If it is to be something in alignment with the Kantian system it would be as follows;Arminius wrote:From another thread:Arminius wrote:Here are some examples of modern Occidental imperatives like Kant's categorical imperative and other's imperatives:
(1) "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law without contradiction."
(2) "Be revolutionary."
(3) "Trust in the absolute spirit and the dialectic processes."
(4) "Relinquish."
(5) "Be yourself."
(6) "Persevere."
(7) "Be autarkic as much as you can."
(8) "Take care of you, your relatives and dependants, your surrounding and ecolgical environment."
(9) "Participate in the discourse."
(10) "Take care of your foam, because you live in it."
....
Modern imperatives of ILP members:
....
(I) "Clarify, Verify, Instill, and Reinforce the Perception of Hopes and Threats unto Anentropic Harmony."
(II) "Do unto yourself and others as you'd do unto yourself if you were them."
(III) "The important thing is KINDNESS."
....
What do you think about that?
As with Kant I had always insisted one is not qualified to comment on Kant unless one had delved into his philosophy via his original works thoroughly.Erik_ wrote:Yo Prismatic,
What do you think of Fichte's metaphysics in comparison to Schelling's? Do you see any merit in either of their philosophies, or did they deviate from Kant in error?
If this is what Ficthe meant, then he has misunderstood Kant re thing-in-itself.First of all, he [Ficthe] argued that the very concept of a “thing in itself,” understood as a mind-independent, external “cause” of sensations, is indefensible on Critical grounds.
In this case I do not want to venture to say it is 'closed' or 'open' as that lead to an infinite regress, i.e. 'what is behind the 'closed.'Orb wrote:prismatic, regardless of whether the thing in itself is dependent or independent of human thoughts , it is closed. The distinction becomes totally irrelevant. the main thing is, that it is closed system, and it's closure is not attributable to what source the closure is to be accounted to. Predecessor philosophers may, also,have views on this, which do or do not relate to such an idea, but even within this view, such preceding views, and the degree to which, they may have been inffluential on Kant is immaterial.
Prismatic567 wrote:Another straw-man.Diekon wrote:And Prismatic, you keep stating that i misunderstand Kant and am merely using strawmen, but i am the one giving actual textual evidence for my claim.
In the end your argument only really amounts to an appeal to authority. Kant is a famous posterboy philosopher and he says he awoke from his dogmatic slumber, and went on to reconcile empirism and rationalism... so it must be true.
It's right there in his work of morals that suppositely came after he awoke from his dogmatic slumber... the moral laws themself need to be derived from pure reason, and experience has to be kept out of it.
Now how messed up is that, that when determining the rules we should live by, we shouldn't look at how the actual world operates.
If you insist you understand the Kantian Moral/Ethics system, show a simple example of how it is done and why it don't work.
Arminius wrote:Diekon wrote:Sure, but Kant apparently didn't use his understanding of the world to better decide his actions... he ended up with the categorical imperative.
I mean, if that is the actual goal of philosophy, it seems that he failed as a philosopher.
No. Not Kant as a philosopher but, if at all, the philosophy as a philosophy failed, or, in other words, Kant was the first philosopher who showed that also the philosophy can come to an end. After having its climax the philosophy became more and more redundant and at last something like a „pensioner“. It was not a coincidence that Kant was a contemporary of Mozart, Hegel a contemporary of Beethoven, and Nietzsche a contemporary of Brahms - and by the way: Sloterdijk is a contemporary of Zappa, and Ecmandu a contemporary of Eminem.
Diekon wrote:What do you mean 'both works and not derivable for the Categorical imperative'?
I mean that you or anybody else should show me any moral which both works and is not derivable from Kant's Categorical imperative.Diekon wrote:If it has to work, it better not be deduced from the CI... because that sure doesn't work.
And therefore you should show me a (for example: your) moral, if it both works and is not derivable from Kant's Categorical imperative.Diekon wrote:And no, i'm not going to show you my moral, this thread is not about me.![]()
Yes, Diekon, this thread is not about you.
I meant that you should show me a (for example: your) moral, if it both works and is not derivable from Kant's Categorical imperative.Diekon wrote:Philosophy isn't about building a system... it's about finding your way out of the system.
