Dr. Liz Jackson defeats the objections to "Pascal's Wager."

I watched.

Please start praying. You’re in grave danger.

That isn’t how it works.

Determinism takes a little mind-time to see what is going on and why people must be held responsible even though causality would not have allowed them to behave differently.

I disagree that causality would not allow us to behave differently, and disagree that omniscient foreknowledge has any effect on our free acts.

That is the very definition of causality - “everything is caused by prior conditions”.

I agree with you on that - foreknowledge from some other being has nothing to do with freewill one way or another. The implication is that because a being could know in advance - then causality must be the reality (that declaration could be debated - can God know things even without the principle of causation? - another issue).

This is basic quantum.

Once you know something, you can change the outcome.

Projecting into future states and deciding in your present state is an equivalent to time travel.

See my discussion in the Determinism thread of regularity theory, also known as Humean or neo-Humean compatibilism, in which the idea that causal determinism obviates free will is challenged,

Regularity theory doesn’t change the definition of the word - it only declares (without sufficient backing) that people cannot know causality - rather only what seems regular.

Just because you cannot know God - doesn’t mean there isn’t God.

Obsrvr,

You are insane with your posts on ILP.

Regularity theory is about sensory acuity norms that allow for perception.

I can walk back so far from a stop sign that I can’t see it. If I walk closer, I can see it but not read the word, “stop”

I can use an electron microscope on it and not see the word, “stop”

What we live in a what’s called a perceptual acuity sweet spot.

God doesn’t exist dude. You have no fucking clue what you’re talking about.

And before you criticize me, debate me. Debate forums dude.

You argue god exists and I’ll argue the opposite.

If you refuse to formally debate me, then shut the fuck up. Seriously. That just makes you a troll.

It’s interesting that you like to call other people delusional and insane. Have you ever stopped and considered that you might be?

Dueling definitions begetting dueling deductions begetting the sort of “general description intellectual contraption” dueling we find here all the time. My “world of words” vs. your “world of words”.

Both God and determinism defined into existence. Little or nothing in the way of hard evidence establishing that either of them actually exist phenomenally as proposed theoretically.

As for all of this given “the Gap” and “Rummy’s Rule”?

Trivial pursuits.

Wouldn’t all of this depend on how you define omniscience given your definition of God? If God knows everything and everything encompasses anything at all then how are we free to do something that God was not already privy to? Simple. Define causality and God in one or another theoretical contraption that allows for it.

And then when someone asks you to demonstrate your conclusions in the manner in which, say, an electrical engineer can demonstrate how a lightbulb works, you…do what exactly?

No matter what anyone writes on this board, iambiguous’s responses are pre-determined, as on a save-get key. All he has to do is press the key:

“world of words … theoretical contraptions in the sky … desein … I am fractured … of course, we’ll need a context … electrical engineer, lightbulb … the gap … Rummy’s rule …

It’s all the same post!

I offered you a logical demonstration of why there is no conflict between God’s omniscience and human free will. That’s even better than demonstrating how a lightbulb works. Of course, there might be a flaw in the demonstration — the logic may not be fully airtight on fuller examination —but you offered no such examination or even a meaningful response to the demonstration I offered. You just pressed your usual save-get key!

And this actually addresses the points I raised above…how?

In other words, a “by definition” demonstration such that the “logical” conclusion depends entirely on agreeing with the meaning he gives to the words that are encompassed in his “world of words”?!

What God is this applicable to? Of course: the one he defines into existence. And my failing here is that I refuse to come up with my own theoretical “world of words” “by definition” deductions about an omniscient God and causality.

And the sheer gall of insisting that his own “demonstration” of how “for all practical purposes” the relationship between God, causality, omniscience and the brains of mere mortals intertwined unfolds is even better than the demonstration by the electrical engineer of how a lightbulb works!!!

Even most electrical engineers will concede the existence of “the gap” and “Rummy’s Rule” when it comes to explaining why electro-magnetism exists as it does and not some other way going back to all of the unknown unknowns still out there in regard to the complete understanding of existence itself.

You tell me where arrogance ends and ignorance begins in minds like his?

Assuming of course he has any actual volition at all over how that unfolds. Though [compelled or not] you can “wager” that he has a theory for that too.

I don’t think it’s possible to understand God or omniscience though it is possible to understand what somebody means by those terms.

Especially given “the gap” and “Rummy’s Rule”.

Instead, we are all able to simply believe what we do about God and omniscience knowing that others are no more able to demonstrate that what they believe is true than we are.

I merely wager that what we do come to believe here is rooted more in dasein than in anything that the hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of religious and spiritual denominations down through the ages have been able to pin down with any degree of finality.

And that surely what we come to believe about God is embedded deeply in that which, psychologically, we want to believe is true because in believing it we have access to an objective morality on this side of the grave and immortality and salvation on the other side of it.

And that this is considerably more comforting and consoling than in not believing it.

So now we’ve got two wagers: iambiguous’ versus Pascal’s. Pascal argued that with his one might gain eternity. What could be gained with yours?

Well, once again, iambiguous misreads and mangles what I say. But he does that with everyone, so no surprise there.

No, it just depends on following the logic.

I don’t believe that any God exists. Do you actually read people’s posts?

Do you know what arguendo means?

Strange you did not read, or conveniently forget to mention, my statement that “of course, there might be a flaw in my demonstration — the logic may not be fully airtight.” How come you forgot to note that? Was it deliberate? I think so.

