Kant vs Nietzsche

[Sauwelios]

In this case, every participant will have one 'vote' and all 'votes' counter equally. Why? this is to avoid biasness.

But it doesn't avoid bias at all, as the vote would then be biased toward the idea that all men are equal. This would actually make the vote biased for Kant and against Nietzsche a priori.

Note sure of your point?
What is your proposal to ensure fairness then?

I don't propose a poll or a rating at all. In my view only the great can recognize greatness.

To be more credible we could get recognized philosophers to complete the rating.

Philosophers recognized by whom?

A reasonable sample that is recognized by you and others.

But wouldn't that recognition then also have to be based on a rating with accepted criteria and "weightances", and this rating, in turn, also have to be completed by recognized philosophers to be more credible? Doesn't recognizing who is the greatest among multiple philosophers presuppose the recognition of philosophers in general?

No, Kant's unhistorical conception of reason implies what Picht, following Pascal, calls the God of the philosophers in contradistinction to the God of the Bible. I quote again:

"What the sun is in the domain of the sensual world, the idea of the good, which Plato in his later works designates as God, is in the domain of true being. As light and heat radiate from the sun, so truth and being radiate from the idea of the good, and as the sensual eye of man is at the same time brought forth by and adequate to the light of the sun, so that he can see what appears in this light, so the spiritual eye of man is both engendered by and adequate to the idea of the good, so that he can know [erkennen] what is in truth.
Modern philosophy calls this spiritual faculty of knowledge 'reason', and adheres to the doctrine that reason is able to know what is solely because reason is in accord with that light of truth in which we are able to know all that is. Christian metaphysics calls this light the lumen naturale, the natural light, in contradistinction to the lumen supranaturale, which is also called the lumen fidei [light of faith], namely the light of eschatological revelation. The term lumen is ambiguous. Lumen in Latin does not just mean 'the light' but also 'the eye'. [...] For philosophy the ambiguity of lumen means the following: the seat of the lumen naturale is the human faculty of knowledge. It rests on the inborn ideas which give reason the faculty of knowing the world the way it is in truth. But these ideas could, as Descartes establishes, just as well be a deception. They could just as well force us to know [or: cognize] the world the way it is not. We could well have been created by an evil spirit which has created us as a creature fallen prey to deception. The truth of the inborn ideas, and with that the lumen naturale, is ensured only if it is proven that the hypothesis of an evil God is unthinkable. As long as we do not transcend the bounds of the human faculty of knowledge, the only unquestionable thing is that we think. If, over and above that, we wish to ensure that what we think is true, we have to assure ourselves of the knowledge of God." (Picht, Nietzsche, page 217, my translation.)

Again I am not sure of your point?

I gathered,
1. Kant's unhistorical conception of reason = the God of the philosophers,
in contradistinction to
2. the God of the Bible.

I can't detect what is your argument and problem statement from the above.
For me, your point 1 make no sense at all and I cannot relate it to the Picht quote you provided. Picht views above do not explain and reflect Kant's view of what is the faculty of reason and its limits.

"Kant's unhistorical conception of reason" - what has to do with Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.
To Kant, the faculty of reason is the highest mental faculty which humans must exploit to the fullest but one must understand its limits and limitations. He expressed this in his Critique of Pure Reason.

Note here is how Kant criticized Plato's abuse of the faculty of reason [italic = mine],

It was thus that Plato [relied on reason] left the World of the Senses, as setting too narrow Limits to the Understanding, and ventured out beyond it on the wings of the Ideas, in the empty Space of the Pure Understanding.
He [Plato] did not observe that with all his efforts he made no advance meeting no resistance that might, as it were, serve as a support upon which he could take a stand, to which he could apply his powers, and so set his Understanding in motion.
It is, indeed, the common fate of Human Reason to complete its Speculative Structures as speedily as may be, and only afterwards to enquire whether the foundations are reliable. All sorts of excuses will then be appealed to, in order to reassure us of their solidity, or rather indeed to enable us to dispense altogether with so late and so dangerous an enquiry. [A5] [B9]

Kant understood and respect the higher power of the faculty of reason and use it optimally and at the same time 'kill' it where necessary if reason [pure] is going too far.
Obviously Kant's use of reason would not fit into Picht's view, i.e.
"Modern philosophy calls this spiritual faculty of knowledge 'reason' ......."
If you insist, prove and justify that with reference to Kant's texts.

