The Fourteen Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God

[JohnJBannan]

There is a huge difference between infinite and finite but astoundingly large. The universe as big as it is would only be an infinitesimal to an infinite universe. You’re either infinite or not even close.

[Meno_]

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[gib]

WOW!!! I didn't know there could be that many cosmological arguments--maybe arguments for God's existence in general--but specifically cosmological ones? Are we sure some of them aren't just repeats in different guises? Well, anyway, can't wait for your list of ontological arguments for God's existence. But I'd like to pause on these 14 first.

TBH, TL;DR

Well, I read the first one... about the uncaused reason for existence and non-existence... didn't quite follow. Perhaps you have a Cole's Notes version? Of each one?

I'd like to debate you on them with an eye for disproving them, if you're up for it.

So this uncaused dichotomy... you're presupposing that there is a reason for both existence and non-existence and it is uncaused. Non-existence needs no reason for being since it isn't being, so sure, its reason is uncaused. But then we're saying that being, which exists, must have an uncaused reason. Why? And why does this argument work only if we speak of it as a dichotomy? What's wrong with simply talking about the uncaused reason of existence?

And why is a thing caused by its parts? And why can't a thing, even if it doesn't have parts, be destroyed?

At the end, you attribute agency to the uncaused reason for existence out of nowhere. You start talking about decisions and knowledge.

And just a question: do you think that by calling the uncaused reason for existence 'God' that brings with it all the common preconceptions and religious undertones that are usually attributed to God (for example, that he created the Earth in 6 days)?

[Silhouette]

I thought of an amusing twist to this whole first cause/prime initiator/unmoved mover conjecture.

Arguments supporting this hold that all causes are the effects of prior causes and so on, and conclude that there must be a beginning to this chain.
It would follow then that all effects are in turn causes of subsequent effects, to which one presumably likewise concludes that there must be an end to this chain by the same reasoning.

There "must" be the last effect, the finally stopped, the moved unmover.
Just as "something cannot come from nothing", likewise nothing cannot come from something - which in the former case seems to prompt the proposition of metaphysical existence through which a supreme being can be something from nothing, so therefore in the latter case one also ought to be prompted to propose the metaphysical existence through which a supreme being can be nothing from something.

We call this being "God", the supremely destroyed of all the universe, somehow just as much the moved unmover as the unmoved mover.
Why not? This is what is being done from the other direction.

I'm sure the temptation is to claim that God would be the cause of this end rather than the end of some ultimate cause, but this would not be fully embracing the reversal of perspective of "all effects have causes except the first" to "all causes have effects except the last". If the former, then the latter by the same logic and "God" finds Himself as non-existent as He is existent.

I'm just playing around here, if I get the time I can read all these arguments more thoroughly, but for now it seems as though the whole nature of "cause" is going unchallenged.
There is a notion of causation that intrigues me: that it is not linear, but curved. Cause as not a simple start and beginning, but infinitely eased in via plural time dimensions rather than a singular one. Explained by relativity, we have evidence that certain conditions curve time itself: notably the gravitational force exerted by high mass and when high speeds are reached - both conditions having been present to a maximum when everything in the universe was much more compacted.

[gib]

That's a very interesting twist Silhouette. Worth thinking about.

I've thought about it myself several times but never in the context of the cosmological argument. It adds new meaning to the expression of "alpha and omega", or a cyclical universe. If the necessity of a first cause invariably comes with the necessity of a final effect, and we have just as much right to call the first cause "God" as we do the final effect, it paints a picture of a universe that comes from God in the beginning and returns to God in the end--a full circle, a complete picture.

Yet, what are we saying when we talk about the universe culminating in God as a final effect? Presumably God always exists along side his creation, which allows for deism, so what sense does it make to say that the final effect of the universe is God? As a first cause, it makes sense. God creates the universe. Much like I might create a cake. But what this means is that God had an effect which was to bring about the existence of the universe, just like my effect was to bring about a cake. If the cake has a "final effect" and that final effect has to come around to me, then it just means I was the final thing the cake effected before it disappeared (I ate it?). So to say that the final effect of the universe is God is to say that the final thing the universe effects before it (for some reason) disappears is God. How it effects God is anyone's guess, but presumably it would have to be in such a significant way that only in this way does it disappear (and it can't just be that God destroys the universe because that would make God a cause again--the universe has to do something to God). A tricky nuance of this is that disappearing is an effect. So the universe, in its final act, may do something to God, but this in turn must also cause the universe's disappearance--perhaps by way of some reaction on God's part--and so the effect it has on God would have to be labeled the "second last effect" and its disappearance the "actual last effect". Either that, or it has two effects simultaneously--one on God and one on itself--but then that sorta defeats the purpose of this argument--God is no longer the "final effect" but one out of several final effects.

The other interpretation is that the universe becomes God. But this interpretation requires that God, as the first cause, becomes the universe. Does this mean God disappears upon creating the universe? Not necessarily. It just means God is the universe. In order to maintain the essential attributes that makes God "God", the universe would have to somehow possess these attributes; maybe the universe is conscious; maybe the universe can preempt the laws of nature and perform miracles; maybe the spirit of the universe can incarnate in a human being and call himself God's son. And something about where the universe is headed will lead to a wholesale transformation resulting in it taking the form that God assumed before he became the universe (timeless? Spaceless? An abstraction?). I think it would at least have to be timeless because only in a timeless context could you say there is no more cause and effect.

