back to the beginning: morality

I follow you up to here: “Abortion then is a human tragedy in my view precisely because, like so many other moral conflagrations, it necessarily involves a conflict of legitimate rights.” Legitimate right? Any right is just proclaimed to be some moral persuasion, saying it’s legitimate doesn’t give it any more power. Rights are only provided through law.

Since it’s an emotional issue, you’d therefore hold that your emotional response to the matter is the only correct one to have? Or that it’s most likely wrong?

I think feeling can lead to the truth as well as thought and that my views are correct.

So if someone else feels differently about abortion, they are “feeling wrong”? How do you defend your feeling being closer to the truth than theirs? You both “feel” that you’re right, after all. Maybe due to a lack of self-awareness they even feel it more strongly than you do.

Feelings can never be right or wrong. Beliefs are always right or wrong. My feelings about 23 week old aborted foetuses result in the correct belief that it is wrong to kill them.

And the correctness of that belief is evidenced by your subjective feelings, and not by any objective measure?

There is no objective measure to decide when it is and when it isn’t acceptable to perform an abortion. There are objective measures to find out when the foetus is viable outside the womb and when the foetus becomes conscious of pain, but how much we take these things into account is up to us as human beings to decide. I think the abortion time limit should be 13 weeks. I know that a 13 week old foetus cannot feel pain and is not viable outside the womb, but looking at one makes me feel it is something too human to kill. It has a face. If we allow those organisms to be killed what does that make us? Killing a clump of cells is unfortunate, but different. I arrive at these beliefs through feeling alone. I don’t think beliefs should be dismissed because they are arrived at purely through feeling. I think if humans do that then we are undervaluing our feelings which are a precious resource.

I’m not talking about dismissing beliefs. You said you were a universalist and not a relativist, I’m just trying to work out what that means in the context of feeling-based belief.

As far as I can tell, you mean that you think that what you believe to be true really is true; which is really just an obvious detail of what it is to hold a belief as true.

Edit: in addition, you call people fucking idiots for arriving at conclusions about the existence of God based on feelings rather than evidence. Which seems a little hypocritical, if that is your argument.

There are no objective measures to decide when it is and isn’t acceptable to kill anyone or not kill anyone, for any reason whatsoever.

Okay, tell us the one and only truly rational way in which to view abortion morally.

And I suspect you despise relativism contemptuously because “universalism” is a point of view that allows you to approach everything in an “either/or” frame of mind. In other words, this point of view is, in my opinion, little more than a psychological defense mechanism.

First of all, being illegal is, in one respect, very different from being immoral. Regarding the law, a particular behavior either is or is not legal. That can be denoted. In America, for example, abortion is legal under particular sets of circumstances. In other sets of circumstances, however, it is not.

Secondly, some insist that behaviors deemed immoral should be deemed illegal in turn. Often this is predicated on a particular religious or ideological agenda.

Thirdly, however, there is no way in which to demonstrate objectively why one set of moral values regarding abortion is necessarily more rational or ethical than any other.

For instance, Ayn Rand insisted her own moral values here were metaphysically rational. She believed that, objectively, the fetus was only a potential human life. Like an acorn is only a potential oak tree.

That might seem reasonable to some but it is also reasonable to insist that not a single oak tree has ever existed without first having been an acorn. Just as not a single human being has ever been born without first having been a fetus.

In other words, you have two reasonable arguments that come to conflicting conclusions. How do we determine the most reasonable argument? In my view, we can’t.

What I say is this:

The point of view we embrace regarding the morality of abortion is rooted in dasein. In other words, it is rooted in the life we’ve lived. It is rooted in our indoctrination as children [which is rooted, in turn, in ever evolving historical and cultural contexts], in our experiences, in our relationships with others, in the ideas we come into contact with etc…

So the question then becomes:

If this is true to what extent can we engage philosophy here in order to transcend dasein? Can philosophy enable us to determine whether abortion is in fact moral?

No, I don’t think so. It will be useful in enabling us to think more clearly about the issue. But inevitably we will reach junctures where reasonable thinking that is pro-choice collides with reasonable thinking that is anti-choice. Then what? Then we muddle through as best we can.