I know Kant has an idiosyncratic conception of reason (Vernunft), distinguishing it from the "understanding" (Verstand) and "intuition" (Anschauung). Picht and I, however, are talking about the entire human cognitive apparatus, which makes synthetic a priori judgments. What Kant assumes or posits is that that apparatus, and therefore the judgments it makes, is unhistorical. To be sure, he does not teach that it was created by a transcendent God; after all, he teaches that things in themselves are inaccessible to us. Thus Fichte already dismissed the whole notion of "things in themselves"--in fact, he was convinced that such a great mind as Kant could not possibly have meant this the way he seemed to have meant it! But Kant of course had an ulterior motive: to leave open the possibility of a good transcendent God, immortal souls, free will, and an afterlife with rewards or punishments. But thereby Kant leaves open the possibility that our cognitive apparatus was created by a good transcendent God! Indeed, Kant taught that it was necessary for human beings to believe in such a God, the immortality of their own souls, the freedom of their will, etc. So according to Kant it's necessary for us to believe that our cognitive apparatus with its necessary beliefs and synthetic a priori judgments was created by a good transcendent God, "in His own image" so to say: our finite reason is then the once-and-for-all finite incarnation or in-spiration of infinite divine reason, much like, in Christianity, Jesus Christ--who is there called the Ultimate Adam--is the sole and definite incarnation of God. Compare Hegel and Vaishnavism: in Hegel, every finite form of reason is a historical manifestation of absolute spirit, and the sequence of these forms is progressive, so that each consecutive form is a more perfect manifestation; much like, in Vaishnavism, there are at least ten incarnations of God, of whose progressive-evolutionary interpretation there exists a veritable tradition: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dashavatara#Evolutionary_interpretation

[Prismatic567]

Prismatic,
What i think Sauwelious is trying to get at is that Kant merely replaces God with reason. ...

Noted.

[Prismatic567]

I don't propose a poll or a rating at all. In my view only the great can recognize greatness.

So how would you propose a reasonable objective comparison.

As Nietzsche had implied, 'there is no absolute, there are only perspectives'.
I have no issue with poll or rating, as long as I am aware of the terms and conditions.
If the greats are egoistical, narcissistic, etc. they may be bias only to their own greatness.

But wouldn't that recognition then also have to be based on a rating with accepted criteria and "weightances", and this rating, in turn, also have to be completed by recognized philosophers to be more credible? Doesn't recognizing who is the greatest among multiple philosophers presuppose the recognition of philosophers in general?

As I said, the final resultant is conditioned to the terms, criteria and other conditions that are used within the framework.
Thus in this case we need to understand who are the participants.

Let say we select 200 credible philosophers who has at least 15 years of teaching in a university and are familiar with Kant and Nietzsche. Their credentials are open for all to read and verify. If you find all the variable acceptable, then you should find the final results acceptable.

The point is whatever the approach used, we need to understand and agree with the variables used. The result is then conditioned upon these agreed variables.


The following points are bad understanding of Kant's view and straw-men.

I know Kant has an idiosyncratic conception of reason (Vernunft), distinguishing it from the "understanding" (Verstand) and "intuition" (Anschauung).

This is a delineation in line with progressive evolution from animality (senses to thinking) to humanity (thinking to higher reasoning). What Kant did was representing the fact in a more detailed form and explanation.

Picht and I, however, are talking about the entire human cognitive apparatus, which makes synthetic a priori judgments.
Note Kant's main approach is 'Completeness' and his forte is systematicity and architectonic. However to get an idea of the whole we need to understand the parts in details. This is why Kant analyzed the parts of the mental faculty in detail.

In this enquiry I have made Completeness my chief aim, and I venture to assert that there is not a single metaphysical problem which has not been solved, or for the solution of which the key at least has not been supplied.

Completeness - this is what neuroscience and connectome is attempting to do.

A connectome is a comprehensive map of neural connections in the brain, and may be thought of as its "wiring diagram". More broadly, a connectome would include the mapping of all neural connections within an organism's nervous system.

What Kant assumes or posits is that that apparatus, and therefore the judgments it makes, is unhistorical.

When understood thoroughly, Kant's 'history' cover from the epigenesis of the first one cell entity to the human being. What Kant deliberately left out was the later cruder history of mankind which he left for others [from Hegel to the postmodernists] that followed him to take up.

To be sure, he does not teach that it was created by a transcendent God; after all, he teaches that things in themselves are inaccessible to us.

To be sure, according to Kant, the transcendent God is impossible to be real and to insist it is real is illusory and delusional.
It is your phrasing of the things-in-themselves as ontological that is misleading yourself to what Kant meant.
Kant never intended the thing-in-itself as some independent ontological substance or essence that need to be or possible to be known at all.
I have quoted, to Kant, the thing-in-itself is an assumption to be used negatively as a limit and never be used positively in the real sense.
Kant used the thing-in-itself within his moral system in another sense but that require extensive analysis to understand where it stand, but ultimately it is never an independent ontological absolute substance nor essence.

Thus Fichte already dismissed the whole notion of "things in themselves"--in fact, he was convinced that such a great mind as Kant could not possibly have meant this the way he seemed to have meant it!

If Ficthe unable to align the idea of the thing-in-itself epistemologically within philosophy, then he had wrongly interpret Kant's view. Note Schopenhauer's positive Will.
As far as I had gathered, Nietzsche's philosophy is in alignment with Kant's but fall short of Kant's total 'complete' framework representing reality.

But Kant of course had an ulterior motive: to leave open the possibility of a good transcendent God, immortal souls, free will, and an afterlife with rewards or punishments.

Nah .. this 'an afterlife with rewards or punishments' is rubbish to Kant and he detested organized religions.
But Kant did state,

I have therefore found it necessary to deny(aufheben) Knowledge[Wissen] in order to make room for Faith.[Glaube.]

This require VERY heavy and in depth analysis to understand and 'faith' in this case is not religion nor the theistic God.