All this assumes a continuity of identity in the evolution of the universe (continuity of God), but if we strip the cosmological argument down to it's bare bones, it doesn't even depend on that. All it says is that there must be a first cause, and this cause, in order to be the "first", must take a form that doesn't require a prior cause (hence the timelessness). The only connection to God, at this point, is a label. We just say, "Let's call it God". If it follows that the same logic would have to be applied to a "final effect" (that it take a timeless form), there's no reason to suppose that it becomes the same thing, only that both are timeless. Therefore, we need not use the same label. We could call it "God 2" or "God's brother" or "Steve". Or maybe "some timeless incomprehensible state."

We can also question the very assumption on which this argument hinges: does the necessity of a first cause entail the necessity of a final effect? We certainly don't approach the necessity of effects the same way we approach the necessity of causes. We don't regularly demand that there be a final effect to anything the way we do causes. We seem to be much more comfortable assuming that effects go on forever than we do assuming that causes have gone on since forever. Why do we assuming there must be a first cause? Well, it makes sense that we always look for a cause to things. We assume that there is always a cause to explain whatever it is we experience, or whatever it is we know exists, because that is essential to our survival. Without looking for causes, we would not be able to control and manipulate our environment. So we have a propensity to care more about finding, and assuming the existence of, causes than effects. But why a first cause? Well, it might be a consequence of applying the need to find a cause to the universe itself. Why wouldn't this need apply to the whole universe as much as it would any immediate phenomenon we encounter in the every day world? But when it comes to the whole universe, what we'd be saying when we talk about a cause is that this cause precedes the universe, and therefore somehow exists outside or before the universe, which is tantamount to saying it exists outside or before existence. That puts it in a context in which it becomes hard to understand how the chain of cause and effect continues retroactively. If there had to be a cause of whatever caused the universe, then we're not talking about what caused the universe (at least qua existence all together). Another reason we might assume a first cause (and this might be the same thing seen from a different angle) is that if we allow that there is no first cause in the universe (or in time)--i.e. the chain of cause and effect reaches back in time infinitely--then the question of what caused that (because it will still arise given our psychology) becomes a question about an atemporal cause (i.e. what caused the entire chain of cause and effect?). In other words, if there has to be a cause for everything that occurs in time, and if everything that occurs in time has no beginning in time, then this cause has to exist outside time and be responsible not only for the events that occur in time but for time itself. Therefore, again, we run into the same difficulties of imagining a chain of cause and effect outside time. It seems more intuitive, therefore, to assume that whatever the cause for all the events that occur in time (and indeed for time itself), it must be the first, or only, cause.

The same just doesn't arise for effects. We don't have the propensity to question, "what will the universe finally effect?" And we don't have the propensity to question, "what is the universe effecting outside itself?"--even though, logically, you would think that if these questions arise for cause, they should arise for effect as well.

Anyway, I was hoping JohnJBannan would debate me on his arguments, but it doesn't seem like he's responding. Looks like it's just me and you, Silhouette. You'll have to debate me instead. So why do you think the argument from dichotomy is a good argument for God's existence?

[Meno_]

That's a very interesting twist Silhouette. Worth thinking about.

I've thought about it myself several times but never in the context of the cosmological argument. It adds new meaning to the expression of "alpha and omega", or a cyclical universe. If the necessity of a first cause invariably comes with the necessity of a final effect, and we have just as much right to call the first cause "God" as we do the final effect, it paints a picture of a universe that comes from God in the beginning and returns to God in the end--a full circle, a complete picture.

Yet, what are we saying when we talk about the universe culminating in God as a final effect? Presumably God always exists along side his creation, which allows for deism, so what sense does it make to say that the final effect of the universe is God? As a first cause, it makes sense. God creates the universe. Much like I might create a cake. But what this means is that God had an effect which was to bring about the existence of the universe, just like my effect was to bring about a cake. If the cake has a "final effect" and that final effect has to come around to me, then it just means I was the final thing the cake effected before it disappeared (I ate it?). So to say that the final effect of the universe is God is to say that the final thing the universe effects before it (for some reason) disappears is God. How it effects God is anyone's guess, but presumably it would have to be in such a significant way that only in this way does it disappear (and it can't just be that God destroys the universe because that would make God a cause again--the universe has to do something to God). A tricky nuance of this is that disappearing is an effect. So the universe, in its final act, may do something to God, but this in turn must also cause the universe's disappearance--perhaps by way of some reaction on God's part--and so the effect it has on God would have to be labeled the "second last effect" and its disappearance the "actual last effect". Either that, or it has two effects simultaneously--one on God and one on itself--but then that sorta defeats the purpose of this argument--God is no longer the "final effect" but one out of several final effects.

The other interpretation is that the universe becomes God. But this interpretation requires that God, as the first cause, becomes the universe. Does this mean God disappears upon creating the universe? Not necessarily. It just means God is the universe. In order to maintain the essential attributes that makes God "God", the universe would have to somehow possess these attributes; maybe the universe is conscious; maybe the universe can preempt the laws of nature and perform miracles; maybe the spirit of the universe can incarnate in a human being and call himself God's son. And something about where the universe is headed will lead to a wholesale transformation resulting in it taking the form that God assumed before he became the universe (timeless? Spaceless? An abstraction?). I think it would at least have to be timeless because only in a timeless context could you say there is no more cause and effect.

