Why a being of Pure Act is God

Philosophy Forums Religion and Spirituality
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Hello good ILP people,

In a recent thread I created “The first way - Aquinas’ argument from motion”, I presented Aquinas’ first way of demonstrating the existence of God. This argument arrives at a being of Pure Act necessary to explain change within the universe. In this thread, Xunzian sensibly asked what makes this being of Pure Act God, and therefore makes Aquinas’ first way an argument for God, rather than an argument about Pure Act. This post will attempt to show that a being of Pure Act corresponds to the orthodox God, as St Thomas has elucidated.

As a quick excursion, let me just mention one thing. Richard Dawkins, the poor fellow, makes the claim on page 101 of The God Delusion (after a very brief and poor summary of Aquinas’ five ways) that there is “absolutely no reason to endow that terminator with any of the properties normally ascribed to God”, where the “terminator” here mentioned in the Pure Act/Being that Aquinas’ five ways arrive at. However, there are literally hundreds of pages of arguments to ascribe the orthodox properties of God to this Pure Act within the works of St Thomas, and unfortunately Dawkin’s engages with none of them.

First, a being of Pure Act is therefore a being with no potentiality whatsoever. If something has no potential, it is unchanging - for there is no potentiality to actualise, whereby the reduction of potency to act is the source of change in space-time (i.e. an electron in a lower energy orbit of a hydrogen atom has the potential to be excited into a higher orbit - this potential is actualised by an incident photon and therefore a change takes place). Time is a concept based around change - therefore a Being which is unchanging is therefore timeless or eternal. This gives us one attribute : Eternal

Secondly, all matter is capable of change and therefore has potentiality. Because a being of Pure Act has no potentiality and is therefore unchanging, said being is also immaterial. This gives us another attribute: Immaterial

Third, because the being of Pure Act is the source of all actuality (see the thread on the first way), the being is the source of all actual things - in other words, the being is the source of the universe. Therefore, at the very least, the being of Pure Act has a massive amount of power. Can we say that this being is “all powerful”? Aquinas makes the statement “the more actual a thing is the more it abounds in active power” - an example might suffice to demonstrate this. Say a ball has the potential to be in motion - the more this potential is actualised (i.e. the faster the ball is moved by something) the more it is able to actualise other things. Therefore, something which is Pure Act is purely, unlimited actuality and is therefore “all powerful”. This gives us another attribute: All powerful

Fourth, because the being of Pure Act has no potential, there cannot be many beings of Pure Act, but only one. Take this reductio ad absurdum: Say there are two beings of Pure Act, however, in order for them to be two separate things, they must have some difference (otherwise they would be the same thing). However, if they have some difference, this would mean something would have some potentiality actualised that the other did not, which is absurd (both beings are supposed to be Pure Act). This gives us another attribute: One-ness

Fifth, the being of Pure Act can be found to be perfect and wholly good. This one is perhaps the most complex of the arguments, and I can only give it a very brief overview which will not do it justice. First, Pure Act can be considered to be Pure Being. Something actual is only actual to the extent that it has existence and therefore being. Something which is potential does not exist and is therefore non-being. Therefore, a being which is Pure Act, which has no potentiality, can also be considered Pure Being. Now, the conceptions of perfection and good-ness only make sense in respect to the adherence of something to some ideal, or to its essence. For instance, a perfect triangle is one whose edges are entirely straight. In the same respect, a triangle drawn with a ruler and compass is better or “more good” one drawn purely by hand, because it conforms more to a triangles essence. In Aquinas’ view, the good is more broad than just moral good, which is a certain “species” of good if you like. For instance, whenever something actualises a potentiality that is its specifying potentiality (that is, the potentiality of something that makes it what it is) this is a good. For instance, the specifying potentiality of an acorn is its potential (under the right conditions) to form an oak tree. This potentiality is what separates it from other things under its genus. Now it is good for an acorn to turn into an oak tree, resulting in an increase in being and actuality. It follows therefore, that the being which is complete actuality, would also be perfectly good. This gives us the final attribute: Perfect and wholly good.

