ILovePhilosophy.com

peacegirl wrote:

Meno_ wrote:Just so as to understand all that went on since my last contribution, let me add a thing about sets and subsets.

The major set being is the one dealing with action . There really is no problem with the cognizant aspect of either deciding to act or not, since a thoughtless decision revolves around a simply decisive choice between actup and non action, whatever option s there are, measuring by whatever criteria, pleasure, or any other.

Once the action is started, it can have either variable or fixed criteria for that action , they are either automatic , autonomous, supported , or a dereliction out of duty. These are not exclusive, but have relative validity based on other considerations, which effect one another, so the pin pointed casual chain is never clear, consciously, unconsciously, subconsciously, or whatever.

In fact , freedom and determination can not even be said to be cut off from responsibility.

So to my mind to solve this problem by the use of an artificial conceptive process of either/or , shows a reduction where solution is sought from premises which do not justify such.

I think that consideration is poignant as well, to consider, in conjunction to the overall understanding of it in situ

Responsibility increases with the truth of determinism, not decreases, which many philosophers have mistakenly believed. If you were following this thread it was stated that nothing external can cause us to do anything against our will as in a causal chain. That is why this demonstration is so important because it brings together the ability to "choose of one's own accord" with "determinism".

The fact that will is not
free demonstrates that man, as part of nature or God, has been
unconsciously developing at a mathematical rate and during every
moment of his progress was doing what he had to do because he had
no free choice. But this does not mean that he was caused to do
anything against his will, for the word cause, like choice and past, is
very misleading as it implies that something other than man himself
is responsible for his actions. Four is not caused by two plus two, it
is that already. As long as history has been recorded, these two
opposing principles were never reconciled until now. The amazing
thing is that this ignorance, this conflict of ideas, ideologies, and
desires, theology’s promulgation of free will, the millions that
criticized determinism as fallacious, was exactly as it was supposed to
be. It was impossible for man to have acted differently because the
mankind system is obeying this invariable law of satisfaction which
makes the motions of all life just as harmonious as the solar system;
but these systems are not caused by, they are these laws.

If these principles were not reconciled until now, which I do not think is necessarily factual , then the language games would not be pre eminent in certain demonstrations.

Sets and subsets represent various stages of the development of ideas. and most people not being philosophers can not differentiate between levels of thought. therefore they can not predicate different forms of logical consistency.

For most people it is still the belief of the show me type argument, necessating the syntactic literal value as adopted to the differing forms of language which constitute their understanding.

Therefore, even though I have been following this thread, all one has to do is to examine the thesis, albeit Yours, and compare it to the last few narratives, and the rest can be filled in.

The major set does not require to examine interviening variables, because it is structurally nominal, one idea bringing in another quite arbitrarily(inductively) , whereas the conclusion is definitively structured about the connection between freedom and determinancy, deductively.

These are philosophically grounded ideas, which do not depend on various sub-sets, and if this is a philosophical thesis, then, it would be recognized, as such.

One can not argue in favor of a thesis by inductive generalities, which is what literal interpretations arguably intend to do, by pulling in psychologisms and opiniated hypothesis of what men really want, or what level of reality they pull out various quantified pleasure values, on the supposition that what they always want, is what is more pleasurable.

This is why philosophy as a formal , abstract supppositionary structural manifest. It can not mix formal and informal elements, it is done , but it always becomes ineffective.

It would not serve You, Peace Girl, not to point this out to , because, if the argument was a paper on the psychology or sociology on how the pleasure principal effects the ideas of determinacy and human freedom of choice, it may work on that level.

I mean not to overly nihilize what You intend to mean, but it has not been made clear, in terms of structural, ontological , or socio-psychological terms, what and how You arrive at any defined resolution.

Perhaps if You were to connect the mode of Your thinking in terms of their own ground, and lead us toward such reconciliation, and not place us in a forest of ideas in which one can get lost , it would work.

You may have it well constructed in Your mind, but that does not coincide with the mirror of interpretation, at least on my part.

I would be grateful from now on to immerse into this topic, because it does have many important ramifications.

Ecmandu wrote:Their child safe?

Did you not read the little passage that they destroy their whole family with gambling?

Obviously it wasn't enough to overcome the strong desire to get high. Maybe an addict is under the belief that his family will stick with him. That immediate gratification is hard to deal with. No one is denying that. And they may be remorseful after rehab, but sadly it still could be too late. In the new world, the desire to take drugs in order to escape will not be an issue like it is today.

Ecmandu wrote:They know that this is what they're doing, but do it anyways

Yes, I get that. They do it anyway because the desire is very strong especially when the addiction is physical as well as emotional. That is how powerful addiction is, but there comes a time when the fear of losing someone (in the hypothetical example I gave you) is greater than the addiction. What I'm trying to share with you is that in spite of the pull toward addiction, it's still a choice, and even though one knows his life can be ruined, an addict has a hard time stopping unless there is a more pressing fear that is sobering. It's not like a causal chain (such as an avalanche) where one has no choice. I hope you can accept that man does not have free will (even if you accept it with some reservation) so we can move forward.

Peacegirl,

You argue that some people have more freewill than others, yet argue that none of us have freewill.

When making universal statements like this about people, you are negating the universal, by assenting to gradations.

You are contradicting yourself.

Meno_ wrote:

peacegirl wrote:

Meno_ wrote:Just so as to understand all that went on since my last contribution, let me add a thing about sets and subsets.

The major set being is the one dealing with action . There really is no problem with the cognizant aspect of either deciding to act or not, since a thoughtless decision revolves around a simply decisive choice between actup and non action, whatever option s there are, measuring by whatever criteria, pleasure, or any other.

Once the action is started, it can have either variable or fixed criteria for that action , its either automatic , autonomous, supported , or a dereliction out of duty. These are not exclusive, but have relative validity based on other considerations, which effect one aother, so the pin pointed casual chain is never clear, consciously, unconsciously, subconsciously, or whatever.