No, that's merely nihilistic philosophy, thus nihilism, and of that sort we have already enough. There is no way out of nihlism, if nihlism is already entered.Diekon wrote:Socrates originally questioned the Greek Gods and the arbitrary imposed morals that came with it. That's what it is about, about questioning the societal imposed norms you happen to find yourself confronted with, reëvaluating them and replacing them with your own view on how to live.
No, that's again social critcism, thus again nihilism, merely nihlistic philosophy. You have the wrong idea about philosophy.
If we all would think and act in the sense you are prefering, then in the end (consequently) there will be no philosophy anymore. Everything and anything would be sociology, nothing would be philosophy anymore. We are already on this "trip".Diekon wrote:It's first and foremost a personal endeavour.
No, because then most people would say (like you): "This thread is not about me".![]()
They would say "I want to have every and any right because I am the victim". Look at the so-called "human rights". They all begin with the word "one" or the word "everyone". Do they work? Does individualism ()extreme egoism) really work? And are they not derivable from Kant's Categorical imperative?Diekon wrote:Building universally applicable morals and metaphysical systems to found those, is something for party ideologues, priests, politicans and other people in power... who need to device ways to crowd control.
"Party ideologues, priests, politicians, and other people in power"? Like I said: social criticism and sociology, thus nihilism. I say: primarily philosophers should do it, and they should not be allowed to get money for it.
Diekon wrote:So your argument is that there is something like social criticism, and it's nihilistic ....
Diekon wrote: ... and therefor philosophy cannot be that.
Diekon wrote:You argue like Kant from definition.
Diekon wrote:You know, the root of Nihilism, is not some criticism on the societal system, but the allready present lack of belief in the societal promoted values... because the values end up being hollow. God is dead because people killed him.
Diekon wrote:The philosopher, or societal critic if you really will, merely reports that God is in fact dead. He's the doctor diagnosing society. To find a cure, it doesn't suffice to desparately try to stitch together the deceased corpse and hope that it will magically come back to live, like Kant does.
Diekon wrote:You need to dispose of it alltogether, to create space for something new...
Diekon wrote:.... The human rights don't really work, there is contradiction abound .....
Diekon wrote:Look, you are leaving out the reëvaluation part ....
Diekon wrote:I never said a philosopher should only criticize, but it will be an important part of it.
Diekon wrote:There is the sceptic deflationary part and also the constructive positing of his own values.
Diekon wrote:You (the philosopher, not you specifically!) cannot build on unsolid ground to good result. The philosopher is the doctor diagnosing... and looking for a cure.
Diekon wrote:The god is dead reference is of course a reference to Nietzsche... and i don't see the problem as he didn't say he died at that exact moment, he was allready dead (for a while), people just hadn't got the memo yet.
Diekon wrote:I don't agree with your characterisation of non-philosophy and philosophy.
Diekon wrote:Criticism is intrinsically tied into philosophy, it's not non-philosophy.
Diekon wrote:I don't think you can get good philosophy without it. If it were that simple you could just build whatever arbitrary thing and call it philosophy.
Diekon wrote:Influence isn't the only, or even the most important, criterium for a good philosopher. A good philosopher has both aspects, he reëvaluates which implies a certain scepsis and a creative act.
Diekon wrote:And some got the memo, but most didn't.
Diekon wrote:Kant for example didn't really get the memo, nor did the whole tradition that followed him.
Diekon wrote:And if they did get the memo, they certainly didn't fully realise all the ramification of it.
Diekon wrote:Nietzsche was the first to do that... to do philosophy without metaphysics.
Arminius wrote:Diekon wrote:Influence isn't the only, or even the most important, criterium for a good philosopher. A good philosopher has both aspects, he reëvaluates which implies a certain scepsis and a creative act.
Did I say that a philosopher has nothing to do with reevaluation or skepsis? No. I did not.
Be honest: you do not want Kant to be the greatest philosopher.
Not your or anybody else's "opinion" but the history itself decides about the greatness of a philosopher. You do not accept historical facts. That's all.
alyoshka wrote:Sauwelios wrote:It does not matter what he [in this case Jesus] was to others.
Then you have a very simple sense of value. Where do you see value in life? Is the value of your life the value YOU assign it? If so, who wouldn't value their own life beyond measure? Even the most deplorable would do so... TRUE value, or the only meaningful value, is the value OTHERS assign your life.