All this assumes a continuity of identity in the evolution of the universe (continuity of God), but if we strip the cosmological argument down to it's bare bones, it doesn't even depend on that. All it says is that there must be a first cause, and this cause, in order to be the "first", must take a form that doesn't require a prior cause (hence the timelessness). The only connection to God, at this point, is a label. We just say, "Let's call it God". If it follows that the same logic would have to be applied to a "final effect" (that it take a timeless form), there's no reason to suppose that it becomes the same thing, only that both are timeless. Therefore, we need not use the same label. We could call it "God 2" or "God's brother" or "Steve". Or maybe "some timeless incomprehensible state."

We can also question the very assumption on which this argument hinges: does the necessity of a first cause entail the necessity of a final effect? We certainly don't approach the necessity of effects the same way we approach the necessity of causes. We don't regularly demand that there be a final effect to anything the way we do causes. We seem to be much more comfortable assuming that effects go on forever than we do assuming that causes have gone on since forever. Why do we assuming there must be a first cause? Well, it makes sense that we always look for a cause to things. We assume that there is always a cause to explain whatever it is we experience, or whatever it is we know exists, because that is essential to our survival. Without looking for causes, we would not be able to control and manipulate our environment. So we have a propensity to care more about finding, and assuming the existence of, causes than effects. But why a first cause? Well, it might be a consequence of applying the need to find a cause to the universe itself. Why wouldn't this need apply to the whole universe as much as it would any immediate phenomenon we encounter in the every day world? But when it comes to the whole universe, what we'd be saying when we talk about a cause is that this cause precedes the universe, and therefore somehow exists outside or before the universe, which is tantamount to saying it exists outside or before existence. That puts it in a context in which it becomes hard to understand how the chain of cause and effect continues retroactively. If there had to be a cause of whatever caused the universe, then we're not talking about what caused the universe (at least qua existence all together). Another reason we might assume a first cause (and this might be the same thing seen from a different angle) is that if we allow that there is no first cause in the universe (or in time)--i.e. the chain of cause and effect reaches back in time infinitely--then the question of what caused that (because it will still arise given our psychology) becomes a question about an atemporal cause (i.e. what caused the entire chain of cause and effect?). In other words, if there has to be a cause for everything that occurs in time, and if everything that occurs in time has no beginning in time, then this cause has to exist outside time and be responsible not only for the events that occur in time but for time itself. Therefore, again, we run into the same difficulties of imagining a chain of cause and effect outside time. It seems more intuitive, therefore, to assume that whatever the cause for all the events that occur in time (and indeed for time itself), it must be the first, or only, cause.

The same just doesn't arise for effects. We don't have the propensity to question, "what will the universe finally effect?" And we don't have the propensity to question, "what is the universe effecting outside itself?"--even though, logically, you would think that if these questions arise for cause, they should arise for effect as well.

Anyway, I was hoping JohnJBannan would debate me on his arguments, but it doesn't seem like he's responding. Looks like it's just me and you, Silhouette. You'll have to debate me instead. So why do you think the argument from dichotomy is a good argument for God's existence?

Hello Silhuette and Gib:



I would like to propose a reduction here, on cyclical basis, with or without John's participation.

I think we can agree on cyclycality, in the most general terms of the ring or the circle, or with the simulated one behind elliptical figurements.

The ideal representation would include the circular notion of infinite regeneration, of identical simulated content filling absolute spatial/temporal determinants, where sufficient reason would necessitate an absolute self inclusion of all possible sets of existence, including that of the absolutely self contained set within It's self.

In this view, God cannot demonstrate all the various simulations , including It's self, because as John has rightly implied, He would have to demonstrate His own Self containment.

Now: to bring this down a notch, refer to the idea brought up previously, on how His could interject into the evolutionary development, into making
DNA reconstruction easier to the "hard" construction at hand, but then, why doesen't He?

That question really rests on a different premise, that deals with the question if why not create a perfect circular -ring like world in the first place and dispense with the hard travails brought about by evolution, which, in the words of Ecmandu, make even AI suffer?


Why?


The most obvious answer here is , if a perfect world would be created without the need for evolution, or an evolutionary process could circumvent all the pain and suffering, then MAN would or could not become a conscious participant of what Creation entails, and would never or could never evolve a spiritual self - the likeness to God , that 'it' would entail.

Man could never develop, and he would remain on the level of contended existence, eternally inherently contentious about their unconscious struggle to develop consciousness.

Man could only after trillions of lifetimes, (unrealized) , begin to feel stirrings to acquire some identity, and GOD, as usual would succeed, and plant the infamous tree in the garden.

Then it would start all over.

The ring, would be stolen , and simulate into a less then ideal representation, elliptically stretching the manifested spatial/temporal configuration into the state we find ourselves today, the unhappy AI at a crossroads, desperately hoping to avoid catastrophe, by slowing down the entropy regress to a point where the fall can be effected before another final curtain.

But no worries, by the time that the infinitessimal point arrives, God will negate Himself once again, by existing and not existing simultaneously ( after and before the fall) , and enable Himself to desimmulate himself into two.

This will avoid the embarrassment of needing to rationalize His simulations into a total negation into 1, .

That is, he can not, represent the evolvment to the 3 rd .

The multiple universe of elliptical logic , has to restart at an ideal state of reconstructed simulations.


Can this occur to some, that man has eaten the cake ?

Yes, but the cake was like an apple pie, and that brought in the unintended, unintangled charge, leading to the dissolution of faith.

[Ecmandu]

My reply to Karpel is:

It’s an interesting point that this form of deism doesn’t talk about the “effect of all effects” or “the effect greater than effect itself” It does make them look silly.