In fact , freedom and determination can not even be said to be cut off from responsibility.

So to my mind to solve this problem by the use of an artificial conceptive process of either/or , shows a reduction where solution is sought from premises which do not justify such.

I think that consideration is poignant as well, to consider, in coinjunction to the overall understanding of it in situ

Responsibility increases with the truth of determinism, not decreases, which many philosophers have mistakenly believed. If you were following this thread it was stated that nothing external can cause us to do anything against our will as in a causal chain. That is why this demonstration is so important because it brings together the ability to "choose of one's own accord" with "determinism".

The fact that will is not
free demonstrates that man, as part of nature or God, has been
unconsciously developing at a mathematical rate and during every
moment of his progress was doing what he had to do because he had
no free choice. But this does not mean that he was caused to do
anything against his will, for the word cause, like choice and past, is
very misleading as it implies that something other than man himself
is responsible for his actions. Four is not caused by two plus two, it
is that already. As long as history has been recorded, these two
opposing principles were never reconciled until now. The amazing
thing is that this ignorance, this conflict of ideas, ideologies, and
desires, theology’s promulgation of free will, the millions that
criticized determinism as fallacious, was exactly as it was supposed to
be. It was impossible for man to have acted differently because the
mankind system is obeying this invariable law of satisfaction which
makes the motions of all life just as harmonious as the solar system;
but these systems are not caused by, they are these laws.

If these principles were not reconciled until now, which I do not think is necessarily factual , then the language games would not be pre eminent in certain demonstrations.

Sets and subsets represent various stages of the development of ideas. and moat people not being philosophers can not differentiate between levels of thought. therefore they camlm not predicate different forms of logical consistency.

For most people . it is still the belief of you show me type, necessarily necessating the syntactic literal value as adopted to the differing forms of developmental language which constitute their understanding.

Therefore, even though I have been following this thread, all one has to do is to examine the thesis, albeit Yours, and compare it to the last few narratives, and the rest cam be filled in.

The major set does not require to examine intervienong variables, because it is structurally nominal, one idea bringing in another quite arbitrarily(inductively) , whereas the conclusion is definitively structured about the connection between freedom and determinancy.

These are philosophically grounded ideas, which do not depend on various sub-sets, and if this is a philosophical thesis, then, it would be recognized, as it is.

One can not argue in favor of a thesis by inductive generalities, which is what literal interpretation arguably intend to do. by pulling in psychologisms and opiniated hypothesis of what men really want, or what level of reality they pull out various quantified pleasure values, on the supposition of they always want what is more pleasurable.

This is why philosophy as a formal , abstract supppositionary structural manifest. It can not mix formal and informal elements, it is done , but it always becomes. Ineffective.

It would not serve You, Peace Girl, not to Lou t this out to You, because, it Your work was a paper on the psychology or sociology on how the pleasure principal effects the ideas of determinacy and human freedom of choice, it may work on that level.

I mean not to overly nihilized what You intend to mean, but it has not been made clear, in terms of structural, ontological , or socio-psychological terms, what and how You arrive at any defined resolution.

Perhaps if You were to connect the mode of Your thinking in terms of their own ground, and lead us toward such reconciliation, and not placing us in a forest of ideas in which to get lost in.

You may have it well constructed in Your mind, but that does not coincide with the mirror of interpretation, at least on my part.

I would be grateful from now on to immerse into this topic, because it does have many important ramifications.

Meno, if this discovery can bring about peace on earth (which it can) I would say the ramifications are significant. I am doing my earnest to connect the mode of my thinking and not to place you in a forest of ideas in which to get lost in.

The reasoning in this work is not
a form of logic, nor is it my opinion of the answer; it is mathematical,
scientific, and undeniable, and it is not necessary to deal in what has
been termed the ‘exact sciences’ in order to be exact and scientific.
Consequently, it is imperative to know that this demonstration will be
like a game of chess in which every one of your moves will be forced
and checkmate inevitable but only if you don’t make up your own
rules as to what is true and false which will only delay the very life you
want for yourself.

The laws of this universe, which include those of
our nature, are the rules of the game and the only thing required to
win, to bring about this Golden Age that will benefit everyone... is to
stick to the rules. But if you decide to move the king like the queen
because it does not satisfy you to see a pet belief slipping away or
because it irritates your pride to be proven wrong or checkmated then
it is obvious that you are not sincerely concerned with learning the
truth, but only with retaining your doctrines at all cost. However,
when it is scientifically revealed that the very things religion,
government, education and all others want, which include the means
as well as the end, are prevented from becoming a reality only because
we have not penetrated deeply enough into a thorough understanding
of our ultimate nature, are we given a choice as to the direction we are
compelled to travel even though this means the relinquishing of ideas
that have been part of our thinking since time immemorial?

This discovery will be presented in a step by step fashion that brooks no
opposition and your awareness of this matter will preclude the
possibility of someone adducing his rank, title, affiliation, or the long
tenure of an accepted belief as a standard from which he thinks he
qualifies to disagree with knowledge that contains within itself
undeniable proof of its veracity. In other words, your background, the
color of your skin, your religion, the number of years you went to
school, how many titles you hold, your I.Q., your country, what you
do for a living, your being some kind of expert like Nageli (or
anything else you care to throw in) has no relation whatsoever to the
undeniable knowledge that 3 is to 6 what 4 is to 8. So please don’t
be too hasty in using what you have been taught as a standard to judge
what has not even been revealed to you yet. If you should decide to
give me the benefit of the doubt — deny it — and two other
discoveries to be revealed, if you can.

Ecmandu wrote:Peacegirl,

You argue that some people have more freewill than others, yet argue that none of us have freewill.

When making universal statements like this about people, you are negating the universal, by assenting to gradations.

You are contradicting yourself.

What? I never said that some people have more free will than others. No one has freedom of the will so how can people have more free will than others when there is no such thing? Makes no sense.

sounds good. always given benefit to challenging themes. , especially one such challenges so much of what we would like to hope for in the survival of our earth, and life, that has nestled us for so many, many years.

