Hume's non-problem of Induction?

Is Hume’s problem of induction really a problem at all? What assumptions does the problem rest on and what is their nature?

To my mind there are two, and I’ve given this alot of thought and it’s preoccupied me for a few months now both with reading and thinking. (Yes Tab, books!).

(1) A metaphysical assumption that the only necessity to exist is a logical one.

(2) A more epistemological assumption that it is irrational to think there is any other necessity simultaneous to logical necessity.

If a good argument can be found as to either of these, then I want to hear it. We can debate whether or not they really are determining assumptions, but I don’t want this to be just about that. I’d rather have someone show me that an argument can be found to support one or the other, because to my mind they are the determining assumptions of Hume’s induction and they are the cause of alot of nonsense.

I’ve got to the point now where I am starting to think, unbelievably, that Hume’s problem of induction, that many good philosophers have failed to deal with, might not actually be a problem at all. There was Ayer, who noted that it musn’t be a real problem because he couldn’t find a way to solve it. I think the above reasoning is a little better than that though.

not a problem at all?

I frankly don’t understand your points…

(1) A metaphysical assumption that the only necessity to exist is a logical one.

A metaphysical assumption about existence? where? hume is an empiricist… nothing metaphysical about it… it exists. period. only then can anything be said about it. ball b moving after ball a strikes it is our expectation of the unseen event… there is no logical connection between events. the metaphysical assumption is made by those that claim that they “know” that ball b will move when all they are basing that movement upon is an error in reasoning, begging the question. for hume it exists when it exists, the moment, nothing more.

(2) A more epistemological assumption that it is irrational to think there is any other necessity simultaneous to logical necessity.

what exactly do you mean? are you under the impression that synthetic a priori judgments are rational?

-Imp

Sorry Imp - my bad. I’ve not made myself clear. I’ll clarify later on.

Ok, work with me on this one.

Most of the attempts to refute Hume on this have accepted these two assumptions. So when I read about this it started me thinking and compared other attempts to see if indeed they had let Hume decide the ‘rules’ of what was being argued.

These are the rules as best as I can see them, that define the debate over induction. If we take induction to mean an argument using inference to suggest that we can infer:

from

then it’s generally said that Hume shows us there is no guarantee that this sort of inference is truth preserving.

BUT it’s been suggested that Hume has only provided the argument for why this is true logically and that he has not considered other constraints, other than logic, that may be involved. For example, there are sometimes physical constraints that surpass logical constraints (i.e. logic allows for something to be possible which is not actually possible - logic 101).

More later, today is a nightmare.

BUT it’s been suggested that Hume has only provided the argument for why this is true logically and that he has not considered other constraints, other than logic, that may be involved. For example, there are sometimes physical constraints that surpass logical constraints (i.e. logic allows for something to be possible which is not actually possible - logic 101).

no, you’ve got it backwards…

hume demands empirical evidence, not logical possibility…

the “logical possibility” route is a kantian synthetic a priori judgment

a causes b… no

a happens.

b happens.

there is no logical connection between the two.

-Imp

Not really. Hume’s argument is that no finte set of observations can logically entail the corresponding universal statement - so that it’s possible to accept the propositions behind the premises of an inductive argument while disagreeing with the conclusion without contradicting oneself. i.e. the conclusions are not adequately determined by the premises. Thats basically the difference, and the problem.

He then says because there is no guarantee available for induction, it’s irrational to rely on it. Hume’s pointing out it is always logically possible for the conclusion of an inductive argument to be false while its premises remain true. What he does not do, is show that it would be physically impossible for that conclusion to be true, in this or any imagined worlds.

Let me know if you get me, or if anyone gets me, before I go on.

I get you, but you have hume’s argument backwards…

he isn’t worried about conclusions, he is concerned with premises that beg the question…

-Imp

Well we have to sort this out before I continue.

I’m confused as to what is making you think I have it backwards. So far, all I’ve done is explain what induction is to Hume. It doesn’t matter if he cares more about premises or conclusions, the fact remains his problem of induction states that it’s logically possible for premises to be true where conclusion is false (who could argue with this?) - i.e. the inference is not truth preserving and therefore - the problem of induction and science is unreliable and insanity is sanity [russell] etc etc.

Quite true but irrelevant to breaking down the problem of induction.

Induction involves the conclusion necessarily and so I am involving it necessarily in my thinking.