To meno:

Do you really think it important for everyone to learn on gods terms or our own? Is it really important that we all be like god? I mean sure, after hundreds of trillions of years of continual bliss, we will inevitably become like god. Why the rush for god? Why the need for a being that lives forever to make a copy in 30 years?!? Is god impatient!?! Does god have narcissistic low self esteem?!?!

Doesn’t sound very godlike to me!

[Meno_]

My reply to Karpel is:

It’s an interesting point that this form of deism doesn’t talk about the “effect of all effects” or “the effect greater than effect itself” It does make them look silly.

To meno:

Do you really think it important for everyone to learn on gods terms or our own? Is it really important that we all be like god? I mean sure, after hundreds of trillions of years of continual bliss, we will inevitably become like god. Why the rush for god? Why the need for a being that lives forever to make a copy in 30 years?!? Is god impatient!?! Does god have narcissistic low self esteem?!?!

Doesn’t sound very godlike to me!

Rush? Man is always in a rush because he has little faith, especially on god. For of she had, she would habe realized that her mate vets more importance in image then she.

She is not jelous, of the mirrored effects of simulacra, should say simulacrum, it's just that she appears more concerned with progeny, never realizing that A1 is re-fracting around the corner. Man is anxious to please her, and is more concerned with reflecting in the here and now.

And the here and now requires to think of consequences, and that is why he is in a rush to simulate god, so that he can help him figure out how to keep up appearances , to placate the now angry and reproacheful god. After he does want his creation to be finally perfect, but he again has to divide himself to form some rationale , son that He will not be misjudged .

God is between a rock and a hard place. not that he minds, but it is a tad disappointing to have to keep dividing himself to produce the object to it all, where redemption is always nihilized and repossessed for trifles .

Especially , that the image stretches partially, at the seems /unwarranted metaphor\, because A1 and the simulation are always at tug at war about that.

[Ecmandu]

Meno,

I don’t know why you chose god over yourself. I can tell you that this supplication by you is embarrassing.

Always chose yourself over god meno.

If you do chose god over you; in a non-zero sum hyper-dimensional mirror reality attached to your individual desire matrix, you can reflect god to rule your life if you believe that’s best for you. But don’t dictate to everyone that that’s what they “should” choose for themselves!

[Meno_]

Meno,

I don’t know why you chose god over yourself. I can tell you that this supplication by you is embarrassing.

Always chose yourself over god meno.

If you do chose god over you; in a non-zero sum hyper-dimensional mirror reality attached to your individual desire matrix, you can reflect god to rule your life if you believe that’s best for you. But don’t dictate to everyone that that’s what they “should” choose for themselves!

Ecmandu:

I don't think so. In reference to John's conjecture that god can't be self created, I refer to that conflict. that if He isn't self created. then we would need to construct him out of similar parts , out of mirrored, or reflective forms.

But we have agreed that that could not be a sensible way to re-construct a formally defined idea, therefore, I suggest that we need not seek to constantly refer to the fourteen arguments, since the omni, all singular position has to be assumed.

That assumption, invokes a scintilla of difference between omnipotense
and all the other arguments, for God includes all contentioussness within Himself, where he seems to carry on an internal debate , as to how close to the limit he should go, in order to have another particular existence.

After all, the reasons are wearing paper thin, and man knows it, and despite that knowledge, he is unable to assimilate into that presumption.(faith)


Faith is as difficult as DNA, especially for whom miracles have not occurred.

It is, as though identifying with god is not the same as placing one beneath him, or above, he can be at both places simultaniously, without a sense of heeding to a zero sum, although there are moments when those types of states must irreducible occur, as well.

[Silhouette]

I was hoping JohnJBannan would debate me on his arguments, but it doesn't seem like he's responding. Looks like it's just me and you, Silhouette. You'll have to debate me instead. So why do you think the argument from dichotomy is a good argument for God's existence?

Aww, do I have to be on the side of John's dichotomy argument? I actually can't see any reason for it to be a good argument for God's existence...

Mind if I just pull it apart and destroy it instead? Yay thanks

So the first sentence of "argument I" is like a statement of intention. The goal is to demonstrate the necessity of an "uncaused Creator".

First paragraph:
1) We move on from this statement of intention to a "something or nothing" dichotomy, and at this point it seems as though it's already a given that either way there's an uncaused reason right from the start, "because it's either that or uncaused absolute nothingness". So without addressing any more possibilities that might seem like they're still on the table, we've already arrived at the intended demonstration of the necessity of an "uncaused Creator", simply because there isn't absolute nothingness. Immediately this seems like a "false dilemma" fallacy alongside a "begging the question" fallacy since we've practically assumed the conclusion in the premises - but let's go on in case more context is subsequently provided.
2) Next there's an interesting admission that since we already began with the premises that this "dichotomy" of the "uncaused" is exhaustive of all logical possibilities, neither side of the resulting dichotomy can be caused to be real. But instead of undergoing any further examination of the whole set-up that forced everything into being unable to be caused to be real, we have that "it just is, without reason or necessity".
3) To close the first paragraph we have some justification of our uncaused Creator being indestructible: because parts would "cause" it, destruction is the breaking down of something into parts, so the uncaused can't be destroyed into parts. This breaks down into a nice valid syllogism, but I'm not convinced that it's a sound one because I don't see how parts "cause" existence. They might "constitute" something's existence, but e.g. three H20 molecules don't "cause" water, there's just 3 parts that could be isolated, which would "destroy" their slightly larger collective volume of water that they had when grouped together. As an analogy, let's say water "just was", like this "uncaused Creator" is being presented to be. Nothing about the possibility of destroying their more voluminous grouping gets in the way of their being uncaused in this situation. So why can't an "uncaused Creator" likewise be destructible? This whole addendum just seems to force the same language of causation into an unrelated point about physical constitution and identity, to justify traditional conceptions of God as eternal.