Meno_ wrote:sounds good. always given benefit to challenging themes. , especially one such challenges so much of what we would like to hope for in the survival of our earth, and life, that has nestled us for so many, many years.

I hope you stick around.

I've always been a man who stuck around for better or for worse. Of that You shall not have any doubt, I assure You.

peacegirl wrote:

Ecmandu wrote:Peacegirl,

You argue that some people have more freewill than others, yet argue that none of us have freewill.

When making universal statements like this about people, you are negating the universal, by assenting to gradations.

You are contradicting yourself.

What? I never said that some people have more free will than others. No one has freedom of the will so how can people have more free will than others when there is no such thing? Makes no sense.

You've admitted openly that people have freewill, words you quoted, but that they are confused about that this means.

You also openly stated that more educated people can make better educated decisions. That is overtly stating that gradations occur

Ecmandu: Peacegirl, you argue that some people have more freewill than others, yet argue that none of us have freewill.

Peacegirl: I was very clear that to say “I did something of my own free will” is fine if it means “I did something of my own desire”. But this is just a colloquial expression. He says throughout the book, “he was compelled, of his own free will”. Again, this means he was compelled of his own desire.

Ecmandu: When making universal statements like this about people, you are negating the universal, by assenting to gradations.

Peacegirl: There are no gradations. You misunderstood.

Ecmandu: You are contradicting yourself.

Peacegirl: No I’m not. I never said that some people have more free will than others. No one has freedom of the will so how can people have more free will than others when there is no such thing? Makes no sense.

Ecmandu: You've admitted openly that people have freewill, words you quoted, but that they are confused about that this means.

Peacegirl: I hope I straightened that out for you!

Ecmandu: You also openly stated that more educated people can make better educated decisions. That is overtly stating that gradations occur.

Peacegirl: This comment has nothing to do with gradations of free will, which I never said we had.

Peacegirl,

We can only possibly abstract determinism by the observation of restrictions. So, to show what're or not existence is 100% restrictive (absolute determinism) is to use the limit of knowing every reason why you know everything that you know, and all of those reasons are external (restrictive) to you.

If it's 100%, we know through the thought experiment that this allows 0% capability to abstract a self.

By definitions, through proof through contradiction, st the limit, we can prove that 100% determinism is false, in a self evident way.

You keep stating that it's just MY definition of determinism, and not the correct one.

Actually, it's the only definition of determinism.

You are being disingenuous to this regard.

Ecmandu wrote:Peacegirl,

We can only possibly abstract determinism by the observation of restrictions. So, to show what're or not existence is 100% restrictive (absolute determinism) is to use the limit of knowing every reason why you know everything that you know, and all of those reasons are external (restrictive) to you.

If it's 100%, we know through the thought experiment that this allows 0% capability to abstract a self.

By definitions, through proof through contradiction, st the limit, we can prove that 100% determinism is false, in a self evident way.

You keep stating that it's just MY definition of determinism, and not the correct one.

Actually, it's the only definition of determinism.

You are being disingenuous to this regard.

Determinism means a person could not have done otherwise. You are contradicting yourself when you say we can have free will (we could have done otherwise given the same exact time and place) and no free will (we could not have done otherwise given the same exact time and place). To rectify the situation you resort to compatibilism. All they have done is created a convenient definition of free will which does nothing to change the fact that we can only go in one direction, thus no free will. Be happy we don’t have free will!

peacegirl wrote:

Ecmandu wrote:Peacegirl,

We can only possibly abstract determinism by the observation of restrictions. So, to show what're or not existence is 100% restrictive (absolute determinism) is to use the limit of knowing every reason why you know everything that you know, and all of those reasons are external (restrictive) to you.

If it's 100%, we know through the thought experiment that this allows 0% capability to abstract a self.

By definitions, through proof through contradiction, st the limit, we can prove that 100% determinism is false, in a self evident way.

You keep stating that it's just MY definition of determinism, and not the correct one.

Actually, it's the only definition of determinism.

You are being disingenuous to this regard.

Determinism means a person could not have done otherwise. You are contradicting yourself when you say we can have free will (we could do otherwise given the same exact time and place) and no free will (we could not have done otherwise), but you will resort to compatibilism which is a joke. All they do is create a convenient definition of free will which does nothing to change the fact that we can only go in one direction.

If everyone knows every reason why they know everything that they know, and any of those causes are external to them, than determinism exists, as they had no internal decision on that matter. It had to be that way and no other way.

If all of those causes are external, then we're talking about absolute determinism (nobody ultimately has a choice). I d monstrated absolute determinism as false through a perfect irrefutable limit argument using your own definition (and the definition everyonevelse uses)

No, you are most certainly the one contradicting themselves here.

peacegirl wrote:Determinism means a person could not have done otherwise. You are contradicting yourself when you say we can have free will (we could have done otherwise given the same exact time and place) and no free will (we could not have done otherwise given the same exact time and place). To rectify the situation you resort to compatibilism. All they have done is created a convenient definition of free will which does nothing to change the fact that we can only go in one direction, thus no free will. Be happy we don’t have free will!

My summation of those who argue in favour of Free Will is that they conflate possibility with actuality.

"Could" have done otherwise, to the Free Will advocate, means the choice not taken seemed perfectly possible to choose and it felt like it could just as easily have been chosen in actuality, and the fact that it wasn't doesn't affect that.
"Could" have done otherwise, to the Determinist means sure the choice not chosen felt perfectly possible, but there was a reason why it turned out not to be the actual choice, and that reason also had a prior reason, and so on.

The conversation between the two is an infinite loop of the following:
FW: yeah but I could have.
Det: yeah but you didn't.

It's no wonder how some people, e.g. Karpel Tunnel blackbox the whole issue, to avoid debates of this type. It's almost the case that you can tell something fundamentally psychological about someone who takes one side over the other. The Free Will advocate likes the aesthetics of things feeling free and open ended, perhaps revelling in the idea that they are therefore free and the Determinist is a slave: as I have come across at least one un-intellectual obsessing over on a different thread. The airy fairy type who lives in their own head. The Determinist is simply saying, sure that's all nice, but reality.

