Pandora wrote:Is there an equivalent behavior to banking and money lending in nature, or animal kingdom, or is this a 100% purely human creation?
Pandora wrote:What could be the closest analog in nature?
demoralized wrote:http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1700821,00.html
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ih9M2d-KaMA
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/w ... fruit.html
Seems like animals using money to me
As far as banking is concerned... I suppose a squirrel burying a nut is akin to a bank
demoralized wrote:Seems like animals using money to me
As far as banking is concerned... I suppose a squirrel burying a nut is akin to a bank
Pandora wrote:I think a more accurate comparison would have been if the male monkey stole the fruit from the female and then gave it back to her in return for sex. Lol!
Pandora wrote:Is there an equivalent behavior to banking and money lending in nature, or animal kingdom, or is this a 100% purely human creation? I just can't think of any.
What could be the closest analog in nature?
James S Saint wrote:Money is promissory notes, scripts, or credit items in place of goods or services, else it is merely bartering.
Arminius wrote:Money ... is something that can be exchanged between things, between living beings, between things and living beings, provided that these living beings confide, trust, believe in it as a means of exchange (barter). Money is a promise, which will be fulfilled in the future. So, if the money shall work, the promise shall be fulfilled in the future, one has to confide, trust, believe in it; and if one really confides, trusts, believes in it, it will work, the promise will be fulfilled.
...Human contracts are unique in nature because no other species has developed institutions as powerful as our laws and their enforcement, through which almost any trade could, in principle, be protected against breach of contract. In the world of non-human organisms, however, there are no policemen to arrest traders who play against the rules and no judges to sanction them. Most biological trade can thus be expected to have self-stabilizing properties in the sense that the actions of all traders are compatible with their individual ‘fitness incentives’ [95]. These self-stabilizing properties determine what might be called the ‘biological terms of contract’. The scope for biological trade thus seems very small in comparison with human trade—most human contracts would not be self-stabilizing in nature. Conventional theory from economics, therefore, does not apply all too well to biological trade. However, modern economists have learned that human traders are not as committed to their contracts either. This puts modern economics in much closer proximity to the life sciences [94].
(b) How is biological trade self-stabilized?
Bobtail squids (example E5) provide a particularly intriguing example of self-stabilized trade. They have to ensure that the commodities they offer are selectively transferred to cooperative partners, that is, to bacteria from which they receive light in return [84,96,97]. This is difficult to achieve, however, since a great variety of bacteria exists in the sea and, in addition, the association between the squid and its partners is formed anew in each generation. Shortly after hatching, the squid recruits its first bacterial ‘passengers’. A population of Vibrio fisheri then quickly builds up in the light organ. After this initial recruitment, no more bacteria are ‘admitted’ and every day 90–95% of the bacterial population are pushed out by the squid [84]. But what enables the squid to select the luminescent bacteria, V. fisheri, and why should these actually produce light?
While recruiting bacteria as partners, the squid uses antibacterial defences to protect its entry sites. This apparently paradoxical way of opening the door for bacterial guests makes it possible to receive just a few of those that are ‘welcome’ [96]. The wanted guests, V. fisheri, seem better able than unwanted bacteria to resist the squid's defences. Furthermore, by letting just a few bacteria in, the squid probably makes it harder for unwanted invaders to hide among V. fisheri. Once in the light organ, the selected bacteria produce the enzyme luciferase that catalyses an oxidation reaction through which blue-green light is generated. The squid senses this cooperative behaviour and changes some of its gene expression patterns according to the perceived luminescence [98]. By mechanisms that are not fully understood yet, the squid manages to eliminate dark individuals of V. fisheri from its light organ [96]. This creates the incentive for V. fisheri to actually produce light and stabilizes the trade. The evolution of this now highly advanced mutualism was probably facilitated by the fact that luciferase interacts with host defences when it generates luminescence by indirectly disrupting the host's production of reactive oxygen species [84,97]. Hence, the bacteria's answer to the host's antibacterial defences almost inevitably generates the light that benefits the host.
Returning now to the general question of how trades are self-stabilized, the evolution of increased dependence of trading partners on each other can strongly protect trade from cheating [95]. This is nicely demonstrated by the example (E3) of the mutualism between acacia trees and their ant defenders. The extrafloral nectar offered to the ants contains glucose and fructose but virtually no sucrose [99,100]. This makes the nectar unattractive to unspecialized ant species because diet choice of ants in general seems to be strongly driven by sucrose content. The mutualistic Pseudomyrmex ant species, however, depend on the tree's extrafloral nectar, having lost the ability to digest sucrose [100]. The ‘ant bait’ is offered away from the tree's flowers, because preventing pollinator visits to flowers is certainly not in the interest of the tree. It is a likely evolutionary scenario that the acacia trees altered their sugar production, because this had the advantage of making them less attractive to non-mutualistic ants, and that this in turn created the need for the mutualistic ants to specialize. Finally, being well defended by an ‘ant army’, the acacia seems to have been under selection to restrict its ‘budget for self-made defences’. This budget cut manifests itself in the tree's leaves, which do not contain any of the alkaloids used for defence by other Acacia species. What results from these evolutionary steps is a mutual dependency between ant and acacia that is strong enough to create a high degree of ‘common interest’ [92]. Common interest is, of course, the best prerequisite for a trade unhampered by cheating and exploitation.
Many mutualistic relationships are not stabilized by common interest. In the yucca plant example (E4), the plant needs fertilization services of its mutualistic moth but a moth individual would, in principle, have fitness benefits from depositing an excessive amount of eggs, thereby overexploiting the plant. Yucca plants, however, actively limit this option for fitness gains. They abort those flowers [50,51] into which the moth has laid excessive amounts of eggs. This stabilizes the trade but it leaves one question open. What caused the evolution of selective abortion? Presumably, it did not evolve in the first place for reasons of sanctioning, since the first sanctioning yucca plants would not have benefited from the effects of their sanctions on moth evolution. It is much more likely that the plants originally had a more generally used shut-off mechanism that prevented the allocation of resources into damaged flowers and fruit. This mechanism would have had sanctioning effects as a by-product and could therefore be considered as pre-adaptation for the self-stabilizing trade between yucca plant and yucca moth. Similarly, in rhizobia–legume mutualisms (example E1), the plants tend to selectively stop the resource flow into parts of their roots, in which rhizobia draw on the plants' resources without providing nitrogen in return. This could be demonstrated for soya beans in experiments with rhizobia acting in an N2-free atmosphere [101]. The general question of how sanctions can evolve and how they work has received much attention in recent years [46,95,102–104].
Arminius wrote:Especially, the "animal kingdom" lacks promises for the remote future, lacks belief or trust in those promises, lacks institutions like banks that hords those promises and works with them (mostly by misusing those promises).
Arminius:But all those promises for the remote future need the belief or trust, faith, hope, cofidence in them. So, there are two sides needed: (1) the promise and (2) the belief in it.
Zero_Sum wrote:Arminius:But all those promises for the remote future need the belief or trust, faith, hope, cofidence in them. So, there are two sides needed: (1) the promise and (2) the belief in it.
You know what us cynics call that Arminius? A con job but then again money itself is an essential form of con-artistry that revolves around con-fidence.
Arminius wrote:Zero_Sum wrote:Arminius:But all those promises for the remote future need the belief or trust, faith, hope, cofidence in them. So, there are two sides needed: (1) the promise and (2) the belief in it.
You know what us cynics call that Arminius? A con job but then again money itself is an essential form of con-artistry that revolves around con-fidence.
I already said that there are cynics who are opposed by kyniks.
Return to Society, Government, and Economics
Users browsing this forum: No registered users