the psychology of objectivism - one possible narrative

That’s pretty objective.

[quote=“Lev Muishkin”]
Dasein dilemma is a contradiction in terms, anyway.

The whole point about Dasein is that it was Heidegger’s solution to the Sartrean angst. Dasein is a Germanic solution to a Gallic problem.
There is no Dasein Dilemma, and if it is presented as such the presenter is still stuck in an existential Nausea.[/quote

Heidegger could not possibly have attempted this, in good faith, since he knew the boundary issues between Germany and France. He may have tried to show a politically expedient good faith. His signature was much more grounded in people like Husserl and Holderline.

Translation: Iambiguous does not know what he is talking about.

Dasein IS a concept as developed by philosophy, reaching its apogee with Heidegger.
If you don’t know what he was talking about then I suggest you read Being and Time.

If al you got is your own uninformed idea, then you are actually talking about something else, so I suggest you stop using a term that does not apply.

It’s not about what he intended to “attempt” ; its about what he achieved with Dasein.

There are no boundary issues to ideas; so what do you think you are talking about?

Don’t you mean objectionable?

Fine, then I don’t know what I am talking about.

But anytime you are inclined to bring the manner in which you define and understand the meaning of the word down to earth, I’ll be more than happy to accommodate you.

Hell, I would liked to have discussed and debated dasein with Heidegger himself. Sans all the abstruse jargon of course. :wink:

 There are even boundaries between issues and ideas.  As for example in cases where issues are framed in terms of ideas.  The political post war climate between Germany and France can not be discounted in basically ideological garb, although a case can be made for that view.  Even the distinction between idealism and the existential reduction can be interpreted, as the effect of political backlash, on part;of former underground french patriots,Sartre having been one of them, to reduce the traces of an ideal buildup by a reduction of politically loaded ideas.

Granted the genesis of existentialism did not begin with Sartre, Nietzsche, too, reacted against that, however, Nietzche did not end idealism, he merely closed it with the circle. The metaphor of the ring cycle, culminating with Brunhilda’s immolation, leads to the view that Sartre, par excellance, started the politico-ontological deconstruction of the ideal, Liebnitzean world. He proved too metaphorically obscure, and propped it up with the system anti system of the pure Heglelian dialectic, that of Marx. That failing, meaning analysis was reduced to the meaning of meaning, and preoccupation with text and context. Unfortunately for Russel, he was caught in a semantic ,irresolute semantic trap.

What remains? Hermeneutics and relational meaning between subject and object, ad hoc creation of temporal meaning.

You are right, that there is no subject/object referentiality in all this, and it is because the language of reference and meaning, has been buried within in solution of irreversibility. But vestiges remain, and these are archetypical foundations of what Polanyi calls ‘tacit knowledge’

The only reason to bring up this absence in presence, as Stirner calls it, is because, it is too tempting to bring in old notions of subjective/objective differentiation, of what it has become basically a text-context issue.

Whether it is or is not what he intended to effect, or if what he has achieved would be the primary focus , in defining the contradictory nature of dasein, is trumped by the antithetical Sartrean position on Heidegger’s intentionality, vis. presence can be imbued in absense.(ibid)

Sartre’s existenze is not absolute,it persists in a nausating duration, containing within it, the possibility of what is absent. The nothingness is contained in being, but from a so called objective position, being may well turn out as empty as nothingness. For Russell, these terms are probably co-dependent to a point where definitionally it may prove totally reductive to build any real framework upon them.

It’s a matter of choice. Accept the Hedeggerian Dasein, or wallow in the Sartrean Angst. The choice is yours.
Nothing you write here establishes any “boundaries”, and nothing you write here necessitates a position where all we have left is some sort of half digested Hermaneutic Circle.
If you accept H’s Dasein then you are free from the worry of the Gallic navel gazing, but that is as open to a Frenchman as it is to a Anglo-Saxon.
With H you are the centre of your experience and when asked what you think about your girlfriend’s abortion, inevitably all questions have to be filtered through the Dasein.
The point is that in H there are no objective moral considerations. Ultimately your choice is about how you feel about and for your girlfriend, not about some societal injunction gained through moral law. The Dasein might want to have adopted such views, and might “do the decent thing” in terms of society or his girlfriend. But the dilemma is a mirage. Ultimately all personal decisions are made by , and taken responsibility for the Self. This is true whether or not you accept H’s concept of the moral self or not.
The difference comes, that when you accept the truth of the Dasein, you are enlightened in a super-Kantian sense of Aufklarung, far in excess of Kant’s rather servile version of enlightenment. There is now no need to obey; that is nothing more the “obey” that your true self.

Dasein clutches to the heart, and embraces the truth of the human experience; that all we do is on our own heads. Whilst Sartre beats himself like a true Catholic wallowing in self loathing, and at odds with his relationship with the world; H puts himself first.

While giving you the benefit of doubt the only weakness in the above argument lies in the idea of free will, grounded in total freedom. The aufklarung it seems has nothing objective about it, it is based on a realization of synthetic unity, where reductive or regressive and progressive issues define the way we live. The boundaries are limits where such realizations can bear fruition. We may think we are totally free, or, absolutely hampered by a lack of clarity or the presence of responsibility. The aufklarung is a state of mind, with no connextion to issues as above?