Free Will only seems possible to a Dualist, avoiding the "mind-body problem". The Determinist can be either. The respective causal chains seem to advance as follows:

FW
Material influences(external experience/genetics) \
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ======> Choice
Mental component (internal disposition/identity). /

Det
External experience/genetics/disposition/identity => decision mechanism => Choice

The former's "mental component" is the "decision mechanism" from the latter, but ex nihilo: in and of itself, it exists independent of the information to consider in making a choice - somehow being influenced by it without being influenced by it. If it were being influenced by it, it would be slave to the master of its influences, but not being slave to the master of influence would make the decision essentially random: a paradox.

My argument is that either you make a decision for a reason, in which case there is will but it is not free, or you make a decision for no reason, in which case it is free but not by your will. Free or will, not both.

Silhouette wrote:

peacegirl wrote:Determinism means a person could not have done otherwise. You are contradicting yourself when you say we can have free will (we could have done otherwise given the same exact time and place) and no free will (we could not have done otherwise given the same exact time and place). To rectify the situation you resort to compatibilism. All they have done is created a convenient definition of free will which does nothing to change the fact that we can only go in one direction, thus no free will. Be happy we don’t have free will!

My summation of those who argue in favour of Free Will is that they conflate possibility with actuality.

"Could" have done otherwise, to the Free Will advocate, means the choice not taken seemed perfectly possible to choose and it felt like it could just as easily have been chosen in actuality, and the fact that it wasn't doesn't affect that.
"Could" have done otherwise, to the Determinist means sure the choice not chosen felt perfectly possible, but there was a reason why it turned out not to be the actual choice, and that reason also had a prior reason, and so on.

The conversation between the two is an infinite loop of the following:
FW: yeah but I could have.
Det: yeah but you didn't.

It's no wonder how some people, e.g. Karpel Tunnel blackbox the whole issue, to avoid debates of this type. It's almost the case that you can tell something fundamentally psychological about someone who takes one side over the other. The Free Will advocate likes the aesthetics of things feeling free and open ended, perhaps revelling in the idea that they are therefore free and the Determinist is a slave: as I have come across at least one un-intellectual obsessing over on a different thread. The airy fairy type who lives in their own head. The Determinist is simply saying, sure that's all nice, but reality.

Free Will only seems possible to a Dualist, avoiding the "mind-body problem". The Determinist can be either. The respective causal chains seem to advance as follows:

FW
Material influences(external experience/genetics) \
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ======> Choice
Mental component (internal disposition/identity). /

Det
External experience/genetics/disposition/identity => decision mechanism => Choice

The former's "mental component" is the "decision mechanism" from the latter, but ex nihilo: in and of itself, it exists independent of the information to consider in making a choice - somehow being influenced by it without being influenced by it. If it were being influenced by it, it would be slave to the master of its influences, but not being slave to the master of influence would make the decision essentially random: a paradox.

My argument is that either you make a decision for a reason, in which case there is will but it is not free, or you make a decision for no reason, in which case it is free but not by your will. Free or will, not both.

That's why I'm a compatibalist.

Besides it being the correct answer.

Sorry silluoutte,

My bad, I only read up to the arrowy stuff.

You don't believe compatibalism.

peacegirl wrote:
Of course it comes from nature, even your sly way of answering.

"Sly" however is the sort of thing you would expect from the free will folks. They would accuse someone of trying to be sly because they are convinced that this choice was something they did have control over. They chose to be sly when they could have chosen not to be. Whereas in a determined universe I "chose" to be sly only because nature compelled me to.

You want it both ways. But in a manner I am still unable to grasp. You want to make a distinction between a domino not choosing to topple over and John choosing to set it up to topple over. While at the same time acknowledging that both the dominio and John do only that which nature compells them to do.

iambiguous wrote:How anything is used is normal. Why? Because it can only have ever been used as it in fact was used.

Right?

peacegirl wrote:That's your escape hatch every time we talk.

No, that's the hatch that nature compels me to "choose" to escape down. Just as nature compels us to "choose" to post these words in our exchange only as they ever could have been posted. What you want is to escape down the hatch that revolves around the meaning that you were of necessity compelled to give to "choose".

It really comes down to how you connect the dots between the things you want to do and the things that nature compels you to want to do. As though there actually is a distinction to be made in a world where all matter [including the human brain] is inherently connected to all of the dots that comprise nature itself.

peacegirl wrote: I gave two undeniable principles that lead to the two-sided equation (which you have no knowledge about.) There are no unknowns that stand between the soundness of these principles. You do not know what you're talking about iambiguous.

iambiguous wrote:So what? "In your head" that makes the unknown unknowns go away. As though that need be as far as it goes. As though that actually does make them go away!

peacegirl wrote:There are many unknowns in the universe. This is not a prerequisite to understanding what can be known. It's not that in my head it makes the unknowns go away. It's just not something I need to know about in order to explain this discovery.

This is simply preposterous to me. You admit that what you think you know is necessarily embedded in all that you do not know...and then simply shrug that off. Why? Becasue you need to do this in order to sustain the belief that what you think you do know is somehow in sync with what the author thinks that he knows in discovering this wholly subjective progressive future.

It's all neatly contained in the internal logic that revolves entirely around what you think you do know about that 5% of the universe that physicists themselves admit is applicable only to the matter that they are grappling to understand given all the unknown unknowns contained in the other 95%.

What you can't ever own up to [in my view] is how crucial the authors "discovery" is to sustaining the psychological comfort and consolation that believing in all his assumptions provides you. It's your own equivalent of God and religion from my frame of mind.

