Why not Solipsism?

Hello, first time poster on the boards. I am very impressed with the quality of discussion here. Perhaps you can help me in my personal endeavor.

What is a philosopher without his own beliefs? People draw their own conclusions based on their own experiences, it seems, however, very little has been said that was not held or stated by another person in the past. Except for one belief…

Solipsism.

However, the more I read, the more I write, the more I explore my own thoughts and beliefs, the more I come back to the same idea… for all I know, my mind is the only one in existence.

Why, then, does Solipsism seem so ludicrous? I have read various takes on this, but none of them seem very cogent. I was wondering what your take on this is.

Oh and yes, I do understand the apparent irony in my asking others for reasons why solipsism is not held as rational by you. However, my personal philosophy accounts for this apparent contradiction, so any quips aren’t needed.

Hello, Rafajafar! Welcome to the boards.

I’ve been reading a little about solipsism too, but only where ideas tend to lead to solipsism (for instance, idealism, phenomenalism). Where this happens, it is seen as a criticism. Like yourself, I was wondering - why?

The book I was reading (Philosophy: The Basics, Nigel Warburton) went into it a little further. Solipsism is seen as unpractical for a philosophical argument, as it is often seen as closer to a mental illness. Let me give you an example. I bend down by somebody’s front door, and peep through their keyhole, observing their activities. After several minutes, they discover me. An ordinary (and sane) person would feel shame and embarrassment, but the solipsist believes that other minds do not exist, and so there is nobody to feel embarrassed in front of.

Unfortunately, that brief answer to your question is as much as I know about solipsism. I would be interested to hear your response to it, and other people’s answers to the original query.

Take care, and enjoy the boards!

That bending looking into peep hole/shame argument is a famous Sartrean one. He has more counter arguments to the view that you can’t possibly concieve of another in Being and Nothingness.

Someone should kill you. That will end your solpsism once and for all.

Warrior Monk: Perhaps I should kill myself, but then again, how do I know I will die if I’ve never died before? OR even better, if death exists. Would be an aweful waste for me to die if it is possible, but interesting if it wasn’t. Some gambles one should not take, I guess.

Matt: You’re right, one cannot conceive another being as nothingness. However, can’t you conceive another being as a representation of yourself? For instance, what if life was like a dream? While I’m dreaming (unless lucid), I consider everything in that dream to be real. And it is real…to me. However, how do I know I’m awake? Why can’t I just be dreaming…everything? Without a solid proof of god, it is irrational to assume his existence (although you cannot prove his non-existence). Therefore, without the Cartesian proofs for reality, what is left other than idealism?

Samantha: You are the reason I went in reverse order, as to answer you, I have to build on my answer to Matt. If I am in a dream, and I feel embarrassed, how crazy is that? Yet for some reason, it’s accepted. Well, if reality is a dream, which it very well could be, then everything I experience, all my standards, my input, my output, it’s all a fabrication. A method of sanity. A result of the reason that is me. It is NOT unreasonable to ask a question in a dream, because the answer I get back is like myself answering my own question. I may not remember it that way, but it essentially is. This then answers the question “why bother asking if you are the only one who answers?”. Because, my imaginary friends, I have concluded that the unexamined life is not worth living (rawr, that is to say I was told by myself that Socrates said it), so by asking you questions, I’m searching myself.

This, by the way, is also why I do not see any reason not to abide by social standards and norms.

But, alas, ultimately the flaw of every philosopher is hypocrisy. My rational side may lead me in one direction, but my humanity, another. Hence, my search.

The piont is that the only thing that you can be absoultly sure about is that your consiusness exists, not even yourself (your physical being). IT is the only thing you have first hand knowledge of. Everything eles you cant be absolutley sure of.

I guess in a roundabout way it sort of an issue of trust.

For example you live in D.C. I live in Salisbury Maryland. lets say i went to Tonga and i came back and i said i went to this really cool place called tonga. Lets also say that you had never been there. but you had heard of it and mabey even seen pictures of it. You would most likely belive me and ask me how it went. But you can not be sure that i went there or even that tonga exists unless you have been there yourself. THis is the same case with the question that solpilism poses wheteher other people exist. The reson why we belive that other people esist is because we trust them i guess?

Right…which begs the question…why NOT Solipsism? It seems PERFECTLY valid to me.

And, as a question of this trust, how many times have you taken someone’s word for something only to be greatly let down.

