Regarding Nietzsche, there is no paradox in the morality of the greater type, as Russell points out in the simulation of ‘botching.’ The dilemma Russell wishes to create so that he might frame Nietzsche’s morality into a objectivist/relativist dichotomy is in fact nonexistent.
For Nietzsche the dynamic of morality is in one form of power- the Will. The manifestation of the Will exerts itself in individuals, but individuals do not have unique moralities- there are no truely ‘subjective’ morals. Therefore, morals are not ‘relative’ in this metaphysical sense. However they can also be understood practically and linguistically, as with Russell, and as such those false problems can be created to make a haze over Nietzsche…as Academia loves to do.
And that’s not even the bad news for Russell. Even if the above rendition of Nietzsche’s morality is incorrect, one thing still stands- the principle of resentment.
The real moralist does not resent a conflict, but neither does he hesitate to overcome it. In the event that one man wishes to botch another, the one does not despise the other; that would be hipocrisy. So there is no problem in the matter of deciding who gets to be the ‘over-man.’ Those pieces fall into place naturally, the Will to Power is the normative form of morality and ‘conscience’ is merely the surface. The only exception to this principle would be the lie, but even that is a device of the Will. The intentional lie, if it involves hipocrisy, is acceptable…but only if it was on purpose and not accidental…as one would ‘save face.’
There is no way of conversing the objectivity of morality because it is not a phenomena that can be enclosed in language. The understanding of objectivity can be reached by a monistic conceptualization of ecology and organization and it must be intuited; it is the sharpest and simplest sensibility in all things…the interdependence of all events. Objective morality is the determined form of progress as it happens through human reality, only appearing to have multiplicity- as acts and language.
As Schopenhauer once put it, “the world which we percieve is characterized by great diversity, though this diversity is not fundamental. Fundamentally the world is a unity.”
The powering of acts is the same for all things existing- the concept of morality in the individual is the measure of his knowledge…its adequacy, to paraphrase Dunamis, at the time and his understanding of existence.
The morals are then neither objective or relative, but instead hermeunetic?