But thereby Kant leaves open the possibility that our cognitive apparatus was created by a good transcendent God!

This contradict your above;
To be sure, he does not teach that it was created by a transcendent God;

I had already stated Kant asserted the transcendent and real God is an impossibility.
Kant did use the idea of a transcendental [not transcendent =illusion] God within his System of Morality. However we need detail analysis to avoid conflating it with the conventional belief in God as in theism and theistic religions.
I personally do not agree with his use of the term 'God' [carry a lot of negative baggage] rather I would prefer the term ens realissimum as an assumption [not ontological substance].

Indeed, Kant taught that it was necessary for human beings to believe in such a God, the immortality of their own souls, the freedom of their will, etc. So according to Kant it's necessary for us to believe that our cognitive apparatus with its necessary beliefs and synthetic a priori judgments was created by a good transcendent God, "in His own image" so to say: our finite reason is then the once-and-for-all finite incarnation or inspiration of infinite divine reason, much like, in Christianity, Jesus Christ--who is there called the Ultimate Adam--is the sole and definite incarnation of God.

This is all bullshit, nonsense and has no relevance to Kant's philosophy.

Compare Hegel and Vaishnavism: in Hegel, every finite form of reason is a historical manifestation of absolute spirit, and the sequence of these forms is progressive, so that each consecutive form is a more perfect manifestation; much like, in Vaishnavism, there are at least ten incarnations of God, of whose progressive-evolutionary interpretation there exists a veritable tradition: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dashavatara#Evolutionary_interpretation

Hegel's philosophy is grounded on the Absolute as in pantheism and Brahman of Vedanta.

Hegel was blinded by a natural and unavoidable illusion;

And secondly, both it and its opposite must involve no mere artificial Illusion such as at once vanishes upon detection, but a natural and unavoidable Illusion, which even after it has ceased to beguile still continues to delude though not to deceive us, and which though thus capable of being rendered harmless can never be eradicated. B449

Once Hegel [other pantheists] has been seduced by the natural unadvoidable transcendent illusion it is not easy for him to rationalize away and this basic virus infect and distort his philosophy.

They are sophistications not of men but of Pure Reason itself. Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them. After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the Illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him.

As for the progressive-evolutionary process, Kant went into great details to lay down the principles of
-the logical principle of genera
-the logical principles of specification
and tying in with the taxonomy of Carolus Linnaeus.

Note this related point;

These we may entitle
1. the Principles of homogeneity,
2. [the Principles of] Specification, and
3. [the Principles of] Continuity of Forms.

The last named [Principle of Continuity of Forms] arises from union of the other two, inasmuch as only through the processes
1. of ascending to the higher genera and
2. of descending to the lower species
do we obtain the Idea of Systematic Connection in its Completeness.
For all the Manifold differences are then related to one another, inasmuch as they one and all spring from one highest genus, through all degrees of a more and more widely extended Determination. A658 B686

Schopenhauer also wrote on the above as if the idea was from himself.

[Orbie]

That gives it away. 'Descended from the slightest genus' is neo-Platonism at its best. the fact is , declension has been eclipsed by ascension, and that is the problem, par excellence. how to measure descent from ascent, is a problem, with myriad implications. relatively speaking, how can one, tell the difference ? If not compared to another object in movement, and event the. It is simply impossible.

[Orbie]

That gives it away. 'Descended from the slightest genus' is neo-Platonism at its best. the fact is , descension has been eclipsed by ascension, and that is the problem, par excellence. how to measure descent from ascent, is a problem, with myriad
implications. relatively speaking, how can one, tell the difference ? If not compared to another object in movement, and even then.
L It is simply impossible.

[Prismatic567]

That gives it away. 'Descended from the slightest genus' is neo-Platonism at its best. the fact is , descension has been eclipsed by ascension, and that is the problem, par excellence. how to measure descent from ascent, is a problem, with myriad
implications. relatively speaking, how can one, tell the difference ? If not compared to another object in movement, and even then.
L It is simply impossible.

Not sure of your point, can you give some examples.
Note Kant is not an expert in biology but merely expound the principles involved from the philosophical approach, i.e. the philosophy of biology.

[Prismatic567]

“I mistrust all Systematizers and I avoid them. The Will-To-System is a lack of integrity.”
Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systems_theory
System Theory is critical to knowledge and an understanding of reality.
By rejecting the 'system' perspective, this is a minus point for Nietzsche in terms of philosophy.

No wonder those who hero-worship Nietzsche are so anti-Kant because one of Kant's stronger point is his systematicity and architectonic.

Here is a comment on Nietzsche's rejection of system theory.

Nietzsche apparently supposes that there could be such a thing as the integrity of a fragment, or even of an isolated impulse or insight, divorced from the whole of which it is a part.
This gets things exactly wrong, by treating stubborn adherence to the isolated impulse in disregard of the whole as a necessary condition for integrity.

[Fixed Cross]

Erik - Reason flows forth from the passions. Whoever treats reason as if it operates independently of the energies has not yet begun to think.

Kants categorizations are useful but not profound or especially meaningful. He is still wholly passion-bound, has not yet begun to clearly reflect (on) it, which is to say himself.

Kants first axiom lies in the dark, and is thus useless to him, affording him honesty nor consistency.