You cannot trust and remain a rational being. Hence, my conflict. My rational mind says solipsism…always…constantly…it cannot go anywhere else because I haven’t seen another concept that works no matter how you look at it (which, again, is why I’m asking). My humanity doesn’t WANT to believe it, though.

greetings!
im always thinking about solipsism… from what i know, it has never been refuted. there is always a possibility that everything i see, feel, interact with is merely in my mind. impossible to know other minds or what these other beings feel. impossible to confirm that there are other minds other than me for all confirmation might be a figment of my mind.
the only argument that comes closest os that of the ‘i and thou’. there is no ME without the Other. for without the other, there isnt a contrary to whom i call myself.
perhaps one must have faith in the other minds, even if they are merely minds in your mind. :unamused:

why not solipsism? i dunno but i always wonder. i feel that my persistent questioning of that is a sign that i am very much alienated and cut off from substantial human affairs. unable to sympathise or empathise, self absorbed and an egoist… much like camus’ character from the fall. :frowning: and yet i communicate with other possible beings. that my mind is the only is placing to great an importance on myself. </end talking about self>

i think that’s a strong enough arguement against solipism. humanity in general couldn’t exist on this system. i don’t think a person in particular could. it’s not a natural belief system, you will be coldly cutting off a part of yourself for the simple reason that it doesn’t fit into your personal beliefs. i don’t see this as being a desireable position at all.

I think causality would suggest that uncertainty results from not being able to distinguish what is right from what is wrong, ethically speaking or in some sense to lose touch from reality. Even so it would place the individual searching for something to believe in rather than sulk himself in endless, nonsensical contemplation, which might probably be inane or in some response, innate in human nature.

To be in a state of confusion, such that every repose, every thought and idea disguises itself from the truth. For example, finding yourself in the middle of nowhere, all alone and have no discrete idea of what to do or to be misplaced by society in a fascious way for a period of time. And the incapacity to see clearly the things surrounding the person, to be blinded from the truth, wherein a transformation from being filled to being empty resides.

“Everything must be thoroughly overthrown for once in my life, if I ever want to establish anything solid and permanent in the sciences.”

                                        -Rene Descartes,  [i]Meditations[/i]-

My take on Solipsism is that it is often misunderstood and hence misdefined and hence wrongly criticized.

For example, you wrote:

And that is a perfectly true statement. But solipsism, correctly conceived, does not mean you actually have to believe that, only that you acknowledge it.

In other words, you are right to acknowledge that you cannot know whether there other minds. It is impossible. In fact, you cannot know whether anything exists objectively at all. For example, you are aware that what you perceive is merely the result of your brain processing data sent to it by your senses (e.g., eyes, ears, nose, etc.). All you are experiencing is signals. That is, information. You have no way to verify any of that information. No way to know whether the information that you possess corresponds to any outside reality. No way to verify whether that information that your brain has processed is real.

In fact, we can take this a step further. You can’t even know whether you have a brain. All you have is information. And you know not where that information comes from.

Now, that’s all epistemological stuff. That just tells you what you know, or more appropriately, what you don’t know. But, acknowledging this, you are still free to believe whatever you want. In other words, just because you acknowledge that all you have is information which you cannot absolutely verify, it doesn’t prevent you from accepting that information and acting on it. Or from assuming that it corresponds to some reality.

The reason solipsism is so derided is because philosphy hacks don’t get this. They assume that acknowledging the epistemological restriction is the equivalent of accepting that restriction as an affirmative belief. In other words, they assume that a person who acknowledges that he cannot know whether anything exists must believe that nothing exists.

But that isn’t the case. I can acknowledge that I don’t know whether only my mind exists while at the same time believing that other minds (and indeed the entire “objective world”) do exist. And I do just that.

I think solipsism is an interesting notion as well, but the skepticism I have towards it would be all of the concepts that are beyond my control or even negative. If the universe is just a projection from my mind and a product of my creation, why would there be things that hinder myself?

When solipsism gets to the point in which I do not find the universe agreeable, then that to me signifies that there are some limitations that very well minimize the possibility that I am really directing my observations.

Unended wrote:

That’s right, solipsism is a metaphysical belief founded on epistemological “stuff.” And it lost its charm for me after I worked through this epistemological “stuff.” In his book, Modern Philosophy, the contemporary British philosopher, Roger Scruton, wrote:

“The self is the place where doubt expires; it is the one absolutely certain thing; it is also metaphysically distinct from everything else over which my beliefs may range.”

I think Scruton is correct. This first person proof of existence is absolutely unique. Descartes famously tried and failed to build on this unshakable rock. It provides us with absolute certainty of self yet it has no extensibility for matters outside of the self.

