Are there arguments for materialism?

Materialism is a form of philosophical monism that holds that matter is the fundamental substance in nature and that all things, including mental states and consciousness, are the result of material interactions. According to philosophical materialism, mind and consciousness are by-products or epiphenomena of material processes (such as the biochemistry of the human brain and nervous system), without which they cannot exist. This concept is in direct contrast to idealism, in which mind and consciousness are first-order realities to which matter is subject and material interactions are secondary.

Materialism is closely related to physicalism - the view that everything that exists is ultimately physical. Philosophical physicalism has evolved from materialism with the theories of the natural sciences and now encompasses more sophisticated notions of physicality than just ordinary matter (e.g. spacetime, physical energies and forces, and dark matter). Therefore, the term physicalism is preferred by some to materialism, while others use the two terms as synonyms.

The basic causal argument for materialism is that since physics is causally complete, states of consciousness must either be physical or be epiphenomenal “danglers” with no causal influence on the physical world. Papineau examines this argument in detail, paying particular attention to the concept of causality, the meaning of the term “physical”, the relevance of functionalism and other versions of non-reductive physicalism, and the status of the claim that physics is causally closed.

But is Materialism really the bottom line? Or Are Materialists begging the question like Bernado Kastrup points out:

Is there no alternative for explaining the ontology of consciousness other than materialism and idealism? Other than either/or?
I listened to one Kastrup podcast and am no authority on his ideas. It was the one on “Materialism Is Baloney.” Being a down to Earth person,
I found his explanations a bit ephemeral. As a panentheist I cannot exclude matter from the whole that I see as God; so I cannot see materialism and idealism as contradictory philosophies. They are takes on the same phenomenon, which may include both explanhations.

First, I wonder why you put this in the religion/spirituality forum rather than in the philosophy forum.

When you speak of physicalism and materialism, in philosophy they more commonly fall under the remit of metaphysical naturalism. This is the thesis that there is a mind-independent, fully natural world and that this world is causally closed; i.e., it is, all that there is.

This is in contrast to metaphysical supernaturalism, the idea that there is a supernatural realm that grounds all of reality, both physical and mental.

What Kastrup is talking about is metaphysical idealism, the idea that reality consists of nothing but mental states, and that these mental states ground the physical, rather than vice versa, as assumed by metaphysical naturalists.

One can make the move from metaphysical idealism to metaphysical supernaturalism, though not, logically, from metaphysical naturalism to either metaphysical idealism or metaphysical supernaturalism. Is Kastrup making that move? Because if he isn’t, I don’t see why this is a religious topic. If he is, he hasn’t shown his cards yet in the quoted excerpt, but he would have good company. Berkeley, the original or at least most well known metaphysical idealist (esse est percipi) was both a metaphysical idealist and a metaphysical supernaturalist. He believed that the world consists entirely of mental states, but that objects like tables and chairs still existed when no one was observing them because they were mental states in the mind of God.

But one can consistently be a metaphysical idealist without being a metaphysical supernaturalist. Is Kastrup a metaphysical idealist only, or a metaphysical supernaturalist as well? If the latter, Berkeley has long anticipated his arguments.

When it comes to science, a scientist could be a metaphysical naturalist, a metaphysical idealist, or even a metaphysical supernaturalist. When it comes to the practice of science, however, they are, functionally, methodological naturalists. Methodological naturalism does not retrodict, or depend upon, the truth of metaphysical naturalism. It merely states that in the practice of science, there is no room for supernaturalism, because the supernatural does not show up in the data. Napoleon: “where does God fit into your equations?” Laplace: “I have no need of that hypothesis.”

Methodological naturalism (as opposed to metaphysical naturalism) is essentially silent on metaphysical idealism. And a methodological naturalist can be a metaphysical supernaturalist — a scientist who believes that god exists, for example, and there are many of them (though they are a minority among all scientists). They just don’t use God or appeals to God in the methods of science, as explained just above.

I think Kastrup doth protest too much. As just explained, a scientist can practice the methodologies of science without subscribing to the assumption of metaphysical naturalism. A methodological naturalist may even be a metaphysical idealist, because science works exactly the same under metaphysical idealism as it does under metaphysical naturalism.

I say he protests too much because when he claims that “materialism is baloney,” it is HE who is now guilty of the same thing he ascribes to his purported materialist adversaries — he is begging the question in favor of idealism! O, irony!

Let me start my post with just a simple fact: we don’t understand consciousness. If we did, of course, there would not be much of a debate. But the fact is that we don’t.

Now, generally speaking, explanations of phenomena take the form of using elements of things we know and understand (to some extent), and showing how their interactions in specific circumstances could produce that phenomenon. If someone explains something to you and you don’t understand the components of the explanation, then the explanation probably failed and you did not come away with much more understanding than you started with.

