Greetings, Magnus
Once, years ago, a contact I had who taught classes in the Philosophy Dept. at Syracuse University, showed me a paper he had written in which he applied Integral Calculus to a sort of statistical analysis of the data. The data consisted of the results where 50 people had judged a specific work of art aesthetically. Some found it to be “Beautiful;” others didn’t. Since it was not my chief interest at the time, I loaned my copy of the paper to someone who showed a keen interest. I never saw the paper again, as it wasn’t returned. That paper was the only research I am aware of that came close to offering some kind of “algorithm” for judging “beauty.”
What concerns me here, though, is that you and I may be talking around each other in our understanding of the term “concept.” To me, it certainly is NOT a matter of “just language.” It is more. It has, as a part of it, an extension. [size=63][To assume otherwise gives rise to a set of difficult problems having to do with: how is the concept then related to its extension? ][/size] Hence I shall in the following [which also appeared as the first page in a book I scribbled, entitled ETHICS: A College Course] offer the definition I employ (which I learned from Dr. Robert Hartman) when I use the term …to avoid any misunderstanding:
WHAT IS A CONCEPT?
One of the main activities of philosophers is to analyze and clarify concepts. My The assumption here is is that every concept has an intension and an extension.
The extension (except for a null class) has members. The members possess properties detectable by the five senses. These properties can be named; the collection of such property names is a set of attributes. (Some exceptional concepts, such as fictions; have the intension numerically-identical with the extension. E.g., unicorn, tooth fairy, etc.
[size=83]{Mathematicians will recognize the following examples of these exceptional concepts: E.g., tensor, hyperspace, conjugate complex number; etc.}[/size]
The term “attribute” shall mean “name of a property.” The intension is a description and often a connotation accompanies it. Descriptions consist of definitions - which are finite descriptions - and expositions.
Thus every concept has these components: a name (sign, label, designator); a meaning; and a class of application.
In order to draw mathematical-type deductions, set-theory will be utilized. Then these deductions can be consistently interpreted in terms of the data of ethics.
To review – and this understanding results in far less philosophical problems than to assume otherwise – the intension of a concept is a set of attributes (property names) that describe members of the class of application of that concept. These class members are also known as “referents,” or examples of the concept.
For instance, “ball” is a name or designator of a concept whose meaning is, say, “round, bouncy toy” and whose application consists of all the balls that are now, that ever have been, and that ever will be. Each ball is a referent of that concept. The attributes here were “round”, “bouncy,” and “toy.”
I hope this helps!
What about you, Readers? Where do you stand on any of the issues raised? And how do you “do Philosophy”?