Epistemological problems arise when we try to transfer this unique criterion of absolute certainty to matters outside the self. In other words, we need to shake the idea that nothing short of metaphysical certainty is required in order to count something as true. Aside from the fact that I exist, everything I believe is subject to revision. That is, I assign to every other belief a truth-probability less than unity. Our problem with solipsism arises when we try to use our unique first-person criterion of absolute truth to decide a question that has to do with the second person.

We ask ourselves, “How can I be certain that other minds exist?”

Bong…Wrong Criterion!

Instead, we ought to ask ourselves, “Is it true with an acceptable degree of probability that other minds likely exist in this world?”

Ah, that’s better. Let’s see. There are some six billion people crawling around the surface of this little rock hurtling through space. All of them have the same body organs as mine. They share nearly an identical DNA structure to mine. They seem to laugh and cry just like I do. They tell jokes that sometimes make me laugh and they occasionally do things that make me angry. They write music, some of which I find beautiful but most of which sounds like noise. They’re forever telling me things that I hadn’t yet thought of myself. They created a language that I use to talk to myself. Hmm…I’d say the odds weigh heavily in favor of the belief that I am not the only conscious form of life in this universe.

Regards,
Michael (only one of the six billion)

How do you know you’re not schizophrenic?

Is it highly probable you’re not?

A schizophrenic would answer that, yes, indeed, it is highly probable that he is not schizophrenic and that YOU’RE the crazy one.

Which one of you is right?

The problem with what you said is that it boils down to, “Hey, it doesn’t matter, we still have to live with ‘others’ no matter the form.” I disagree. The very nature of other’s minds and their particular place in the universe is the foundation of ethics. How you react to your ethics give YOU place in the universe and it relates toward your own self esteem.

It also establishes what you CAN know. It’s the foundation for scientific thought.

You may think solipsism is the stuff of psychotics, but how do you know ou’re not psychotic…oh but that’s right, it doesn’t matter to you, does it?

Solipsism is a problem for a reason. Why else would thousands of philosophers like Sartre devote so much energy to the problem?

But that can’t be shaken. I mean, that’s just the definition of truth: something known with absolute certainty.

What you are suggesting is simply redifining the meaning of truth. Which is fine. But it doesn’t change the correctness of the original conclusion, only the terms.

But that question is also unanswerable. If doubt exists, we lose all bases for judging probabilities. In other words, if it is true (as it is) that the only thing I can know is that I possess unverified information (i.e., knowledge of “self”), then it is equally as likely and hence probable that other minds exist as it is that only my own mind exists. I have no basis for deciding what is probable because I only know one thing.

What this means is that I must assume. Furthermore, it means I must assume without any basis for doing so. This deduction from solipsism is what makes philosophers so loathe to accept it. But I don’t care about that, because it’s absolutely correct. And it should be acknowledged.

For example:

But you don’t know that there are six billion people crawling around the surface of the earth. You have only assumed it, by assuming that what you perceive has been correctly interpreted by your brain (and also by assuming that the information you have corresponds to any external world at all in the first place). Essentially, there is no way to guage the probability. It’s a blind leap of faith.

In practice (i.e., real life), this doesn’t really matter because we all make the same unprincipled assumptions. That is, we assume that the information we possess corresponds to an actual world and that what we perceive represents that world as it actually exists. This assumption is the basis of empiricism.

And because of that, we can speak to each other without regard to the basic truths. In other words, we can say we “know” something when it has been empirically detected. But when we use the word “know” in that sense, it carries with it at least two unspoken assumptions (making it, ultimately, not “known” at all but assumed).

Incidentally, the problem of “other minds” is an empirical problem and not a solipsistic problem. Solipsism actually calls into question the existence of other people and the entire physical world as we (think) we know it. Even once, however, we assume the existence of other people (using the empirical assumption), we still have the problem of other minds.

Rafajafar wrote;

I believe you when you say it is a problem for you, but did you notice where I explained why it’s not a problem for me? There are enough philosophical concerns on my plate without my having to anguish over something I sorted out to my satisfaction long ago. I’m similarly not kept awake at night wondering how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. Someone might think this is worth losing sleep over. For me it isn’t. A philosophical problem is a problem only if you think it’s a problem.

Yes, it’s probably true that I’m not. The voices I hear generally have people at the other end of them.

That’s not good enough, Rafajafar. You can’t simply ignore a classic refutation of an old idea by telling us that your personal philosophy accounts for it. How does your personal philosophy account for it? If your belief in solipsism is an accurate description of the world then my argument is merely an illusion of your mind. In fact, it’s your argument; and you’re only arguing with yourself. Why do you need the Internet to argue with yourself? I’d think you could do that sitting alone in a darkened room?