This is obviously(?) completely un-Nietzschean. I'm immediately reminded of a passage that supports my position:The best example of the degree to which a plebeian agitator of the mob is incapable of comprehending the concept "higher nature" is provided by Buckle. The view he combats so passionately---that "great men," individuals, princes, statesmen, geniuses, generals are the levers and causes of all great movements---is instinctively misunderstood by him, as if it meant that what is essential and valuable in such "higher men" were their capacity for setting masses in motion: in short, their effect.
But the "higher nature" of the great man lies in being different, in incommunicability, in distance of rank, not in an effect of any kind---even if he made the whole globe tremble.
[WP 876, entire.]
Note that the editor and translator of the English translation, Walter Kaufmann, adds the following footnote to this passage as a whole:The misunderstanding attacked here is widespread among those who have attempted popular expositions of Nietzsche. Again and again, the view he castigates has been attributed to him.
By the way, it works both ways: men who "make the whole globe tremble" do not have to be great men:The founder of a religion can be insignificant---a match, no more!
[WP 178, entire.]
Who do you think Nietzsche is referring to here? But there cannot be any doubt:Consider with what degree of freedom Paul treats, indeed almost juggles with, the problem of the person of Jesus: someone who died, who was seen again after his death, who was delivered over to death by the Jews--- A mere "motif": he then wrote the music to it--- A zero in the beginning.
[WP 177.]
So far Nietzsche's position in regard to the value of human beings. Or wait---that reminds me:[E]very human being, with his total activity, only has dignity in so far as he is a tool of the genius, consciously or unconsciously; from this we may immediately deduce the ethical conclusion, that "man in himself," the absolute man possesses neither dignity, nor rights, nor duties[.]
[Nietzsche, The Greek State.]
Okay, so far Nietzsche's position etc. I subscribe to his position, but I want to provide my own argument against yours. You say:TRUE value, or the only meaningful value, is the value OTHERS assign your life.
If that goes for all men, the only meaningful value a man has is that assigned to him by other men. But those other men are then also worthless in themselves. So you're saying the assignment of value to one another by inherently worthless beings is somehow capable of making them all worthful, i.e., valuable. This is irrational, of course.
No, we cannot do without a being who has value in and of himself. "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?" Is a human being assigned value by others because he is inherently valuable, or is he valuable because he is assigned value by others? Either the one assigned value must be valuable in himself, or those who assign value to him must be valuable in themselves. [http://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopic.php?p=2079122#p2079122]
Diekon wrote:Nietzsche was the first to do that... to do philosophy without metaphysics.
And already about 20 years after his death metaphysics returned (was it because of the eternal recurrence? :wink: ).
Isn't that a fair request?Diekon wrote:Prismatic567 wrote:Another straw-man.
If you insist you understand the Kantian Moral/Ethics system, show a simple example of how it is done and why it don't work.
This is fast becoming pointless if you going yell strawman every time.
Did any other philosophers provide an actual argument for their moral/ethical system?To restate, my basic problem with the CI is that Kant doesn't present an actual argument for it. It pretty much all follows from definition. "A moral law is a law, and therefore needs to be universal and derived from reason only, etc..." If you don't buy into his metaphysical jumbling with mere definitions of words, there is no reason to accept any of it. Why use the CI, and not - to give but one example - Nietzsche's twist on it in the eternal recurrence?
This is what I meant, another straw man again because you have not a thorough knowledge of how Kant moral/ethical system works.As for practical concerns for why the CI doesn't work, or at least is of no real use, I think the Artful Pauper did a pretty good job. The CI just doesn't say alot. If you come up with some maxim (like killing is not permissible), you immediately need to amend it with a host of exception for it to have any use in the real world. The real content comes from experience with real world situations. And it's not like we can't come up with some general principle without using the CI.
I have given you the reason for the CI, i.e. it is an ideal benchmark for humanity to strive towards. Of course the ideal is not expected to be achieved at all times, but such a benchmark is a 'push factor' to enable continuous improvement at every optimal point.So in the end I'm stuck with the same question and no real answer : why the CI?
Which one?Sauwelios wrote:Prismatic, when will you reply to The Artful Pauper's last reply to you, in which I think he raised all the pertinent questions begged by your last reply to me?