In summary then, the one being of Pure Act is Eternal, Immaterial, All powerful, and perfect/wholly good. This is a very short overview of the arguments that Aquinas has presented to show that the being with Pure Actuality, whose existence is demonstrated in the first way, is what we know as God.

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First, let me testify that I fully accept that what you are trying to express is indeed the famed, orthodox God. Although my reasons for accepting that are far more detailed and precise.

In Newtonian Science, the words “potential” and “actualization” have a specific, and to me, sensible usage. I suspect that Aquinas intended to use them in that same manner, although not merely applied to material-only aspects. So I am wondering if you might want to reconsider some of your usages of those words.

In the philosophy of Science, something with potential is something that has the future ability to perform and act, but has not yet done so, as in “potential energy”. When the item (“being”) actualizes, for whatever reason or by whatever cause, it becomes “kinetic energy” or “actualizes its abilities”. But what that means is that as any being actualizes, it loses its potential, hence the total sum of the 2 energy types are conserved. The reasoning for this is simply that as any affect takes place, the ability to cause that effect is lost due to accomplishment. If I had the potential to destroy my toys, after I destroyed my toys, I would no longer have the ability to destroy them because they have already been destroyed.

If I propose that a being is potential only, I am proposing that it has the ability to act but is not acting currently. The being is not changing at all because it is not altering its potential in any way. It is not accomplishing. Thus it is unchanging.

If I propose that a being is action only, having no potential at all, then I must conclude that it has just accomplished and become impotent because it has no potential to do any more. It has already destroyed its toys and has no potential to do more.

If you propose that God WAS Pure Act, you have proposed that God instantly lost all potential in his Pure Action. The Deists would be pleased. But is that really your intent? If you intend to say that God IS Pure Act, then you are saying that God has no potential for tomorrow, “God is dead”. I’m pretty certain that isn’t what you’re intending.

The only alternative is to accept that God had pure potential to create and used that potential in creating, thus had potential and also acted. But hopefully has plenty of potential remaining. But potential to do what? Certainly not create the universe. That is already done. What is God’s potential? What is God’s actualizing/kinetics?

Thus God can neither be said to be Pure Potential, nor Pure Act unless you accept that said God is NOT the famed orthodox God.

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James,

Thanks again for the comments. I disagree that Aquinas is considering actuality and potentiality in the way you are suggesting. One (perhaps a little inaccurate way) of describing potentiality as Aquinas saw it was regarding a thing’s “powers”. For instance, I have (hopefully) the power for rational thought and my rationality is a specifying potentiality of my being a human being - it is what separates me from other animal species under the genus “animal”. When I think rationally, I don’t somehow “use up” my capacity for rationality - rather I actualise my potentiality for rationality. For inanimate substances, they have their own potentialities (some of which will be specifying potentialities). Let’s take the example of a rock - it has its own specifying potentialities which define it from other inanimate objects. One of these will be “hardness” - this doesn’t initially sound like a potentiality, but if you think about it, “hardness” just means being impervious to a lot of things striking or squashing it. So, say I hit a rock with a stick, at this moment its potentiality for hardness is actualised and it doesn’t fly apart. It doesn’t lose this potentiality by it being actualised at any one moment. This isn’t the case for all substances however, some will lose their potential for something when it is actualised, because it will involve the dissolving of the essence of the substance - for instance an acorn will lose it’s potentiality to lead to an oak tree, simply because it stops being an acorn (i.e. it loses it’s acorn essence).

This is how Aquinas sees potentiality, not in the limited notion of kinetic and/or potential energy. God doesn’t have any specifying potentialities because He isn’t a species in a genus - there is nothing potential in Him to separate him from some other species. To talk of God as having “kinetics” is to beg the question against God’s immateriality - as kinetic only makes sense when referring to moving objects.

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Perhaps. You would know better than I.

So far that is the same as I have defined it.

You used up your ability to form those same rational thoughts because you have already formed them. That doesn’t mean that you can’t do it again. God could create another universe too (sort of).

We are talking about potentials to Act; to create, not properties of form; to be or possess. You could say that a ball has the potential to be round, but that is a different kind of potential. But even with that example, once the ball has achieved roundness, it no longer has the ability to achieve it, but rather it merely possesses it. The same applies to hardness. The difference is whether we are talking about achieving something (which we have been) or if we are talking about the potential to be something. Did God have the potential to become God? Or did God have the potential to be God? Or are we talking about what God had the potential to achieve other than God’s Self?

