Universe and Time

[James S Saint]

Moving out from this cycle for ever is Nirvana/enlightenment.

And that is what I have been calling "Anentropic Harmony".

[Arminius]

Moving out from this cycle for ever is Nirvana/enlightenment.

And that is what I have been calling "Anentropic Harmony".

So for you "Anentropic Harmony" is "Nirvana"?

[James S Saint]

Moving out from this cycle for ever is Nirvana/enlightenment.

And that is what I have been calling "Anentropic Harmony".

So for you "Anentropic Harmony" is "Nirvana"?

No.. but yes.. but no.

Anentropic Harmony is the ultimate stage from which no one departs to become something different. In Buddhism and Hinduism, Nirvana is what they call the "ultimate stage". But their image of that ultimate stage is one of extreme peace with very little motion or activity. But in reality, peace is not an ultimate stage, merely the beginning of it, the "clearing of the field for the ultimate form to be built". Anentropic Harmony is a momentous harmony that occupies the prior stage of pure peace and thus becomes stable and eternal. Without the momentum, peace is not stable.

I don't think Hinduism and Buddhism have a word for Anentropic Harmony. The closest thing is their their word for ultimate eternal heaven. "Anentropic Harmony" describes the make of the ultimate heaven. "Nirvana" is misunderstood to be ultimate heaven (but lacks the required momentum) and is said to be that ultimate stage.

So yes.. but no.. but yes.

[monad]

Anentropic Harmony is the ultimate stage from which no one departs to become something different. In Buddhism and Hinduism, Nirvana is what they call the "ultimate stage". But their image of that ultimate stage is one of extreme peace with very little motion or activity. But in reality, peace is not an ultimate stage, merely the beginning of it, the "clearing of the field for the ultimate form to be built". Anentropic Harmony is a momentous harmony that occupies the prior stage of pure peace and thus becomes stable and eternal. Without the momentum, peace is not stable.

Being dead sounds like a close second but without the momentum.

[James S Saint]

Being dead sounds like a close second but without the momentum.

"Why can't you kill Buddha?"

..because he is already dead.

[monad]

Being dead sounds like a close second but without the momentum.

"Why can't you kill Buddha?"

..because he is already dead.

I wonder if he knows that or not compared to the rest of us poor pathetic mortals who know nothing after that.

[Arminius]

James, you are saying that „existence is that which has affect“, and that in „reality, people are already using the word »exist« to mean this definition. They often never think about it, but in every case, the person really means that something having existence means that it has the potential to affect something; be seen, touched, smelled, or detected in some way even if not already detected.“. But one can doubt that „the person really means that something having existence means that it has the potential to affect something; be seen, touched, smelled, or detected in some way even if not already detected“, as you probably know. We just have to know more about the term „having affect“.

[James S Saint]

James, you are saying that „existence is that which has affect“, and that in „reality, people are already using the word »exist« to mean this definition. They often never think about it, but in every case, the person really means that something having existence means that it has the potential to affect something; be seen, touched, smelled, or detected in some way even if not already detected.“. But one can doubt that „the person really means that something having existence means that it has the potential to affect something; be seen, touched, smelled, or detected in some way even if not already detected“, as you probably know. We just have to know more about the term „having affect“.

I have yet to find anyone who can name anything they believe to exist and yet also believe to have absolutely no affect on anything. At times, they get concerned with the issue of something not having affect on them personally, which is not the issue.

Can you think of anything that you believe to exist and yet also believe has absolutely no affect upon anything?

In RM:AO, it is merely a declared definition for what it means to physically exist, within the ontology. But in reality, I haven't found anything that didn't fit that definition anyway. But if someone wants to declare the existence of something that also has no affect upon anything, they are free to do so. They just can't declare it in RM:AO.

[Arminius]

Can you think of anything that you believe to exist and yet also believe has absolutely no affect upon anything?