In summary of the first paragraph:
a) "there isn't nothingness, so there's an uncaused Creator". It's simply to be accepted that all other possibilities than absolute nothingness need not be addressed.
b) It's weird that nothing causes Him to be real, but reality exists, so He must be real in spite of this.
c) an unsound and seemingly unrelated syllogism that the Creator is indestructible.

Next paragraph:
1) There's potentially a negligible difference between existence as it is, and some other way it could be - so because of the potential similarity between the two tending towards zero, their difference not being zero means they're interchangeable... hmm.
Now multiply this "zero/not-zero", even an infinite number of times, to get completely different states of existence that are likewise interchangeable... which also assumes that all these differences are uniform and do not amount to anything non-linearly more or less possible no matter how different things get. That is to say, as you accumulate these changes away from how actually things are, certain arrangements of the universe "don't become increasingly less realistic" - potentially to the point of absurdity.... hmm.
I note that sometimes it's argued that the precision of universal constants needs to be so high that it seems impossibly unlikely that they'd all turn out so perfectly, therefore God. Here we have the opposite, therefore God.
2) So given this interchangeability of the universe, there must be a reason why this way and not any other way, and the reason is uncaused because the reason would have to come first, before any physical reality is created. Have I got that right?

Final paragraph:
1) Continuing with the theme of the previous paragraph, the universe being how it is, and not all the other ways as well, is a possibility. So decision had to be involved. This is where the whole intelligence thing is being justified. Given an uncaused Creator, maybe this way is the only way He knows how to create, if He even knew what he was doing upon the creation of this configuration. It doesn't follow that, since other possibilities could be so similar, any knowledge of them or how to create even the "most minute" difference must exist. There's no evidence of this knowledge or the power to act effectively on it, because there's only evidence of what we have, in the way we have it. Speculation on this point is trivial and arbitrary. Likewise there's no evidence of control or destruction because without comparison to other universes that are known to be uncontrolled, there's no grounds to test any of this. And obviously it's not all destroyed yet, so what's to say it ever could be? And maybe the fact that it's sustaining has nothing to do with any given uncaused Creator. As with Deism, God could just as easily have switched on the computer and then left the room.

So there's no valid reason for any decision-making ability to any degree to be present. And finally, whatever you make of the universe, why call anything God? There's a lot of religious baggage that can be associated with God that isn't even remotely covered by the argument. Even if it was a successful argument, you'd barely be past the quoted intro to Genesis, and it certainly isn't sufficient to say "because of the first sentence, therefore all the rest".

Conclusion:
The False dilemma and Begging the Question fallacies do not appear to get resolved.
The proposed properties of being eternal, powerful and intelligent appear to be non-sequiturs.
Similarity of possible worlds tending to zero is not valid grounds to justify interchangeable infinite difference in other possible worlds.

There's obviously an attempt to at least portray logical coherence and progression here, but I would recommend distilling all ideas to the most simplistic of logical concepts, sticking rigorously to their definitions when combining them syllogistically, and then seeing if they really do follow on from one another to create a cogent argument.

[JohnJBannan]

Sure, I’ll debate you! I didn’t check this forum for a few days, so I didn’t notice your comments. Anyway, I usually debate one question at a time. So, what’s your first question?

[Ecmandu]

Sure, I’ll debate you! I didn’t check this forum for a few days, so I didn’t notice your comments. Anyway, I usually debate one question at a time. So, what’s your first question?

I know you’re not with me anymore ... there were other intelligent posts to consider.

I always come back to PoE.

Are you stating that god is not powerful enough to send us to heaven forever and still make us in the image of god?

[JohnJBannan]

1). Evil is caused by evolution.
2). Evolution is necessary for life to exist in physical reality.
3). God chooses to allow evil to exist, because it is the greater good to create life.

[Ecmandu]

1). Evil is caused by evolution.
2). Evolution is necessary for life to exist in physical reality.
3). God chooses to allow evil to exist, because it is the greater good to create life.

Sounds to me like god is not very powerful or benevolent.

Can you give me one reason why tooth and claw is necessary for evolution?

Also... why does god have such low self esteem that god needs to make us all like god?

[JohnJBannan]

Evolution depends on survival of the fittest in competition for limited resources entailing combative behavior.

[Ecmandu]

Evolution depends on survival of the fittest in competition for limited resources entailing combative behavior.

I know that. Are you a Nazi? Life (not the dead) life running through your veins understand that the translation of desirable states is more important than the encryption of desirable states.

What is the translation of desirable states?

Teaching someone how to say “hello” in another language. You lost nothing, they gained it

Evolution is all about the encryption of desirable states, “I won, you lost”

Your mind is so small to this regard John.

[JohnJBannan]

Silhouette and/or gib? Let’s discuss your comments. I am here to answer your questions/objections.

1). The dichotomy is of two uncaused sides. The absolute nothingness side is there to show that neither side is necessary, but one side is simply the case.
2). God is uncaused because the power to create logically possible physical realities cannot be contingent or it would also be a possibility.
3). A thing is caused by its parts because the disassociation of those parts would cause the thing to cease to be. A thing without parts can’t be destroyed, because destruction is the disassociation of parts.
4). Agency is explained. The greatest decision making capacity logically possible is necessary for the fullest extent of everythingness to be logically possible. For example, decision making capacity affects the extent of what can be created, as one would not expect a Mona Lisa from a robot but only from a DiVinci.