As per above, I think you have merely equivocated the word “potential” into separate meanings. God has the potential to be whatever God is. We are talking about His potential to create; to Act. He displayed that potential by achieving creation.

But in any case, you are still talking about God having potential, yet your argument was that God is “Pure Act”…
…What potential was God missing? :-s

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James,

In other words, I have a capacity/power/potential to think rationally, which is just what I was claiming. Just because I have “used up” my capacity to specific thoughts in their specific time and context, doesn’t negate that I have a capacity or inherent potential to think rationally.

You are misunderstanding the breadth of the term “potential” as Aquinas understands it. Take your ball example. The ball actually does have a specifying potential of roundness - the matter of the rubber of the ball has the potential of being in a round shape, a potential which needs to be actualised at every moment of its existence of being a ball. If this specifying potential is ever lost (for instance, say the electro-magnetic force breaks down and it turns into an amorphous smudge of non-charged particles) then the ball will cease to exist as a ball. Note how this relates to my arguments in the first way thread. The fact that this specifying potential must be actualised at all times simply means that the existence of the ball is contingent, and its existence is not identical with its essence. It should also be clear from this how actuality is tied intimately with being (for instance, for the ball to be as a ball requires a constant actualisation of its specifying potentials). God doesn’t “have the potential to become God”. God, being pure actuality has no potentiality and therefore He is pure being. Also, being pure actuality with no potentiality means that His being is not contingent but necessary, and therefore His essence is the same as his existence.

I’m not talking about God having potential. Regarding equivocating, see comments about the much broader conception of “potential” as used by Aquinas.

Thanks again for the interesting comments.

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Yes, using something doesn’t mean using it up, else there would be much fewer prostitutes. We are talking about the specifics of a single instance, “Initiating creation”.

I was referring to a ball that might not have been entirely round, but is still a ball. With that underlined statement, you are beginning to equivocate “potential” with “contingent”. “In the broader sense”, those are different things.

And I am not talking about God being contingent. Think in terms of “potential to do what?” The word “potential” comes from “potent”, meaning to have power or ability, doesn’t it?
So you yet haven’t convinced me.

It still seems to me that a “pure act void of potential”, is merely an act that has already taken place and thus hasn’t potential to perform that act. Without the property of potential, the entity could never do it again. But in reality, without the potential to do it, the entity could never have done it the first time.

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James,

You might be, but I’m not. I am talking about capacities as I stated in :

Note the use of “capacity” not actualising a single instance.

I don’t see how this is relevant - it has to still be round to some extent or it is not a ball. For it to be round to any extent, this specifying potentiality must be continually actualised.

On the face of it, they are different, but the argument is that they are actually related, see this comment:

If the specifying potentiality of roundness of the ball was not actualised even for an instant, the ball would no longer be a ball because it would no longer have any “round-ness”. Hence, its being or existence as a ball is tied to actualisation of it’s specifying potentiality, and therefore it’s being is contingent (existence different from its essence).

Yes it does, but we can’t use the terms “power” and “ability” in a equivocal way when we are talking about God, only an analogical way. When we say we have a power, say the power of speech, it is a potential whenever we are not using said power (i.e. when we are not actualising our power for speech). Therefore, whenever we are not speaking, we lack something (i.e. we have some potential). This is not the case with a being of Pure Act, who has no potential. The being of Pure Act is “always speaking” so to speak (sorry for the pun) - but just because he is “always speaking” doesn’t mean there is no sound, and therefore that this “sound” isn’t able to change things, if you get my drift. In other words it doesn’t mean that a being of Pure Act can’t change things while remaining itself unchanged. See below.

What you’re saying doesn’t follow as far as I can see. You seem to be wanting to put a being of Pure Act “in time”. For instance “do it again” only makes sense when there is a progression of time to “do it again” in. A being of Pure Act would act eternally and is unchanging (remember, change is a reduction of potency to act which of course won’t occur in a being of Pure Act), therefore to talk about “doing it again” doesn’t make sense. Also, to talk about the act “already taking place” also makes no sense with an eternal being.