I hope we can agree on what the problem of induction is (even if you don’t think it to be a problem, which is great, because I don’t either…!).

the inductive conclusions are drawn from flawed premises and they are not valid.

the scientific method is based on an error in reasoning.

-Imp

If you’re happy with this bit then I’m happy.

Regardless of a difference in interpreting Hume, let’s just say the problem of induction as it is widely accepted, be that from Hume or just because of him, relies on the two sentences I outlined.

As Grice, I think that any theory which posits a more complex view of reality carries with it the onus of justification - that is, we need not do the hardwork for it. It’s widely accepted that rejecting the principle of induction is counterintuitive and that it creates many more problems than it solves (which is none, it solves nothing).

The ‘burden of proof’ lies on proponents of enumerative induction, particularly with regards to (a) and (b) in my opening post.

I don’t understand where you want to take this now…

and please clairify the two premises…

hume himself admitted that one lives as if the inductive fallacy did not occur…

-Imp

Hey guys! Interesting thread. I know it’s out of date, but I followed it up from a newer thread that touched more lightly on the same topic.

So Hume’s problem of induction is pretty simply stated, I think, and is more or less as Obw stated early on in the thread.

  1. Using induction, we take a finite amount of data, and extrapolate from it an estimation of the probability of a similar future event. The sun has risen every day in recorded human history - therefore, it will almost certainly rise tomorrow.

  2. While this is a common practice, it is impossible to justify this sort of conclusion using logic alone.

  3. Therefore, since logic does not justify induction, induction must somehow be wrong.

This is the problem as Hume saw it, and while it is a problem in some sense, the solution is pretty simple. This universe doesn’t work on logic alone. It certainly works according to logic - but it has extra “axioms” thrown in. Logic does not demand the existence of atoms, but our universe has them anyway. Logic is an important cornerstone of our universe, but there is more to our universe than that - which is why there are mathematicians AND physicists - and among the physicists, there are theoretical physicists and applied physicists.

Essentially, induction is one of the extra axioms of our universe. You can’t use logic to prove induction - but it works anyway, in our universe (or at least inductively seems to)! You can easily imagine a (very confusing) universe in which, the more something happens, the less likely it is to happen again in a similar circumstance.

That seems all there is to it! Please let me know if you think any part of the problem of induction has been ill-explained or unresolved.

-Tristan

welcome to the boards…

the only problem with "You can’t use logic to prove induction - but it works anyway, in our universe (or at least inductively seems to)! " is that with this admission, the scientific method becomes an exersize in faith, no more than a religion…

-Imp

The problem is quite large, and it would require a clarification of terms first. But here’s my pin-pointed view.

Inductive reasoning is hazardous only when concerning empirical data taken alone, as with the example given by Twiffy, with the Sun being likely to rise everyday as it has unmistakenly did until now. Applied to empirical data considered apart, induction tends to reveal its fallacious side.

Induction has substance only with synthetical a priori judgements, though. And I guess it is wise to say that it is a reasonable application of the causality and community categories from Kant’s table. The inductive argument holds water only when its conclusions are taken as apodictical. If we consider the sun “as likely to appear tomorrow as it has done today”, then my take is that no induction has taken place here. Indeed, we know a certain phenomenon will take place based on certainty given by scientifical proofs. The sun will be tomorrow where it is today because we have observed its mass and physical properties and melded them with the pure branch of conceptual physics. One might say the two methods are basically the same (based on empirical observation) but in reality they are not - synthetical a priori judgements come in. So the real issue would be if these synthetical a priori judgements are possible and real.

I think this sentence isn’t clear - I mean:

“The only necessity that matters, is a logical necessity.” I.e. such a position ignores that there are other alternative types of necessity that govern our world.

To say that ball A did not cause ball B to move when they impacted is like saying that event did not cause the proposition “ball A did not cause ball B to move when they impacted.”

If the proposition is “true,” and propositions are derived from empirical conditions, and empirical conditions are causal, then propositions are causal and the induction fallacy is a chimera.

Let’s walk through it.

I say “I cannot prove that the sun will rise tomorrow,” and rightly so, but not because it is impossible to predict, but rather because it is impossible to be in the future and the present at the same time. When tomorrow comes and the sun rises, I will be before myself with the recollection of the comment I made yesterday (today), and say that my prediction was an induction fallacy.