This is why physicalism or naturalism is the natural (no pun intended) starting point for explanations. We have a basic understanding of the physical things around us, how they interact, and so a satisfying explanation will tend to make reference to those things that we know to exist and understand.

The problem with “explaining” consciousness as something that isn’t an emergent phenomenon fully explainable by physics is that, in my estimation, it ends up not being much of an explanation at all. To me, the thought process sort of looks like this:

I don’t understand consciousness, and nobody does. I cannot even imagine a way that physical matter could produce the experience I feel of being me, so I don’t think it can. So I think there must be some separate non-physical realm where my consciousness resides.

As a thought process, it makes sense, but it hasn’t produced an explanation. You’ve said this mysterious phenomenon actually happens in some other realm, but you’ve gotten no closer to the answer about HOW it happens in that other realm. You’ve just moved the hard problem somewhere else.

Suppose that consciousness did happen in some other realm, or because of some non physical substance that we don’t know of yet. If you became familiar with the elements and operations and evolutions of that other realm, or other substance, to the same extent that you’re familiar with the behaviour of matter, do you really think you would understand how consciousness arises in that realm or from that substance?

I think likely not. I think that the question “how does consciousness arises out of this?” would remain equally hard, whether “this” was the physical matter we are familiar with, or some other realm or substance that goes by different rules.

And that’s my problem with substance dualism. It doesn’t answer the question, it just moves a mysterious question into a more mysterious realm, and wipes its hands. I don’t feel any more satisfied by not knowing how consciousness works in this non physical realm than I felt satisfied in not knowing how it works in our physical realm. I don’t feel like I’ve made any progress at all upon accepting that premise.

You should know by now that I see an interconnection between religion/spirituality and philosophy, although the latter tends to be less empirical in some ways. It is interesting that you try to reformulate my question, but the question remains. You have a natural assumption that you know what I mean better than I do.

This is the typical way in which a question can be overcome, by asking whether the person making the statement is really what he claims to be. As far as I am concerned, he is what he is and what he says has spiritual/ transcendent qualities. I am aware of Berkeley and Kastrup does mention him, but he is coming from a completely different angle. It was his work as a computer scientist that led him into philosophy.

Unfortunately, the whole splurge you wrote has no bearing on the statement that materialism is baloney at all, or at least you haven’t managed to prove that. You also haven’t presented any arguments to refute what Kastrup says, conveniently bypassing the examples in which materialism “begs the question”.

I’m sure you can do better.

The curious part of this is that we have evidence that the ancients were already speculating upon consciousness and their mythologies were full of references, albeit with different terminology than we use today. In fact, even with the last 200 years the terminology has been changing whilst referring to the same phenomenon. The “Will” of Schopenhauer, the “Soul” of Emerson, or Carl Jung’s “collective unconscious” are all referring to the elusive same. Jeffrey Kripal gave some examples in his introduction to a book by Kastrup:

The case is better put by the author himself of course, but we are avoiding the question. The examples of science “begging the question” still have to be refuted.

The question is, is there an argument for materialism. Kastrup gives examples of science begging the question. You are off on a tangent.

Interesting that you try to solve the “hard problem”, which is only indirect the subject of this thread.

It seems to me that the materialism issue is not a question concerning truth but of choice and priority.

Pick an ontology. And don’t confuse it with others.

Materialists want to dismiss discussions that involve the perfect ideals, supernaturals, or spirits and limit the discussions to only physical objects. That is their choice of ontology, right?

When that is done - everything normally referred to as “supernatural” or “spiritual” will be translated into material verbiage. The truth of things doesn’t change - merely the way it is viewed and discussed. Science doesn’t speak of God - that is a choice they make - so God must then be translated in a non-God scenario.

In order to get away from belief in God or spirits and religion - stop talking about them - don’t even define the words.

Pick a language. And don’t confuse it with others.

Well, Bob, I read your OP, and found it fascinating, because these subjects are long-standing interests of mine, and so I decided to craft a thoughtful post sorting out the various metaphysical stances underpinning our views of the world. And you blithely dismiss it as a splurge.

Not that it will do any good, because it seems, like so many here, you are determined to be antagonistic, but I will try to clarify my position for you, since you so baldly misrepresented it and I should like your mutilating of my alleged splurge not to stand uncontested.

I did not try to contest Kastrup’s charge of question begging because I agree with him, up to a point. This is the reason I offered a distinction between metaphysical naturalism and methodological naturalism. Methodological naturalism is, well, science, or the practices of science. Metaphysical naturalism represents one possible philosophical assumption that underpins the practice of science.

