I have read Nietzsche extensively but not as deeply and intensely as I have read Kant. I have also covered quite a number of articles on Nietzsche’s critique of Kant and find most to be based on Nietzsche’s incomplete understanding of Kant’s work and philosophical ideas.
Why do you claim Kant as incoherent, or simply wrong?
Most often those who critique Kant negatively usually do have grasped and understood Kant’s Critically Philosophy fully and taking into the fine nuances therein.
As far as systemization of conceptions of knowledge and reason are concerned, I find Kant had delivered what he had offered, i.e.
In this enquiry I have made Completeness my chief aim, and I venture to assert that there is not a single metaphysical problem which has not been solved, or for the solution of which the key at least has not been supplied. Preface A Axiii.
The above is leverage on Kant’s following framework;
As Systematic Unity is what first raises ordinary Knowledge to the rank of Science, that is, makes a System out of a mere aggregate of Knowledge, architectonic is the Doctrine of the scientific in our Knowledge, and therefore Necessarily Forms part of the Doctrine of Method.
In accordance with Reason’s legislative prescriptions, our diverse Modes of Knowledge must not be permitted to be a mere rhapsody, but must Form a System. Only so can they further the essential ends of Reason.
By a System I understand the Unity of the Manifold Modes of Knowledge under one Idea.
This Idea is the Concept provided by Reason – of the Form of a Whole – in so far as the Concept determines a priori not only the scope of its Manifold content, but also the positions which the parts occupy relatively to one another.
The scientific Concept of Reason contains, therefore, the end and the Form of that Whole which is congruent with this requirement.
The Unity of the end to which all the parts relate and in the Idea of which they all stand in Relation to one another, makes it possible for us to determine from our Knowledge of the other parts whether
• any part be missing, and
• to prevent any arbitrary addition, or
• in respect of its Completeness any indeterminateness that does not conform to the Limits which are thus determined a priori.
A833 B861
The whole is thus an organised Unity (articulatio), and not an aggregate (coacervatio).
It may grow from within (per intussusceptionem), but not by External addition (per appositionem).
I noted Nietzsche’s critique of Kant is like most, based on the incomplete comprehension of Kant’s work. There is no obvious evidence [some claimed he read the 3rd CJ?] that Nietzsche even read Kant’s main books seriously and thoroughly. Most of Neitzsche’s understanding of Kant’s ideas came through his reading of Schopenhauer’s books and ideas. Schopenhauer like most also misunderstood the central core principles of Kant’s philosophy, i.e. the Thing-in-itself, and the idea of Will, Freedom therefrom.
Kant anticipated many would fall victim to an illusion and lose grip on the central core ideal of his philosophy;
They are sophistications not of men but of Pure Reason itself. Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them. After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the Illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him. B397
Schopenhauer, Fitche, Hegel and others were seduced by this transcendental illusion that Kant warned above.
When Nietzsche rejected Schopenhauer concept of Will, he in fact came within Kant’s framework and scheme. However, Nietzsche claimed the Thing-in-itself is self-contradictory is due to a misconception.
Here is one view reconciling Nietzsche Will-to-Power with the Thing-in-itself;
Abstract:
This paper investigates the argument that substantiates Nietzsche’s refusal of the Kantian concept of thing in itself. As Maudemarie Clark points out, Nietzsche dismisses this notion because he views it as self-contradictory. The main concern of the paper will be to account for this position. In particular, the two main theses defended here are (a) that the argument underlying Nietzsche’s claim is that the concept of thing in itself amounts to the inconsistent idea of a propertyless thing and (b) that this argument is a sound one. Finally, I will show that the reading proposed allows a deflationary response to the objection that Nietzsche’s will to power is simply a new version of the post-Kantian thing in itself.
academia.edu/721862/Nietzsc … _in_Itself
Kant’s ideas of the Noumenon or Thing-in-itself, Absolute Freedom, Will, God [postulated and assumed] are at first glance like ‘sitting ducks’ for many but they are very sound ideas when one clear the cobwebs to understand them with their nuances.