Here we get into the distinctions that are made between something being right, moral, ethical, politically correct, virtuous, legitimate, appropriate etc…

The tragedy of abortion in my view is that from both sides of the issue these words can used interchangably. This is what disturbs equal2u, in my view.

Legality, on the other hand, is more readily demonstrated. And, ultimately, it comes down to who has the power to enforce a particular agenda.

  1. Not everyone who does philosophy is engaging philosophy to transcend dasein.
  2. Not everything who uses language is using language to transcend dasein.
  3. You don’t have to transcend dasein to have a moral belief.

That’s Faust’s objection, and now it’s my objection too.

This is where we are talking past each other. You are saying that the only way we could have a moral belief about abortion is a belief about whether abortion is “in fact” moral. Then you define “in fact” as “independent of dasein” or “having transcended dasein.” Of course there are no moral facts if we cannot transcend dasein and a moral fact is a result of transcending dasein. Obviously!

I agree. I also agree that the point of view we embrace includes a moral belief. Maybe when YOU SPECIFICALLY think about this moral dilemma, YOU decline to posit a moral fact (because of your philosophical training or whatever), but what should matter for an existentialist, and ESPECIALLY a Heideggerian is whether we do this in AVERAGE EVERYDAYNESS.

You’ve just said that points of view are rooted in dasein. We don’t have to transcend dasein in order to have a point of view. Thus, we don’t have to transcend dasein in order to posit a moral fact. People constantly posit moral facts in everyday life. Just because you think the existence of moral facts is ultimately indefensible on some heady philosophical level doesn’t change the existentiale of people positing moral facts.

You want to have your cake and eat it too. You want to avoid rationality by claiming to be concerned with the real world (“moral facts are not proven by rational arguments”), and you want to avoid the real world by claiming to be concerned with philosophy (“if a moral “in fact” exists we would have to transcend dasein in order to see it”).

Yes, this is true. I understand that. But over and again I note what my approach to philosophy is: to use it as a way [a tool] to make the distinction between knowledge that transcends dasein and mere opinions that reflect the subjective and subjunctive agenda of each uniquely existential man and woman.

And this is certainly applicable to discussions that revolve around morality. If, however, you wish to use philosophy for other purposes, fine. I have no objection to that. What I am looking for are those who do use it for other pursuits and can then integrate their own discoveries into a constructive critique of mine.

Yes, but there are those who insist you can. They invent Gods and ideologies. They obviate moral ambiguity and uncertainty by subsuming the moral agent in duty and obligation.

William Barrett from Irrational Man:

…in a good many cases there is no such universal rule or receipe available, and the individual can do nothing but muddle through on his own and decide for himself. Life seems to have intended it this way, for no moral blueprint has ever been drawn up that covers all the situations for us beforehand so that we can be absolutely certain under which rule the situation comes. Such is the concreteness of existence that a situation may come under several rules at once, forcing us to choose outside any rule and from inside oursleves.

Ah, but if you can convince yourself this is not the case, that a “moral blueprint” can be found [in God, in Reason] you take the weight that is “the agony of choice in the face of uncertainty” off your shoulder and live in certitude.

And if that is not basically a psychological defense mechanism what is it?

iambiguous wrote:

Can philosophy enable us to determine whether abortion is in fact moral?

I emphasize the expression “in fact” here because the facts regarding abortion are all on the side of the doctors who perform them. They are medical facts built into the evolution of life on earth…of human biology.

But there are folks who insist that we can “in fact” know whether abortion is moral or immoral with the same sort of certainty. But, in fact, we cannot. The facts embedded in performing an abortion as a medical procedure are applicable to all daseins. These facts transcend mere points of view. But the sense of certainty embraced by each side in defending or defaming abortion morally can only—ultimately—be opinions, not facts.

Not sure what exactly you are suggesting here. I suggest a moral belief is just a point of view. There may be any number of actual facts embedded in the arguments from both sides. But you can’t add the facts [embedded in premises] up such that one conclusion is said to in fact be true. Instead, you reach the point where the logic embedded in the facts from both arguments breaks down and the irresistable force that is one argument meets the immovable object that is the other. That’s the limitation of language [of philosophy] even in an exchange of moral arguments that contain facts. That’s Barrett’s point.

