Also from the SEP on knowledge:
1.2 The Belief Condition
The belief condition is slightly more controversial than the truth condition, although it is certainly accepted by orthodoxy.
Although initially it might seem obvious that knowing that p requires believing that p, some philosophers have argued that knowledge without belief is indeed possible. Suppose Walter comes home after work to find out that his house has burned down. He says: “I don’t believe it.” Critics of the belief condition might argue that Walter knows that his house has burned down (he sees that it has), but, as his words indicate, he does not believe that his house has burned down. Therefore, there is knowledge without belief. The dominant view, however, is that Walter’s avowal of disbelief is not, strictly speaking, literally true; what Walter wishes to convey by saying “I don’t believe it” is not that he really does not believe that his house has burned down, but rather that he finds it hard to come to terms with what he sees. If he didn’t genuinely believe it, some of his subsequent actions, such as phoning his insurance company, would be rather mysterious.
A more serious counterexample has been suggested by Colin Radford (1966). Suppose Albert is quizzed on English history. One of the questions is: “When did Queen Elizabeth die?” Albert doesn’t think he knows, but answers the question correctly. Moreover, he gives correct answers to many other questions to which he didn’t think he knew the answer. Let us focus on Albert’s answer to the question about Elizabeth:
(E)
Elizabeth died in 1603.
Radford makes the following two claims about this example:
Albert does not believe (E).
Albert knows (E).
Radford’s intuitions about cases like these do not seem to be idiosyncratic; Myers-Schutz & Schwitzgebel (forthcoming) find evidence suggesting that many ordinary speakers tend to react in the way Radford suggests.[3]
In support of (a), Radford emphasizes that Albert thinks he doesn’t know the answer to the question. He doesn’t trust his answer because he takes it to be a mere guess. In support of (b), Radford argues that Albert’s answer is not at all just a lucky guess. The fact that he answers most of the questions correctly indicates that he has actually learned, and never forgotten, the basic facts of English history.
Since he takes (a) and (b) to be true, Radford would argue that knowledge without belief is indeed possible. But either of (a) and (b) might be resisted. Those who think that belief is necessary for knowledge could deny (a), arguing that Albert does have a tacit belief that (E), even though it’s not one that he thinks amounts to knowledge. Alternatively, one might deny (b), arguing that Albert’s correct answer is not an expression of knowledge, perhaps because, given his subjective position, he does not have justification for believing (E). This reply anticipates the next section, involving the necessity of the justification condition.
At least the SEP grants room for change non this issue, unlike you Uccisore
But no, orthodoxy says so