Ah, so morality is not just the topic about how you ought to act. As I said way earlier in the conversation, it’s more specific than that. It’s a subset of the topic of how you ought to act. So, just saying “it’s the topic of how you ought to act” is a bit misleading. It’s a specific subset of that topic, and you would describe that subset as the subset pertaining to things that really matter.
Preferences are subjective.
“What really matters” is subjective.
So, if there’s a scale of ought-questions, and on the left side of the scale is stuff that doesn’t matter that much, and on the right side of the scale is the stuff that matters, the left side is the prudential side and the right side is the moral side, yeah? And so, since what matters is subjective, the line between prudence and morality is subjective.
There sure is a lot of subjectivity in your objective morality.
When I say, “I like ice cream,” that’s an objective fact.
About my subjective opinion.
So, since your morality is just on the right side of the subjectively-determined scale of actions that, as you keep insisting, should be judged as good or bad based on their utility, hedonistic value, and other such subjective values…this morality of yours seems mostly subjective. It’s not any more objective than ice cream preferences.
So, if what you’re saying when you say morality is objective is just something along the lines of “We can say objective facts about peoples’ subjective preferences,” then yeah, obviously. Do you not have a more substantial form of objectivity in mind? Or is that really it?