Crimes and Misdemeanors
Terri Murray gets to the core of ethics with Socrates and Woody Allen
And that’s where these things often end up: morality here and now, immortality there and then.
And that means a frame of mind relating to God and religion. If you are able to think yourself into rejecting them, then any possible guilt you might feel comes to revolve more around the consequences of getting caught. Your eternal soul isn’t part of the unfolding drama, but if you are caught how to explain what you did to those who know and love you. Not to mention those who knew and loved the person you hired someone to gun down.
And even the most committed atheist is likely to acknowledge that when push comes to shove there is no way in which to be absolutely certain that a God, the God does not exist. But here this can all only unfold from the perspective of dasein. Some things you may be able to communicate to others, but any number of things can easily remain beyond a divide rooted in lives lived in very, very different ways.
Here morality clearly revolves around one’s capacity to ground it in one or another objectivist font. It can be either God and religion or atheism and a Marxist-Leninist political ideology.
On the other hand, murdering Delores would not be condoned by either frame of mind. Instead, Judah must be reconfigured into Woody Allen’s own rendition of a sociopath. Though a cultured, intelligent and sophisticated sociopath. Like, say, Hannibal Lector. From this amoral perspective, there is no ethical foundation upon which mere mortals can anchor their behaviors. There is only what “here and now” you have come to believe furthers your own best interests. And then finding an option to bring it to fruition.
And then not getting caught.
Can there then possibly be a grimmer, more cynical way in which to construe the “human condition”?
Crimes and Misdemeanors
Terri Murray gets to the core of ethics with Socrates and Woody Allen
Clearly, if the Jewish God does in fact exist, having set into motion a series of events that resulted in Delores being murdered doesn’t bode well for Judah’s soul. On the other hand, from the perspective of any number of Humanist ideologies, murder is surely the secular equivalent of a mortal sin. His soul may be irrelevant but his behavior is still thought to be objectively immoral. And he shall be punished accordingly if caught. And, if not caught, the deed will still weigh heavily on his conscience.
What then makes his Aunt’s “cynical” approach to acts of murder – even genocide! – so ominous is that the implications of moral nihilism for the “human condition” becomes brutally clear. And, in the end, Judah “goes on with his life” – a satisfying and fulfilling life – as though Delores had never existed at all.
But: all the more ominnous is that Judah is still shown to be a cultured, civilized, decent and accomplished man. The incident with Delores was a stark exception.
What then of moral nihilism in the minds of those who were and are brutal and savage down to the core?
I think what is crucial here is how it depicts my point about “I” in the is/ought world reconfiguring given new experiences. There is before and after the murder of Delores. Just as there was the before and after the affair itself. But it’s one thing to rationalize adultery, another thing altogether to rationalize a cold blooded murder.
Or, perhaps, not? Over time, Judah manages to rationalize both. Others may not manage to rationalize either. It’s all embedded in one’s own existential trajectory. Some sociopaths start out given one or another moral compass, while others can experience a childhood in which there never really is a moral compass at all.
There are as many possible paths here as there are particular human beings out in particular worlds understood in particular ways.
Crimes and Misdemeanors
Terri Murray gets to the core of ethics with Socrates and Woody Allen
Morality light? After all, what is Clifford losing Halley to Lester next to Judah hiring a hit man to kill Delores? It might be analogous to comparing Woody Allen’s relationship with 21 year old Soon-Yi Previn to those who allege that he sexually molested and abused 7 year old Dylan Farrow. And, in fact, some will argue that, as a moral nihilist – sociopath? – himself, Allen was more than capable of rationalizing both behaviors.
And, sure enough, in regard to this lighter sub-plot, I found myself becoming viscerally angered when Halley chose Lester over Clifford. It was the “wrong” thing to do given my own attachment to Clifford’s more substantive character. But this is something I am only able to attribute to dasein. Others are equally able to attach themselves to Lester for their own reasons.
That’s simply how human interactions can unfold. And we often find ourselves judging them based on our own assessment of good and bad choices.
Instead, my focus is always on the extent to which any value judgments in the form of moral narratives and political agendas are within reach of those ethicists who claim that the only legitimate path to wisdom here is through philosophy.
Crimes and Misdemeanors
Terri Murray gets to the core of ethics with Socrates and Woody Allen
Next up [of course]: What would you do? And, more to the point in a philosophy venue, is there a way to, deontologically, come up with the definitive argument that establishes what all rational and virtuous men and women ought to do.
It’s like our individual reactions to the “real world” that seems to have successfully wrecked Woody Allen’s movie career. Flagrantly slanted documentaries like Allen v. Farrow – worldofreel.com/blog/2021/2 … q35lf3cgkw – are able to create a reality/“reality” in which facts/“facts” are able to be assembled to sustain one point of view.
But the tricky thing here is that, facts or not, many assume that Allen is capable of rationalizing even the sexual abuse of his own daughter. That, in being a moral nihilist himself, his own psychological defense mechanisms are never all that far removed from the behaviors of a sociopath. He wants something, he goes after it. As with Judah and Dolores, nothing is not okay if it sustains his own perceived self interests. In other words, scrap all that “philosophical” crap some seem to obsess on.
All I do here is to note how, in regard to our moral and political value judgments, the choices we make seem to be derived more from the arguments I make in my signature threads than from the arguments any number of moral objectivists here make in rooting the resolution of conflicting goods in God or deontology or ideology or nature. And how those decisions are derived in turn from any number social, political and economic contexts down through the ages.
Then, in acknowledging the existential implications of this, others are either more or less “fractured and fragmented” themselves.
Crimes and Misdemeanors
Terri Murray gets to the core of ethics with Socrates and Woody Allen
On the other hand, historically, every war finds itself intertwined in very different contexts/sets of circumstances. Was it better to suffer the evil that many saw embodied in a Nazi victory in World War II, or to inflict what they saw as evil in our own moral and political agenda. When does it become morally okay – even obligatory – to inflict pain and suffering on others in a particular war.
Then fast forward to Korea or Vietnam or Afghanistan or Iraq. How do the moral parameters here become, say, more ambiguous?
In Crimes and Misdemeanors, suppose Dolores was shown to pursue behaviors that many feel are immoral. Would it be more appropriate to inflict evil on her in order stop her from inflicting it on others. Could Judah have come to think of himself as the hero instead?
It’s all, well, existential…
Okay, but how is that not rooted subjectively/subjunctively in the manner in which I construe human identity here as the embodiment of dasein?
No, in view, for Socrates, Plato [and the author], meaning here becomes more “formal”. It is linked to conclusions about the self and morality that, in my view, are more intellectual contraptions…philosophical assessments that allow them to avoid the more “down to earth” arguments I make here in my signature threads.
The Ethics of Ambiguity
Charlotte Moore freely subjects de Beauvoir’s ethics to a discerning scrutiny.
More to the point [mine] the parts that some do find defensible theoretically…what then becomes of that defense when “for all practical purposes” they find themselves in a situation where their own assessments of ethical behavior are challenged by others?
To which I point out that, given the many, many, many very different experiences any particular individuals might have over time historically and across the globe culturally, how could value judgments not be profoundly subjective intellectually and profoundly subjunctive emotionally? And if subjective and subjunctive how do we reach the point where as philosophers/ethicists our arguments become less and less ambiguous.
My condition here is only that the theoretical conclusions be taken down out of the intellectual contraption clouds and be explored, well, existentially.
Okay, but how would this distinction be made in regard to moral values that come into conflict? From my vantage point the ambiguity here is derived from the fact that based on sets of experiences that can be radically different each individual subject is going to come away with different moral and political predispositions.
On the other hand, moral and political values that are not construed ambiguously/subjectively are anchored to religious or secular fonts that are said to encompass the only rational frame of mind.
The Ethics of Ambiguity
Charlotte Moore freely subjects de Beauvoir’s ethics to a discerning scrutiny.
Okay, but how far removed is essence and nature from objective? It still comes down to the extent to which whatever you call your ethical values is construed by you as that which all rational and virtuous men and women are thought by you to be obligated to share if they wish to be thought of by you as both rational and virtuous.
And then the part where the creation of an ethics, however it is thought be by one as an individual, is still rooted more or less in one’s historical, cultural and circumstantial interactions. And in the ever evolving interaction of contingency, chance and change.
Meaning, from my frame of mind, that there really is no essence involved here. After all, we all don’t become who we are in the present based on the same past or projecting into the same future. Instead, one by one by one, our values are likely to be profoundly existential fabrications instead.
Here, of course, I make the distinction between aspects of our self derived from our genes, out biological predisposition, our demographic profile in which any number of factors related to our identity are the human equivalent of rocks and tables. They reflect objective facts about ourselves which are far more easily communicated to others as “things” about us. And then the “self” that comes to embody particular value judgments rooted far more subjectively/subjunctively in dasein.
Again, there is what all of this is said to mean technically given the tools at the disposal of “serious philosophers”, and how ambiguity here is understood by me given the arguments I make in my signature threads.
That’s the part I wish to explore here. Given a particular context.
The Ethics of Ambiguity
Charlotte Moore freely subjects de Beauvoir’s ethics to a discerning scrutiny.
Here of course the assumption must be made that, for reasons we still are unable to grasp, the mind is able to “transcend” the body and discuss this distinction with some measure of free will, autonomy, volition…or whatever word is preferred in circumventing hard determinism. If the relationship between nature and nurture, genes and memes is entirely embedded in the laws of matter then, well, your guess is as good as mine.
So, here…
…we are back to all agreeing that the author is not noting only that which she was ever able to note and we are not reacting to it in the only possible manner in which nature compels us to.
I merely reconfigure this point in the general direction of the arguments I make in my signature threads. The nature of our being rooted “out in the world” given the components of my own intellectual contraption given descriptions, assessments and judgments passed regarding our existential freedom and moral obligations.
Again, how bogged down are we going to become in language such as this in discussing our own moral and political value judgments? It’s less a question of priorities in my view than in recognizing that sooner or latter our theoretical or technical conclusions are going to have to take on the mind and the matter, the self and the other, the individual and the society in regard to experiences and interactions that necessary intertwine the id and the ego and the superego. What of them then?
The Ethics of Ambiguity
Charlotte Moore freely subjects de Beauvoir’s ethics to a discerning scrutiny.
On the other hand, it’s only oppression if that’s what others are able to talk you into believing that it is. After all, for Sartre, “hell is other people” not only because the objectify you but because they think themselves into believing that they can tell you the one and the only way in which to embody moral and political value judgments. My point is merely to suggest that any number of existentialists fail to grasp the extent to which they are more than capable of objectifying themselves. By, for example, making a “philosophical” distinction between authentic and inauthentic behavior.
And not just in regard to gender roles. Only, for someone like me, the further I get away from authenticity the closer I get to fractured and fragmented. And eventually I reached the conclusion that it is almost impossible to say which is worse.
Again, “condemned” only to the extent that we are able to think ourselves into believing that we understand what he means by this. And, if we do think that we do, agree that it’s true. The part about being born to make choices is certainly the case. Not many exceptions there. But the part about choosing ethically and/or authentically seems rooted more in the assumptions that I make. As the "fractured and fragmented “I”.
On the other hand, is this just another example of “bad faith”?
The Ethics of Ambiguity
Charlotte Moore freely subjects de Beauvoir’s ethics to a discerning scrutiny.
Here, however, I always go back to the existential parameters of freedom in a No God world. If you think yourself into believing that sans God freedom becomes the embodiment of “in the absense of God all things are permitted”, then you can choose to behave as, say, the sociopath does. And, more to point, justify that frame of mind…philosophically? If there is no omniscient/omnipresent entity able to grasp everything that you do and, in being omnipotent, able to punish you for doing objectively wrong – sinful – things, then why not choose a morality that revolves around “what’s in it for me”?
You can still choose to fit into a community based on the accepted mores of that community…if it is to your advantage. But then choose not to if it is not to your advantage. You merely shift gears so as to focus more on not getting caught.
Again, back to this: In what particular context? We would have focus in on this clash between assessments of freedom and moral obligation, given a set of circumstances in which moral and political value judgments come into conflict. How would someone who embraces de Beauvoir’s reaction differ from someone who embraced Sartre’s?
Inherently free, perhaps. But only given the assumption that the exercise of this freedom is always going to be situated within the parameters of the particular worlds experienced existentially in particular historical and cultural contexts. Isn’t it the fact of this that precipitates philosophical discussions that revolve around ethics either construed or not construed to be within the rational and virtuous parameters of deontology?
The Ethics of Ambiguity
Charlotte Moore freely subjects de Beauvoir’s ethics to a discerning scrutiny.
You know, in a universe that has unfolded over billions of years resulting in, among other things, the evolution of biological life on planet Earth culminating [thus far] in a species – us – that may or may not have the capacity to intertwine these important components of the “human condition” of our own volition.
And, given free will, moral freedom can be explored in any number of particular, existential contexts. But ontological freedom? What on Earth is that? Has anyone even come close to pinning it down other than in a world of words?
As I understand this, the ontological component then revolves around the assumption that we do have free will. We cannot not choose a point of view regarding moral conflicts because even if we choose not to “get involved” that in and of itself is a choice.
Something along the lines of the Objectivist band Rush:
“You can choose a ready guide in some celestial voice
If you choose not to decide, you still have made a choice
You can choose from phantom fears and kindness that can kill
I will choose a path that’s clear, I will choose Freewill”
Through human interactions. Such that, as Sartre noted, “hell is other people”. Why? Because they do refuse to accept our own moral freedom…and, instead, objectify us. Everything comes back around to their own moral and political prejudices seen instead as the objective truth “in their head”. I merely suggest that to the extent we become like them and insist others are obligated to share our own values, we objectify ourselves as well.
And this of course is not just a political prejudice rooted subjectively in dasein. This is the objective truth going all the way back to your own definitive explanation for existence itself.
Same here. This settles it. Period. Don’t agree? Then you are necessarily wrong.
The Ethics of Ambiguity
Charlotte Moore freely subjects de Beauvoir’s ethics to a discerning scrutiny.
Technically, as it were.
Still, given a particular situation, there are going to be facts that can be more or less ascertained. Even in thought experiments like the Trolley Car conundrum, an actual number of people will die if you choose one option rather than another. And, in fact, you may or may not have a personal relationship with some and not others. And, in fact, others will react to your choice based on all of the actual facts involved in the circumstances of their own lives.
In other words, it’s not exactly like just flipping a coin.
Of course here [for some] everything then hinges on pinning down the precise [technical] definition of “subjectivism”. A didactic exchange in which it is determined that, given the consensus regarding what the word does mean, only then can we rationally assess whether the existentialists in general and/or de Beauvoir’s “ethic of ambiguity” in particular is or is not in fact an example of it.
Meanwhile, I come in only after the meaning of it is established…in order to ask how, given a set of circumstances, a particular subject has come to conclude what either is or is not ethical “for all practical purposes”.
In the interim, back up into the clouds…
“Bad faith” philosophically…and “bad faith” encompassed in the charges of those who insist that good and bad themselves have already been established by them. And, thus, that moral freedom must revolve around this default in any discussion.
And, if others insist I am not grasping this technical distinction correctly, what other option is there but for us to focus the exchange on situations involving conflicting goods…situations most will be familiar with…and flesh out the components of our own moral and political philosophy.
The Ethics of Ambiguity
Charlotte Moore freely subjects de Beauvoir’s ethics to a discerning scrutiny.
Well, in my view, it’s objective only to the extent that, in taking a leap of faith to No God, you assume that there is no getting around the fact that over and over and over again, in interacting with others socially, politically and economically, we are often confronted with the need to choose behaviors that come into conflict with others. So, the choice must be made. You must choose one value over another. But that is a very different approach to objective morality than the one I focus in on: the belief that, in being confronted with the choice, one can in fact choose good over evil in a world where there is no transcending font able, on the other side, to reduce our choices down to one or another Judgment Day.
And the values we are obligated to create given the manner in which freedom is construed to be an objective component of the human condition are [for me] no less rooted existentially in dasein.
And even here assuming in turn free will.
Here, of course, it all comes down to how far you take this “ethical calculus”. Every context is embedded in facts that can be shared. Mary can have her own perfectly rational assessment of her unwanted pregnancy. She can provide any number of sound reasons why, given her situation and frame of mind, it is reasonable to choose abortion. And those on the other side can do the same in regard to the fate of the unborn. In other words, since it is an individual subject who thinks and feels as they do given their own assessment of their life, there’s no getting around subjectivism in that sense.
As for this though:
“Ethical subjectivism or moral non-objectivism is the meta-ethical view which claims that: Ethical sentences express propositions. … The truth or falsity of such propositions is ineliminably dependent on the (actual or hypothetical) attitudes of people.” wiki
You tell me. Given a particular situation for example.
However, we would still need a context in which to explore these distinctions as I do. Though definitely intersubjective. After all, if you were alone, completely isolated and apart from all other subjects, what would be the point of ethics? Other than in relationship to any particular God you believed in.
The Ethics of Ambiguity
Charlotte Moore freely subjects de Beauvoir’s ethics to a discerning scrutiny.
First, the technical take on ethical subjectivism at wiki:
[b]Ethical subjectivism or moral non-objectivism is the meta-ethical view which claims that:
1] Ethical sentences express propositions.
2] Some such propositions are true.
3] The truth or falsity of such propositions is ineliminably dependent on the (actual or hypothetical) attitudes of people.
This makes ethical subjectivism a form of cognitivism (because ethical statements are the types of things that can be true or false). Ethical subjectivism stands in opposition to moral realism, which claims that moral propositions refer to objective facts, independent of human opinion; to error theory, which denies that any moral propositions are true in any sense; and to non-cognitivism, which denies that moral sentences express propositions at all.[/b]
Got that? Or, perhaps, might examining the meaning of this given a situation in which two or more individuals come into conflict over particular moral judgments given a particular context be helpful in making it all more perspicuous?
