It requires a certain level of self-awareness and environmental-awareness and self-in-relation-to-environment-awareness to begin thinking more objectively.
You need to understand your self, your own biases, your own needs, to take them out of the equation when evaluating the environment more objectively.
Letâs say I was a humanist of sorts and Iâd try to base my decisions on what is good for humanity. At first glance someone could think that I am now being objective because I am not considering myself. But what I am considering is my ideals of what is good for humanity. That I have even chosen to base my decisions on what is good for humanity and not basing it on negroes or on all organic life or all matter is already a specific ideal.
This is why I canât see how a judgement is not connected to a subject and the subjectâs ideals, preferences, tastes.
However that doesnât mean that all judgements are equal in terms of understanding reality. The self-awareness of the subject is not complete and is also influenced by how reality at large is understood, more nuanced or less. In this way the self-awareness of the subject grows with understanding the surrounding environment.
Nevertheless, in my view, itâs not life-affirming to try and diminish the subject. The subjectâs strength must grow as the subjectâs capability for objectivity grows.
Yes, knowing that the validity of these âlaws of natureâ can more or less only be temporary. The more exercises, ecperiences, experiments, observations, objectivity are done, the closer comes the goal (aim).
We did? When? Was there a conference? Did the authorities formally declare âFrom this day forth, âApples are fruits,â will mean such-and-such-and-suchâ? Did they not get around to âX is true independently of what anyone thinksâ? I mean, the list of all possible expressions which can have a meaning or not must be huge, so Iâm guessing they didnât get around to it yet.
I agree with this for the most part (I disagree on the point about why we speak of truth as being independent of human judgement, but thatâs a digression). My take on it is as follows:
Saying that truth is a product of human judgement is like saying Luke Skywalker is a product of George Lucasâs imagination. This is true, but only in the context of the real world. In the world of Star Wars, George Lucas doesnât exist. He hasnât written himself into the story. And Luke Skywalker isnât dependent on him for his existence. Luke Skywalker imagines himself (we can presume) as being just as independent as any other character in the story.
The human mind is like this in that it invents a narrative (metaphorically speaking). It writes a story beginning with the material given to it by the senses (which is also like a story being told to it by the universe). It makes judgements on what it senses and invents plot elements to the story which we call beliefs, knowledge, theories, assumptions, predictions, etc. All such judgements and truths, therefore, are dependent on us for their reality. However, in the context of the story weâre writing, these truths are independent of us. We donât say â2 + 2 = 4 because I think so.â We say â2 + 2 = 4 independently of what I think.â We say this only because that is the truth in the story weâre writing.
Most people just live in the story. And itâs not wrong per se. Itâs just the default way we live. You and I, who recognize the dependence of truths and judgements on human thought, are simply writing a different story, but a story nonetheless. We have not risen out of the story to a higher truth, we have simply switched to a different story.
So when you ask me whether Santa Clauseâs existence is mind-dependent or not, I cannot answer that without knowing whose story weâre talking about. I will often fall back on the default story (the one most people are writing in which Santa Clauseâs existenceâwhether real or notâdoesnât depend on anyoneâs mind) since I assume thatâs almost always the context in which we speak. Itâs the context in which âindependent of what anyone thinksâ is meaningful and makes sense. But if we are explicit about the fact that weâre talking in the context of my subjectivist story, then sure Iâll agree that Santa Clauseâs (non-)existence depends on my assumptions.
But those donât mean the same thing as âX is true independently of what anyone thinks,â (though they might follow from it). The latter statement is only meaningless in an idealist/subjectivist context (or as Iâd prefer to say, incoherent), but I must assume that the one uttering it, if heâs being serious, doesnât mean it in an idealist/subjectivist context.
Iâll bet I misunderstand you. Letâs fix that, shall we?
You said: âindependently of what anyone thinksâ is meaningless. â True or false?
You said: âindependently of what anyone thinksâ means the same as âthat which some person thinks existsâ. â True or false?
Talk to those who believe it, not me.
Or faith, or reason, or authorityâŚ
So what do you say to a theist? That heâs referring to the land of Honalee?
Care to add that extra touch of precision?
Iâm being a stickler on language here. You can say real and unreal âapplyâ to assumptions (though I still disgaree that they only apply to assumptions), but not âreferâ. To âreferâ is to focus on a thing as that which you are speaking about. I might have the assumption that my car is real, but when I say âMy care needs a wash,â I am referring to my car, not my assumption in my head. But if I were to say âI hold an assumption in my head that my car needs a wash,â then Iâd be referring to my assumption.
When we hold assumptions, we regard them as true (i.e. real), but there neednât be any assumptions when we look at an object and take it to be real. If we then think to ourselves âthat object is real,â that thought could be said to be an assumption, but that thought neednât be there just to look at the object and see it as real. Seeing objects as real is not an assumption, itâs nature of experience.
Sometimes, it appears as if you are taking the piss out of me. Thatâs not a fun thing to perceive.
It is me who interprets whether what youâre saying has any meaning or not. And if you said something like âApples are fruitâ Iâd assume you are saying something meaningful.
I understand that.
The problem occurs when people deny that truth depends on human judgment. This creates social disagremeent which is a kind of social friction. A peaceful way to resolve it would be to 1) adopt one and the same method of reasoning and 2) find a way to join our experiences. This would either require that they present some kind of evidence that would change my opinion or accept that truth depends on human judgment.
What does âtruth is independent from what anyone thinksâ mean to you?
So far, it appears to me that you think that âtruth is independent from what anyone thinksâ means âwe ignore that truth is dependent on what someone thinksâ.