Yes, I can think in that way. The "potential to affect something" and the fact to "be seen, touched, smelled, or detected in some way even if not already detected" are perhaps not the same thing or, if they are the same thing, perceived differently because there are - for example - different observers, and there is the problem of the subject/object dualism.

"By declared definition, Existence is that which has affect." You are saying that existence is that which has affect. But do all people really use the words "exist" and "existence" as you use them? And if so, what or who ist the one which or who affects what or whom? What or who is the first one? Does an "affectless affect" exist? Is this so called "affectless affect" similar to the so called "unmoved mover"?

In RM:AO, it is merely a declared definition for what it means to physically exist, within the ontology. But in reality, I haven't found anything that didn't fit that definition anyway. But if someone wants to declare the existence of something that also has no affect upon anything, they are free to do so. They just can't declare it in RM:AO.

Different cultures/civilisations interpret or even construe the reality in a different way than other cultures/civilisations.

Does nothingness or nonentity have any affect? What about the "nirvana"? What do you think about the "nirvana"? And probably in contrast: what does Zinnat think about the "nirvana"? What do you think about Zinnat's thinking about the "nirvana"? .... And so on ....

[Mithus]

Arminius, I'm trying to understand you

Can you think of anything that you believe to exist and yet also believe has absolutely no affect upon anything?

Yes, I can think in that way,

Could you give one example for that?

If I understand you right, you mean the following: When people say that something exists, they mean, that they have the active part by perceiving that what exists with their senses. After James' ontology, waves of affectance come from the objects to affect them (the people), so that they can perceive the objects (that what exists). In that case the 'active part' comes- first- from the objects. Is that right?
If yes, why is it relevant for you who or what affects first who or what?
Or, in other words, does s.th. exist because I see it or because it can be seen by me?
I think in commom usage of the word 'exist' people don't really see a difference in that.

[Arminius]

Arminius, I'm trying to understand you

Can you think of anything that you believe to exist and yet also believe has absolutely no affect upon anything?

Yes, I can think in that way,

Could you give one example for that?

If I understand you right, you mean the following: When people say that something exists, they mean, that they have the active part by perceiving that what exists with their senses. After James' ontology, waves of affectance come from the objects to affect them (the people), so that they can perceive the objects (that what exists). In that case the 'active part' comes- first- from the objects. Is that right?
If yes, why is it relevant for you who or what affects first who or what?
Or, in other words, does s.th. exist because I see it or because it can be seen by me?
I think in commom usage of the word 'exist' people don't really see a difference in that.

Many people don't think very much, but if (if!) they really think that something exists, they do it in two different ways: (1) subjectively, so they think existence has merely to do with the thinking subject, and (2) objectively, so they think existence is something which has nothing to do with the thinking subject. Merely the second way is also the way to think that "waves of affectance come from the objects to affect". If they think "they can perceive the objects", they actually have to ask themselves, whether that objects "exist" without any subject or because of the "existence" of the perceiving subject, so that objects don't "exist". I am speaking about the subject/object dualism. Is subjectivity or objectivity that what we call "reality" or is it both, so that there is no solution for the subject/object dualism?

[Mithus]

Still I would like to have an example for s.th. what you believe that exists but doesn't affect you or anything at all. I can not think this way.

[Arminius]

Still I would like to have an example for s.th. what you believe that exist but doesn't affect you or anything at all, because I cannot think this way.

If you think that all around you - everything except you - merely "exists" because of the fact that you are perceiving and thinking, then you can also say that there is nothing that "exists" except you, so you are either merely a subject without any object or both subject and object (or even: there is no subject and no object - because there is no difference between them).

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz once asked:

    "Warum ist überhaupt Seiendes und nicht vielmehr Nichts?"
("Why is there anything [being] at all rather than nothing[ness]?")
("Seiendes" is derived from "sein" ["to be"] and means an identical mode of "being".)

Do you know the answer?