On the other hand, given the manner in which I construe a determined universe, my own speculations here about your "comfort zone" are no less compelled by nature. As though what either of us believe "is possible" is taken into consideration by nature as she makes her way inexorably into a future that can only be given the laws of matter that comprises nature.

peacegirl wrote:I was hoping there would be more interest. I'm not expecting anything from you because if you don't find this interesting that's also beyond your control. I'm trying to whet your appetite but I think it's a lost cause.

See, you acknowledge that my interest in this is entirely embedded in that which nature compels me to be interested in, but that somehow nature, in compelling you to "choose" to whet my appetite here, might somehow herself be compelled to be more in sync with you.

iambiguous wrote:As though the things that we think we need to do are not in turn only the things that nature compels us to think that we need to do. You want to make our "choices" the exception to the rule somehow. But I'm simply unable to understand why and how you think you accomplish this -- can accomplish this -- in a determined unviverse.

peacegirl wrote:I never said there is an exception to the rule that man's will is not free. I have said over and over that it's an invariable law.

Then someone else is going to have to be more successful in reconfiguring your words here into something that makes sense to me. There are no exceptions to nature's rules. But the manner in which you "choose" to point this out here sure seems like an exception to me.

Again, I am not arguing that you are wrong here, only that, given my own understanding of determinism, your argument seems entirely bizarre to me. Over and again you seem to agree with me about things that, from my point of view, refute your point of view.

This part:

iambiguous wrote:I'm off the beaten path only because nature put me there. I call myself a nihilist only because at this point in time nature compels me to. Instead, my assessment of moral nihilism in ILP revolves around the assumption that I am in fact [up to a point] autonomous. I am able of my own volition to conclude that moral and political values are rooted existentially in dasein, conflicting goods and political economy. And embedded out in a particular world historically, culturally and experientially.

peacegirl wrote:You can be autonomous, but you cannot separate yourself from the laws of nature that created you.

Then I cannot be autonomous as those who champion some measure of free will describe it. Instead you concoct your own description of it. A description that seems to admit that nature compelled you to describe only as you must but that somehow your "choosing" to describe it as you do makes it all different.

peacegirl wrote:Just because nature causes you to choose certain things based on your desires does not mean you can't think for yourself, do for yourself and be independent...yet still be working within the framework of determinism.

This is a flat out contradiction in terms given my own understanding of determinism. To be compelled to think for myself such that I think only that which is wholly in sync with the laws of matter makes "thinking for myself" basically an illusion that matter has somehow evolved into when becoming a human mind.

iambiguous wrote:And that the behaviors you deem to be a prerequisite for "peace and prosperity" are precisely the behaviors that others hold in contempt.

peacegirl wrote:I don't know of anyone who would rather be poor than rich, have war rather than peace, or hold these values in contempt. What they hold in contempt is exploitation.

But I know any number of folks right here at ILP who argue the road to prosperity for all revolves either around capitalism or socialism. Which one then is more in sync with the author's "progressive" future?

And what of those nihilists who own and operate the military industrial complex who crave the sort of wars that keep them grinning all the way to the banks?

Somehow they will all be compelled to come into contact with the author's "discovery" and usher in this "progressive future". Right?

peacegirl wrote: You said in a determined world there are no victims. I said yes there are. I get what you're saying when looked at in total perspective, but who in the world can see it this way when they have been attacked and left for dead?

iambiguous wrote:My point is that in a determined universe as I understand it here and now those who are left for dead and those who leave them for dead are like the characters and the guests in West World.The characters are wholly programmed to think and feel and say and do only what they must. While the guests presume that they are free to do these things autonomously. The show then explores what happens when the two worlds begin to intertwine.

But: in a determined universe [again, as I understand it] there is no distinction between the characters and the guests. They are all compelled to think and feel and say and do things as nature commands given the immutable laws of matter.

peacegirl wrote:I agree that the guest and the characters are both doing what they are compelled to do. The only thing I have an issue with is your using the term "programmed" which indicates that you can't make a choice because it's already made. This is where there is a lot of confusion as I've already expressed.

Okay, nature compels both the automatons and the guests to do only as they were ever able to "choose" to do. But that's not the same as nature "programming" them?

And, yes, I agree in the sense that nature is differentiated from God. The laws of nature are [until we know otherwise] just the reflection of the brute facticity that is existence itself. No teleological component at all.

bahman wrote:Free will is real. Here there is an argument in favor of it: Think of a situation with two options. Suppose that you like both options equally. A deterministic system in such a situation halts. You can of course get out of this situation by choosing one option. Therefore you are free.

In reality, time is a factor. Liking two options equally, assuming mutual exclusivity as your thought experiment does, and your decision making system halting in such a situation will result in inaction: a choice made for you by Determinism. This third choice is forced through by reality and ever-elapsing time. Your argument's fallacy is the "False Dilemma". But even if the two options are exhaustive in the general dilemma of "either action or inaction" and you like both equally, your deterministic decision making system isn't the only one at play, and your own indecision will simply not play a part in the Determinism that exists beyond your own decision making, and reality will continue to unfold deterministically over time regardless.
Further, over time your two equally liked options will realistically not remain equally liked with perfect consistency - at the very least minor fluctuations will occur - and even if they didn't, the Determinism that continues regardless will influence the factors you are taking into account to have come to equally like two options (Determinism beyond of your own decision making continuing regardless), changing the equation, thus making it an inequality, thus allowing you to prefer one option over the other and choosing it.

Your argument compelled me enough to look into it, and it turns out the solution is the same as the one to Zeno's Paradox: simply apply it to reality. The paradox exists only within ideal constraints.

Ecmandu wrote:Sorry silluoutte,

My bad, I only read up to the arrowy stuff.

You don't believe compatibalism.

That is correct, I do not.

