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Moral Truth Litmus
Part 1: Moral truth, like all other truth, must be discovered, not created.
Part 2: Moral truth, like all other truth, must count the self and the other interchangeably, being true for all or none.
Part 3: Moral truth must describe how and why we should be and/or behave with others and ourselves.
Each part of the litmus is a dialectical synthesis of thesis and antithesis (58), which we will flesh out below. Basically, dialectic resolves what appeared to be a contradiction. An antithesis appears to contradict a thesis, but then a synthesis resolves the apparent contradiction. Itâs a lot of drama with a happy endingâand the synthesis is our hero, saving us from a life of paradox and contradiction. If you are not familiar with dialectic, you will âlearn-as-you-goâ by reading how it is used in this paper to draw out the moral truth from all the morality out there. Morality means standards and ends (the âhowâ and âwhyâ), of social character and/or conduct. Morality may be created by the individual or cultural will, or perceived to be discovered in evolving human nature, or in an eternal social essence. While it may be true that a given morality exists in reality, its standards may or may not be âtruthâ. Truth is that which corresponds to reality (that which is). Moral truth (or true morality) is those standards, ends, of social character and/or behavior which are true (corresponding to reality, which must necessarily include the fulfilled ought, or the ought is just a nice concept). We will find out if various moralities and ethical theories pass as moral truth by testing them with our Moral Truth Litmus. If they do not pass all three parts, they are made up, even if they claim to be discovered.
Moral Truth Litmus, Part 1 â Moral truth, like all other truth, must be discovered, not created.
Favorite relevant C.S. Lewis quote: As creatures with a moral sense, ââŚwe remain conscious of a desire which no natural happiness will satisfy. But is there any reason to suppose that reality offers any satisfaction to it? âNor does the being hungry prove that we have bread.â But I think it may be urged that this misses the point. A manâs physical hunger does not prove that that man will get any bread; he may die of starvation on a raft in the Atlantic. But surely a manâs hunger does prove that he comes of a race which repairs its body by eating and inhabits a world where eatable substances exist,â (57).
By way of dialectic (58), we are going to answer two views on moral truth: moral truth is created, or voluntarism (thesis), and there is no (discoverable) moral truth, or nihilism (or skepticism) (anti-thesis), with their synthesis: moral truth is discovered, or essentialism (14, 37).
Thesis: We all hunger for true meaning; moral truth is created, or voluntarism. There are true voluntarists, and there are voluntarists by default. True voluntarists think that moral truth is created by the individual or cultural will (subjectivism or relativism; individual/divine or cultural voluntarism) (14, 37)âthey think all nihilists cannot help contradicting themselves as their attitudes and behavior acknowledge meaning, and they think essentialists arrogantly claim to have discovered moral truth and should instead create their own meaning (atheist voluntarists) or submit to Godâs created meaning (theist voluntarists). Those who attempt to discover moral truth where it cannot be found (for example, evolving human nature) may think of themselves as essentialists, but they are voluntarists by default, since their âdiscoveryâ is actually a creation of will. Since voluntarism (both true and by default) does not acknowledge essential meaning, it is nihilism by default, though that offends the voluntaristâs moral sense (and so defaults to essentialism).
Anti-thesis: We do not hunger for true meaning, because truth cannot be created, only discovered; there is no (discoverable) moral truth, or nihilism (or skepticism). We can discover created things, but we cannot create truthâwe can manufacture meaning, but we cannot create âtrueâ meaning. If the truth about morality is that it evolves with individuals, cultures, or nature (if there is no morality among all moralities which does ânotâ evolve)âthen there is no (discoverable) âmoral truthâ (actuality with no potential; truth never changes). There are true nihilists/skeptics, and there are nihilists/skeptics by default. True nihilists/skeptics think that truth cannot be created, and feel that even essentialists âcreateâ rather than discover. However, nihilists/skeptics will not allow a construct to pass as truth, and so agree with essentialists that voluntarists are nihilists by default. On the other hand, atheist voluntarists think essentialists are nihilists by default, because they will not âcreateâ truth (or âmeaningâ)! The attitudes and behavior of nihilists/skeptics, in reaction to the violation of their moral boundaries, betray an intuitive sense of moral truthâno one ever acts as if their moral boundaries are just âmade upââand so they default to essentialism.