Or think about the Indian culture/civilisation - the so called "Hinduism" (b.t.w.: I think it is more than merely „Hinduism“) - and its concept of "nirvana". Do you exactly know what is meant by that? Non-Indian and Indian people have a different understanding of "nirvana". Is it nothingness, nonentity? (That is the way how Western people understand "nirvana".) What is it?

Are "affectance" and nothingness perhaps the same? And if so: why? Just because we are able to think the nothingness? Or is the reverse true?

If there is nothing, then there is also no "affectance". If there is no "affectance", then there is nothing. The former is true! But is the latter also true?

And do you always think that there is "affectance" everywhere and nothing else? Do you really always think that?

What do you think when you are anxious and don't know the reason - the cause - for that fact? What or who "affects" you then? Is it the nothingness? And if so, then the nothingness also "affects", but is it then really nothingness?

We can think the nothingness and the difference between subject and object. Is this difference the nothingness? Or is it even the "affectance"? Or both? Are they the same (see above) or at least similar? If so, then we can't know anything of them because it is the definition - the linguistic convention or the lingusitic laws - of the word "nothing" to be nothing at all, and the noun for that is "nothingness".

You can't just brush aside our ability for thinking the nothingness and the subject/object dualism.

So James' "RM:AO" has an objective character; the terms "rational metaphysics" and "affectance ontology" claim to be objective, and they are objective. But what about James himself? Is he a part of that objective issue? Is he not present when he argues objectively? And what about the nothingness?

[James S Saint]

Can you think of anything that you believe to exist and yet also believe has absolutely no affect upon anything?

Yes, I can think in that way. The "potential to affect something" and the fact to "be seen, touched, smelled, or detected in some way even if not already detected" are perhaps not the same thing

Can you give an example of something that exists, yet has absolutely no affect on anything? Name something for me.

or, if they are the same thing, perceived differently because there are - for example - different observers, and there is the problem of the subject/object dualism.

So do you believe that a box only exists when it is being observed? Or that its actual size depends on what someone thought its size was? And if they change their mind, the box changes its size?

You are saying that existence is that which has affect. But do all people really use the words "exist" and "existence" as you use them?

Firstly, it doesn't really matter what ALL people do, but in my experience, I have never found anyone who, after being questioned, can name anything that they believe exists, and yet also believe that same thing has absolutely no affect.

A "declared definition" means that in this ontology (RM:AO), the word is going to mean what it is defined as. Other people can use that same word in many other ways. But in RM:AO, any time the word "exist" is used, it means "having affect".

And if so, what or who ist the one which or who affects what or whom?

What or who is the first one?

Those are another subject. Which came first and which affects which, are separate details from the issue of what it means to exist within the ontology.

Does a "affectless affect" exist?

By definition, "Affectless affect" is an oxymoron. So no, an "affectless affect" could not exist any more than a "square circle".

Is this so called "affectless affect" similar to the so called "unmoved mover"?

No. An unmoved mover would be something that never moved, but moved something else. An "affectless affect" would be an affect that had no affect. If it had no affect, then it wouldn't be an affect.

Or are you meaning to ask if there is an "unaffected affect"? That would be a different question but again, is a separate issue from what it means to exist.

Different cultures/civilisations interpret or even construe the reality in a different way than other cultures/civilisations.

I'm not concerned with what "other cultures" might do. They might do anything.

Does nothingness or nonentity have any affect?

No. "Absolute nothingness" is the "lack of affect".

What about the "nirvana"? What do you think about the "nirvana"? And probably in contrast: what does Zinnat think about the "nirvana"? What do you think about Zinnat's thinking about the "nirvana"? .... And so on ....

???
I don't know how many worms are in Zinnat's apple.
Do I have reason to care?

[James S Saint]

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz once asked:

    "Warum ist überhaupt Seiendes und nicht vielmehr Nichts?"
("Why is there anything [being] at all rather than nothing[ness]?")
("Seiendes" is derived from "sein" ["to be"] and means an identical mode of "being".)