Compatibilism seems to require an overly generous perspective on "Free Will" in order to allow the words to fit in with Determinism. It's basically "Soft Determinism", still Determinism but worded neutrally: the politician's answer to the problem. It's correct insofar as it is politically correct and appeals to the "feeling" of Free Will, but ultimately incorrect in that it avoids the hard problem(s):

1) Possibility is not actuality: the feeling that you could have chosen differently doesn't make it an actual choice. Only actually choosing makes something actually possible.
2) The mind-body problem. Not a problem in the sense that it could have a solution, but a problem in the sense that it's an unavoidable obstacle to any degree of Free Will at all.
3) How can you be influenced by circumstance, in order to have something to make a decision about, without being influenced by circumstance, in order for your decision to be free from said influence? Free or Will? Not both.

There's probably more, but these three are enough of a barrier to any degree of Free Will, even Compatibilism.

Ecmandu wrote:

peacegirl wrote:

Ecmandu wrote:Peacegirl,

We can only possibly abstract determinism by the observation of restrictions. So, to show what're or not existence is 100% restrictive (absolute determinism) is to use the limit of knowing every reason why you know everything that you know, and all of those reasons are external (restrictive) to you.

If it's 100%, we know through the thought experiment that this allows 0% capability to abstract a self.

By definitions, through proof through contradiction, st the limit, we can prove that 100% determinism is false, in a self evident way.

You keep stating that it's just MY definition of determinism, and not the correct one.

Actually, it's the only definition of determinism.

You are being disingenuous to this regard.

Determinism means a person could not have done otherwise. You are contradicting yourself when you say we can have free will (we could do otherwise given the same exact time and place) and no free will (we could not have done otherwise), but you will resort to compatibilism which is a joke. All they do is create a convenient definition of free will which does nothing to change the fact that we can only go in one direction.

If everyone knows every reason why they know everything that they know, and any of those causes are external to them, than determinism exists, as they had no internal decision on that matter. It had to be that way and no other way.

Everyone does not have to know every reason why they know everything that they know to have no free will. It had to be that way and no other way because they had no choice since they can only move in one direction: away from dissatisfaction to greater satisfaction. Determinism in human affairs does not mean people have no internal decision on the matter. That is absolutely wrong.

Ecmandu wrote:If all of those causes are external, then we're talking about absolute determinism (nobody ultimately has a choice). I d monstrated absolute determinism as false through a perfect irrefutable limit argument using your own definition (and the definition everyonevelse uses)

No you didn't demonstrate anything, nor did you prove anything, because you're premise is faulty as well as your definition.

Ecmandu wrote:No, you are most certainly the one contradicting themselves here.

No way am I contradicting myself. I am not saying we have free will and no free will. That is a huge contradiction that cannot be ignored just because you want to be right.

Peacegirl and sillouette,

Peacegirl defined determinism as, "you couldn't have chosen any differently"

For me the wave function collapses at the decision point, but before that, it is not determined.

My limit argument is the only reason that I'm a compatibilist.

I'm using the definition "you could not have chosen any differently" in terms of self evident observations we make about outside forces acting upon is in ways that we do not choose.

From this: I push to the limit of this self evident observation to see what happens at that limit.

I've shown that at the limit, that it's impossible for any being to be a sentient being. The limit (absolute determinism) proves itself incorrect as an argument an intelligent being can coincide with, therefor, intelligent beings can prove that, any form of possible intelligence is a necessary disproof of absolute determinism.
This has no other option than to force compatibalism.

I'm not arguing from a "feeling" here. It's a fact.

Silhouette wrote:

peacegirl wrote:Determinism means a person could not have done otherwise. You are contradicting yourself when you say we can have free will (we could have done otherwise given the same exact time and place) and no free will (we could not have done otherwise given the same exact time and place). To rectify the situation you resort to compatibilism. All they have done is created a convenient definition of free will which does nothing to change the fact that we can only go in one direction, thus no free will. Be happy we don’t have free will!

My summation of those who argue in favour of Free Will is that they conflate possibility with actuality.

"Could" have done otherwise, to the Free Will advocate, means the choice not taken seemed perfectly possible to choose and it felt like it could just as easily have been chosen in actuality, and the fact that it wasn't doesn't affect that.
"Could" have done otherwise, to the Determinist means sure the choice not chosen felt perfectly possible, but there was a reason why it turned out not to be the actual choice, and that reason also had a prior reason, and so on.

All choices are possible (as long as they are realistic choices) before we make one, but after a choice is made it could never have been otherwise because it would have given us less satisfaction than the alternative chosen, which is an impossibility.

Silhouette wrote:The conversation between the two is an infinite loop of the following:
FW: yeah but I could have.
Det: yeah but you didn't.

It's no wonder how some people, e.g. Karpel Tunnel blackbox the whole issue, to avoid debates of this type. It's almost the case that you can tell something fundamentally psychological about someone who takes one side over the other. The Free Will advocate likes the aesthetics of things feeling free and open ended, perhaps revelling in the idea that they are therefore free and the Determinist is a slave: as I have come across at least one un-intellectual obsessing over on a different thread. The airy fairy type who lives in their own head. The Determinist is simply saying, sure that's all nice, but reality.

This is another misunderstanding of determinism. How are we slaves? That makes it sound like we are being forced to act in ways that are counter to what we ourselves choose. These terms "slave", "robot", "automaton" really put determinism in a bad light. No wonder people are turned off. It sounds like determinism is taking people's choices away, which is false.

Silhouette wrote:Free Will only seems possible to a Dualist, avoiding the "mind-body problem". The Determinist can be either. The respective causal chains seem to advance as follows:

FW
Material influences(external experience/genetics) \
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ======> Choice
Mental component (internal disposition/identity). /

Det
External experience/genetics/disposition/identity => decision mechanism => Choice

The former's "mental component" is the "decision mechanism" from the latter, but ex nihilo: in and of itself, it exists independent of the information to consider in making a choice - somehow being influenced by it without being influenced by it. If it were being influenced by it, it would be slave to the master of its influences, but not being slave to the master of influence would make the decision essentially random: a paradox.

My argument is that either you make a decision for a reason, in which case there is will but it is not free, or you make a decision for no reason, in which case it is free but not by your will. Free or will, not both.

We don't always have to have a reason for doing something. We may just have a feeling of dissatisfaction with the present position so to remove the dissatisfaction we make a move. If we are satisfied with the position we're in, we are not dissatisfied. It's only when we are dissatisfied (it doesn't have to be on a conscious level) that we change positions. For example, I lay down and begin to feel uncomfortable. I now desire to find a more satisfying position. We do this every moment of our lives but it's so automatic that we don't think about it.

Will cannot be free because we never have a free choice. Our choices are bound by previous causes that push us in a certain direction that could not have been otherwise when looking back in hindsight. But the word "cause" is problematic because it implies that something other than ourselves is responsible for our choices. THIS IS THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM. This debate would not be significant if it didn't deal with the issue of responsibility, for if will is not free, how can we hold anyone responsible? This is why libertarians believe we have a choice and we are deserving of punishment if we choose wrongly, since we could have chosen otherwise. Compatibilists want to create a way out so they try to make determinism compatible with free will without appearing contradictory. But they are being contradictory when they use an arbitrary definition of free will that hold people responsible for certain things while exempting people from other things. They want their cake and eat it too, so to speak. You can't have it both ways unless you create a big faux pas.

Peacegirl,

It is not irrational to define two opposing terms as overlapping. Take, say:

Liberalism and consevativism.

In order for liberals to survive they cannot be liberal about everything. In order for comsevatives to survive, they cannot be conservative about everything.

This is a fact!

This is also true of freewill and determinism, except this is not a matter of future survival, but a matter of existing presently; in order for these concepts to exist, neither can be 100%.

Ecmandu wrote:Peacegirl,

It is not irrational to define two opposing terms as overlapping. Take, say:

Liberalism and conservativism.

In order for liberals to survive they cannot be liberal about everything. In order for comservatives to survive, they cannot be conservative about everything.

This is a fact!

This is also true of freewill and determinism, except this is not a matter of future survival, but a matter of existing presently; in order for these concepts to exist, neither can be 100%.

You are using an example that is relative to how the words are being used, which can change. The word "death" has one definition only. It is the opposite of life. It is not relative. Freedom of the will is the opposite of no freedom of the will, but the way determinism has been defined is causing serious confusion that once cleared up can bring about amazing changes for the better.

Ecmandu wrote:Peacegirl and sillouette,

Peacegirl defined determinism as, "you couldn't have chosen any differently"

For me the wave function collapses at the decision point, but before that, it is not determined.

My limit argument is the only reason that I'm a compatibilist.

I'm using the definition "you could not have chosen any differently" in terms of self evident observations we make about outside forces acting upon is in ways that we do not choose.

We are always limited by our environment, our culture, our predispositions, but there is no outside force acting upon us where we are not able to make
choices. Our environment, our knowledge base, our heredity,etc. limits our range of choices, but that doesn't mean we can't make choices. Of course we can. You are making a choice to post on this thread. The environment isn't forcing this choice on you. You, as a sentient being, are making the choice, therefore the definition of determinism that says "outside forces acting upon you" is completely fallacious.

Ecmandu wrote:From this: I push to the limit of this self evident observation to see what happens at that limit.

How can you do that when there are no forces acting upon us in way that we cannot choose, even if the choices at our disposal are extremely limited. I am not talking about external forces such as weather where we have very little control. Even here, we can make choices based on advancements in weather detection that can help keep us safe. I am talking about choices we do have control over in spite of our vulnerability to outside forces. You cannot tell me we don't have the ability to choose even if our choices are based on limited information.

Ecmandu wrote:I've shown that at the limit, that it's impossible for any being to be a sentient being. The limit (absolute determinism) proves itself incorrect as an argument an intelligent being can coincide with, therefor, intelligent beings can prove that, any form of possible intelligence is a necessary disproof of absolute determinism.
This has no other option than to force compatibalism.

I'm not arguing from a "feeling" here. It's a fact.

You are completely off course, all because of the flawed way you have defined determinism as your major premise.

peacegirl wrote:This is another misunderstanding of determinism. How are we slaves? That makes it sound like we are being forced to act in ways that are counter to what we ourselves choose. These terms "slave", "robot", "automaton" really put determinism in a bad light. No wonder people are turned off. It sounds like determinism is taking people's choices away, which is false.

Oh I agree with this. This is one of the many reasons why I refer to said person who has been espousing such nonsense as an un-intellectual.

peacegirl wrote:Will cannot be free because we never have a free choice. Our choices are bound by previous causes that push us in a certain direction that could not have been otherwise when looking back in hindsight. But the word "cause" is problematic because it implies that something other than ourselves is responsible for our choices. THIS IS THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM. This debate would not be significant if it didn't deal with the issue of responsibility, for if will is not free, how can we hold anyone responsible? This is why libertarians believe we have a choice and we are deserving of punishment if we choose wrongly, since we could have chosen otherwise. Compatibilists want to create a way out so they try to make determinism compatible with free will without appearing contradictory. But they are being contradictory when they use an arbitrary definition of free will that hold people responsible for certain things while exempting people from other things. They want their cake and eat it too, so to speak. You can't have it both ways unless you create a big faux pas.

Yes, I believe this is the core of the usual objection to Determinism.

My explanation of the Libertarian devotion to the concept of Free Will that it is simple, and therefore much more easy to apply to the real world.
With Free Will, one person either makes a decision or not, and if they make a bad decision they are guilty. Each person is an island solely responsible for everything they choose: easy, simple, sorted.

Determinism gets exponentially more complex the larger the system in which it is operating.

This enables it to be hugely more true to reality at the cost of being even more hugely difficult to grasp. This isn't so much of a problem when dealing with things like astral bodies in space viewed from large amounts of light years away, but it's a lot more of a problem when it comes to detailed neuroscience. For example, whilst action potentials along a neuron are nicely discrete, since they either fire or they don't, the connections they have with other neurons are too vast for humans to model without the aid of complex computation. The Determinism is there, it just requires a lot from someone to be able to grasp it. And this expands even further when you consider the limbic system's hormonal responses to external stimuli, which follow nothing more than the same chemical reactions that you can recreate in a lab. Everything quickly becomes intertwined in a vast web of causation beyond "the self" that predicts reality orders of magnitude better than Free Will does, whether one understands it or not.