With Schopenhauer there is a breakthrough. He discerns what it is in passion that allows for reason to come out of it: will and imagination ("Vorstellung").

Nietzsche went on to dissect the workings of that phenomenon, and to integrate all conceptual understanding into the fundamental logic he had discerned in and developed out of Schopenhauers idea.

What we have here is a logic that is consistent with itself and includes in itself the ground of logic itself. From here on philosophy could begin to produce scientific results.

Nietzsches emphasis came to lie on the concept value. Herein he found the terms to the logic of what manifests as power.

I developed these terms to amount to a fully operational philosophical grammar. In Kantian terms, that means an a priori judgement that is equally analytic as it is synthetic. Or: a circular formulation that is not tautological but creative.

Creative in the way of man, the world, the will to power itself; the formula is an active representation, it "enacts" the world. It is thus "alive" - it behaves in the same way as what it describes - it represents itself along with the world. In this it is not alone - both Schopenhauers and Nietzsches ideas "behave" in the same way; as ideas that aren't imposed on reality as if from some other purer realm, ideas that aren't untouchable to themselves, ideas of flesh and blood. This is the lineage of honesty and power, two things that in philosophy are indispensible to each other. From the pessimism of Schopenhauer the idea of will ('energy with intent' to use your phrase) has become more optimist, more free to enjoy itself, more vital, healthy, fuller; more "well rounded", a world to itself, voluptuous and incessantly (pro)creative.

[Prismatic567]

Erik - Reason flows forth from the passions. Whoever treats reason as if it operates independently of the energies has not yet begun to think.

The above need further interpretations from various perspectives otherwise it can be misleading.

It is odd to say reason flows forth from the passions.
The term 'passions' can also mislead as 'passion' generally refers to very strong emotions on the edge of them being uncontrollable by the person with the potential toward extreme good/Beneficent or extreme evil.
In addition, extreme passion with common reason can generate more extreme evil, e.g. those of the psychopath.

It is a fact, the primary and secondary emotions evolved earlier and are embedded 'deeper' in the human brain than the neural circuitry that support the faculty of reason [from common to pure reason].
As such, we can agree the faculty of reason emerged with the leverage on emotions and other mental elements. This point is easily recognized, note
The Evolution of Reason: Logic as a Branch of Biology (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Biology) (9780521540254): William S. Cooper.

Neuroscientists has also done research to arrive at a very strong hypothesis that reason has to work interdependently with emotions.
Note Antonio Damasio's

Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain is a 1994 book by neurologist António Damásio, in part a treatment of the mind/body dualism question. Damásio presents the "somatic marker hypothesis", a proposed mechanism by which emotions guide (or bias) behavior and decision-making, and positing that rationality requires emotional input. -wiki

Re Ethics [btw not moral], Kant believed the faculty of reason is the worst element to be relied upon to drive ethical motives and actions.

Now in a Being which has Reason and a Will, if the proper object of Nature were its Conservation, its Welfare, in a word, its Happiness, then Nature would have hit upon a very bad arrangement in selecting the Reason of the creature to carry out this purpose.
...
For all the Actions which the creature has to perform with a view to this purpose, and the whole rule of its conduct, would be far more surely prescribed to it by Instinct, and that End would have been attained thereby much more certainly than it ever can be by Reason.
....
And, in fact, we find that the more a cultivated Reason applies itself with deliberate purpose to the enjoyment of life and Happiness, so much the more does the man fail of true satisfaction.
...
Nature would have taken care that Reason should not break forth into Practical [Ethical] exercise, nor have the presumption, with its weak insight, to think out for itself the plan of Happiness, and of the Means of attaining it.
Nature would not only have taken on herself the choice of the Ends, but also of the Means, and with wise foresight would have entrusted both to Instinct.

Despite Kant's understanding that instincts and emotions are more effective and critique Reason as ineffective for ethical motives, he believed there are good reasons why Reason is necessary for Morals [not ethics]. Kant do not expect Reason* to drive the motives/actions of ethics directly but merely act as a sort of overseeing counselor for ethics.
* Kant analyzed the concept of Reason in great details and the relevant reason in this case is positive Pure Reason with rationality and not Common-Reason or even philosophical logic in general.

Kant's categorizations are useful but not profound or especially meaningful. He is still wholly passion-bound, has not yet begun to clearly reflect (on) it, which is to say himself.

Kant's approach is system-based and he represented sensibility [emotions and other sensual faculty] in its proper place within the human system [mental and physical] in its interdependent interaction with reality.

Kant's categories are a critical but merely a very small part to his whole system of philosophy. Kant presented his categories in principles and its forms/details are limited within the knowledge available in his time, but its details, forms and complexities can now be explored further via cognitive neuroscience* and other advance knowledge.
Some claim Kant to be a pioneer of cognitive science (thus cognitive neuroscience).

As I had mentioned elsewhere, to made a fairer review and critique of Kant's views or for comparative purposes, one need to put in a LOT of effort to grasp and understand [not necessary agree with] his philosophical theories.

[Fixed Cross]

I had feared that the term 'passions' might be interpreted like this, even as I replaced it in other instances with 'energies' which should make it clear that I an referring to a more general category than mere sensibility. I mean the basic life force.