Do you know the answer?

Yes.
It is mathematically impossible for absolute zero affect to be a state or condition at any time, in any place.

Or think about the Indian culture/civilisation - the so called "Hinduism" (b.t.w.: I think it is more than merely „Hinduism“) - and its concept of "nirvana". Do you exactly know what is meant by that? Non-Indian and Indian people have a different understanding of "nirvana". Is it nothingness, nonentity? (That is the way how Western people understand "nirvana".) What is it?

Irrelevant.

Are "affectance" and nothingness perhaps the same?

They are exact opposite. Affectance is the lack of nothingness and Nothingness is the lack of affectance.

And do you always think that there is "affectance" everywhere and nothing else? Do you really always think that?

I don't just "think that", I know that to be incontestable.

But realize that I am talking about one ontology, RM:AO. Many forms of affectance can come together and be named as entities, such as a particle or an atom. But that doesn't change the fact that they are still merely a clumps of affectance. Literally everything, including the "vacuum" of space is made of affectance.

What do you think when you are anxious and don't know the reason - the cause - for that fact? What or who "affects" you then? Is it the nothingness? And if so, then the nothingness also "affects", but is it then really nothingness?

The thought of nothingness, is not nothingness.
The feeling of something missing, is not the feel of nothing, but rather the lack of the feel of something.
And the lack of a touch, is not the touch of a lack.

We can think the nothingness and the difference between subject and object. Is this difference the nothingness? Or is it even the "affectance"? Or both? Are they the same (see above) or at least similar?

I don't understand what is being asked.

You can't just brush aside our ability for thinking the nothingness and the subject/object dualism.

Well, I certainly "can". But the question is whether I really have to. So far, I'm not seeing those as relevant to anything - yet.

So James' "RM:AO" has an objective character; the terms "rational metaphysics" and "affectance ontology" claim to be objective, and they are objective. But what about James himself? Is he a part of that objective issue? Is he not present when he argues objectively? And what about the nothingness?

Again, what is the relevance? Define "objective" and you have your answer.
RM:AO doesn't bother with declaring "objective" versus "subjective". It's not relevant until someone gets confused. And frankly, it is a bit like asking if "RM:AO is red, blue, or is it colorless? And if it is colorless, how can we see it or know that it exists?"

[Arminius]

Can you give an example of something that exists, yet has absolutely no affect on anything? Name something for me.

Yes I can, provided that you agree to my thesis that our thoughts exist and especially the nothingness exists as well - exists without "having affect" of course ( ) -, but I know that you don't agree to that thesis because you are saying that "exist" means "having affect", so that "existence" is "affectance". Would you agree to the thesis, that other people don't agree to your definition of "existence" as "affectance"?

Nothingness has no affect, else it would be no nothingness. And if nothingness were no nothingness, then we would have to find another word for nothingness, and we soon would have find one because we can think nothingness. Nothingness has no affect, but exists, at least in our thoughts, and our thoughts exist as well. That all depends on the definition, so your definition has to be a different one - and is a different one (I know) -, but if your definition is right, then you have to exclude nothingness from your definition of "existence".

So do you believe that a box only exists when it is being observed?

I don't believe that but I also don't deny that it is possible. If someone believes that, I would not say that it is absolutely wrong to believe that. Remember that we are philophising, and the philosophy has not resolved the problem of the subject/object dualism. The science can't resolve it anyway, and I think the philosophy probably neither.

Don't get me wrong because I don't think that your ontology is false, but you have to admit that it depends on your definition of "existence".

A "declared definition" means that in this ontology (RM:AO), the word is going to mean what it is defined as. Other people can use that same word in many other ways. But in RM:AO, any time the word "exist" is used, it means "having affect".

Yes, as I said.

Which came first and which affects which, are separate details from the issue of what it means to exist within the ontology.