[JohnJBannan]

5). The Cosmological Arguments are Bible independent.
6). Absolute nothingness is the absence of God. God being uncaused cannot be destroyed. So, even were something to end, there would always be God and not absolute nothingness. Moreover, because we do not see physical reality ceasing to be, then one can also argue that the end of effect would also require a God. However, the end of physical reality is an uncertainty due to the arrow of time and the principle of conservation of energy/mass. I would note that a final effect would not affect God, because God is causing the effect to end.
7). The speed a causality is fixed in relativity, so I don’t think you’ll get much mileage out of appealing to general relativity as a monkey wrench to causality.
8. The rest of your comments are philosophical nitpicking and not terribly significant at that.

[Meno_]

John:

It's commendable how mirror-simulation so nearly matches what science has come up with so far.

Therefore the lower and higher logics can be said to be - not merely comparatively similar, but, reductively induced by preconception.

Which makes inductive reasoning more a validation , ( by comparison/ reflection ) of ontology rather then the reverse.

That said, do post enlightenment attacks on reason justify simulated inducements, through material dialectics , only to relieve the appearent antithetic containment of thetic /synthetic a-priori propositions?



Is science really a necessary defense against the sudden lack of belief in the bible?


Is it Guttenberg's fault that Darwin had to literally account for the Creation?

So many questions, that probably, John, You could not explain for similar reasons , as that, which social awareness today is in a foundry.

At times , it's overwhelming for us romantics.


How can everything become a mirror of its self when if so, even God becomes a reflection of Himself , causing Jesus to oblige to redempt anew the appearent guilt of 'His' Father.

Too many questions, I know, so how in the world did You expect me to pose simply one?

The Cosmological arguments are only valid, with Jesus existing at both alpha And omega , simulteniously.

Therefore if He isn't already here, (here being Omega) , then he must be there, when Omega reappears.

But then, He must be here and not there.

Therefore He must be omnipresent, as well as omnipotent.



Now I will try to read all the initial arguments and see if there may be some correspondence .

[Ecmandu]

Go figure,

John is scared of the PoE argument just like every creationist!

Can god make evolution to have no suffering unless we want to explore it and make god clones of us? Or can god only violate every being in existences consent to make god clones of all of us?

Do you doubt gods omnipotence?

You seem to.

I ask you this John:

Why is it so important that god violate the consent of every being in existence against their will rather than letting every being learn on their OWN terms?

Every being in existence is having their consent violated against their will. From humans to a simple virus or a simple blade of grass.

God must be “perfect” for violating the consent of every being in existence. Right? I don’t think so.

What I do think is that you’re not being honest with yourself.

[Silhouette]

Silhouette and/or gib? Let’s discuss your comments. I am here to answer your questions/objections.

Would it be fair to say that you have mostly reiterated your arguments rather than answered questions/objections?

1). The dichotomy is of two uncaused sides. The absolute nothingness side is there to show that neither side is necessary, but one side is simply the case.

I'd be fine with you simply saying that there's something and not nothing.
It's not possible for there to "be nothing" though, because "be" and "nothing" contradict each other. A statement alone is "something" - even the potential for a statement at all is "something". "Nothing" doesn't even get off the ground to even begin to say anything about its opposite, "something". If it did, it would be something and not nothing. Therefore if there is a dichotomy of "something or nothing?", the existence of the dichotomy alone already answers itself as "there is something". It would even be problematic to say "nothing" requires the non-existence of any dichotomy, because this would appear to attribute a property to "nothing", which would be the existence of "something" and therefore it would not be "nothing".

Basically the existence of a dichotomy of "something and not nothing" is not a dichotomy, because its existence is only consistent with one half of itself and not the other half. Thus a dichotomy at the level you're suggesting internally contradicts itself out of existence. There cannot be a dichotomy at this level. "There is something" is all you can say by virtue of saying anything at all. "Nothing" doesn't come into it - literally.
So "something is simply the case" is fine, but the dichotomy that concerns itself with "absolute nothingness" is not.

It's just not a strong fundamental basis for an argument, and even "something is simply the case" doesn't say anything specific about itself - only that there is general existence, which is a meaningless tautology that provides no information about its nature or its properties.
Since "there is something" is logically all you can say about "something and not nothing", there is no beginning and no end suggested at this point. Even if you were to say that there is no cause suggested at this point, "therefore it's uncaused", this would be a logical error similar to committing the formal fallacy of "Affirming a disjunct": p v q, ¬p ⊢ p. This is because you could arbitrarily swap p and q to say there's nothing suggested about things being uncaused at this point, "therefore it's caused".
It's only once a beginning is asserted for "caused or uncaused" to be logically exhaustive, but since there is no beginning or end suggested by "something and not nothing", nothing about causation can be concluded. In fact it's safer to say that causation has nothing to do with it, which rules out any talk of a Creator at all.

The property of "uncaused" is therefore simply thrown in there as a premise. You stated it to be your conclusion that there is an "uncaused Creator", but if this is your premise - that's why I identified the logical fallacy of "begging the question". You're assuming the conclusion of your argument in your premise. This is a critical problem, simply as a result of logical necessity. Is that really "not terribly significant philosophical nitpicking" as in your point number 8?