It is not (objectively) good that reason relies on energy, it is merely fact.

Therefore, philosophical reason must engage this admittedly daunting and even terrifying difficulty of the passions including all their obscurity and violence before it can engage the subject of reason.

But as I have discovered, the passions aren't nearly as dreadful as they are made out to be by the champions of reason-a-priori. In fact it is the passions that include love, and reason which is unbound by love as it can choose any passion as its logical ground, as its axiomatic value. In the passions is com-passion, however irrational it would often seem to the merely calculating mind. It is the passions that value being, of self and of others, and reason can only accomodate the valuing of others if these loving passions are strong enough.

Therefore I laud Kants passions, because they drove him to imagine that reason in itself would give birth to similar appreciation as he felt in his heart. But he was misled, as loftily as a man can be perhaps... but from Kant there follows not any effective moral command, only a rhetorical, aesthetically pleasing one. To be effective in commanding integrity of action and compassion, which are Kants axiomatic values, we have to dig deeper than he did and confront those plasmic forces beneath the surface, and discover that they, the passions, from sensible emotions to the raw unconscious energies, are themselves valuing.

There is no indifference to nature. All is love, in a sense, but most of it is blind love. The path to a lofty hearted politics of power is the process of illuminating love to iself. This path is a poetic, creative one, not one of system building. It is the process of awakening.

For human consciousness to become aware of its own lofty ground and nature, this is the moral imperative and the purification of reason.

[Arminius]

Geez.. you guys are still trying to compare the apple to the banana?

Or a mouse with an elephant, or a molehill with an huge mountain like the Mount Everest.

Trying to compare a nihilistic philosopher with a non-nhilistic philosopher is difficult but not impossible.

Thre is realitiy, and so there is objectivity. There should be science, thus there should be history too. Thers is still science, thus there is still history too. We have logic, empirical evidence, and history in order to know that a nihilistic philosopher can never be the greater or better philosopher. Nihilistic philosophy has merely a litte bit to do with philosophy.

Kant vs Nietzsche is like Logic vs Emotion, Order vs Chaos, or Construction vs Destruction.

Yes, or like non-nihilistic or pre-nihilistic philosophy verus nihilistic philosophy - as I said before.

Nihilistic philosophy has merely a litte bit to do with philosophy. The greater or better philosopher can never be a nihilistic philosopher. A partly destroyed house can never be the greater or better house.

True.

Heidegger, .... Hitler, .... Neumann ....

The question was, who was the better philosopher Nietzche or Kant. Heidegger, Hitler, and Neumann were not considered ....

Nietzsche totally negated it. Therefore Nietzsche is far better.

But not the better philosopher! He was the better negator, the better nihilist ... (see above).

It is not certain that there is an absolute exclusivity between a negator and a philosopher, although there may be.

As I said before: A nihilistic philosophy has not nothing, but merely a little bit to do with philosophy.

He even negates the negation by his affirmation.

Long before Nietzsche, Hegel did it in a better way. So Nietzsche was not the only, not the best, and even not the frist one who did that.

The question was, who was the better philosopher Nietzche or Kant. Hegel was not considered, in exclusive terms.

I mentioned Hegel merely because of the fact that Nietzsche was not the only, not the best, and even not the frist one who negated the negation by affirmation. If i had not mentioned Hegel, you would probably have asked: "Who was it before Nietzsche?".

I did not want to weigh in on that, the issue here is context. the fact is, that exclusivity and inclusivity of thought is entailed by basic focus. the focus being on who was the best is mistaken. The was Neitzche exclusively working within a context of pure intuition,
of course not. Is Kant?, neither. Intuitionism is nothing new, I could likewise roll off names, Bergson comes to. Ink first and foremost, but others too,
Santayana, a source of inspiration for William James.
The latter, was mostly known for being a psychologist, but with a very strong philosophical basis. Included just as well declare, that Picasso's
supporter Gertrude Stein was a very credible
philosopher, having studied undernWilliam James.
But returning to the topic, yes, Hegel did that, but,
he did not nihilize, he did the opposite, he
constructed an absolute. Kant did not have what it takes except perhaps intuit the coming succession of Hegel' search for the absolute.
A pure transcendental reason with which to try to
. Nietzche saw through this, not because he was able to think through this colossus of edified construction,
but, because he intuited from other sources, some
knowingly, and some probably, and most likely subliminally, that this structure has to be brought down. Because if it isn't the results would be an
absolute model, that should be strung in to reason,
by virtue of it's 'goodness'. But, what the good and bad is, has nothing to do with arriving at it with formulae, but it is an act consisting of ad hoc
decisions. The point here, is to point out a cognitive
shift away from reason towards action as a modicum of analysis, because , reason, and analysis in reliance upon reason has been offset. Philosophy, ever since then, has become the product of tools of newly formed thought, admittedly, and undeniably. denial meaning the same thing as A nihilistic attempt to invent a new form of denial.
The philosopher has become a tool, and this became Nietzche's misfortune, to be so mis interpreted,by people who still thought of the philosopher as the primal movernofmthought. the ontology has ceased to be but a sign , the signature of which was written
At a time where people still had to be convinced that the earth was not flat .

