For what itâs worth, hereâs what I had before I changed my mind and wrote what I wrote.
::
In Jamesâs thread, I quoted part of the following passage (which I myself wrote):
[size=95]Nietzsche does of course not says âBeing is willing to powerâ, but âlife is will to powerâ or âLiving is will to powerâ (Leben ist Wille zur Macht). However, he also says we have no other concept of Being than as Living. And a will is a Willing. Thus: Being is Willing to power. But the notion of selfhood or Being is lacking in âWilling to powerâ. It seems that only a self or a being could will. The specific notion of selfhood or Being as power is lacking, and therefore Heidegger said the doctrine of the will to power only answered the guiding question of metaphysicsâthe question what beings areâ, and not its grounding questionâthe question what Being is. Value Metaphysics (as I call it) makes this step, by not speaking of Willing power but of Willing selfhoodâWilling Being. And yes, that is a self-reference, a circularity.[/size]
It is not my aim to delimit the will to power in the sense of saying âthere is moreâ; rather, it is to expand it, by saying âit is moreâ. The âpowerâ in âwill to powerâ means much more than the narrow sense in which people usually understand it. It becomes too broad, however,âtoo general, too abstractâuntil we specify the meaning of âpowerâ. We expand the will to power, then, precisely by delimiting it.
To expand on the notion of Being as power, it may be helpful if I quote at length from Laurence Cooperâs Eros in Plato, Rousseau, and Nietzsche. There, the Nietzschean counterpart to Platonic eros is understandably the will to power; Platonic eros, however, is understood as follows:
[size=95]â[I]f philosophy isnât erotic in any ordinary sense, it is nevertheless erotic in the truest sense. For it understands that what we most deeply want, or what would most deeply satisfy us, is not immortality but experience of the eternal and infinite. That is erosâ true aim, which means that what is normally called eros is a defective version of the desire for the good based on a misapprehension of what would really satisfy us. Ordinary eros, in fact, is based on two delusions: first, that immortalityâearthly immortalityâis possible, whether through children, fame, or lasting works; second, that, if attained, it would bring comprehensive satisfaction.â (Cooper, op.cit., page 95.)[/size]
Now the second part of Cooperâs book is dedicated to eros in Rousseau, and the first section of that part (chapter 5 of the book) is titled âBetween Eros and Will to Power: Rousseau and âThe Desire to Extend Our Beingââ. In it, Cooper writes:
[size=95]âThe good, as the desirable, is fulfilling either of our deepest desire (Plato) or our highest desire (Kant, and also Plato). What, then, are our deepest and our highest desires?
Rousseau has an answer worth considering. [âŚ] Rousseau holds that there is one good, arising from one desire, that outranks all others and indeed comprehends them, in the sense that these other goods are good only to the extent that they participate in or contribute to the primary good. In this, Rousseauâs good is comparable to Platoâs good. Yet Rousseauâs good is not, in its content, presented as synonymous with Platoâs, and Rousseau does not endorse or otherwise indicate that he subscribes to the Platonic conception of eros. The kinship between his thought and Platoâs appears to be formal or structural more than substantive. Rather than suggest that there is some particular condition or state of being or content of consciousness that constitutes the good for human beings, he holds that the good exists in maximized existence, that is, felt existence, or, as he calls it, the sentiment of our being, a good whose rather formal and abstract name points to the fact that it can be gained through a number of means. Rather than suggest that we all long for or are drawn to transcendence of our finitude and mortality (which would seem to be the core meaning of eros), he seems to hold that our desire for the good, that is, our desire to exist, a desire whose name is self-love, is more a push than a pull and an intrinsically directionless, nonteleological push at that. Self-love is inherently expansive: it seeks to extend oneâs very being or selfâthough not, apparently, to any particular end.â (Cooper, op.cit., pp. 136-37.)[/size]
To say that life (or that being as life) has no end or goal/aspiration other than itself or than âexpansionâ would be a simplification and distortion, for the structure of what we call living or consciousness is rooted far beyond itself in greater and wider circles-- expansion is a sign of basically concentric and hierarchical finitizations of which âbeingsâ are partialities. But we were talking about Being.
Being can most accurately and completely be described as truth, which is to say if we want to speak of life and the âliving as beingâ (manifest being-ness, will to power) as depth. What is depth? Depth is connection and openness, unconscious or pre-conscious receding linkages through material and immaterial substances; depth is a reality as well as a sign of the underlying mechanics of method, here we have a unity of episteme and ousia.