Prismatic567 wrote:Which one?Sauwelios wrote:Prismatic, when will you reply to The Artful Pauper's last reply to you, in which I think he raised all the pertinent questions begged by your last reply to me?
Prismatic567 wrote:Did any other philosophers provide an actual argument for their moral/ethical system?
What Kant did was he provided sound and reasonable justifications from various angles to support his moral/ethical system with the CI therein.
This is what I meant, another straw man again because you have not a thorough knowledge of how Kant moral/ethical system works.
I have stated many times, Kant moral/ethical system comprised theory and its use in the real world. So why is the complain about adapting the CI to the real world.
I have already given a lot of draft examples on how Kant moral/ethical system works but you did not seem to understand nor did not read them.
Note, earlier I listed this draft process of how the Kantian system would work, i.e.
viewtopic.php?p=2530896#p2530896
A. The Categorical Imperative
Formulation (1) "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law without contradiction."
Formulation (2) - (5) to note.
............................................................
Do you have any issue with the above?
I have given you the reason for the CI, i.e. it is an ideal benchmark for humanity to strive towards. Of course the ideal is not expected to be achieved at all times, but such a benchmark is a 'push factor' to enable continuous improvement at every optimal point.So in the end I'm stuck with the same question and no real answer : why the CI?
The other reason why the CI is necessary because the CI as a guide is based on reason which is more preferable than any thing that is based primarily on emotions and subjective feelings, e.g. utilitarianism and consequentialism ethical system.
For any actions, there must be a good "reason." However in general a 'good' reason influenced by psychological feelings in not good enough. As such we have to rely on the best or highest possible reason, i.e. pure reason.
Note the other formulations of the CI assume all normal human beings within the ethical community [Kingdom of Ends] are perfect individuals who collectively formulate the necessary Law, rules and maxim acting on the basis of absolute freewill. Btw, I am not interested to discuss these more complicated elements till you are really familiar and understand [not necessary agree] them.
Sauwelios wrote:Arminius wrote:Did I say that a philosopher has nothing to do with reevaluation or skepsis? No. I did not.
Be honest: you do not want Kant to be the greatest philosopher.
Yes and no.
Sauwelios wrote: Yes, that goes for all of us: I want Nietzsche to be the greatest philosopher, and you want Kant to be the greatest philosopher.
Sauwelios wrote:But because Nietzsche would, in sharp contrast with Kant, actually affirm this, he is the greatest philosopher.
Prismatic567 wrote: Willed as a Universal Law meant it is applicable to all normal rational person. In principle [note principle] if all [universally] normal rational person applies this [permitted to kill others], then it will lead to the eventual extinction of the human species after the last person is dead.
The Artful Pauper wrote:You repeat this without demonstration. I have already shown above it is incorrect. See below:
Prismatic567 wrote:Your examples are not applicable as you are conflating 'Ought' with "IS." What is needed is a reconciliation of 'ought' with "is" not a conflation of them.
As I mentioned, in principle, if killing is permissible to all people, then, the final result is the extinction of the human specie.
In contrast, if killing is not permissible, then there is no threat to the human specie as a far as 'killing' is concerned.
What I am saying is that in the way you have formulated the imperative about killing, there is no ought involved (which is not to conflate ought and is).
You say, if "killing is permissible" is willed by people it will result in the extinction of humanity.
I am saying, in the context of the example you gave, the imperative "killing is permissible" does not imply an ought.
To bring ought into this context would mean framing the imperative as "you should kill". But even that does not imply that one will kill, so in that case I would not be conflating ought and is either, I would be separating them.
The only way for an imperative to necessitate killing (melding the ought of an imperative with an is) would be if it was phrased as something like "Kill" in the sense of a demand, which was then willed as an imperative.
What I had said (which it seems kind of strange to restate it because I thought it was clear) is that, just because it to be permissible does not mean that it is necessary.
So, the imperative that it is permissible to kill does not necessitate the result that people will kill each other. Which is separating the is from the ought, not conflating them.
Saying that killing is permissible is equivalent to saying "You can kill", can is different than ought (should), and will.
I can kill this person — I should kill this person — I will kill this person.
I am separating them. On the contrary, I would assert that you are conflating can and will (They can kill each other with they will kill each other).