The question was, who was the better philosopher Kant or Nietzsche. The others that you are mentioning here were not considered ....

Excuse me , James, for wedging into the sequence something which I hope will not interrupt the flow, and yet I have to say it. In reference to the suggestion that, we oft mix up the philosopher with the philosophy, or near to that, the suggestion came to mind, which Fixed Cross and I have discussed on one occasion, vid, that You may consider threeseemingly illogical propositions at the same time:
1. Nietzche is the greatest philosopher.
2. Nietzche is a better philosopher than Kant.

A nihilistic philosopher can never be the greater or better philosopher. Nihilistic philosophy has merely a litte bit to do with philosophy.

The point is, just because a philosopher is 'better' in some respect, does not meet the substantial aspects of the corollary that a belief in him must follow.

And what about the reverse? A belief in a philosopher "does not meet the substantial aspects of the corollary that" this philosopher is "better".
Nihilistic philosophers may be more sympathic - and in nihlistic times they mostly are, at least for other nihilists -, but they can never be the greater or better philosophers.
It is the definition itself that makes it impossible to really have a little philosophy as the greatest or better philosophy.

[Fixed Cross]

I don't propose a poll or a rating at all. In my view only the great can recognize greatness.

That's the main problem I am having with the idea of trying to uplift people here. There's some people who have it in them to dare to understand but they don't really require teaching. As for valuing normal honest people, that is inevitable to a great soul, I think, but valuing them does not mean trying to teach them to think like great men. They might be great in their own nature, such as a man like our friend whom I will refer to as "El", who surely has greatness in him even though he may understand less than petty hearted people with some intellectual cleverness. What he does understand he understands generously and joyously, and he is able to act on it.

Part of valuing the great hearted and the honest is also denouncing the petty an the dishonest. It never ceases to amaze me, even though from a VO perspective it is perfectly comprehensible and predictable, to what lengths people will go to ignore, misread or otherwise stupidly interpret my writing so as to be able to disregard it. I am afraid I do not have your patience at all and will also never attain it.

[Fixed Cross]

There's some people who have it in them to dare to understand but they don't really require teaching.

This is of course the weak link. That group is exactly the group that does require teaching. But how large is that group really? How many posters are likely to eventually come to value their valuing so consciously as to break through into understanding?

[Prismatic567]

Noted your use of the term 'passion,' and 'energy'.
If it is not qualified accordingly it can be easily misunderstood. Note the controversial Hume's 'Reason is the slave to Passions ........'

Therefore I laud Kants passions, because they drove him to imagine that reason in itself would give birth to similar appreciation as he felt in his heart.
But he was misled, as loftily as a man can be perhaps... but from Kant there follows not any effective moral command, only a rhetorical, aesthetically pleasing one.
To be effective in commanding integrity of action and compassion, which are Kants axiomatic values, we have to dig deeper than he did and confront those plasmic forces beneath the surface, and discover that they, the passions, from sensible emotions to the raw unconscious energies, are themselves valuing.

Kant was not misled.
Kant's system comprised the Moral [pure[ and Ethics [applied] aspects. Kant understood for humanity to progress both the pure and applied aspects must work complementarily and interdependently.

Due to the very divergent sphere within the world of the empirical, practices [practical], pragmatic and the likes, Kant preferred [passion perhaps] to concentrate on the converging principles, systems and framework, i.e. the pure moral aspect rather than the applied ethical aspects. In addition Kant has limited time to deal with the 'anthropological', pragmatic-practices due to his age (64 when he wrote Critique of Pure Reason].

In the course of these labours I have advanced somewhat far in years (this month I reach my sixty-fourth year), and I must be careful with my time if I am to succeed in my proposed scheme of providing
1. a Metaphysic of Nature and
2. a [Metaphysic] of Morals
which will confirm the Truth of my Critique in the two fields,
1. of Speculative [Reason] and
2. of Practical Reason. [Morality]
The clearing up of the obscurities in the present work they are hardly to be avoided in a new enterprise and the defence of it as a whole, I must therefore leave to those worthy men who have made my teaching their own. [B xliv]

A philosophical work cannot be armed at all points, like a Mathematical treatise, and may therefore be open to objection in this or that respect, while yet the Structure of the System, taken in its Unity, is not in the least endangered.

Kant did attend to the practices of the empirical world [he called it anthropology then - not the same as its current use ], but his work on this aspect was not significant.

There is a very strong correlation between Buddhism and Kantian philosophy in essence however Buddhism is not as systematic in its presentation. The additional feature that Buddhism over the theoretical Kantian system is its personal self-development program of the individual to align optimally with the natural moral impulse towards the ideal. This involve actual rewiring of the neural circuitry in the brain.

Thus in my case, whatever is omitted from the Kantian system is supplemented by the affective system from Buddhism.

[Sauwelios]

I don't propose a poll or a rating at all. In my view only the great can recognize greatness.

That's the main problem I am having with the idea of trying to uplift people here. There's some people who have it in them to dare to understand but they don't really require teaching.