Also, note how you are using the word “potential” - “without the potential to do it, the entity could never have done it the first time”. Here you are using “potential” as “power” i.e. “without the power to do it…” but in the sense that we have “power” - i.e. involving potentiality. You can’t use “power” in that sense when talking about a being of Pure Act. You can use it analogically in the sense that something powerful can cause lots of significant changes, but not in the sense that it contains potentiality (i.e. when we have the “power” of speech). I hope this is making sense

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Not really (not to me). It is an issue of proper concept and word association and I’m afraid that you are building a case that any seriously expert Atheist could shoot down or worse, use against you.

I think the key is in the word “potent”. How do you define that word? What is its concept?

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With regards to the Atheist thing - neo-Thomism has seen a resurgence in recent years and appears to be successfully defending itself against professional philosopher critics. Saying that, I am not necessarily accurately presenting the arguments, but I am doing my best.

With regards to the definition of “potent” with respect to how St Thomas used it, here are a couple of definitions from Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange:

“It is a real capacity to receive a definite, determined form, the form, say, of the statue, a capacity which is not in air or water, but is in wood, or marble, or sand. This capacity to become a statue is the statue in potency.”

“Act, being completion, perfection, is not potency, which is the capacity to receive perfection: and act, perfection, is limited only by the potency which is its recipient”

With regards to the first definition, “potency” is the capacity to receive a definite form. So for instance, rubber has the capacity to receive the form “ball” - therefore it has a potential to be formed into a ball. In order to do so, it requires act, that is, some active thing to transform it i.e. a lump of rubber won’t become a ball all by itself. This potential is not necessarily fulfilled perfectly, for instance, the instantiated ball may not be perfectly round. Nevertheless, in the process of creating a ball out of rubber (which by the way, is it’s own form), the potency is actualised to some extent, and to that extent is made “more perfect” - where perfection is a complete instantiation of the form.

So while “power” and “capacity” is a way to talk about potentiality, one has to be careful how these terms are being used. When there words are used in the Thomistic sense, “capacity” relates to the potential of something to receive a definite form. Because God, being Pure Act, has no potential or capacity or power in this respect - He is entirely perfect and lacking nothing. However, God can be considered powerful in the sense that He is able to change an infinite number of things. When I say I have the power of speech, what I am really saying is that I have the potential to speak at will at any point in time - in other words, I can actualise that potential in me. However, to say such things about God makes no sense - first He is out of time, second God never lacks anything because (being Pure Act) he has no potential - therefore God is “speaking eternally” if that makes sense.

Anyway, I hope that makes sense. Thanks for the good questions.

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Yes, I see what the difference is. But now look at a more common definition (perhaps a little too “common”), but;

The “potential to receive” seems usable, but hardly the first thing anyone is going to read into it.

I just gave yet another lecture concerning how important it is to speak the language of the people to whom you preach. When atheists complain about how wrong Christians are, I invariably have to point out that the words have different meaning than they are used to or think. Since you, in this case, are presenting argument for non-Christians to read, doesn’t it make since that you should take care to use Their language? Why else say anything at all? Surely confusion and disbelief isn’t your intent, yet is the predictable result of not watching every word for its actual effect.

Likewise, look at what people hear when you say that God is “Pure Act”;

Do I need to reference the Bible passages concerning the effect of voice? I hope not, because I have hell looking things like that up. :confused:

Yes, used by the listener. The preacher already knows what he is trying to say.

Yes, but do you ever say that and mean, "I have to potential to receive speech"?

Yes, I needed to hear that “power to receive” bit. Thank you. But still consider that I am certainly not the only one. Maybe clear that up Before you present such an argument?

“Our mutual responsibility is to say things such that they are easily understood.
And to understand things so that they can be easily said.”

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James, thank you very much for your constructive criticism. Your point is a good one, and I will be more careful how I frame such arguments in the future.

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Well, I enjoyed the exchange. But I am still interested in whether Aquinas really was referring to time related cause to effect relationships in his First Way, if you have the time, of course.

Thanks for the Thread. :sunglasses: