Prismatic567 wrote:Note sure of your point?Sauwelios wrote:Prismatic567 wrote:In this case, every participant will have one 'vote' and all 'votes' counter equally. Why? this is to avoid biasness.
But it doesn't avoid bias at all, as the vote would then be biased toward the idea that all men are equal. This would actually make the vote biased for Kant and against Nietzsche a priori.
What is your proposal to ensure fairness then?
I don't propose a poll or a rating at all. In my view only the great can recognize greatness.
A reasonable sample that is recognized by you and others.To be more credible we could get recognized philosophers to complete the rating.
Philosophers recognized by whom?
But wouldn't that recognition then also have to be based on a rating with accepted criteria and "weightances", and this rating, in turn, also have to be completed by recognized philosophers to be more credible? Doesn't recognizing who is the greatest among multiple philosophers presuppose the recognition of philosophers in general?
Again I am not sure of your point?No, Kant's unhistorical conception of reason implies what Picht, following Pascal, calls the God of the philosophers in contradistinction to the God of the Bible. I quote again:"What the sun is in the domain of the sensual world, the idea of the good, which Plato in his later works designates as God, is in the domain of true being. As light and heat radiate from the sun, so truth and being radiate from the idea of the good, and as the sensual eye of man is at the same time brought forth by and adequate to the light of the sun, so that he can see what appears in this light, so the spiritual eye of man is both engendered by and adequate to the idea of the good, so that he can know [erkennen] what is in truth.
Modern philosophy calls this spiritual faculty of knowledge 'reason', and adheres to the doctrine that reason is able to know what is solely because reason is in accord with that light of truth in which we are able to know all that is. Christian metaphysics calls this light the lumen naturale, the natural light, in contradistinction to the lumen supranaturale, which is also called the lumen fidei [light of faith], namely the light of eschatological revelation. The term lumen is ambiguous. Lumen in Latin does not just mean 'the light' but also 'the eye'. [...] For philosophy the ambiguity of lumen means the following: the seat of the lumen naturale is the human faculty of knowledge. It rests on the inborn ideas which give reason the faculty of knowing the world the way it is in truth. But these ideas could, as Descartes establishes, just as well be a deception. They could just as well force us to know [or: cognize] the world the way it is not. We could well have been created by an evil spirit which has created us as a creature fallen prey to deception. The truth of the inborn ideas, and with that the lumen naturale, is ensured only if it is proven that the hypothesis of an evil God is unthinkable. As long as we do not transcend the bounds of the human faculty of knowledge, the only unquestionable thing is that we think. If, over and above that, we wish to ensure that what we think is true, we have to assure ourselves of the knowledge of God." (Picht, Nietzsche, page 217, my translation.)
I gathered,
1. Kant's unhistorical conception of reason = the God of the philosophers,
in contradistinction to
2. the God of the Bible.
I can't detect what is your argument and problem statement from the above.
For me, your point 1 make no sense at all and I cannot relate it to the Picht quote you provided. Picht views above do not explain and reflect Kant's view of what is the faculty of reason and its limits.
"Kant's unhistorical conception of reason" - what has to do with Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.
To Kant, the faculty of reason is the highest mental faculty which humans must exploit to the fullest but one must understand its limits and limitations. He expressed this in his Critique of Pure Reason.
Note here is how Kant criticized Plato's abuse of the faculty of reason [italic = mine],It was thus that Plato [relied on reason] left the World of the Senses, as setting too narrow Limits to the Understanding, and ventured out beyond it on the wings of the Ideas, in the empty Space of the Pure Understanding.
He [Plato] did not observe that with all his efforts he made no advance meeting no resistance that might, as it were, serve as a support upon which he could take a stand, to which he could apply his powers, and so set his Understanding in motion.
It is, indeed, the common fate of Human Reason to complete its Speculative Structures as speedily as may be, and only afterwards to enquire whether the foundations are reliable. All sorts of excuses will then be appealed to, in order to reassure us of their solidity, or rather indeed to enable us to dispense altogether with so late and so dangerous an enquiry. [A5] [B9]
Kant understood and respect the higher power of the faculty of reason and use it optimally and at the same time 'kill' it where necessary if reason [pure] is going too far.
Obviously Kant's use of reason would not fit into Picht's view, i.e.
"Modern philosophy calls this spiritual faculty of knowledge 'reason' ......."
If you insist, prove and justify that with reference to Kant's texts.
I know Kant has an idiosyncratic conception of reason (Vernunft), distinguishing it from the "understanding" (Verstand) and "intuition" (Anschauung). Picht and I, however, are talking about the entire human cognitive apparatus, which makes synthetic a priori judgments. What Kant assumes or posits is that that apparatus, and therefore the judgments it makes, is unhistorical. To be sure, he does not teach that it was created by a transcendent God; after all, he teaches that things in themselves are inaccessible to us. Thus Fichte already dismissed the whole notion of "things in themselves"--in fact, he was convinced that such a great mind as Kant could not possibly have meant this the way he seemed to have meant it! But Kant of course had an ulterior motive: to leave open the possibility of a good transcendent God, immortal souls, free will, and an afterlife with rewards or punishments. But thereby Kant leaves open the possibility that our cognitive apparatus was created by a good transcendent God! Indeed, Kant taught that it was necessary for human beings to believe in such a God, the immortality of their own souls, the freedom of their will, etc. So according to Kant it's necessary for us to believe that our cognitive apparatus with its necessary beliefs and synthetic a priori judgments was created by a good transcendent God, "in His own image" so to say: our finite reason is then the once-and-for-all finite incarnation or in-spiration of infinite divine reason, much like, in Christianity, Jesus Christ--who is there called the Ultimate Adam--is the sole and definite incarnation of God. Compare Hegel and Vaishnavism: in Hegel, every finite form of reason is a historical manifestation of absolute spirit, and the sequence of these forms is progressive, so that each consecutive form is a more perfect manifestation; much like, in Vaishnavism, there are at least ten incarnations of God, of whose progressive-evolutionary interpretation there exists a veritable tradition: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dashavatara#Evolutionary_interpretation