Prismatic567 wrote:For example, there is a perfect triangle within Pure Geometry in theory and measurements but there will not be any perfect triangle in empirical reality.
Similarly, we can postulate and assume ideal and perfect absolute moral principles, i.e. the Categorical Imperative, but we do not expect the CI to exist in empirical reality.
You seem to be implying here that the categorical imperative is for use as some kind of measuring or gauging tool, but I don't think these two are comparable in a useful sense.
The application of the concept of triangles in empirical situations is based off other criteria than the model of equilateral triangles. If an equilateral triangle was necessary by application it would be determined in the context of the situation, not by the foreknowledge of its existence as an imperative to use equilateral triangles.
In this sense I question the usefulness of the categorical imperative. You say:
Prismatic567 wrote:To reconcile and align actual practice with the CI we need to introduce Maxims that are aligned as near as possible to the CI.
We may start the maxim with 'No killing is permissible.'
But we know this is not realistic in practice.
So we add a provision to the Maxim with a Law,
'Killing is permissible only with the following exceptions'
It is then up to the judiciary to deal with such exceptions.
and by saying so you mean that we address the empirical reality with reasoning (which in your statement above would be done by whichever parties would formulate exceptions and by the judiciary). If the categorical imperatives are just to be put aside as empirical reality approaches, there is no real reason for creating them in the first place. All one would really need is a goal or conclusion in order to examine the situation and decide on the best course of action to reach that goal or conclusion, and the categorical imperative can be done away with entirely. But it is first up to reason to decide what constitutes a worthwhile goal and consider whether diverse held goals contradict each other.
Prismatic567 wrote:The positive direction is the setting of the CI establish a fixed goal post to modulate and improve on actual ethical conditions.
When the Maxim is 'No killing is permissible, ' i.e. Zero,
then there is a benchmark for the executive to manage the variance between zero and the actual number of killings.
Say, the number of actual killings is 100,000 in 2015.
We will analyze the root cause of these killing and find preventive measure to reduce the number to as close as possible to the [quite] impossible ought of zero.
Here you say something similar to what I've said above, in terms of setting a goal, but what I am saying is that the categorical imperative is not needed for what you have set as your conclusion to the process:
"We will analyze the root cause of these killing and find preventive measure to reduce the number to as close as possible to the [quite] impossible ought of zero."
This is an argument for the analytic process, and my argument is also for the analytic process which is used to decide goals (the what and the why) and figure out how the goals can be achieved in empirical situations. The categorical imperative seems like an extra addition without real use, because the goal has already been set by which the outcome (and by relation to the outcome the modes of action) is measured.
What I am taking issue with is the assertion that there should be some need to create a categorical imperative, which we immediately disregard based on "empirical reality", why not just skip the categorical imperative and simply use the critical and analytic faculties (which to my mind are going to be determined by irrational desires) to decide on a goal, analyze the empirical factors to generate solutions, then measure the solutions based by weighing the outcome against the goal, with consideration of empirical factors?
Prismatic567 wrote: Applying the principle of the CI, genocide will lead to eventual human extinction. The CI will stand as a moral principle regardless. Thus the initial maxim is,
No genocide is permissible.
Theoretical: IF [big IF] genocide really necessary, the judiciary will then implement laws to cater for exception where genocide is necessary. In reality I don't think such a provision for genocide will ever be considered. Within the taxonomy of evil, genocide will be categorized as one of those with the highest degree of evil and obviously no compromise will be allowed.
My argument against this is the same as what I have given above against the categorical imperative, which is that if by some human reasoning we would forego the conclusions of the imperative, there is no reason for the imperative to begin with but only for the critical and analytical faculties be applied to empirical circumstances to accomplish an (analytically) chosen goal.
Prismatic567 wrote:Re why the preservation of the specie is good, I have explained in my earlier post. It is like asking why breathing is good, i.e. a critical universal necessity. The test of whether something is good can be done by putting it through Formula 1 of the CI. If it lead to the extinction of the specie, then, it is not good. In other cases, the test is that of general reciprocity.
Btw, the formulation of the CI assume humans are normal rational people and thus exclude people who are mentally sick.
Breathing is a critical necessity for survival, but should we not subject even survival to rational inquiry to understand if and how survival is good?
