The invalidity occurs because you qualify that not all Being is Interpreting, but imply that all Interpreting is Being.
So, you state that all Interpreting is Being.
That all Being is X.
That all Interpreting is X.
That Interpreting Being as X is X.
And that Being is Interpreting.
Really, you don’t even need numbers 2, 3, and 4 because you’ve already qualified in 1 that all Being is not necessarily interpreting, but then in 5 you say that all Being is Interpreting.
Understood, but saying that it need not mean that implies that there is a time that it does not mean that, otherwise, it would not need to be said.
For instance it would make no sense for me to say:
All males, females, transvestites, and homosapien hermaphrodites are humans. (But not all humans need be men or women or…etc.)
The reason it would make no sense for me to say that is because I’ve defined everything that could possibly be a human.
Considering hermaphrodites, I might say that:
All males and females are humans (But not every human is necessarily a male or a female)
That would make sense, because if you do not necessarily consider a hermaphrodite as either, or if the hermaphrodite in question has not chosen what gender with which he/she associates, then there is room for something else to qualify as human that is not male or female.
I see nothing invalid about the new proposition above. In fact, numbers two, three and four are still irrelevant as 1 validates 5 and 5 validates 1 by way of their mutual existence.
The whole logic sequence is invalid because of premise 2, All being is X, where X is undefined and could include anything. But clearly Interpreting as a subset of Being could not be equated with the all inclusive, undefined set X which is all being. Thus, the sequence is just an example of circular logic that sounds good on the surface because of the way the terms are bandied about, but fails when examined more closely in light of the fact that not all Being is Interpreting. What is Interpreting about a rock, or a pencil, for instance?
Okay, I did not mean it that way. I just meant to make clear I did not mean “=”. “Interpreting is Being” does not mean “Interpreting = Being”. I wanted to make clear that I meant “is” in the sense of, e.g., “an apple is a fruit”.
I don’t think they do. My argument goes like this:
All males are humans.
All humans are X.
All males are X.
…
All humans are males.
Except of course that I cannot think of a valid fourth statement in this example.
I think I may have found something. This example makes it clear that the crucial statement is # 4.
All Interpreting is Being.
All Being is X.
All Interpreting is X. [from 1 and 2]
All Interpreting all Being as X is X. [from 3]
All Being is Interpreting. [from 4]
I think now I may have skipped a step.
All Interpreting is Being.
All Being is X.
All Interpreting is X. [from 1 and 2] 4. All Interpreting all Being as X is Interpreting, or: There’s such a thing as Interpreting all Being as X.
All Interpreting all Being as X is X. [from 3 and 4]
All Being is Interpreting. [from 5]
If Y is X, can one interpret Y as X? Can one interpret something correctly? Is it still Interpreting when one sees something as it is (supposing that Interpreting something correctly is Seeing it as it is)?
If the answer to these questions is “no”, however, how could one misinterpret something?
Not at all, though yours was. Anyway, moving on. So you are saying that the ontological status of a rock or a pencil is interpreting? Can you explain how that would work? Because – as far as I know, neither a rock or a pencil is capable of interpreting or has the existential status of interpreting.
You’re sooo stubborn… Are you saying you don’t start from the assumption that nothing about a rock or a pencil, for instance, is Interpreting?
Anyway, the reason mine seemed circular reasoning to you is only that you interpreted my “is” as “=”.
Not necessarily. That’s just what the conclusion of my argument says.
Let’s stick to the argument, please. Only when its validity has been established should we start looking at the soundness of the premise(s) and thereby the conclusion.
We’re not all Beings. We’re all beings. I capitalise nominalised gerunds for clarity’s sake. I do not capitalise nominalised participles. In this I follow Krell’s translation of Heidegger’s Nietzsche, though he did this only for the verb “to be”.
Whoa, why is it necessarily wrong? I agree that the above argument, even if we could think of a fourth premise that would make it valid, would still be unsound. But males is not = Interpreting and humans not = Being.