Now substitute all the conditions involved in a rising sun (the sun, earth, rotation , axis, space, etc.) as “ball A” and the proposition “I cannot prove that the sun will rise tomorrow” as “ball B.”

Here the induction turns on itself. Regardless of the “waiting to verify” the truth later on, what allows for the possibility of the induction, indeed, everything one way or another involves an induction, is the causal necessity of the “empirical” events, those which are the world and the “epiphenomena” of the “mind.”

It cannot be said that “causality” exists…

That statement is nonsense…

For the above two quips to be correct or incorrect, there must be something that caused one or the other, for it certainly can’t be both and if it is one or the other it is because of an effect.

Causality is happening where it is being argued that causality doesn’t exist and a prediction is an induction fallacy.

But remember, we aren’t talking about “predictions” anymore because we know we cannot be in the future and the present at the same time. All we are concerned about is the causal nature of experience and the how it happens in time and space…with “things” here and there. If, as the empircists suspect, propositions are results of impressions of physical data, then they would most certainly be quantifiable and causal.

I don’t need to know what a electron is made of to know that it bumps into things. There are trajectories and momentums and other causal effects which dictate the movements. If only we knew the grand masta plan, if only we could see the dice, if only we could find a constant, all the little laws we have found would be justified and we would finally see the biggin.

Alright, try this, Imp. Say that the sun doesn’t rise tomorrow because the solar system shifts from a force or something, and there is twenty-four seconds where the laws as we knew them are in disorder. Gravity becomes weaker, magnetic fields change, cellular growth rates increase drastically, and the price of a number four at Jersey Mike’s Subs drops almost fifty percent.

Everything is screwed and Humeans everywhere are celebrating in a great magnificent non-causal induction fallacy-free orgy, where nobody makes promises and loves Megadeath.

But look closer, Imp. You are standing outside of the solar system in your space ship watching this happen for twenty-four seconds, where the laws as you knew them are in tact. Your ship generates the same gravity fields, the poles have not changed, your cells are aging at the same rate, and your number four is still soggy and extremely over-priced.

Here you notice that the justification for the disruption of the laws on earth are not universal in that they are only local, but also that they had to be caused by something.

Now let’s say that it was a energy flare that happened every few hundred years, and Newton, who just happen to have knowledge of this energy flare, also happened to place a bet with his contemporaries one day that while sitting under a tree an apple that came loose from the branch would not fall on his head, but instead, Newton himself, as well as his contemporaries, would fall upwards themselves.

Newton timed it so he would be under the tree for the twenty-four seconds of disruption.

The question is, was Newtons bet an induction fallacy if he knew in advance an event was determined to happen which would change the laws of physics as he knew them, but nonetheless be part of a larger set of laws, which his contemporaries knew nothing about?

Do you, Imp, standing in your space ship, with the capacity to travel back in time, disguise yourself and join the group with Newton at the tree, and place a bet against him? Probably not, now that you know Newton knows about the disruption.

Dammit! Now my theory won’t work. Nevermind.

Imp, thanks for the welcome.

You are absolutely correct to say that the Scientific Method is a matter of faith. “No more than religion” isn’t quite right, though - religion doesn’t accomplish anything tangible (it doesn’t make computers or cure diseases), but the scientific method does.

Here’s the gist of things. Math, humans, and universes all work in this way: they have fundamental axioms, rules that you assume, or that you begin with, but cannot in any sense prove. Then, there are deductions you make from these rules. “Theorems”, conclusions, etc. Essentially, you have to begin with some assumptions that are unprovable - there’s no way to truly start from nothing. Induction, in the sense of humans and in the sense of the universe, is one of these assumptions.

Mucius Scevola:
Unfortunately, there is no synthetic a priori component to induction at its most raw level. Any pure branch of conceptual physics, no matter how pure, has purely observational components behind it. Take Special Relativity, although any other area of physics would work just as well. Sure, physics uses pure math, and math is certainly synthetic a priori. But the assumptions of Special Relativity - its axioms, e.g. that light travels at the same speed in all reference frames - are not in the LEAST deducable from pure logic. Rather, Einstein wasn’t able to include this as an axiom until after the Michaelson-Morley experiment, which established the absolute-ness of the speed of light via observation and induction. One could easily imagine a universe in which the speed of light were different, or in which there WERE no cosmic speed limit.

I don’t think the problem is quite large at all, but I’m willing to be corrected.

as is existence

-Imp