I don’t believe we can transcend dasein—however many actual facts are accumulated in our arguments.

For example, you could argue it is a fact that aborting a fetus that is well beyond the “point of viability” is qualitatively different from aborting an embryo that is just a clump of cells. Yes, that is, in fact, true. But it doesn’t change the point I made in the OP. My point revolved around another fact instead: That, in forcing women to give birth against their will, you are denying them the possibility of gender equality. Why? Because only women can become pregnant and forcing them to give birth would certainly impact their lives grieviously. How, for example, could they attend the best colleges or acquire the best jobs if they are forced to have babies against their will? Then we are, once again, back to Barrett.

No, I want to situate “rationality” out in the world of actual human interaction by exposing its limitations regarding human moral conflicts. I want to explore the relationship between philosophy and human behaviors that come into conflict. But not just in the world of words.

George Bernard Shaw on The Golden Rule in, Maxims for Revolutionists

Do not do unto others as you would that they should do unto you. Their tastes may not be the same.

Never resist temptation: prove all things: hold fast that which is good.

Do not love your neighbor as yourself. If you are on good terms with yourself it is an impertinence: if on bad, an injury.

The golden rule is that there are no golden rules.

Sander Lee on Woody Allen’s Crimes and Misdemeanors:

[b]…Allen’s investigation of the moral decline of society had been limited to acts which, while clearly immoral, were rarely illegal. In Crimes and Misdemeanors…the main character, Judah Rosenthal, comes to ‘see’ that in a world devoid of divine presence, all acts are permissible, even murder.

The apparent philosophical despair of this film, in which the most moral individual, Ben, is shown gradually going blind, has been taken by many to symbolize Allen’s ultimate sense of hopelessness. All of the supposedly virtuous characters are shown wearing glasses because of their inability to see the true nature of the world. As the film progresses, one character, Halley, is apparently able to discard her glasses only after she has also discarded her values by agreeing to marry an arrogant, pompous but successful TV producer Lester. Allen’s character, Cliff Stern, is punished for his commitment to his beliefs as we see him lose everything he cared for: his love, his work, and even his spiritual mentor, the philosophy professor Louis Levy who, like Primo Levi, survived the Holocaust but responds to the petty immoralities of everyday life by killing himself.

Most ominously, Judah, who bears the name of one of the greatest fighters for traditional Jewish values and heritage, betrays the faith of his father Sol by not only committing a murder, but also renouncing the consequenses of his guilt in a universe which he declares to be indifferent to our actions.[/b]

Now, in my view, Woody Allen blinked in this film re the manner in which he rationalized the murder. In two ways:

1] He clearly portrays the murdered mistress, Dolores, as a neurotic demon from hell bent on destroying his marriage by exposing their relationship to Judah’s wife. He tries to escape the noose by talking her out of it first…but she won’t go along with him.

2] He clearly shows the moral agony Judah endured as he genuinely wrestled with the searing ambivalence of hiring someone to kill the woman.

Suppose, instead, the mistress was nothing like that at all? Suppose she was an enormously appealing woman? Suppose he wanted her dead for a far less weighty reason? He just got tired of her and had her killed so there was never any possibility at all of this wife finding out. And, in turn, suppose he reacted to her death as he might react to a mere inconvenience in his life? Suppose her death didn’t bother him at all?

In other words, it is still the same Godless universe in both scenarios…one where all human behaviors are essentially interchangable in the end. That, of course, is something [a point of view] most folks find particularly unnerving, right?

More Lee:

Dialogue from the film Crimes and Misdemeaners:

[b]Judah:

'Our entire adult lives you and I have been having this same converstation in one form or another.

Ben:

‘Yes, I know. It’s a fundamental difference in how we view the world. You see it as harsh and empty of vaules and pitiless, and I couldn’t go on living if I didn’t feel it with all my heart a moral structure, with real meaning, and forgivenesss, and some kind of higher power, otherwise there’s no basis to know how live!’

