probing questions (perhaps, probing only for myself) for you in the near future.

Thanks for taking the time to respond to my post.

Old Gobbo,

Was this supposed to be difference or differance here? It makes sense for me both ways…

You are quite perceptive this should have been differance. I had a continuous battle with my spell check in order to maintain the spelling mistake.

Also, now they are you are looking back in heinsight, what is it that you do not like about it?

Perhaps, hindsight is the problem all by itself. It would seem, at least in my case, that the writing I commit to always seems incomplete or lacking soon after its completion. Or, rather, it seems to be the case that upon completion it becomes marked by a radical incompleteness, which seems to plague any reading I undertake of my own ecriture. Hindsight, in my case, is a terrible affliction. I think Derrida, and Merleau-Ponty, have, perhaps, helped in this regard. My encounters with both of them have made it clear to me that all writing is a kind of process, which always remains incomplete and, once committed can never be undertaken again in the same manner. Differance has been difficult for me to grasp and I think it is due to the manner in which Derrida proceeds to articulate it.

I think Neitzsche got it, he got it all too well in fact.

I agree. It would seem that so many of my thoughts come from Nietzsche. I think I carry him alongside me, perhaps, as a silent guide throughout my encounters. I think more than anyone else Nietzsche has given me the right kind of ears, the kind for proper hearing.

I’m fucking ripped… there’s a good chance the above made little to no sense. Danger.

I am not an habitual smoker, although I once was. It would seem that I suffer from incredible bouts of paranoia about 1 out of every 9 times I smoke (I am talking about the sense that I am genuinely being faced with the possibility of my immediate death). However it has, in the past, been a remarkable tool for engaging with difficult material. I once attempted to read Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript and seemed to hit dead end after dead end, my wife suggested that I read it from an enhanced state and let me tell you I had a life changing religious experience (as if reading Kierkegaard alone would not be enough o provoke such a response.) Since then I never underestimate the power of an altered perspective. Don’t even get me started on my experience playing Monopoly baked.

Thanks for the response.

SIATD,

Well thanks for the vote of confidence I do tend to be highly unsure of myself philosophically. I find it interesting the amount of refutation that takes place within this forum. I most often assume that if I interpret a certain move made by another poster to be a mistake, I often attribute it to a lack of understanding on my part.

If we’re being strictly metaphysical (which Derrida both is and isn’t, from paragraph to paragraph and sometimes within a single sentence) then grammar is not only that which provides the rules and means of correct usage, it is also what makes correct usage possible at all.

In Structure Sign and Play Derrida makes reference to Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche as the last metaphysician, Derrida offers a similar reading of Heidegger and Freud, is this due to the inability to escape the metaphysical in the order of discourse? What I am trying to say is that one could read Derrida himself as the last metaphysician as he too must remain within the metaphysical.

This is the strategic nature of deconstructing binary oppositions (which is how most philosophy conceives of speech and writing, with privilege being accorded to the former) can be extrapolated from one simple neologism.

I get this what I seem to be struggling with is the Archi-writing which, although impossible, would seem to come before, what, or perhaps, how would such a writing be possible, or is that the point?

That the same thing that makes signification possible is what threatens the possibility of signification ever working ‘purely’.

This is perhaps where my understanding of Derrida takes leave of me. Why does Derrida speak in terms like pure, and origins? For example, both Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, seem to accept the circle, Heidegger characterizes it as non-vicious, Merleu-Ponty does not search for an origin but rather turns to a kind of ontology of the body, yet Merleau-Ponty is characterized as being nostalgic and Derrida is not? Differance is not, yet at the same is Derrida origin, or non-origin, this is what I meant in an earlier post when I said that I think Derrida remains too close to Husserl; why does Derrida need to remain this kind of non-origin?

Furthermore, what does deferral defer to? Another present? Another deferral? Is this not still the metaphysics of presence?

I have one final question, which is the real source of my problem, which has left me questioning my reading of Derrida. Why does Derrida abandon the phenomena?

I hope these questions are not too vague.

Thanks for reading and sharing your thoughts.

Daybreak,

Thanks

[/quote]

[Szpak]

=D>