Consciousness expresses a formal system of moving into relation to larger realities and logics, what we call expansion is grounded in one aspect or pole of this structure just as the other pole is rooted in coherence and recoherence, in resisting the expansive, dissociating impulse. Meaning circles back upon itself in consciousness and becomes the actual contents and âsubjectivityâ of a given consciousness, as âliving as beingâ, which is to say that formal structure alone cannot reveal anything about the ânature of lifeâ or of existence except to define some outer parameters beyond which our momentary reason cannot yet travel. Therefore it is a huge mistake to rest in these categories of rational (de)limitation in terms of that which to and for consciousness is pronounced as most real, substantive, meaningful, true.
Every shade of philosophy or ethics reflects one such place of temporary rest, where some such categorical configuration and series of psychologically-procured drives have been reified beyond their proper scope, thus once an intimation of this appears irresistably to us we also gain a subtler idea of a more essential âexpansivityâ as if growth, will, creation, were somehow the secret truth all along, when in reality our constitution and psychological makeup has not even yet prepared us, let alone in our highest ideas, for receiving any such âsecret truthsâ. This is of course where Nietzsche and cynical scientific modernity fall victim to the same trap, a trap that so-called postmodernity struggles to break free of. We should read the often absurd âat all costsâ associated with that struggle of the postmodern spirit as a sign of the danger and seriousness of the trap itself.
Then we are also speaking of Being itself which might be at this point most adequately described as this very pre-figuring schematism itself (and consequently beginning to be encapsulated by a Peircean approach to logic and the âmetalogicalâ), the ebb and flow of tides which momentarily coordinated configurations speak convincingly of will, freedom, strength or even beauty, good and right. Expansion defeats itself in a sufficiently greater purview in which such expansion might actually be comprehended and given a true context-- in that largeness once finally invoked expansion loses its momentum and its majesty, becoming just one more abstracted dynamism that, once we really see it clearly, plays a largely derivative role in the grand succession of things, in the more eternal bend and ideality. Life cannot comprehend itself without undoing that comprehension, hence the vast diversity of conscious forms and moments, and too this vagarity and profusion cannot be comprehended its own structure and âessenceâ without likewise un-making those very coordinations and organizations that we call life, consciousness, or truth. Being aims to draw itself as a veil around its contents, around an interiority; philosophy cannot root itself either in the structure of that beingâs drawing-itself-around nor in some kind of abstraction and generalization from beings to Being along similar routes⌠philosophy must instead go bravely into the center, into the depths and darkness, into the contents themselves and bring with it as tools all former powers of abstraction, formalism, categorical will, phenomenal passion, ethical freedom, etc. But philosophy isnât ready for that yet, not nearly there yet. So we can basically work to bring about such possibilities and transformations in the philosophical spirit, if we really want to contribute something. Or we can be human and coordinate human substances among the living and non-living, freedom and slavery as ultimate bounds for our valuation. In the absence of being required to sit oneself in the hell of philosophy, the next best thing is to seat oneself firmly in our humanity, to be human.
That is a mistranslation. The zu means âforâ, not âtoâ, and Wille is not always merely âwillâ, as you can see if you consult a good German-English dictionary. Thus, Leben ist Wille zur Macht = âLife is the desire for powerâ.
The English âwillâ can also be synonymous with âdesireâ, so you donât really have a point there.
Moreover, youâre also wrong there, as the Wille in Wille zur Macht does expressly not mean âwillâ in the sense of âdesireâ.
As for zu, that means as literally âtoâ as Wille obviously literally (etymologically) means âwillâ.
The only reason to translate it as âforâ is if the context demands it, for instance because there is as little such a thing as a âdesire toâ as a âwill forâ something.
But, to be sure, there is an even more literal possible translation than mine above: âLiving is will to mightâ.â
No. âWill toâ in English is followed only by a verb (will to win, will to fight, will to live, etc.). The âtoâ is thus not a preposition but part of the infinitive. The translation âwill to powerâ is not only incorrect, it is impossible.
Zu in German does not mean only âtoâ. For example, zum Beispiel means âfor exampleâ. Ich bin zu Berlin means âI am in Berlinâ. Er is nicht zu Hause means âhe is not at home (or in)â. To say I am going home, you say nach Hause, not zu Hause.
No, Ornello merely broke ILN 1 (I Love Nietzsche) and ILSC (I Love Social Criticism).
tab ILF (âI Love Funâ),
(2) ILG (âI Love Gossipâ),
(3) ILL (âI Love Liesâ),
(4) ILN 1 (âI love Nietzscheâ),
(5) ILN 2 (âI love Nonsenseâ),
(6) ILN 3 (âI Love Nothingâ),
(7) ILP (âI Love Philsophyâ) (that means: averagely merely 12.5% (1/8) are really interested in philosophy),
(8) ILSC (I Love Social Criticism).[/tab]
The Nietzschean(ist)s do not know what Nietzsche meant - as usual.
But perhaps the German philologist Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche did also not know what he meant.
