Both of you are correct in different aspects of the argument. PG, or the author she is citing rather, is correct in proposing that the human animal is rationally “economic” in its social interactions, and in cases where there are consequences, such a “law”…and the risk is not worth it…alternatives will happen that seek to establish the same end, but after compromising. The compromising is the rational act…the initial instinct and desire to disregard the “law” is the raw passion without the intellect. Once rationalization occurs in a social setting…which is the only setting man has ever been in…the concept of individual will-power becomes something dynamic and “diplomatic”.
Sauwelios is correct in saying that there is no “consequentialism” stopping a violent act. Which is to say, the only thing that I should allow to stop me is my own decision. There is only my decision, and that is all that is important.
But individual wills must, and do, conspire together for power, as Nietzsche put it. It is here that diplomacy occurs and rational control over the passions. A Nietzschean ethic, ironically, only works out in practice and not in theory- his ethics are ethics which ignore consequence and order. In theory, there should be no compromising or submission, since this is degenerate and weak. In such a scenario, society and civilization is just a waiting period until total dissolution. No wonder, then, that PG is correct in that ethical decisions are not involuntary acts of power and will force only, but rational choices occuring within an economic system or dynamic. Only after a large society is formed can Nietzsche’s ethical system take life and begin working. The conspiring for power is now a secular expression of the same dynamic that allowed for the organization of the society in which the secular ethics take life. Although all acts of will are not answerable to anyone else, they tend to compromise and enter into diplomacy, agreement, mutual consent, and negotiation.
You may say that the intellect here is just another expression of will, and it is of course. But the moment this will begins coresponding with another will, it becomes social.