Since I didn’t say what you imputed to me, you are lying.

Interesting.

If you guys want to keep your questions and answers short like Socrates requested, and focus on this issue, maybe you’ll get somewhere.

The issue is communication. Specifically, communicating that you have read and comprehended the others argument. The context is the actual dialogues on this forum, and most specifically the interaction on this thread will do nicely.

Thank you in advance for your cooperation in the interests of civil dialogue in pursuit of the truth.

I agree, and I think I have communicated my positions quite well. It’s just that iambiguous doesn’t seem to read what I write, or misconstrues what I write, or something. In any case I’ll shortly post the argument I gave to him here, and let others be the judge.

Yes you communicated your position well, but it’s also a matter of communicating back to the other person what you understood they said. Have you been doing that?

Here is what I posted in another thread, a thread on theodicy, with two separate posts combined and slightly condensed:

The argument to natural evils against the so-called omni-god — all knowing, all powerful, and all good — is pretty conclusive imo. Still the theodicy practitioner will move the goal posts, offer ad hoc rationalizations, and if necessary fall back on the “mysterious ways” copout.

I feel, though, that the common argument that God’s omniscience precludes human free will should be addressed as a matter of logic. The argument is not just poor, it is logically invalid and ought to be discarded.

It goes:

Today I had eggs for breakfast.

But if God is omniscient, he knew even before I was born — for all eternity, in fact — that I would have eggs for breakfast today.

If God knew even before I was born that I would have eggs for breakfast today, then I could not have had pancakes or anything else for breakfast today. My choice was foreordained by God’s foreknowledge.

Hence, I have no free will.

The argument commits the modal scope fallacy. The fallacy consists in confusing logical contingency with logical necessity.

The fallacious argument goes:

If God knows today that I will have eggs for breakfast tomorrow, then I must (necessarily) have eggs for breakfast tomorrow.

The modal scope fallacy occurs when one applies the logical concept of necessity to the consequent of the antecedent alone, rather than to the conjoint relationship between antecedent and consequent.

The corrected argument is:

Necessarily (if God knows today that tomorrow I will have eggs for breakfast, then I will [not must!] have eggs for breakfast tomorrow.)

The necessity lies only in the relationship between God’s foreknowledge and my free act.

To be sure, If God knows today that tomorrow I will have eggs for breakfast, I WILL have eggs — but it does not logically follow that I MUST have eggs. All that logically follows from God’s omniscience is that what God foreknows, and what I freely do, must MATCH (as a matter of logical necessity).

If I freely choose today to have eggs for breakfast, it means I have provided the truth grounds for God’s foreknowledge of what I do. It does not mean that I could not have had pancakes. For if I had had pancakes, an omniscient agent would have known THAT fact instead — and we would get:

Necessarily (if God knows today that tomorrow I will have pancakes for breakfast, then I will [not must!] have pancakes for breakfast tomorrow.)

I am free to have eggs or pancakes. If I have eggs, God will foreknow that I have eggs. If have pancakes, God will foreknow that I have pancakes. I can have eggs or pancakes, or anything else that I wish. I just can’t escape God’s infallible foreknowledge of what I freely do. To employ modal logic’s logically possible worlds heuristic:

There is a possible world at which I have eggs for breakfast and God foreknows that I have eggs.
There is a possible world at which I have pancakes for breakfast and God foreknows that I have pancakes.
There is no possible world at which I have eggs for breakfast and God foreknows that I have pancakes.
There is no possible world at which I have pancakes for breakfast and God foreknows that I have eggs.

Here is the formal elaboration of the fallacious argument that God knowing in advance what I will do forces me to do that thing:

gKD
~◊(gKD & ~D)
gKD ⊃ ☐D
————————
∴ ☐D

In the above argument, Premise 3 is false. It commits the modal scope fallacy.

The corrected argument goes:

gKD
~◊(gKD & ~D)
gKD ⊃D
————————
∴ D

Reconstructed in natural language:

Fallacious argument:

  1. God knows what I will do.
  2. It is not possible that God knows what I will do, and I fail to do that thing.
    3.If God knows what I will do, I must necessarily do that thing.
    Conclusion: I must do what God knows I will do.

Corrected argument:

  1. God knows what I will do.
  2. It is not possible that God knows what I will do, and I fail to do that thing.
    3.If God knows what I will do, I will do that thing.
    Conclusion: I will do what God knows I will do.

The corrected modal argument eliminates any mention of necessity in my action, which means my action is, was, and always will be, contingent — i.e., could have been otherwise. Therefore I could have done other than what I did. I just can never do other than what God foreknows, but that fact does not impugn my free will in the slightest.

Now — I am adding this here — if my argument goes astray somewhere, and that is possible, it must be challenged and not dismissed. So far as I can tell the corrected modal argument is both valid and sound — the conclusion follows from the premises, and all the premises are true. If so, this makes the argument a deductive proof that God’s foreknowledge does not obviate human free will. A proper challenge to the argument would be to show that the argument is either invalid or unsound, and not to fulminate about electrical engineers and lightbulbs and what “gall” I supposedly have.

I should add that the Christian philosopher William Lane Craig has used this exact line of modal logical reasoning to brilliantly resolve Newcomb’s Paradox: Divine Foreknowledge and Newcomb’s Paradox