Hmm…
The way you keep a simplistic view of a concept that is very complex is illumintaing in many ways. I have come to resent your ability for it, but I am greedy enough to learn from what you say anyway.
But I will, now, begin to question you.
If we assume that nothing is “given” as real other than our world of desires and passions and that we cannot access from above or below any “reality” other than the direct reality of our drives—for thinking is only a relationship of these drives to each other—: are we not allowed to make the attempt and to ask the question whether this given is not a sufficient basis also for understanding the so-called mechanical (or “material”) world on the basis of things like this given. I don’t mean to understand it as an illusion, an “appearance,” an “idea” (in the sense of Berkeley and Schopenhauer*), but as having the same degree of reality as our affects themselves have—
From the mentioned passage in BGaE
There IS a physical… or at least a real. A something. A something that applies itself. Not just human, but something that the human is a complex developpment of.
as a more primitive form of the world of affects in which everything is still combined in a powerful unity, something which then branches off and develops in the organic process (also, as is reasonable, gets softer and weaker—), as a form of instinctual life in which the collective organic functions, along with self-regulation, assimilation, nourishment, excretion, and metabolism, are still synthetically bound up with one another—as an early form of life?
This second part is still refered to by what I wrote above, but I quoted it seperately because… well, don’t you see it?
FC, tell 'em.