Hi all,
I am interested in the metaethical claim that (roughly) moral action consists of or is identified with good/benevolent intentions.
The claim would be that any action which arises out of genuine care and consideration for the well-being of all subjects would be morally good (even if it in fact hurts someone), while action motivated by a desire to see any subject suffer would be morally wrong (even if in fact no one gets hurt).
Centrally what I am interested in is the general idea that morality = good will.
I think this position is contrary to consequentialism or deontology, but I am not sure whether it is rightly considered to be a form of virtue ethics, or some kind of constructivism or sentimentalism.
Can you tell me who are the big hitters currently defending or countering this kind of theory in print? Can you share any further insights into where the focus of the argument is at right now?
Many thanks,
Tom