Does God exist? Does the unmoved mover exist? Does the unaffected affect exist?

"Absolute nothingness" is the "lack of affect".

It is possible that the nothingness is God, or the unmoved mover, or the unaffected affect!

[Mithus]

Can you really think of nothingness? Even the thought of nothingness requires an imagination of nothingness. Is it black, bright, colourless? Doesn't it have to be limited by "something". Can you have a thought without an imagination how it looks, smells, tastes, feels...? And as soon as you have an imagination, it affects you, it is not nothing anymore. Nothingness is just a word.
Could I have another example?

[James S Saint]

Can you give an example of something that exists, yet has absolutely no affect on anything? Name something for me.

Yes I can, provided that you agree to my thesis that our thoughts exist and especially the nothingness exists as well - exists without "having affect" of course ( ) -, but I know that you don't agree to that thesis because you are saying that "exist" means "having affect", so that "existence" is "affectance". Would you agree to the thesis, that other people don't agree to your definition of "existence" as "affectance"?

I am sure that someone could be found who would argue with literally anything I said. What does that have to do with anything?

I agree that thoughts exist (and thoughts have affect). I already explained that by definition, nothingness does not exist. And has nothing to do with whether existence is affectance. The word "nothingness" already means "non-existence".

Nothingness has no affect, but exists,

No. It doesn't exist.

at least in our thoughts, and our thoughts exist as well.

One can have a thought of a unicorn. That doesn't mean that the unicorn exists, but rather merely the thought of it. Something doesn't have to exist in order for someone to think about it.

if your definition is right, then you have to exclude nothingness from your definition of "existence".

Yes, I had already done that.

So do you believe that a box only exists when it is being observed?

I don't believe that but I also don't deny that it is possible.

In other words, you don't know whether it is true or not. This is an issue of the ontology called "Solipsism", not RM:AO.

If someone believes that, I would not say that it is absolutely wrong to believe that. Remember that we are philophising, and the philosophy has not resolved the problem of the subject/object dualism. The science can't resolve it anyway, and I think the philosophy probably neither.

Don't get me wrong because I don't think that your ontology is false, but you have to admit that it depends on your definition of "existence".

Every understanding (ontology) depends on its definition of existence. You can't have an ontology without its definition of existence. It wouldn't be an ontology without one.

And there can be many ontologies with different definitions of existence yet all of them be equally valid and true. RM:AO sets its definition for existence as "that which has affect". Other ontologies can define "existence" in other ways. That isn't an issue.

Does God exist? Does the unmoved mover exist? Does the unaffected affect exist?

Define "God".
The "unmoved mover" is a Situation that does not change yet causes change. Specifically, it is the situation of an affect attempting to reach infinity. Or it can be said to the a Fact, specifically, the fact that infinity cannot be reached. In either case, situation or fact, the propagation of an affect changes because of it.

This is where Plato's "divine" meets the "mortal", or the conceptual meets the physical. A fact is a concept which has no physical existence. For a fact to be the cause of anything, an instance of the fact must occur or form and that is when it becomes a situation. And because of the situation involving the fact, physical changes occur, affects take place. Thus it is said that the fact "causes" physical change. But it is a language issue because in reality it isn't the fact itself, the concept, but the instance of the fact occurring in physical form (a situation) that has the affect. That issue has caused a lot of confusion in the past, but it is merely a language issue.

"Absolute nothingness" is the "lack of affect".

It is possible that the nothingness is God, or the unmoved mover, or the unaffected affect!

No. Or not unless you have a strange definition for "God". Since "God" is defined as the creator (and thus Affecter) of physical existence, God cannot be "Nothingness". Nothingness does not cause anything, or it wouldn't be nothingness. God is a Primary Principle (or "fact") said to be the cause of all other facts and physical reality, "The First Cause" (meaning the most primary cause).

