Moral consciousness.-- However full of error human history may be, there is nonetheless something admirable in the moral consciousness of antiquity, something admirable in the old monk who, of his own accord, named the ‘sin’ within him and sought God. That moral consciousness testifies to the fact that within him there dwells something of a soul, something which looks into the world as beyond the seas, and longs to know it; something which is aware of itself but, still more, longs more than anything else to place itself into proximity with that world, to find out its relationship to things, to weigh, determine, and judge them to that end, just as a flame radiates itself upon all that is spread out before it, trying the elements therein, determining what endures and what burns away, what escapes its touch and what does not. Thus the moral consciousness exacts itself. In this age, however, men do not adopt their beliefs in the same way, not as the consequence of a self-possessed moral consciousness that aims to find out its relation to things, which makes experiments and attempts in boldness to that end. They adopt their beliefs for other reasons: out of fear, tradition, out of hope, perhaps out of love- nonetheless, hardly ever as a consequence of a moral consciousness. Perhaps this very faculty is the one thing that must, above all else, remain with us from antiquity: in every true philosopher, artist, in every great spirit the first thing that one finds is that flame, which tests one with the same audacity with which it tests all other things. To bear the sight of this moral consciousness, however numerous its errors, is one of the first signs of greatness; to be overcome with the passion for determining what one is, and what is hostile and benevolent toward that self, to be touched with this longing as by some necessity, expresses the genuine vigor and liveliness in all moral conceptions. Yet, the moral consciousness has not been assisted by philosophy; separated from it in the course of history, philosophy has always been developed from the standpoint of disinterested contemplation, and the moral consciousness, without the guidance of philosophy, has gone on mistaking illusions for realities, has tested itself upon them, and has been reviled by and captivated with mere illusions. Though they have no doubt been possessed with it, philosophers have yet to truly bring the moral consciousness under the rule of their peculiar art; it, having determined in its own way all of their loves and sorrows, has been contradicted at every turn by philosophy; this painful disunion within the philosopher has no doubt brought many gifted spirits to ruination. This disunion is expressed clearly in Schophenahuer’s conception of beauty as the annihilation of the will; here the moral consciousness within him has exerted itself upon beauty, a beauty which has endured the touch of its flame, and which pleases it, yet the philosophical instinct has disavowed it, has named the excitation which it brought about something inimical.
Prove it.
They never told Chekov or Novalis to prove it.
Maybe not, but they weren’t philosophers. Check out the name of this site.
Of course they were philosophers.
There was no great poet who was not also a philosopher, and no great philosopher who was not also a poet.
And I did check out the name of this site. It says “I love philosophy: provoking thought since 2001.” It doesn’t say “I’m an analytical douchebag, let’s prove some bullshit.”
Ascolo, there is a whole branch of study called “moral philosophy.” You should check it out. Also, there is much in your thinking that is based on unfounded assumptions and faulty transitioning. One example is the idea that there was a golden morality in “antiquity” that doesn’t exist today. I would say, by the same logic as Will Rogers on education, that indeed morality aint what it used to be, but then it never was.
I never asserted that there was a golden morality.
Read Plotinus. Plotinus maintained that the intrinsic impulse of freedom is a turning inward, epistrophe. All great men know of this element of necessity which compels the realization of one’s self, it is the fundamental moral principle. In antiquity, this element of necessity was involved in the saint’s striving towards God, in moral consciousness itself, the conscious creation of values, of judgements, as opposed to our moralizing, which is traditional and instinctive.
The morality of antiquity itself is erroneous, but what is valuable is that moral consciousness.
So what sort of discussion were you hoping to have, when your OP is just a catalogue of assertions?
Lots of texts consist of assertions and elaborations of those premises, and have inspired lots of thought.
But by discussion, you mean argument. Rather something is wrong or right.
Here’s another “catalog of assertions.”