When Ben says that they have moved from ‘a small infidelity to the meaning of existence’, he suggests an interpretation of both the film’s title and the interrelationship between its two plotlines. How one acts to deal with ‘a small infidelity’ determines one’s position on the very ‘meaning of existence’. The distance between such small misdemeanors and unforgivable crimes is much shorter than normally thought, once one has rejected all notions of values and responsibilty.[/b]

This is the way the world actually functions, in my view. Once God is gone, all is permitted. But that does not mean we are not compelled to come up with our own moral compass. We are and most do. It suggests only that whichever one we do come up with is merely an existential reflection of how we choose to live. There is no Right or Wrong way.

And it is, in my opinion, the visercal psychological repugnance that many feel trying to imagine a world like that [the world as it really is] that motivates psychological defense mechanisms to kick in in order to rescue us from an essentially absurd and meaningless world. God thus becomes the mother of all psychological defense mechanisms. We embrace God because, among other things, God stands for the possibility [or the certainty] of Divine Justice.

And, for some who cannot believe in God, they replace Him with Reason. But there is no more or less ratioanl or logical manner in which to differentiate moral from immoral behavior in a Godless universe. How could there be when the vantage point of a mere mortal is inherently existential?

Morality and ethics are beliefs. Nothing more.

You can choose to either believe in them or not to.

There is no such thing as universal values.

The universe cares not of morality or ethics where it imposes nothing.

A lot of morality and ethics end up in contradictions which shows their absurd imperfect existence.

One could say that morality and ethics are so entirely relative or subjective that they don’t really matter at all.

I shall play the skeptic in this discussion.

From Shows About Nothing by Thomas Hibbs:

According to…Immanuel Kant, a democracy is a community of individuals who are simultaneously sovereigns and subjects. No longer is revealed religion, nature or nature’s God an appropriate basis for our own self-understanding. Since these are all in some measure extrinsic to the human will, reliance on them is seen to be alienating, an infringment of the dignity of the individual. In Kant’s technical language, submission to them puts the individual in a state of ‘heteronomy’, the exact opposite of autonomy. Kant is remarkably optimistic about the agreement that is likely to result from everyone cultivating his autonmy, for he supposess that since each is under his own command, each will acknowledge and respect the dignity of the others in their capacity for self legislation.

Hibbs then goes on to ponder these arguments in an analysis of the film To Kill a Mockingbird:.

…Mockingbird seems to be of two minds about tradition and cultural particularity. On the one hand, in Kantian fashion, it asks us to prescind from the prejudices of blind tradition and look past the superficial veils of race. On the other hand, the conception of duty that Atticus embodies is infused with the code of honor appropriate to the Southern gentleman. From the Kantian perspective, then, To Kill a Mockingbird would be a somewhat impure depiction of the politics of autonomy. That assessment may tell us more about the deficiencies of the model of autonomy than about the dramatic flaws of the film. The problem is that radical autonomy, since it undercuts faith in any objective or communally shared source of morality, easily gives way to nihilism. Once cultural nihilism becaomes prevalent, no one has the right or the capacity to determine where the laws ought to be drawn.

Hibbs whole conjecture here revolves around the inherent tension between “too much” autonomy [anarchy] and “too little” [autocracy]. And this applies not just in the narrow political sense but in all other aspects of human interaction as well. He draws our attention to the role of “liberal democracy” and how, perhaps, in taking so much of what we once traditionally construed as essentially right and wrong behavior [think of sexual mores in the 50’s and sexual mores today, for example] off the leash, we have created a debilitating and herterogenous rootlessnees that, perhaps, might necessitate reintroducing a more…well…heteronomous frame of mind all over again. But of course “common sense” would prevail in the end.

Ah, but which rendition of it? And common sense all too often devolves over time into the “lowest common denominator” sensibilities of “the masses”.

Kant, of course, was able to subsume all this in a rational philosophical assessment of human ethical interaction. The mind would deduce the requisite a priori assumptions respecting the manner in which “practical reason” [in conjunction with a Good Will] would then become the horse pulling and regulating the cart. Then, perforce, this philosophically motivated moral agent would derive just the right mix of autonomy so as to convey to the world those behaviors deemed to be either universally right or universally wrong.