[Arminius]

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz once asked:

    "Warum ist überhaupt Seiendes und nicht vielmehr Nichts?"
("Why is there anything [being] at all rather than nothing[ness]?")
("Seiendes" is derived from "sein" ["to be"] and means an identical mode of "being".)

Do you know the answer?

Yes.
It is mathematically impossible for absolute zero affect to be a state or condition at any time, in any place.

The question was not meant mathematically. Leibniz, the founder of the infinitesimal calculus and e.g. of the first calculating machine, was one of the greatest mathematician (the greatest: Carl Friedrich Gauß ), technician, and philosopher, so his question was not meant mathematically, but philospophically, theologically.

Are "affectance" and nothingness perhaps the same?

They are exact opposite. Affectance is the lack of nothingness and Nothingness is the lack of affectance.

James, I know your "RM:AO", thus I also know that according to RM:AO "affectance" and nothingness are exact the opposite. So my questions are not always questions of understanding "RM:AO".

The thought of nothingness, is not nothingness.

I never said that the thought of nothingness is nothingness.

We can think the nothingness and the difference between subject and object. Is this difference the nothingness? Or is it even the "affectance"? Or both? Are they the same (see above) or at least similar?

I don't understand what is being asked.

There is an unknown or undefined difference and there is an unknown or undefined nothingness. If we don't know much about the difference and about the nothimgness, then one can ask whether they are the same or not.

So James' "RM:AO" has an objective character; the terms "rational metaphysics" and "affectance ontology" claim to be objective, and they are objective. But what about James himself? Is he a part of that objective issue? Is he not present when he argues objectively? And what about the nothingness?

Again, what is the relevance? Define "objective" and you have your answer.
RM:AO doesn't bother with declaring "objective" versus "subjective". It's not relevant until someone gets confused. And frankly, it is a bit like asking if "RM:AO is red, blue, or is it colorless? And if it is colorless, how can we see it or know that it exists?"

No. You and your ontology are not the same. In any case defining "objective" is not enough.

[Arminius]

Can you really think of nothingness? Even the thought of nothingness requires an imagination of nothingness. Is it black, bright, colourless? Doesn't it have to be limited by "something". Can you have a thought without an imagination how it looks, smells, tastes, feels...? And as soon as you have an imagination, it affects you, it is not nothing anymore. Nothingness is just a word.
Could I have another example?

Nothingness is not just a word. What about God? Is he just a word? What about something like an unmoved mover or an unaffected affect?

Even if "RM:AO" would be able to explain everything objectively, remains a rest.

[Arminius]

Nothingness has no affect, but exists,

No. It doesn't exist.

Does God exist? Does the unmoved mover exist? Does an unaffected affect exist?

This is an issue of the ontology called "Solipsism", not RM:AO.

Yes, and ...?

Every understanding (ontology) depends on its definition of existence. You can't have an ontology without its definition of existence. It wouldn't be an ontology without one.

That was not what I was saying. I was saying that YOUR ontology depends on YOUR definition of "existence". The accent is on the word "your".

Define "God".
The "unmoved mover" is a Situation that does not change yet causes change. Specifically, it is the situation of an affect attempting to reach infinity. Or it can be said to the a Fact, specifically, the fact that infinity cannot be reached. In either case, situation or fact, the propagation of an affect changes because of it.

God is the first cause, the primary cause, the cause of all reality, of all existence.

The unmoved mover causes change.

[James S Saint]

The question was not meant mathematically. Leibniz, the founder of the infinitesimal calculus and e.g. of the first calculating machine, was one of the greatest mathematician (the greatest: Carl Friedrich Gauß ), technician, and philosopher, so his question was not meant mathematically, but philospophically, theologically.

Philosophy is about reasoning. Reasoning is about logic. When logic is applied to quantities, it is called "mathematics". Since the question was one of quantity, I'm sure Leibniz knew it as a question of mathematics.