I required, and still require, teaching. To be sure, though, I haven't required proselytising--in fact, I've always been most adverse to it. I've required proselytising myself, indoctrinating myself, with ideas I myself found, or which found me, and which I myself chose and thereby honoured. So for me, "trying to uplift people here" means to put my ideas--by which I mean both the ideas I've chosen and made my own and those I myself thought of--out here. It's like recreational fishing for men, for human beings, for potential philosophers, or at least for potential lovers of philosophy: a recreational fisherman does not use a net; he just puts his bait out there, waits until something bites, and then, if and when something does, tries to pull it up into the air and the light with the right measure of force and gentleness, patience and resolve. To be sure, that's something I've needed to learn. And of course, it's not merely recreational--at least not in the shallow sense. It's re-creational:

"Nietzsche often speaks of self-overcoming in terms of self-creation, and this fecund metaphor conveys his sense of the nomothetic [= legislative] influence of exemplary human beings. Great individuals are always artists in Nietzsche's sense, for, in the course of their self-overcomings, they inadvertently produce in themselves the beauty that alone arouses erotic attachment. By virtue of their self-creation, exemplary figures come to embody 'the great stimulus to life,' unwittingly inviting others to join them in the pursuit of self-perfection." (Daniel Conway, "Love's labor's lost: the philosopher's Versucherkunst [= art of the (at)tempter]".)

[Sauwelios]

As for valuing normal honest people, that is inevitable to a great soul, I think, but valuing them does not mean trying to teach them to think like great men.

Indeed. In fact, I was thinking in this direction for my one-sentence summary of what I'd call Value Ethics: "The philosopher is obliged to express his appreciation of beings as much as he can in ways they can appreciate, though not necessarily exclusively." I was especially thinking of beings that make him possible as a philosopher, that make his philosophising possible.

They might be great in their own nature, such as a man like our friend whom I will refer to as "El", who surely has greatness in him even though he may understand less than petty hearted people with some intellectual cleverness. What he does understand he understands generously and joyously, and he is able to act on it.

Yes. I would say that they are great insofar as they are pre-forms of the philosopher and/or make him possible, like the man in the street who is a--more or less--valuable member of the society in which the philosopher lives; even the little yappy dog that helps keep some such people's happiness with their little lives above the minimum level required for that. Though no, I don't think our friend has a yappy dog.

Part of valuing the great hearted and the honest is also denouncing the petty and the dishonest.

Yes, but not absolutely, because they are necessary links in the chain of which the great-hearted and the honest, and especially the philosophers, constitute the links that justify the whole chain. I think the philosophers justify the whole chain because the unexamined life is not worth living; the philosophers examine the whole chain and especially the essence of it and of each of its links, and on examining it discover that it is valuable in itself to them.

It never ceases to amaze me, even though from a VO perspective it is perfectly comprehensible and predictable, to what lengths people will go to ignore, misread or otherwise stupidly interpret my writing so as to be able to disregard it. I am afraid I do not have your patience at all and will also never attain it.

But you will have to try and develop yours, because the success of our political philosophy may depend in no small part on your courteousness.

[Fixed Cross]

Noted your use of the term 'passion,' and 'energy'.
If it is not qualified accordingly it can be easily misunderstood. Note the controversial Hume's 'Reason is the slave to Passions ........'

Therefore I laud Kants passions, because they drove him to imagine that reason in itself would give birth to similar appreciation as he felt in his heart.
But he was misled, as loftily as a man can be perhaps... but from Kant there follows not any effective moral command, only a rhetorical, aesthetically pleasing one.
To be effective in commanding integrity of action and compassion, which are Kants axiomatic values, we have to dig deeper than he did and confront those plasmic forces beneath the surface, and discover that they, the passions, from sensible emotions to the raw unconscious energies, are themselves valuing.

Kant was not misled.
Kant's system comprised the Moral [pure[ and Ethics [applied] aspects. Kant understood for humanity to progress both the pure and applied aspects must work complementarily and interdependently.

Due to the very divergent sphere within the world of the empirical, practices [practical], pragmatic and the likes, Kant preferred [passion perhaps] to concentrate on the converging principles, systems and framework, i.e. the pure moral aspect rather than the applied ethical aspects. In addition Kant has limited time to deal with the 'anthropological', pragmatic-practices due to his age (64 when he wrote Critique of Pure Reason].

In the course of these labours I have advanced somewhat far in years (this month I reach my sixty-fourth year), and I must be careful with my time if I am to succeed in my proposed scheme of providing
1. a Metaphysic of Nature and
2. a [Metaphysic] of Morals
which will confirm the Truth of my Critique in the two fields,
1. of Speculative [Reason] and
2. of Practical Reason. [Morality]
The clearing up of the obscurities in the present work they are hardly to be avoided in a new enterprise and the defence of it as a whole, I must therefore leave to those worthy men who have made my teaching their own. [B xliv]

A philosophical work cannot be armed at all points, like a Mathematical treatise, and may therefore be open to objection in this or that respect, while yet the Structure of the System, taken in its Unity, is not in the least endangered.

I must disagree with Kant here. I think a philosiphical work can and should account for everything that it claims. That in fact philosophy can and therefore ultimately must be more exact than mathematics. This is because mathematics postulates the integer, whereas philosophy must derive it, arrive at it. That's at least what my work has been about.

