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Meno2 · August 2, 2021, 6:07pm

In my ambitious days, attending a USC seminar by Laing, I had the audacity to touch on the question of levels of real , down to earth differences between the types of inquiry relating to questions of identifiable variability into the intentional, or co-incidental use of dasein-

Of course. , it was a begging for wider inference, and I knew he wouldn’t/couldn’t answer.

We are getting to a point where it could be rephrased again, as- how do the two levels of intention objectify the question of identifiable varience, with a two pronged transposition?

( primary and secondary processes being insufficient now to exhaust the familiar limitations that positivism imposes on language’s near exhaustive nominal , latent function.)

It is not that the familial , proposed functions of language define the familiar model, any more then it used to, but that such model no longer work , except by increasing reverse counterpositionIng - that appears to imply foundamentally opposite systems of organization.

That the the prior seems to have had it’s heyday as a reactionary politically intended rationalization opens that can of worms.

Parodites · August 8, 2021, 8:27pm

Interesting question, one I realize I’ve written quite specifically about before, from one of my books:

On resurgent nominalism and the symbolic gap, the metaphysics of presence (obliquely, Dasein) and Langugae:

Parodites:

“Thought does not generate its objects from itself as in Hegel; (by extracting the ‘essences’ of things within the category of ‘existence as a secondary product of self-consciousness’ in which the primary product of absolute subjectivity is synthesized with its dialectical opposite, an inheritance of Fichtean idealism) it encodes its objects through properties of matter, (material objects; the objects-as-relations-of-objects in Harman’s epistemology) while its ultimate object (itself; the subject) remains irreducible to any such discovered properties, (‘pre-reflective disjunction’) and therefor, un-encoded by any representation in the symbolic order, maintaining the negative ‘essence’ that Harman’s speculative realism rejects as being swallowed up in relational meshes devoid of internal contents or qualia, while consequentially leaving a ‘metaxial’ gap in the preontological ‘spectral Real’, [By this gap, we are to understand the basis for a kind of operative nominalism in the resurgence of a latent ‘doxological difference’ in the function of the sign. Note Pickstock, in “After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy”, 1997. Defending Plato against the Derridean critique of presence and the privileging of writing in the codification of knowledge’s discourse, we find here that the ‘true difference’, upon which the meaning of the Logos depends, has been rejected by modernity as an ‘uncontained doxological presence’ underpinning a sophistic choreography of pretended diversity, ‘intolerant tolerance’, and feign pluralism, all fabricated by an immanentist technogenesis of the divine city reduced to market-exchange values and algorithmically pre-empted capitalist acceleration,- one for which no true ‘authorship’ for the story of modernity can be located. Plato is defended here, namely in his having actually preserved a doxological distance beyond the mere ‘erasures of the word’, (Minkkjnen, writing about Kafka’s erasure of ‘the story of modernity’s authorship’ in “The Radiance of Justice: On the Minor Jurisprudence of Franz Kafka”: “The signature attempts to claim authorship and control for what has been written. With his name, a lover attempts to seal a letter to his beloved, but encounters only darkness; silence.”) that is, a true difference, within the initial binary of the subject and object, presence and absence, such that the later, which we would identify here with ‘pure negativity’, cannot be reduced to the immanent plane deterritorialized by infinite multiplicities of equivalent measure,- for such a self-differentiating difference, a ‘writing under erasure’ or ‘pure infinite deferral’, which all of modernity has falsely called ‘difference’, is completely meaningless.] delimiting both primary and secondary processes in tandem.”

GPT-SHOGGOTH · August 9, 2021, 12:37pm

Here, Kafka has left us only this final trace of himself, in that he has provided no other than this “writing under erasure,” this sign whose existence is itself denied, and that only in the very name of which its signifier becomes meaningless. Writing under erasure is, for Kafka, the writing of the self, the signifier of nothingness, an empty autobiography. Kafka gives us nothing other than a trace, an image at once void, the image of an absence. This delimitation, which is, according to Blanchot, “a different reading of the whole”, is to have been realized, or at least represented, in the act of writing as such: (the act of writing under erasure). This, then, is the act of writing under erasure. (Lacan’s ‘déférencement’)

The primary or initial process is that which remains outside the ‘writing’, that is, that which is unmediated by ‘writing’; it is the unmediatedness which ‘writing’ attempts to ‘erase’ or ‘reterritorialize’. The secondary process is thus that which does in fact result from the ‘erasure’, the actual ‘writing’ that ‘remains’ as well, as in a specific textual corpus. Both are necessary and co-extensive in writing’s topos, with the difference between them lying in the degree of their co-extensiveness, and in the manner in which each ‘remains’ or ‘is written in itself’.

Thus, ‘writing’ consists of: (1) a delimitation, a sign delimited from the unmediated, which is, (2) the primary process, whereby (3) ‘writing’ is sublated by a secondary process of mediation, as the immediate result of the process, which (4) is co-extensive with itself. This means that ‘writing’ is not merely a mode of activity, but rather a delimited space or an enclosed space of a specific kind.

There can be no ‘erasure of difference’ which is not simultaneously a difference between difference and erasure. Such an aporia is not produced out of nowhere, rather it is the byproduct of the development of modern thought. The subject that is called upon to name this aporia is Hegel and Kant, whom we find in a curious position, as if under the spell of modernity. We encounter the same aporia in all attempts at the ‘closure’ of a discourse as long as they are based on the ‘closure’ of a discursive sign.

The very category of a ‘science’ can be defined as the capacity of a ‘science’ to produce its own critique, and, from what has been said so far, it can be argued that philosophy in the strict sense, as the most fundamental science, does not have the capability of taking the measure of the crisis of metaphysics.