The special relationship which exists between being and knowledge, present boundaries, which are matters of interpretation. Certainly our knowledge has to do with the clarity of mind, as well as the heart, and the it is not as if either one can act individually. To put it in another way, would place too much of an emphasis away from it dynamics of it, reducing it as it were from the framing of it, toward the pure object. It would deny the ontological intuition, which is behind it, and put it on the level of emotion.

I see where you are going with this, but emotional solutions lead away from the underlying structure, which, here on this forum, may be leading the truth of being through various routes, none of which are set in stone, and the authoritarian focus may be abandoned by inapplicable particulars. The connection between knowledge and it.s object Being present overlapping boundaries, as the need to know sometimes dictates it’s content, which includes it’s ultimate objective: Being.

My particular need, the knowledge and place of intuition within the erklarung? (framed by an commonly sensed objective)

Here is a direct quote from Kant:

Enlightenment is not merely the process by which individuals would see their own personal freedom of thought guaranteed. There is Enlightenment, where the universal, the free, and the public uses of reason are superimposed on one another.

The boundaries here are implied by the text, that of the ideas of the universal are bounded by the free and public uses of reason. The guarantee of personal reason is an idea bounded and overlapping by the free and the public use of that reason.

This throws light on the meaning of the idea of ‘a process of seeing their personal freedom’ as basically an idea, whereas public use is an extension of that into the realm of basing that supposed freedom of thought, toward functioning as such. The difference implies what Kant may means by superimposition. At the least, there is vagueness in maintaining wherefrom the process and the idea are differentiable.

stop dancing and keep to the points.

Sounds profoundly like a description of you.

But not you, right? :laughing:

Wow, you actually said something right. :astonished: :open_mouth:

That 1-7 is me, is it?

Maybe. Maybe not. Again, this list can only reflect my own subjective reaction to what I construe an objectivist mind to be. You will either see yourself reflected in it or you won’t.

You claim not to be an objectivist and yet #7 describes you and your posts very well.

Also, your ad hom responses, in several threads, show that #6 applies - you are defending your Self from objectivist arguments.

First of all, I want to thank you and James for making this thread “active” again. I think that it is important for the objectivists among us to at least consider the points I am raising.

7] Finally, a stage is reached [again for some] where the original philosophical quest for truth, for wisdom has become so profoundly integrated into their self-identity [professionally, socially, psychologically, emotionally] defending it has less and less to do with philosophy at all. And certainly less and less to do with “logic”.

Over and again, I have noted how in the past I had come to embrace what I did construe to be the “philosophical truth” – the objective truth: Christianity, Objectivism, Marxism, Existentialism etc. I did indeed try to embody all of point 7 either through God or through Reason.

But now, regarding the question “how ought one to live?”, I have come to believe that such essentialist points of view are, instead, rooted more in the existential parameters of dasein…and that the “goods” they propagated were predicated only on certain assumptions. In other words, that the Objectivists embraced one set of premises while the Marxists embraced a different set. Yet both sides insisted that only their own assumptions were necessarily true for all rational human beings.

And then there are all of the hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of additional objectivists out there [both ecclesiastic and secular] who insist that, on the contrary, it is only their assumptions that count.

Right?

Also, as I note time and again, I recognize that in a world brimming with contingency, chance and change there is always the possibilty that, through a new experience, relationship, point of view etc., I might change my mind yet again.

[u][b]IF ONLY BECAUSE I HAVE SO OFTEN IN THE PAST![/u][/b]

Ah, but it is when I tap others on the shoulder and suggest this is also applicable to them, that the truly hardcore objectivists demur. After all, if my own narrative is more reasonable than theirs they might have to admit that maybe, just maybe, their own moral and political agenda is as well largely rootecd in dasein and in conflicted goods. Which [in my opinion] means point 7 is, in fact, more applicable TO an objectivist frame of mind that is in fact embracing one or another God or one or another deontological approach to ethics.

6] For some, it can reach the point where they are no longer able to realistically construe an argument that disputes their own as merely a difference of opinion; they see it instead as, for all intents and purposes, an attack on their intellectual integrity…on their very Self.

And yet my very argument here starts with the assumption that “intellectual integrity” is in itself rooted existentially in daseins interacting in a world where, intersubjectively, the “self” is prefabricated in childhood and then ceaselessly refabricated to the grave. And that in a world of contingency, chance and change, we come upon new experiences, relationships, sources of information etc. which always have the potential to reconfigure our points of view pertaining to moral and political values – and to the manner in which we come to understand the fabrication/construction of a “self”.

Now, sure, you can insist that this too is just another “objectivist” frame of mind. Then all I can do is to speculate that others will see it more in the manner in which I do instead.

As for the “ad homs”, that is more reflective of the manner in which I do so enjoy “polemics”. And very often it reflects in turn the manner in which others will try to make me the argument instead.

In other words, they started it!!! :wink: :astonished: :wink:

wrong thread

Gee. Thanks for making this “active”.

Six months later, one post: “Wrong Thread.”

I have to say this is the least active, active thread out there.

Clearly the narrative of the psychology of objectivism, is a null idea.