âIch bin in Berlinâ <=> âI am in Berlinâ.
Instead of âEr ist nicht zu Hause (zuhause)â you can also say âEr ist nicht daheimâ <=> âHe is not at homeâ.
Instead of âIch gehe nach Hauseâ you can also say âIch gehe heimâ <=> âI am going homeâ or âI go homeâ.
The English (and b.t.w.: also the Low German) preposition âtoâ is the right translated form of the High German preposition âzuâ in the term âwill to powerâ or âwill to mightâ <=> âWille zur Machtâ. But it is also true that the English (and b.t.w.: also the Low German) preposition âtoâ requires a following verb, if the foregoing word is a noun, and this is mostly also required by the High German preposition âzuâ.
Are you shocked now?
So again: perhaps the German philologist Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche did also not know what he meant.
The German preposition âzuâ does not always but mostly also require a following verb, if the foregoing word is a noun. âWille zur Machtâ or âLiebe zum Detailâ are examples of the absolutely accepted exceptions of a rule. So the preposition âzuâ in the term âWille zur Machtâ is the right preposition, and therefore the term âWille zur Machtâ is correctly translated by âwill to power (might)â.
No, it is not. âWill toâ can never be followed by a noun in English. Itâs impossible. The âtoâ is not a preposition here, but part of the infinitive (âto liveâ, âto fightâ). There is no such thing as âwill to (noun)â. But in German, Wille zu is followed by a noun, sometimes a nominalized verb (Wille zum Leben). Thus, Wille zur Macht is perfectly normal. The zur means âforâ, just as it does in zum Beispiel. Thus, since âforâ is the correct translation of zur (and âtoâ is incorrect), a noun such as âdesireâ or âwishâ is called for.
Had you lived before roughly the turn of the twentieth century, you may have had a point. Living languages like English are not fixed, however. So, like it or not, there has been a tradition of the phrase âwill toâ followed by a noun in English for well over a century now.
Yes, it means different things in different contexts, as I already pointed out. The language into which one translates it may require different words in different contexts. This does not change the fact that the German literally says âto exampleâ (more literally âto the byplayâ), âI am to Berlinâ, âhe is not to houseâ, etc.
Yes, literally âafter houseâ. Compare the fact that one may also say âdesire afterâ instead of âdesire forâ. This may serve as a hint as to the difference between âwill to powerâ and âdesire for powerâ: the will to power reaches all the way to power, it touches powerâit is not removed from power. Thus Nietzsche writes:
[size=95]ââWillingâ is not âdesiring,â striving, demanding [âbegehrenâ, streben, verlangen]: it is distinguished from these by the affect of commanding.â (Nietzsche, The Will to Power, section 668, Kaufmann translation.)[/size]
Whoever wills is thereby already a commanderâone in power.
[quote=âSauweliosâ]
Nonsense. âWill to (noun)â is not a proper construction in English. There may be some influence from the mistranslation that we are discussing.
By the way, Kaufmannâs translations are full of egregious errors.
Während auf palästinensischer Seite heute der Wille zu verzeichnen ist, zu fordern, daĂ die Europäische Union in den FriedensprozeĂ [âŚ]
While the Palestinian side is currently demonstrating a desire to seek European intervention in the peace process, there are [âŚ]
Dieser gemeinsame Wille zu Veränderung hat in der Wirkung dazu gefĂźhrt, dass der Anteil unrentabler Geschäfte bei LANXESS [âŚ]
The effect of this common commitment to change has been to greatly reduce the share of unprofitable businesses within LANXESS as measured by EBITDA margin.
Zu diesen zählen beispielsweise das Vermeiden von Leid, der Wille zu leben, die Freiheit und die Verwirklichung von Interessen an sich. tierrechte-muelheim.de
These interests are for example the avoidance of pain, the will to live, to live in freedom and the realization of interests itself.
[âŚ] den EU-AuĂenbeziehungen strukturell angelegtes und daher wiederkehrendes Problem: die Frage nach der Gewichtung der Wertedimension im Verhältnis zu Staaten, die gravierende Defizite bei der Achtung der Menschenrechte und der Herrschaft des Rechts aufweisen und in denen der politische Wille zu substantiellen Reformen fehlt.
However, a divergence of opinion emerged in relation to a structural and therefore recurring question within EU foreign policy: what role should values play in the EUâs relationship with states that lack the political will for substantive reforms and exhibit grave deficits in their respect of rule of law and human rights?
Ornello, you have misunderstood me. I did not say that âwill toâ is followed by a noun. I said it is followed by a verb. Please read my last post again.
The foregoing word of the preposition (in this cae: âtoâ or âzuâ) is of course meant by âif the foregoing word is a nounâ.