Of course my own moral philosophy is more, what, radical than hers? In a No God world [as I construe it] the “general criteria” that anyone proposes is going to be derived more from my assumptions regarding “I” as the embodiment of dasein in the is/ought world. Rather than through a philosophical assessment like the one above.
First the intellectual assessment:
And then the part where this is actually taken out into the world in regard to a context in which “goods” and “value judgments” do often come into conflict:
Here though I go back to the part where homosexuality itself is construed by some as either immoral or unnatural. Or both. And unless that can be resolved beyond merely acknowledging conflicting political prejudices, anything that we do to champion it or to impede it is going to be problematic.
This is a classic “serious philosophy” exchange in which for page afrer page after page the discussion goes on and on and on with almost no mention of any actual moral conflicts pertaining to the world that we live and interact in. Descriptions of objective morality there. Or concrete reasons why there isn’t any.
Now, when this was once going to be a debate between ecmandu and pedro, I suggested abortion. And for all of the reason that I would.
That was rejected. But since then what has been put in its place?
True, I haven’t read every single post. So, if there was a discussion of a particular set of conflicting goods, I might have missed it. But, if not, if they ever do get around to, say, something that pops up in the news in which different sides have their own “one of us” objectivist moral narratives and political agendas, I’d appreciate someone bringing it to my attention.
The Ethics of Ambiguity
Charlotte Moore freely subjects de Beauvoir’s ethics to a discerning scrutiny.
Really, think about that. It is clearly true. And, in being true, it becomes abundantly obvious to all those who are not objectivists that this intersubjective meaning is communicated in countlessly evolving contexts over time historically and around the globe culturally. There are, in turn, countless individual experiences that any particular child might come to embody such that his or her own indoctrination can come to encompass any number of hopelessly conflicting spiritual, moral and political narratives. Yet any number of objectivists – and we’ve got our fair share of them here – still manage to be absolutely adamant that it is their very own prejudices that reflect the one true deontological assessment of the human condition.
Tell me that’s not a psychological condition.
Sure, if you embrace an ethics that leaves little or no room for ambiguity, how much care and consideration are you going to give for those who don’t swallow whole your own dogmas? How much ambiguity was there in the political ideologies that rent the human species throughout the 20th Century? You care only for your own when you are an objectivist. On the other hand, as we delve deeper into the 21st Century, philosophical examinations of ambiguity give way to more simple calculations: “show me the money” and “what’s in it for me”. Few great totalitarian juggernauts are still around, but the global economy sustained by and large by the great state capitalists juggernauts can be just as ominous for millions.
And then if the ambiguity you feel leads to a fractured and fragmented understanding of the world around you [and the people in it] all bets are off for where you land.
The Ethics of Ambiguity
Charlotte Moore freely subjects de Beauvoir’s ethics to a discerning scrutiny.
Yes, up in the far less ambiguous clouds of a philosophical exchange, this makes sense. And, perhaps, in any particular community that is small enough a consensus might be reached such that in regard to certain interactions, moral obligations and moral freedoms can be intertwined so as to sustain a minimal of dysfunction from day to day.
But, from my perspective, that’s not the same as establishing a moral agenda that is argued to be objective. And you can be almost certain that sooner or later contingency, chance and change will act to bring this consensus to the breaking point.
Then the part where reciprocity comes to revolve less around a moral consensus and more around the role that power plays in any human relationships. Someone always has more of it than others.
Is there anyone here who thinks they understand the points that are being made above? Because I am certainly at a loss to translate them into the life that I have lived when my own experiences with others resulted in moral and political conflicts.
Transcend myself? My freedom dependent on the freedom of others? Merely subjective?
Sure, I recognize that [given free will] in choosing my own behaviors there can be no real freedom if others are obligated to choose the same behaviors. But that still does not grapple with ambiguity as I understand it from the perspective of the “fractured and fragmented” persona “out in the world” with others.
Instead, it seems more in keeping with an objectivist frame of mind. You allow others to exercise their own freedom but the ambiguity is still contained in a moral narrative and a political agenda in which one is still convinced that their own choices are more “authentic” than others. The compromise instead revolves more around accepting “moderation, negotiation and compromise” re democracy and the rule of law. Rather than in a belief that the world isn’t still divided between “one of us” and “one of them”.