In theory, as it were. But, ironically…i.e. for all practical purposes…this has rarely been sustained beyond particular individuals who claim to live their lives in the moral tradition of Kant. Which, however, is seen as being superior to those who live their lives in the moral tradition of, say, Plato. Why? Because Kant’s rendition of it is “squared” with the phenomenal world somehow. God is, well, a lot deeper in the background.

Authority therefore would be rooted categorically and imperatively in one’s moral duty. As though throughout the entire history of human social, political and economic relationships this has ever actually happened self-consciously [over large segments of a population acting out a philosophical agenda]. As though Kant’s rendition of human moral interaction isn’t just the equivalent of a footnote in the works of Marx and Engels.

But then Nietzsche’s biggest blunder may well have revolved around his failure to read Marx in turn. Philosophy, after all, is to political economy what lungs are to air. You can’t really make sense out of one until you understand its relationship to the other. And what good are lungs without air?

Reading about the “Spring offensive” being planned by some in the OWS movement prompts this:

That, because people do not share our values does not mean we have to appeal to “something unreasonable” in them. Instead, we have to acknowlege this: the facts we use in order to discover, embrace, describe, evaluate and judge values [our own or others] are open to conflicting – yet reasonable – interpretations.

Take, for example, one of the most fundamental conflicts of all: are human beings basically social animals prone towards cooperation and compromise [an argument for socialism] or should we view men and women from the perspective of the individual prone towards competition and conflict [an argument for capitalism]?

Well, historical, anthropological, experiential and anecdotal evidence abounds—for both points of view.

In fact, out in the world we live in, a reasonable argument can be made for both capitalism and socialism. In other words, there are veritably hundreds and hundreds of complex and countervailing variables out of which almost any interpretation can be said to make sense.

In my view, what the ideological factions on both sides of this conflagration fail to grasp is the manner in which most of the wealth and power in the world is garnered by those who are largely amoral in their approach to policy. They merely want to sustain a world in which they predominate “for all practical purposes”.

Emile Cioran:

Even today nobody can tell what is right or what is wrong. It will be same in the future. The relativity of such expressions means little; not to be able to dispense with their use is more significant. I don’t know what is right and what is wrong, and yet I divide actions into good and bad. If anyone asked me why I do so, I couldn’t give an answer. I use moral criteria instinctively; later, when I reconsider, I do not find any justification for having done so. Morality has become so complex and contradictory because its values no longer constitute themselves in the order of life but have crystalized in a transcendental region only feebly connected to life’s vital and irrational forces.

Are our contemporary myths about right and wrong [in the industrial West] really all that more sophisticated than those practiced by primitive, aboriginal tribes around the globe? They certainly cannot be defended as more effective. In fact “the order of life” in the modern world becomes increasingly more fragmented with each passing year. So much so that evangelicals [of all religious and
secular stripes] are on the warpath in nation after nation to recreate that old order. Or a new order even more doctrinaire and draconian.

Is human morality something we can take seriously from a philosophical perspective? We don’t pursue good and bad because we have ensnared them in logic; we do so because it is a fundamental part of being human. We interact—socially and politically and economically. That means disagreements and conflicts. And there are only so many slices in the pie; so rules have to be devised to facilitate the least dysfunctional method for dividing it up.

And we know how that is generally done.

Of course we interact in other ways as well—sexually, emotionally, within and between communities, artistically, racially, ethnically, between genders. But in the 21st century the rules are barely connected at all anymore to “life’s vital and irrational forces”. Instead, amidst a fractured demographic smorsgasbord of literally hundreds of communities and sub-cultures, we kind of make things up as we go along. The old “orders of life” have now transfigured into “lifestyles”.

Everyone has their own story. And even when you recognize this is all it is you also recongnize it is not practical to abandon it. You have to come up with one or another rationale [or rationalization] to justify what you do. And even this analysis is just one more story about how human moral interaction unfolds.

The part that confuses some people, however, is Cioran’s conjecture that human moral interaction reflects an intuitve or instinctive discourse. They prefer to believe we have left that to the savages. We have become so much more civilized in the way in which we ponder and then institutionalize these things; and so derive a much more considered set of moral convictions. And we can, of course, defend them with rational arguments the more primitive folks know nothing of.

Next to us, in fact, they know practically nothing at all.

About, say, lifestyles or the rule of law or the global economy or nihilism.