Ultimately the integer is given, and it is therefore not dangerous or dishonest to postulate it, but to speak of it one must arrive at it from within itself, one must uncover what makes it an integer, even though it is irreducible.

That is the ground of an understanding of how integers can come to interact without damaging each others integrity.

Kant did attend to the practices of the empirical world [he called it anthropology then - not the same as its current use ], but his work on this aspect was not significant.

There is a very strong correlation between Buddhism and Kantian philosophy in essence however Buddhism is not as systematic in its presentation. The additional feature that Buddhism over the theoretical Kantian system is its personal self-development program of the individual to align optimally with the natural moral impulse towards the ideal. This involve actual rewiring of the neural circuitry in the brain.

Thus in my case, whatever is omitted from the Kantian system is supplemented by the affective system from Buddhism.

I too have been trained rigorously in Buddhism as well as in Yogic and Vedic philosophies, which indeed include or even start with physical practices. Yes, the brain does need to be rewired (though some form of meditational disclipline, not necessarily eastern) for it to grasp the inner workings of being.

[Fixed Cross]

deleted

[Prismatic567]

I must disagree with Kant here. I think a philosophical work can and should account for everything that it claims. That in fact philosophy can and therefore ultimately must be more exact than mathematics. This is because mathematics postulates the integer, whereas philosophy must derive it, arrive at it. That's at least what my work has been about.

Ultimately the integer is given, and it is therefore not dangerous or dishonest to postulate it, but to speak of it one must arrive at it from within itself, one must uncover what makes it an integer, even though it is irreducible.

That is the ground of an understanding of how integers can come to interact without damaging each others integrity.

Btw, what Kant meant in the above quote was the substance, i.e. principles, system and framework, is more important than the forms. Thus it is critical to keep the framework intact while one can experiments with the forms.

In his works, Kant did discuss and differentiate between Mathematics and philosophy [especially metaphysics] to establish 'How Pure Mathematics is Possible?' while metaphysics [once touted as the queen of the sciences] cannot be possible. This would be a long story thus off topic.

As for exactness or definite answers, I am with Russell's

Thus, to sum up our discussion of the value of philosophy; Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather for the sake of the questions themselves; because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation; ..

[Fixed Cross]

Sauwelios - Realize that I have been fishing for four years now. The catch has been quite alright, especially with you now on board, but the efforts it took me have been very great. Also note that my acute and exact understanding of being came to be precisely as a remedy against an impending non-being - against valuing other beings and their perspectives too much, being too courteous and considerate, something that actually brought me on the brink of death, as can be understood at the hand of that principle. Its emerging in my mind was due to a necessity on the level of life and death. You must see my aggression as a medicine against unwarranted sympathies and good will. Erik, for example, had received much good will from me, long before I made that one unfortunate expression. My investments in him turned out to have been futile, he had understood (perhaps taken setiously) absolutely nothing, and this was so disappointing as to cause nausea. Lyssa on the other hand, to give an example, has been a rewarding object of investment, despite her and my violent and scornful clashing. Perhaps actually because rather than despite that she is able to muster such brute intellectual force. I still see philosophy as a glorious battle, and diplomacy is warranted only when the stakes are sufficiently high, when much has already been gained.

[Erik_]

Erik, for example, had received much good will from me, long before I made that one unfortunate expression. My investments in him turned out to have been futile, he had understood (perhaps taken setiously) absolutely nothing, and this was so disappointing as to cause nausea

Yeah, you really spazzed out on me, buddy. What was that all about? Just having a bad day? I was genuinely interested in your thoughts on the subject, but you decided to get snide and nasty....

Was it because I casted aspersions on Nietzsche?

[Fixed Cross]

An issue of separating philosophical power from philosophical value, assuming you can do that, and suggesting that I would do that.

[Erik_]

Fixed Cross,

What are your thoughts on the following quote:

"I state that you prefer to get fucked in your mouth by rabid pitbulls over eating a good meal. Now read that very slowly and answer me this. Why do you prefer getting skullfucked by rabid pitbulls? Account for yourself, bitch."

You are quite creative, I gotta hand it to ya.

[Fixed Cross]

That was my version of expressing myself to you in exaggerated caricature of the way you expressed yourself to me.

You said to me: "I stated that you prefer Nietzsche" and went on to say that this did not mean that I thought Nietzsche is the better, stronger, greater, more influential, more relevant philosopher. As strange as this may have been to you, this was a very grave insult to me. You implicitly said that I stated a preference or a philosopher without having philosophical ground for that preference. Hence, I wanted to show you how that comes across to me, and I used a creative way of expressing that (stating something about a preference of yours that was not something you stated at all).

The point was that I prefer Nietzsche only and alone because is greater, more significant, deeper, more powerful, more relevant, more important, has more impact, is more honest, more intelligent, etc etc etc etc - and that I felt and feel that I had made this very clear, throughout all my posts about Nietzsche.

I admire Nietzsche as a master-logician. I look down on Kant whom I consider to be a failed wannabe logician.

[Sauwelios]

In my view Fixed Cross's analogy is sound: you did say the same thing to him first, Erik--in form, that is, not in content. And in fact, it's quite evident that, for him, the content was on the same par.