Again: [size=109]Will (noun and foregoing word of the preposition âtoâ) to (preposition) power (noun).[/size]
The English rule and the German rule are the same. The German language allowed the said exception of that rule much earlier than the English language - that is the only difference.
Iâm very sorry, Ornello, but you are wrong.
Normally it is ânoun + to + verbâ as it is in German: âWille + zu + Verbâ but in High German âWille zu (Nomen)â is acceptionally also possible. That is what I said.
As I said: ii is an exception of a German rule that means the same as the English rule: âNomen (noun) + zu (to) + Verb (verb)â. So the construction âNomen + zu + Nomenâ is normal merely as an exception of that said rule.
Behind the word âzurâ are two compund words: âzuâ + âderâ.
Youâre turning matters around. Yes, âtoâ in phrases like âwill to liveâ is not a preposition but a particle demanded by the infinitive (though not quite required: compare âI want to liveâ with âI will surviveâ). To have the translation of Nietzscheâs Wille depend on this, however, is folly, if not ill will. The translation of zur Macht as âfor powerâ is not a given to which the translation of Wille has to conform. To the contrary, the terms Wille and Macht are the decisive concepts here. We seem to agree that Macht means âpowerâ rather than the narrower âmightâ. Well then, depending on our translation of Wille, the translation of the word zu will be obvious. Looking at synonyms for âdesireâ, I find that most words do indeed require âforââor âafterâ!â, but a fine example of an exception even in this direction is âdelightââwhose meaning by the way perfectly fits the etymology of âwillââ: it would be âdelight in powerâ, not âdelight for powerâ. Compare the German word Lust, âpleasure, joy, etc.â
Yes, this is governed by idiom. âDelight inâ, âdesire forâ, can be followed by nouns or gerunds (which are similar to nominalized German verbs). But âwill toâ can be followed only by a verb, which is why some other construction must be used so that we can keep âpowerâ. "Will to powerâ is simply impossible, as would be âwill to carâ or âwill to light bulbâ. Since âpowerâ is the word that cannot really be avoided, we have to make the construction allow for its presence as a noun. âWill toâ thus cannot be used. Everything turns on âpowerâ, not âwillâ, because âpowerâ must be used, as it is the key concept in the expression.
Consider this one, where Will zu is followed by a noun:
[âŚ] den EU-AuĂenbeziehungen strukturell angelegtes und daher wiederkehrendes Problem: die Frage nach der Gewichtung der Wertedimension im Verhältnis zu Staaten, die gravierende Defizite bei der Achtung der Menschenrechte und der Herrschaft des Rechts aufweisen und in denen der politische Wille zu substantiellen Reformen fehlt.
However, a divergence of opinion emerged in relation to a structural and therefore recurring question within EU foreign policy: what role should values play in the EUâs relationship with states that lack the political will for substantive reforms and exhibit grave deficits in their respect of rule of law and human rights?
I would translate this better as ârelationship with states that lack the political will to make substantive reforms andâŚâ
There is some history of the usage âwill for powerâ in the 19th century unrelated to Nietzsche (so far as I know).
Here is one where âto willâ (the verb) is used:
âThe Spirit Of Might. He was so in Christ, and, therefore, Christ is called by the same Name (Hebrew word) Mighty, in Isaiah ix. The Spirit is the Spirit of Might; because there is no Might, but by him. Not by Might, nor by Power, but by my Spirit, faith the Lord of Hosts. Zech. iv. 6. He is the Spirit of Might to the Redeemed; because Sin, in robbing them of their spiritual Life, left them without any spiritual Strength. Rom. v. 6. Throughout the Scriptures, in this respect, they are described in the Condition of a dead Carcaseâwithout Sensationâ without Capacityâwithout the Power even to wish or to will for Power. In their Regeneration, this Spirit exerts his Might, quickening them from theâŚâ
âAnd now, Monsieur Doltaire, do we settle with you? No, there is no one on earth who could do that. Illegitimate birth, royal and peasant blood, a life of sickening evil, brute cruelty, a relentless will for power or revenge, a love for Alixe â for Alixe! â that was so low a thing as a mere pursuit; and yet a man above petty meannesses, a man of willing charity and generous hand when his heart was touched, a voice, a manner, a pleading grace, a wit to charm in spite of all the evil of his life. Mr. Parker does not leave you to sneer at such a manâs powers of fascination. As Alixe Duvarney fought against his charm the reader has to fight.â
What do you mean âwidely acceptedâ? It is a mistranslation and always has been. Some translator makes a goof, and since nobody seems to give a shit about English idiom, that means itâs âwidely acceptedâ? I think not! I did find some early examples (late 19th c) where the translation of Nietzscheâs phrase was âwill for powerâ.
âDesire for powerâ is an extremely common expression, and is idiomatic.