If your solipsism is correct then “thousands of philosophers” have devoted exactly no energy to the problem for the simple reason that there’d be no philosophers aside from some zombie-like illusions you’ve created in your mind for God only knows what reason. Remember, illusions expend no energy.

If your solipsism is correct then your mind is guiding my fingers on this keyboard, so if you don’t like the tone of my argument then you’ve only yourself to blame. But here’s a real test. I dare you to dream me out of the world! If you can’t do it then it’s going to look as if your mind isn’t fabricating all of this. But if your mind can’t control some aspect of this world then whose mind is doing the controlling?

If everything is in your mind then your mind must be in your mind as well. How do you dream up the very thing doing the dreaming? How do you do that?

Regards,
Michael

Solipsism only has a leg up on other philsophical positions if the statement “I exist” can be demonstrated with absolute certainty. It can’t.

There are good reasons for thinking that Descartes did not achieve his objective in formulating the Cogito. It seems the Cartesian proof for the existence of “I” is based on a very strong intuition rather than on rigorous reasoning. In his first Meditation Descartes questions all of his assumptions in a quest for that which cannot be called into doubt. What he finds is that he cannot question that he is doubting. The Cogito is born: “I doubt therefore I am.”

Wait. Rewind.

How did exactly did we get to “I doubt?” Well, Descartes says he is going around doubting everything, so the statement “I doubt” must be true. Hold it. WHO is going around doubting everything? I am. Wha? We don’t even know if there IS an “I”; that’s what needs to be proven. Now maybe it cannot be doubted that things are being doubted by someone, but what is it for this doubting to be mine? Well there is a very strong intuition that this doubting is mine; it just seems obvious. Fair enough. It seems obvious to some people that God lives inside their hearts; do you see philosophers making an “Archemedian Point” out of that?

Spinoza took Descartes’ premises and came to a radically different conception of the self–in which thinking was not a private activity within my mind, but rather it was an attribute of the infinite substance he called God. On this view, what I call my mind is just a mode of the infinite intellect. Instead of “I think” we have “God thinks.”

Now, I’m not asking anyone to adopt Spinoza’s view of God here. I am saying that the existence of “I” is not something you can demonstrate with absolute certainty. You are aware that doubting occurs; you understand that doubting requires a doubter, and so you assume that that doubter is you. But you’ve proven nothing. You assume the Cogito, and that’s fine; but you also assume that other minds exist (at least on a functional level). Both of these assumptions are necessary in order to make futher claims about the world, so I don’t see the point of not holding both.

A couple of points. First, I have to cover some basics. For me, solipsism is an epistemological position. It speaks to what we can know versus what we must assume as opposed to what we accept and believe to be true.

For the following two points, I will speak in the first person (as if only my mind existed) to make the point clear

  1. I can acknowledge that I cannot be certain that no other minds or people exist without actually believing that no other minds or people exist. Therefore, there is nothing contradictory about me interacting with people I believe (assume) exist.

  2. Even if I choose to believe that no other people or other minds exist, there is nothing contradictory about my interacting with people. I have information that people exist and that I can interact with. Whatever I do with that is my own choosing.

To make point (2) clear, consider virtual reality. Let’s say you have some really sophisticated virtual reality software. You put on the goggles and up comes the virtual world. Now, do you interact with it? According to you, you will not, because you don’t believe it to really exist. But surely you won’t take issue with the person who does interact with the virtual world, even with full knowledge (as opposed to doubt) that that world is not real.

One of the things which I have never really understood about Solipsisim (properly held) is why any one would even bother arguing for it?

Yet, the irony inherent in any justification of Solipsism aside, I’m curious to know why no one has taken up the suggestions of Thomas Reid or Immanuel Kant? Though I disagree with much of Kant’s moral and epistemological thought, I found his use of the transcendental argument appealing in its method.

My discourse with various professors of philosophy has yielded a tendency towards the Common Sense Realism of Thomas Reid. Rather than developing elaborate philosophical systems in justification (so Descartes), Reid argued that the sense data of experience really does genuinely correlate to actually existing extramental reality. Essentially, this is the boring, old, and very unsexy epistemology of Direct Realism. It was common (if not assumed as axiomatic) in much medieval theology, and is still (I think) legitimate position to hold today.

It seems to me that Solipsism as an organized position was birthed out of a recognition of the limitations of experience. Yet, Alvin Plantinga has argued at length (as did Kant, albeit in a rather different fashion) for the existence of extramental objects, such as other minds (especially God). A familiarity of much of this sort of modern philosophy is important in any study of Solipsism (and perhaps its refutation, whether it be possible or no).