Synthesis: We may âsayâ we do not hunger for true meaning, but we live against it. We may âsayâ true meaning can be created or evolve, but we live against it. We live instead as if we hunger for true, uncreated, unevolved, discovered meaning (essentialism). We no more create the true meaning we all hunger for, than we create the nutrients we all hunger forâthey preexisted us, or we could not have evolved a hunger for them. A fulfilled ought has no potential, is actuality, and so it is truth that cannot evolve into being, but must always be (not merely âpre-existâ). There are true essentialists, and there are essentialists by default. True essentialists think that moral truth is discovered in Godâs unchanging essence (14) (universalism; divine essentialism). Rather than settle for the artificial, essentialists choose the real. Given essentialism corresponds to reality, whereas voluntarism and nihilism do notâvoluntarists (both true and by default) and nihilists (both true and by default) are both essentialists by default, further evidenced when the voluntarist takes offense at defaulting to nihilism, and the nihilist takes offense at a violation of their moral boundaries. However, for the sake of argument, if there is no essential moral truth to be discovered, essentialism is a creation of will and is voluntarism by default, which is nihilism by default, though we live against it.
Moral Truth Litmus, Part 2: Moral truth, like all other truth, must count the self and the other interchangeably, being true for all or none.
Thesis: conflicting cultural and individual norms are all valid moral truth (relativistic and subjectivist theories).
Antithesis: conflicting cultural and individual norms are evidence against the possibility of moral truth (nihilistic theories).
Synthesis: truth, including moral truth, transcends cultures and individuals and is true for all or none.
In other words, a fact is true regardless if individuals or cultures believe it to be true. If a standard is âcreatedâ or is a âconstructâ it is fiction (there can be true facts about the fiction, but the fiction itself cannot be a true fact). This rules out those standards which are subjective to the individual will, or relative to the cultural will. It can be true that subjective and relative standards existâbut not that they are true, for the same reason it can be true that individual or cultural beliefs can exist without corresponding to objective reality (which explains the wide range of moralities). That there are a wide range of beliefs about reality (including morality) does not rule out the possibility of beliefs which actually correspond (are universally true). Moral truth does not contradict individual and cultural diversityâit only challenges the aspects of the individual or culture which break away from moral truth. Moral truth feeds the hunger every moral being shares with every moral being, regardless of individual or cultural differences. Notice how the first and second parts of the litmus are very similarâif there is moral truth, it is discovered, and it is true for all.
Moral Truth Litmus, Part 3: Moral truth must describe how and why we should be and/or behave with others and ourselves.
This last part of the litmus may seem redundant, a definition of an ethical theory, but not all theories fulfill this part, like theories that exalt reason as the highest good, which can be done without thinking of others, and theories which regard others only when our behavior with them directly benefits self, making the existence of others entirely unnecessary for a moral existence. Would we even ask how/why we should be and/or behave if there were no others? There are three dialectics combined that we can look at in this last part:
- Thesis: âwhyâ is more important than âhowâ (teleological theories). Antithesis: âhowâ is more important than âwhyâ (duty theories). Synthesis: a âhowâ without a âwhyâ is pointless; a âwhyâ without a âhowâ is impossible to apply. 2) Thesis: âbeâ is more important than âbehaveâ (virtue theories). Antithesis: âbehaveâ is more important than âbeâ (duty theories). Synthesis: the nature of the âdoingâ affects the nature of the âbeingâ and vice versa. 3) Thesis: âothersâ or out-group should always benefit, whereas âselfâ or in-group should never benefit (altruistic theories). Antithesis: âselfâ or in-group should always benefit, whereas âothersâ or out-group should never benefit (egoistic theories). Synthesis: in every in-group and out-group, a self is an other, an other is a self, so however we should treat others/self is the same as how we should treat self/others. Indeed, if there is moral truth, it is discoverable by all moral beings, and true for all moral beings, as shown in the first two parts of the litmus.
References:
A working bibliography can be found here: http://ichthus.yuku.com/topic/60/t/SSP-13-References-and-Notes.html
THIS POST IS OUT-DATED. Updated here: http://www.examiner.com/x-26772-San-Francisco-Apologetics-Examiner~y2009m11d1-Moral-realism-and-our-rights-and-liberties-part-3