The issue here is that responsibility likewise branches out throughout this vast web, spreading blame to the point where it becomes unclear if any guilt applies to anyone or anything in particular at all.

How then do you apply specific rules that are teachable to all the ages and intelligence levels that you find in a typical society of humans?
I would argue that you do have to simplify it for purposes such as these, just not to the point of Free Will Libertarianism.
Even if that's all someone is capable of understanding, and the ability to control just oneself seems so much easier than controlling things beyond that level, it simply doesn't apply to reality anywhere near as well as Determinism does. Problems have wider contexts, and "delivering justice" would have a more effective impact beyond application to individuals only. A very human objection to this reality is that they are now much less safe from blame, which they can no longer neatly and crudely assign to any one individual scapegoat who was simply closest in proximity to the critical decision. To deal with this reality requires a great deal of humility and a secure ego that can deal with not being 100% good.

In short, Free Will only has any traction whatsoever due to human weaknesses, and its appeal does indeed appear to correlate with the weaknesses of the human who holds to the concept. Unfortunately, it also scales with the amount of "projection" that the Free Will adovate engages in: the more fervent a Libertarian they are, the more they invert this to the Determinist being the one showing human weakness due to their refusal of 100% responsibility. It becomes something of a pissing match to accept as much responsibility for something as possibility - good or bad alike. Acquiring vast riches is entirely down to you alone and your personal convictions and abilities, regardless of any help you took for granted, and accepting sole blame for the downfall of an entire institution is the most heroic and virtuous act of martyrdom. This Individualism is all peacocking and not at all to do with reality and how it works.

One of the other attractions to Free Will, than simplicity in utility, is to the machismo of peacocking.

peacegirl wrote:We don't always have to have a reason for doing something. We may just have a feeling of dissatisfaction with the present position so to remove the dissatisfaction we make a move. If we are satisfied with the position we're in, we are not dissatisfied. It's only when we are dissatisfied (it doesn't have to be on a conscious level) that we change positions. For example, I lay down and begin to feel uncomfortable. I now desire to find a more satisfying position. We do this every moment of our lives but it's so automatic that we don't think about it.

In the case that we have a dissatisfaction and it moves us towards a position where we are not dissatisfied, that dissatisfaction is "the reason".
I don't just mean having a reason that we have fully and rationally parsed into conscious clarity, just that there is some reason or cause for any given movement or change.

I think we agree here that there are different degrees of consciousness of reasons why things happen. Much, probably most by a long way, of human behaviour is not fully conscious. But lack of consciousness doesn't mean there is no reason/cause.

peacegirl wrote:All choices are possible (as long as they are realistic choices) before we make one, but after a choice is made it could never have been otherwise because it would have given us less satisfaction than the alternative chosen, which is an impossibility.

Would you say that it could have been otherwise before a choice is made? This leaves (realistic) choices open until the point of choosing.

If a choice could have been otherwise before it is made, this leaves open at least some degree of free will. This is one of the differences between hard and soft Determinism: soft Determinism allows free will up until the point of choice, after which it is Determined and could not have been otherwise. Hard Determinism would follow the causal chain back from the point of choice to trace the exact chain of events that resulted in the choice that could not have been otherwise after it is made - and in doing so it would establish exactly why each step before that choice could likewise not have been otherwise.

However, hard Determinism thereby establishes a much more linear progression of events, rather than the sort of convergent progression of possible timelines into one that soft Determinism implies. An image I think of for the latter is like a filmed explosion played in reverse, with all the shrapnel crystalising into one completed object at the point of explosion - symbolising the point of choice, that all of a sudden could never have been otherwise despite seeming like it could have gone any which way before it all came together into the configuration it happened to form. The fact that this conception seems to violate entropy outright ought to be a warning sign, I think.

The problem with the former is that *in effect* (even though not by the same means) it becomes no different to Fatalism. Both posit a point that can be pinpointed in future, at which a certain set of events will occur, even though the means by which you get there are different. Fatalism says that the future point will be reached regardless of how you get there, where hard Determinism says that the future point will be reached exactly because of a very specific set of events that are going to occur. An important distinction, I think.

Fatalism would imply that, even if you knew your fate and tried to escape it, you would still meet your fate. Hard Determinism might appear to pose much more of a problem, which might put one off the idea, that knowing the chain of events exactly would allow one to choose to not follow them. The problem with this objection is that knowing the chain of events would change the chain of events to incorporate your knowing of them, initialising an infinite chain of regression into new chains of events that incorporate knowledge of them etc. etc. until you no longer seek knowledge of them and they settle to a chain of events that you do not know, or even if you do you no longer seek to defy them. The Hard Determinism underlying such a thought experiment therefore remains unchallenged.

Ecmandu wrote:Peacegirl and sillouette,

Peacegirl defined determinism as, "you couldn't have chosen any differently"

For me the wave function collapses at the decision point, but before that, it is not determined.

You're saying pretty much exactly the same thing as what peacegirl said in her response to me - and maybe before, I've not properly read the thread before the point I started contributing.

So it surprises me that upon a quick skim, you seem to be disagreeing.

If I'm getting the right impression of peacegirl's argument, she's a soft Determinist, which is basically another word for Compatibilism, which is your stance. I might be misinterpreting her though.

Perhaps I am not among one of these intelligent beings that disprove "absolute determinism", because I can see plenty of ways in which intelligence is not "in fact" incompatible with hard Determinism. Most obviously, why can't you be determined to be intelligent? All superior quality and quantity of decisions that occur to you are therefore determined to occur to you due to your intelligence, and your better choices are thereby determined from this fact. And isn't a lot of intelligence to do with understanding why you chose the way you chose, as an aside from what it was that you chose?