To the extent that Kastrup says that science, qua science, begs the question for metaphysical naturalism, I think he’s wrong. I pointed out — honestly, did you even read what I wrote? — that practicing scientists can be, and many are, either naturalists, idealists, or supernaturalists. How did you over look that key point I made?

If Kastrup is saying that metaphysical naturalism is question-begging, of course he is correct. But my point in noting the irony of Kastrup writing “materialism is baloney” is that now HE is the one doing the question-begging, in favor of his particular flavor of idealism, because ALL metaphysical stances beg the question in the sense that they rely on assumptions that cannot be proved, and hence all are logically circular.

Metaphysical naturalism begs the question by assuming without proving that all of reality is a causally closed regime of matter and energy, and that minds supervene on brains.

Metaphysical idealism begs the question by assuming without proving that reality consists entirely of mental states, and that brains supervene on minds.

Metaphysical supernaturalism begs the question by assuming without proving that reality — matter and energy and minds — are grounded by God and a supernatural realm.

I think that one should be AGNOSTIC about which metaphysical stance is true (and there are others I haven’t mentioned). I, an atheist, am actually an agnostic atheist, because there is a difference between gnosis and belief.

But again, when Kastrup declares “materialism is baloney” he abandons agnosticism and then becomes guilty of the very question-begging that he decries.

Now to the extent he is complaining that some scientists or science popularizers go around telling the general public that there is no god and the material world is all that there is, and so on, yes, I agree with the complaint! These scientists have stepped outside their field, which is science or some branch of science, and ventured into philosophy, for which most scientists seem to be spectacularly ill-equipped. In fact, a great many scientists hold philosophy in total contempt, and couldn’t give a flying eff at the moon about it. All they are concerned with are the results of their experiments, and that is as it should be.

As a matter of fact, I have a good deal of sympathy for idealism, because I happen to think there are some good reasons for thinking it more likely to be true than either materialism of supernaturalism. But I don’t know if it is true, or which is true, and neither do you and neither does Kastrup.

Materialism has had a deleterious effect on religion. Depending on one’s point of view that may or may not be a good thing. Can you talk about the possibility that being is both non-material and impersonal and contrast that with the possibility that being is Mind?

What is Mind?

I can imagine Jesus walking across a room, but I can’t imagine Mind walking across a room.

But you picture Jesus walking across a room with, obviously, your mind.

Rene Descartes called mind a thinking substance. Mental substance not to be confused with material substance per Descartes. I can imagine that.

I can imagine Jesus walking across a room. I can’t imagine thinking substance walking across a room.

What does one look like?

No it doesn’t walk across the room itself. But the image of someone walking across the room appears in it. Clear and distinct ideas appear in it. It is consciousness and its object. It is “the light” in which everything appears.

Then, surely, it cannot really exist.

When you say appears in “it,” I have no idea what “it” is. Can you describe it to me? Can you tell me what it looks like?

Someone walking across a room, whether seen or imagined, is a mental construct.

Consciousness. If it didn’t exist we couldn’t be having this conversation.

Exactly.

I agree that I was perhaps not as appreciative of your post as I should have been. I think that your failure to go to the question was the trigger for my reaction, which you have now corrected.

The point that he is making is that which a great number of people like him are now coming out to question is the fact that materialism has gone unquestioned for so long and is causing considerable damage to mental health in a direct and indirect way. The assumption that materialism is the “only” way to view the world and that the mechanistic view of nature is still implied, has been a major influence on how non-scientific people understand their lives and the nature of reality.

I don’t know whether you have read anything from Kastrup, but what he doesn’t do is to create a logical fallacy and doesn’t take the conclusion of an argument as a premise of his argument. His argumentation is as solid as a hypothesis can be, and he is supported by numerous people who share his criticism of materialism as it is presented today.

“Kastrup has articulated a much-needed corrective to the metaphysical illness of our age, scientistic materialism. Scientism is the belief that science is the most valuable part of human learning because it supposedly is the most authoritative, or serious, or beneficial. But science itself is merely a particular method for dousing the tools at hand to propose hypotheses, do experiments, and come to conclusions based on the information derived. As such, it is regrettable that some practitioners of science – and even some philosophers of science – have now taken on the attitude that scientism is the only valid approach to human knowledge.”
Shogaku Zenshin Stephen Echard Musgrave Roshi in the Foreword to Kastrup, Bernardo. Why Materialism Is Baloney: How True Skeptics Know There Is No Death and Fathom Answers to life, the Universe, and Everything (S.4). John Hunt Publishing. Kindle-Version.

Which isn’t the statement I made. Instead, I asked a question. What we do know is true is that “scientistic materialism” has become a law unto itself and has for too long ridiculed any other way of looking at reality. We need to take other routes.