What he didn't know was how it is that logic leads to substance. It appears that no one during that era could understand that issue. RM:AO explains it.

James, I know your "RM:AO", thus I also know that according to RM:AO "affectance" and nothingness are exact the opposite. So my questions are not always questions of understanding "RM:AO".

You don't need RM:AO to know that affectance is the opposite of nothingness, or perhaps better said as "the lack of nothingness".

There is an unknown or undefined difference and there is an unknown or undefined nothingness. If we don't know much about the difference and about the nothimgness, then one can ask whether they are the same or not.

???
But we DO know much about the difference and the nothingness.

So James' "RM:AO" has an objective character; the terms "rational metaphysics" and "affectance ontology" claim to be objective, and they are objective. But what about James himself? Is he a part of that objective issue? Is he not present when he argues objectively? And what about the nothingness?

Again, what is the relevance? Define "objective" and you have your answer.
RM:AO doesn't bother with declaring "objective" versus "subjective". It's not relevant until someone gets confused. And frankly, it is a bit like asking if "RM:AO is red, blue, or is it colorless? And if it is colorless, how can we see it or know that it exists?"

No. You and your ontology are not the same. In any case defining "objective" is not enough.

I believe that by defining "objective" the answer is obvious.

objective (əbˈdʒɛktɪv)
adj
1. (Philosophy) existing independently of perception or an individual's conceptions:

Does God exist? Does the unmoved mover exist? Does an unaffected affect exist?

I thought that I already explained that;

The "unmoved mover" is a Situation that does not change yet causes change. Specifically, it is the situation of an affect attempting to reach infinity. Or it can be said to the a Fact, specifically, the fact that infinity cannot be reached. In either case, situation or fact, the propagation of an affect changes because of it.

This is an issue of the ontology called "Solipsism", not RM:AO.

Yes, and ...?

And solipsism is a pointless (irrational) ontology, not to mention incomplete. In solipsism, everything is within the mind, but it doesn't explain what the mind is in, nor even what a mind is. By explaining either of those, the notion that everything is within the mind is dissolved.

Every understanding (ontology) depends on its definition of existence. You can't have an ontology without its definition of existence. It wouldn't be an ontology without one.

That was not what I was saying. I was saying that YOUR ontology depends on YOUR definition of "existence". The accent is on the word "your".

???
Did you have a better definition?
I don't understand why you are making the statements.

[Mithus]

@ Arminius


"NOTHINGNESS"

Farlex Free Dictionary: „The condition or quality of being nothing; nonexistence.“

Merriam-Webster: „The quality or state of being nothing,as
a) NONEXISTENCE
b) utter insignificance
c) Death

Oxford Dictionary: " The absence or cessation of life or existence

Dictionary.com: a) the state of being nothing
b) something that is nonexistent
c) lack of being, nonexistence

[Arminius]

You don't need RM:AO to know that affectance is the opposite of nothingness, or perhaps better said as "the lack of nothingness".

Yes, I know, but I am just philosophising.

@ Arminius

"NOTHINGNESS"

Farlex Free Dictionary: „The condition or quality of being nothing; nonexistence.“

Merriam-Webster: „The quality or state of being nothing,as
a) NONEXISTENCE
b) utter insignificance
c) Death

Oxford Dictionary: " The absence or cessation of life or existence

Dictionary.com: a) the state of being nothing
b) something that is nonexistent
c) lack of being, nonexistence

That is also well known to me. But "nothingness" is a word with a various definition or concept, so it is worth to philosophise, and I am just philosophising here in this forum, which is an philosophy forum; else I would not doubt the "mainstream" meaning of - fo example - the "time arrow", the "big bang", the "inflation of the universe", or also the "nothingness".

[James S Saint]

So my question now is whether you agree that "nothingness" doesn't exist, by definition. And more importantly to me, why it could never be the state of the universe (Metaphysics is all about the "Why?" question)?