"The more a psychologist–a born, an unavoidable psychologist and soul-diviner–turns his attention to the more select cases and individuals, the greater is his danger of being suffocated by sympathy: he NEEDS sternness and cheerfulness more than any other man. For the corruption, the ruination of higher men, of the more unusually constituted souls, is in fact, the rule: it is dreadful to have such a rule always before one’s eyes. The manifold torment of the psychologist who has discovered this ruination, who discovers once, and then discovers ALMOST repeatedly throughout all history, this universal inner “desperateness” of higher men, this eternal “too late!” in every sense–may perhaps one day be the cause of his turning with bitterness against his own lot, and of his making an attempt at self-destruction–of his “going to ruin” himself. One may perceive in almost every psychologist a tell-tale inclination for delightful intercourse with commonplace and well-ordered men; the fact is thereby disclosed that he always requires healing, that he needs a sort of flight and forgetfulness, away from what his insight and incisiveness–from what his “business”–has laid upon his conscience. The fear of his memory is peculiar to him. He is easily silenced by the judgment of others; he hears with unmoved countenance how people honour, admire, love, and glorify, where he has PERCEIVED–or he even conceals his silence by expressly assenting to some plausible opinion. Perhaps the paradox of his situation becomes so dreadful that, precisely where he has learnt GREAT SYMPATHY, together with great CONTEMPT, the multitude, the educated, and the visionaries, have on their part learnt great reverence–reverence for “great men” and marvelous animals, for the sake of whom one blesses and honours the fatherland, the earth, the dignity of mankind, and one’s own self, to whom one points the young, and in view of whom one educates them. And who knows but in all great instances hitherto just the same happened: that the multitude worshipped a God, and that the “God” was only a poor sacrificial animal! SUCCESS has always been the greatest liar–and the “work” itself is a success; the great statesman, the conqueror, the discoverer, are disguised in their creations until they are unrecognizable; the “work” of the artist, of the philosopher, only invents him who has created it, is REPUTED to have created it; the “great men,” as they are reverenced, are poor little fictions composed afterwards; in the world of historical values spurious coinage PREVAILS. " – Nietzsche
But I guess it is impossible to talk about assertions.
Perhaps history might be less full of error if it is supposed that the canny old monk thought that naming sin in exchange for security, bed and board, in a world in which those were by no means commonly provided, was pretty fair exchange. It is a romantic illusion to suppose that monasticism or any other widespread religious phenomenon was the consequence of self-possessed moral consciousness that aims to find out its relation to things. Such consciousness might rather be supposed to have been exceptional historically was we know it is today; that pragmatism, if not cynicism and sanctimony, were as much the rule in the past as is obvious to the intelligent observer of today’s societies.
But in any case, philosophers labour under self-deception if they believe that they have to bring moral consciousness under their rule. Philosophy is no ‘peculiar art’; it is the search for what must be true, by dint of reason. And reason does not deal in such subjective commodities as beauty, which lies firmly, with ugliness, in the eye of the beholder. As for morality, the philosopher, today as ever, has to obey the common law as much as anyone- as well as the petty rules of society. Moral consciousness, or at least moral behaviour, is universal, because society cannot exist without it. Attribution of its origin is open to the widest range of opinions, and is inessential to philosophy.
I guess that’s why so many monks lived alone for a decade in a cave before they joined a monastery, eating fish and plants. Not for a period of self-reflection, but for social perks.
And no, philosophers don’t have to bring the moral consciousness under the guidance of philosophy. It’s just that, if they don’t, they fall into ruin, like Schopenhauer, producing empty conceptualizations out of the disunion between the two things.
And I do not obey any of society’s “petty rules.”
Provided miraculously, of course. No having to work for one’s living.
The majority of philosophers do not even attempt to provide ‘guidance’, moral or otherwise.
Everyone who posts here does that. We all do more of obeying petty rules than we are aware of. And no ‘harm’ in that, necessarily.
Not at all. You can state your agreement or disagreement with them. But what’s the value of that?
They’re thoughts. You can use them to, you know… think.
Sigh.
And, what’s the value in that?