Schopenhauer, Existence as Thought, Existentialism as Fever

Schopenhauer created existentialism which is the unification of theory and practice, the elimination of metaphysical dichotomy between itself and what it sees as ‘untruth’; Schopenhauer does way with Zoroaster, who governs all moral metaphysics.

The general expression of the elimination of metaphysics from a persons mind is fever. It is essentially the annihilation of parasites and useless mechanisms; it brings the awareness back to the organisms actual substance, the flux of electrical potency, drawing it away from notions which require a cold distance between themselves and what they address.

We are taught to honor Kierkegaard as the main existentialist, but he is merely the first practicer of Schopenhauers philosophy of philosophy; to address the human being as not merely a problem, but as a dis-ease; a visceral problem. Hitherto man aspired to make his problems as un-visceral, as abstract, as cold and far away as possible; he tried to attribute them to the devil, for instance. In Schopenhauer the existential problem of mankind and his passions versus his interests, his perspective versus his truth, is broken down like the spell of enhanced experience in a childhood fever removes the difference between the world and our experience of it; the world is no more, all there is the experience of fundamental presences. We are closer to truth, and farther away from notion. To remove the remorses of the psyche, Christianity proposed to remove the entire psyche. Kierkegaard struggles foremost with this wound; the psychological lobotomy that christianity represents in its colossal failure, resulting in an increased depth of misery and guilt and a decreased power to do anything about it; this is very tough work and Kierkegaard is our dear pal. Sartre takes the opposite approach; he bypasses emotion, which he perceives as the abyss between truth and perspective, and throws himself entirely on his physiology and his most subjective intellectual objects. Nietzsche thirdly encompasses the fever in its fullest scope, disregarding the emotional depths of Kierkegaard and disdaining the physiological explorations of Sartre, he suffers both in private and explores in public the power of this sickness called man; which in short amounts to the power to overcome itself. Because as a man he was as problematic to himself as Kierkegaard and Sartre combined, he succumbs finally to partake in that which must be overcome; but that is mere collateral damage, debris; his work forms the spine of that which overcomes. Nietzsche’s work overcame Nietzsche the man, that is mans greatest nobility and the very opposite to what communism aspires to, where man seeks to put his work entirely in service of himself, which is the full on reversal of the creative force itself and thereby the negation of man as a natural value. Only existentialism stands in the way of this.

Heidegger is focussed entirely on Nietzsche and the Presocratics, and not at all on himself; he is not an existentialist and, given that his object of study is existentialism, he is not a philosopher in the primordial sense; he is a facilitator of philosophy, he allows mankind to make the step from Schopenhauers method as it found its most valuable expression in Nietzsche, to a way of thought based on that method but not restricted to its ground; that is to say, Heidegger fundamentally speaks to health of the future rather than to his own sickness - I, one step yet down that line which I call my lineage iand in terms of which I understand myself as a being, I am speaking to this health as it is being formed. The mastery of value, the power to create it out of its absence, this is the essential property of the fever, which Schopenhauer forged into thought. The Dutch writer Willem Frederik Hermans is a direct expression of this method in literary form, especially his book Nooit Meer Slapen is simply the holding into being of a fever-as-thought. Let me make note that fever as thought is something very different from thought as fever, which is simply agitated thought, usually flawed thought, thought ripped out of context, and it is a metaphor, not an actual fever. Schopenhauer, and the aphoristic form of Nietzsche’s most duality-eviscerating sentences, represent the actual same phenomenon as a physical fever, but on the more subtle paradigm of the mind; it is the type of philosophy that has its impact on a neural level, something mere analytical thought never attains; moreover it has the sort of impact that rewires the system but leaves its coherence in place; and indeed a fever generates a heightened sense for subtleties and thus also an enhanced experience of abhorrence at persistently discongruent objects of experience; the discongruence not of conceptual but of existential nature. What is ‘existential’? That which passes through the fever and remains the same. That which burns away is mere ideation, ideology, category, dust; this includes the personality as a habit. An existentialist will shed the habit of identification with a person; in Nietzsche, the name this relinquishing takes on is Dionysos; symbol both of the savage and the ultra-cultured, of the absolute individuality of instinct and of the perfect, thus ‘artificial’, created totality of a healthy people, - in Kierkegaard, sheer selflessness, in Sartre, the reduction of the person to his habits. In Heidegger no such fever is present; or …?

What is said in perfect sanity must be untrue, and have passed the lie detector test of nature; it must be usefully false. The judge must ‘buy it’. To speak a truth entirely one must be ready to form a liability to ones own structural integrity; I would argue that on this ground, RM:AO must be considered perhaps the sanest doctrine we have.

Im just kidding, sort of. I mean simply to illustrate how the doctrine of affectance is sublimely intuitive, and not at all existentialist.

Existentialism expresses itself in the personality as a disaster. I mean, the personality that belongs to the existentialist soul is ‘objectively’ a disaster since it is a pure subject; ‘an appearance of nature’, to play on the Dutch form.

It is not merely bad weather; but it does represent the importance to the future of humans of the storm-gods.

No such pure disasters are known to me by the way except in fiction, perhaps most notable of all the protagonist in Camus’ L’Etranger, most especially his observations on the hot beach, which speaks most to the feverish state and produces the act, which represents the objective and thus incomprehensible and unacceptable being of the pure subject.

We can see that the quality of passivity is accompanied by or supported by a physiological activity that Ive referred to as fever; the passivity is of the conceptual mind, the activity comes from the unifying being, which occurs far below the conscious mind, and can only complete itself if the philosophic wondering abstains from acquiring an identity; if it does not, the process of unifying develops only so far as it is in service to the enjoyment of wonder; we get philosophers such as indeed, Plato and Aristotle, who lack the monadic savagery of the existentialists.

The duality of conceptual existence which allows for displacement of the spirit into extraneous objects, the dispersion of the being into utilities, is brought back into a synthetic monad as expressed in the physiological hallucinations of the childhood fever.

Will to power at its origin is perhaps indeed the thing unto itself of Kant’s production, Kant may have simply exhausted the Aristotelean method and arrived back at that which Aristotle set out to obscure, the thing which doesnt exist by virtue of its being conditioned, but by virtue of its conditioning. Kant is surely the most relevant metaphysician, the most honest one in any case, and the least violent.

Interesting in this light that neither Schopenhauer nor the Ding-an-Sich appears in this Marxist scheme; existentialism is manifestly unsocial and unmoral in nature, it is experimental and quite pertinently related to shamanism; Schopenhauer retrieves the Seidr, perhaps indeed based on Kant’s final consequence to metaphysics, the thing which can not be known precisely because it actually exists;

This is naturally omitted in Marxism. What in existentialism becomes known as the subject; is then in French translated into a thing of language, an artificial identity, whereas in German and Russian it becomes something visceral and very inarticulate of itself; though language it of course inarticulate of itself as well. It wouldnt work very well to these purposes otherwise.

The thing in itself is thus the feverish relation of the valuer to the value, which is the self-valuing in terms of which we as persons are valued into existence, the great human limit which we may know as our soul, and then as that on which the soul smashes itself, the great rock of Understanding, which is the stronghold of power that resists itself;
we are born of this self-resistance which is fertility, as indeed truths are reversed as they are reproduced on lower and higher arcs,