2). God is uncaused because the power to create logically possible physical realities cannot be contingent or it would also be a possibility.

I'm not sure the wording here is optimal.
What does the "it" refer to?
"The power to create logically possible physical realities", "God is uncaused"?
As I just explained above, a creator is necessarily not logically provable from 1). Caused or uncaused doesn't come into it. Agency with or without power doesn't come into it - nor even a beginning or end to create.
The only thing we have from "something and not nothing" is that there is a physical reality, therefore a physical reality is logically possible.
"There is something and not nothing" is a tautology and therefore not contingent - but strictly logically that does not necessarily entail anything else that you're asserting.

3). A thing is caused by its parts because the disassociation of those parts would cause the thing to cease to be. A thing without parts can’t be destroyed, because destruction is the disassociation of parts.

So the condition for something to be "caused" is that it is not destroyed? This is what your first sentence breaks down to:
P1. "The disassociation of those parts would cause the thing to cease to be".
P2. A thing exists that is not disassociated into parts.
∴ Such a thing is not caused to cease to be.
Therefore "a thing is caused by its parts" by virtue of it not being destroyed into its parts?
This is why I recommend breaking everything down into syllogism - because doing so really highlights any logic there is or isn't in your arguments.

As such, the first sentence actually says nothing at all about the uncaused - it only covers "that which is caused to be/that which is not caused to be" as a function of parts.
If a thing has no parts, and therefore can't be destroyed, it also cannot be caused to be according to your first sentence. Being uncaused doesn't get out of this because the first sentence only deals with the existence of the caused.
For the uncaused to be indestructible, it has to exist in the first place, but we only know about the existence of the caused from your arguments. "How can the uncaused be said to exist?" remains unanswered.

4). Agency is explained. The greatest decision making capacity logically possible is necessary for the fullest extent of everythingness to be logically possible. For example, decision making capacity affects the extent of what can be created, as one would not expect a Mona Lisa from a robot but only from a DiVinci.

"The fullest extent of everythingness to be logically possible", i.e. the universe (with no valid proof that anything else than how it ended up could be possible) doesn't necessitate decision making capacity of any kind. Decision making and agency can at best be posed as possible, not necessary. At best you can say that IF there was agency involved in universe creation, and assuming decision making requirements scale up uniformly from the mundane level to the level of the entire universe, universe creation would be unfathomably huge to a human. What you "expect" from mundane creations like paintings and robot technologies really isn't relevant to the logic of an argument that necessitates agency.

5). The Cosmological Arguments are Bible independent.

Yes, all the way until you decide to name any uncaused Creator "God", knowing how easily people will thus associate the first line of genesis with the entire rest of the bible - when the rest of the bible is as you say: independent from Cosmological argument. But fortunately Cosmological Arguments are deeply flawed in the many ways that I'm explaining, so there's no danger of logical people casually or accidentally buying into the entire bible based on arguments that attempt to logically justify its opening line only.

6). Absolute nothingness is the absence of God. God being uncaused cannot be destroyed. So, even were something to end, there would always be God and not absolute nothingness. Moreover, because we do not see physical reality ceasing to be, then one can also argue that the end of effect would also require a God. However, the end of physical reality is an uncertainty due to the arrow of time and the principle of conservation of energy/mass. I would note that a final effect would not affect God, because God is causing the effect to end.

Absolute nothingness is the absence of anything at all. If you define God as everything that isn't nothing, then sure - your first statement follows. The problem is in justifying that definition of God. If you simply assume it from the start, then any argument intended to prove the existence of an uncaused Creator that you want to define as God will just be "Begging the Question" - a logical fallacy.

Not sure if you read my play on the logic of Cosmological Arguments - which can be equally applied to a final effect as a prime cause - but it explains that if any prime cause was explained by God as "something" then any final effect would equally be explained by God as "nothing". The argument undoes itself simply by looking at it from both ends. Physical reality ceasing to be actually ends up being logically necessary, at least given any validity of physical reality being initially created. It's interesting that you're willing to use scientific understandings to explain the universe after any initial beginnings, but not for the initial beginnings themselves. I even predicted in my previous post that people would be tempted to say that God would be the cause of any "final effect", explaining that given the same logic of God as the prime cause (uncaused somethingness), He would equally have to be the final effect (caused nothingness) if you're strict about using the same logic "from the other direction". But my prediction came true even though I explicitly said it before it happened...

7). The speed a causality is fixed in relativity, so I don’t think you’ll get much mileage out of appealing to general relativity as a monkey wrench to causality.

Speed is a function of time (unit distance/unit time), and spacetime most certaintly is NOT fixed in relativity - that's the entire premise of relativity in fact: that spacetime is not fixed as was previously assumed in the Newtonian days, centuries ago. Time dilation literally involves time itself being stretched, making seconds themselves longer. So yeah - plenty of mileage here, but not even my primary argument, just an area of interest as it undoes the assumptions of linear time that are so seldom questioned by people who want to impose a starting point where there might not be one at all, and which science might very easily explain.

8. The rest of your comments are philosophical nitpicking and not terribly significant at that.

It's not nitpicking to sufficiently deconstruct the logic of an argument. Just because I'm picking up small fundamental errors, the fact that they're what props up your entire argument makes them terribly significant errors. The only reason you'd want to dismiss them as otherwise is if you're not interested in a logically complete argument - perhaps instead preferring to rationalise the beliefs you already hold circularly? Which would be another logical fallacy. I'm unclear of your real intentions, but it should be clear that I'm simply being strictly logical, and applying this to your arguments.