I would personally maintain that humans are not at the base rational creatures, we are driven by irrational desires and subject to our instincts (survival being one of them). In this sense we can say "I desire life", but it does not follow that because we desire a thing it is good, else by the same reasoning whatever someone desired would be good which I think can be proven false by the fact that some of our desires contradict our own and those of others.
Also, what is a "normal" person? What criteria are you basing that on, is it on something like a majority of the population? If that is the case, if the majority of the population desired genocide or even human's extinction, would that then be normal? If not, could you please describe for me what criteria you are basing the classification "normal" on.
Prismatic567 wrote:Note the Law of Non-Contradiction imply same time and same sense.
There is no contradiction in my case as it involves two different senses, i.e.
1. the transcendental pure reason and
2. the empirical
I explained we can strive for perfect ideals [via pure reason] as merely a guide but such ideals are not achievable in empirical reality.
So now I have above posed a new question, which is, what is the need of what you call "transcendental pure reason" if we can deal analytically with empirical reality?
And I will add two more:
Where do the concepts that inform and compose the judgements of transcendental pure reason come from? (concepts such as normal, good, etc.)?
and,
How can we be sure that the concepts we are using in transcendent rational thought reflect the reality of the world around us in such a way as to make them useful?
Prismatic567 wrote: When an action/thought is in alignment with the categorical imperative, it is considered good.
If an action/thought is in misalignment with the categorical imperative [it is considered not so good or bad], it impinges on the survival of the individual, the preservation of the human specie and the progress and well-being of humanity. Note there are degrees [1 -99.99%] of 'good' and 'evil.'
I don't think this follows. You say that the categorical imperative is put aside in empirical situations and when laws and maxims need to take their place, and presumably the categorical imperative is put aside for the sake of decisions (from a judiciary for example) because they could correct inflexibility of the categorical imperative in such occassions when survival is endangered and the categorical imperative does not cover the situation.
In that case (of overriding the categorical imperative) the reason would presumably for survival or some "greater good" (than would be served by following it). But if this is the case then what is good is not determined by its adherance to the imperative as you imply but by some other reason which determines when it is permissible to deviate from it.
Besides this, we still haven't answered what is good? and why is it good?
Prismatic567 wrote:
The Artful Pauper wrote: Without a reason why "all rational individuals should strive to act in accordance with the above CI", what you are stating is mere dogmatism, one would be obligated to act in accordance with the imperative merely because someone (in this case Kant) says so.
In general, when one is a member of a NBA team, being professional one will strive to perform optimally in alignment with the rest of the team member and the team's mission [team CI and goals], not because the coach said so.
The example of the NBA team implies that the individuals who make up the team have voluntarily chosen to enter the team and strive for its collective goal, whereas the categorical imperative makes general statements about how one should live.
An imperative such as "One should not kill" may not be in the interest of a particular individual who could benefit from killing, so when I asked for a reason why one should comply with the categorical imperative what I was looking for was a reason why an individual, for example, should not give the appearance that he is innocent to his peers (to escape their condemnation) while secretly committing murder, provided he was certain he could get away with it?
Prismatic567 wrote:In the case of Kant, it is not because Kant said so. Kant merely highlighted the natural moral impulse within the individual and humanity and presented it very systematically. It is up to the rational and complete individual to understand the principles involved and strive to rewire his/her brain [this is the critical phase we need to consider now into the future] to align with the CI optimally.
Okay, so you are making a statement here about human nature and asserting that it is moral. I am wondering how you explain 'immorality' and in particular 'immorality' in successful individuals?
And, by what measure do you determine with certainty that humanity is moving toward a state of increased morality? Another empirical example I can bring up is practices of torture used by the US in Guantanamo. The US has had a recent history (so far as the public knows anyway) of not using torture but yet readopted this practice that, if I am not incorrect, your analysis would view as outmoded. So do you see a reason why there would be a reversion to such behaviour, if the moral instinct as you have described it is inbuilt in the human species?
It is your discretion not to accept Kant's moral and ethical views.Diekon wrote:Yeah, i mean i have an issue with the CI, and i don't think i can follow him further if i don't accept that. I think if we were to determine moral laws, we shouldn't start with the CI.
...
Reason by itself is empty, and doesn't tell us much on it's own (I probably disagree with Kant's metaphysics here)... don't you think it's strange to start from there?
Users browsing this forum: Google [Bot]