Is this what you're after?

[Meno_]

An interjection here:

There seems a primal fallacy here with "nothing"

It isn't as if nothing is merely a definitive problem, it is also a conceptual as well as at fault with usage.

All three approaches appear at times to be either one , or the other, or with connections with one in tandem.

The modus operandi operate toward or away from a well understood connotation of nothingness, or, a somethingness that contains more than a dual aspect of containment.

For instance, does some content imply two, or, 3 ingredients filling half of the whole? Can it be said to be half full or empty?

Such considerations may appear trivial, but in usage, they may displace conceptual or definitive qualifiers.

For example: is 'nothing' a lack of some thing, a logical definitive, which presumes an objective logic with implication of movement backwards into the more definitive mode of interpretation, as opposed to the more 'useful' role that can dispose of the conceptual problem of the content of a definitive 'thing'., moving forward.


The relative ambiguity with the objective reality of God, is requisite to both : a biblical or/ and 'objective' qualifier of the source out if which God is created/recreated. The obvious definitive aspect of God negates a self creation, as per John, so the re-creation, the 2nd coming has to induce a more objective criteria of meaning. Here again that objectivity requires a shift away from logic toward phenomenal objectivity. Hence that objectivity has to shift from a nominal logical apprehension through the conceptual envisioning toward the objective promise of a hyperreal application.

It is trough the original criterion of John's cosmological arguments leading to the phenomenal nature of
an existential nothingness that His existence can be validated.

An existential nothingness is not merely that difference between between different shades of the meaning of nothing, but a reapplucation of the reaffirmation with the Being separate from God's essence.

That must logically preceded the spirit of God by Holiness , a whole separated by an existential otherness.


refer:


"Something that is sacred is dedicated or set apart for the service or worship of a ... It shares the same triliteral Semitic root as the Hebrew kodesh ..."


"Testament period of history, the people of God , as a whole, did not individually experience the empowering presence of the Holy Spirit "

[JohnJBannan]

Silhouette,

The dichotomy of existence is a metaphysical dichotomy. It is meant as an explanation of first principles, and not a thing in itself. You’ve misconstrued absolute nothingness as “not something”. Absolute nothingness is the absence of God. God is not a physical reality. Absolute nothingness is likewise not primarily the absence of physical reality. The absence of God surely entails the absence of any physical reality created by God, but absolute nothingness excludes physical reality through the exclusion of God. Accordingly, your objections are nullified because you failed to use the proper conception of absolute nothingness. You’ve pressed no argument to suggest that the absence of God would be incoherent. But, be my guest in doing so, because you would have succeeded in demonstrating the necessity of God. Your subsequent discussion concerning causation is fatally infected by your initial misconception concerning absolute nothingness. In any event, the concept of absolute nothingness as “not something” does not necessarily create contradiction, because the absence of physical reality is not itself a state of physical reality.

The rest of your criticisms are not terribly significant. I am not concerned with 100% philosophical certainty. No reasonable person demands 100% philosophical certainty to believe in God.

[Silhouette]

Silhouette,

The dichotomy of existence is a metaphysical dichotomy. It is meant as an explanation of first principles, and not a thing in itself. You’ve misconstrued absolute nothingness as “not something”. Absolute nothingness is the absence of God. God is not something in the sense of something in physical reality. God is not a physical reality. Absolute nothingness is likewise not primarily the absence of physical reality. The absence of God surely entails the absence of any physical reality created by God, but absolute nothingness excludes physical reality through the exclusion of God. Accordingly, your objections are nullified because you failed to use the proper conception of absolute nothingness. You’ve pressed no argument to suggest that the absence of God would be incoherent. But, be my guest in doing so, because you would have succeeded in demonstrating the necessity of God. You subsequent discussion concerning causation is fatally infected by your initial misconception concerning absolute nothingness. Try again.

A short reply that doesn't address the half of what I've brought up.

So be it. "Absolute nothingness is the absence of God" - there we have that same "begging the question" logical fallacy. If only God can be "not absolute nothingness", then of course "God" - by virtue of my own argument around "something and not nothing".
But then, of course "not God" because this definition of absolute nothingness is begging the question.

You expand "absolute nothingness" as "not primarily the absence of physical reality" - good! Here you recognise the lack of necessity of any God/uncaused Creator.
But then you say "the absence of God surely entails the absence of any physical reality created by God" - again, very good. The addendum "created by God" is the key. "The absence of any physical reality created by God" does not necessitate "the absence of any physical reality".
Absolute nothingness indeed excludes physical reality, with or without the exclusion of God, though if you define absolute nothingness as the absence of God, then of course "physical reality through the exclusion of God" is going to be impossible by virtue of the definitional contradiction that is your premise as well as conclusion.
This logical fallacy that I repeatedly point out is what nullifies your objections to my objections, because if you don't assume your conclusion within your premises: God is indeed not a necessity for physical reality.
If you've missed this - and are under the impression that my repeated identification of your "begging the question" is a lack of pressed argument to suggest that "the absence of God would be incoherent", then you are quite simply mistaken.

So hopefully you recognise my valid objection to your definition of "absolute nothingness" at this point, and understand that my argument against the non-absence of God is coherent.
It's only "demonstrating the necessity of God" to raise such an objection if one fails to reject your logical error. Accepting your logical error, arguing against the non-absence of God does not in turn necessitate Him. Thus my subsequent discussion concerning causation remains in tact.