It is true if you interpret it literally as in something that is beyond our experience. Whatever refers to something that is beyond experience does not refer to something that can be experienced. And thatâs what I mean when I say that it is meaningless: it does not refer to something that can be experienced.
It is true in the sense that if you interpret âtruth is independent from what anyone thinksâ to mean âthe more evidence you have the better your judgment isâ then that statement is perfectly compatible with the statement âtruth depends on human judgmentâ.
I never said that they âreferâ to assumptions. I said that they âapplyâ to assumptions. They describe and they categorize assumptions. It is assumptions themselves that âreferâ to something and this somethign is something that we have not experienced.
You are not seeing it âas realâ. You are merely seeing it. It is only after you see the object that you describe it as real. And even then, what youâre really doing is you are describing the assumption that you saw such an object as real.
Of course! And when I say, ââŚindependently of what anyone thinks,â thatâs meaningful too. But for some reason, you want to say âapples are fruitsâ is already meaningful but ââŚindependently of what anyone thinks,â has to be given meaning. What gives a phrase meaning is the meaning of the words that makes up that phrase and the grammar with which the words are put together. I could utter a whole new phrase that, to my knowledge, no one has ever uttered before: Hitler didnât live long enough to eat a Big Mac. â I donât believe anyone has had the opportunity yet to âgiveâ that statement a meaning, yet when I utter it, I assume you have no problem understanding what it means. It comes packaged with a meaning due to the fact that we know the meaning of the words and we recognize the grammatical structure of the sentence. What Iâm saying with respect to âapples are fruitâ and ââŚindependently of what anyone thinks,â is that neither of these are an exception to this rule, and so both are meaningful.
I agree with this. If the truth really matters, then it must be something that will effect peopleâs lives. â That implies there should be evidence for it. If it doesnât effect peopleâs lives, then any friction between two disagreeing parties is just a matter of frustration and not being able to get along, which can be resolved by noting how the truth is conditional on whose point of view we consult (though this would require adopting some form of subjectivism or relativism).
It means the same as it means in the thought experiment I gave earlier. I imagined some truth (say itâs -50C on some ice planet in a distant galaxy) and imagined no conscious being in the universe knew about it. That truth is still the truth in that scenario regardless of what anyone thinks. I would also say that I donât think thatâs how reality works, but I donât need it to be the way reality works just to understand its meaning.
Well, it has meaning in the mind-independent context, which I suppose is to ignore the mind-dependent context, but thatâs not the same as denying the truth of the mind-dependent context.
I wouldnât say thatâs quite true. If it is raining outside, then in a mind-independent context, one could say it is raining outside independently of what anyone thinks. Still, someone can see that itâs raining and someone can think that itâs raining. Itâs just that the rain wouldnât depend on that in order to be a fact.
What you have there is a one way correlation: more evidence â better judgement. If more evidence = truth, then you also need a two way correlation in order to say truth depends on human judgement: better judgement â more evidence. Then you can say: better judgement â more evidence â more truth. And then you are still limited to saying that truth is correlated with human judgement. That it depends on human judgement is a further step. The next thing youâd have to do is equate âhuman judgementâ with âthat which some person thinks exists,â which for all intents and purposes seems reasonable enough to me. Finally, youâd have to show that âindependently of what anyone thinksâ is symantically equivalent to âthat which some person thinks exists,â which I would grant given that âsome personâ is the person uttering ââŚindependently of what anyone thinks,â except that we are crossing contexts in this case: the context of the person uttering the statement and the context of the world (the story) depicted by the personâs statement.
Good! I must have misunderstood you then. I thought I read you saying that ârealâ and âunrealâ refer to assumptions. My bad.
The word âassumptionâ is often used that wayâwe say âyouâre just assuming that,â when a person has no evidence or hasnât experienced itâbut I always interpret things in the context of formal logic. In formal logic, an assumption is simply a starting point, a proposition that hasnât been argued for or proven. In that sense, even if we see something, and on that basis assume it exists, that would still be an assumption.
First, if I describe it as real, then obviously ârealâ describes the object, which is to say we see it as real. Second, you could say Iâm assuming itâs real, but the description of ârealâ is the assumption, it is not describing the assumption (which comes dangerously close to say it refers to the assumption). âThe rock is real,â is an assumption, but the word ârealâ there refers to the rock, not the assumption.
Could be. I donât know. I never said you are using it in a meaningless way. I simply associate that statement with anyone who appears to deny that truth is dependent on human judgment. It does not matter to me how they use that statement themselves i.e. whether they use it in a meaningful way or in a meaningless way.
I disagree. Many words have little to no meaning on their own. It is context that gives them meaning. This is why it is extremely difficult to write a computer program that understands language. It requires inductive/constructive rather deductive/instructive reasoning. (Computer programs are deductive/instructive.)
What I meant when I said âwe already gave it a meaningâ is that people in general mean something when they say âApples are fruit.â
It is not the same. However, I donât think thatâs what people mean when they say that âtruth is independent from what anyone thinksâ. They donât simply mean âwe ignore that truth depends on what someone thinksâ. Instead, what they mean is âthoughts must change in the face of contradictory evidenceâ.
What do you mean itâs not true? You want to say that itâs not true that âwhatever refers to something beyond experience is meaninglessâ?
I am certainly not saying that evidence depends on human judgment. It does not. Human judgment does not create evidence. Evidence is independent from human judgment. It as an independent value. Rather, human judgment uses evidence â but of course, not always â in order to create an assumption regarding some unknown event. This assumption is then called truth. So, the pipeline is like this: evidence â human judgment â truth.
Instead of saying that human judgment âcreatesâ assumptions, which implies that assumptions donât exist before human judgment, you can say that it âselectsâ assumptions. I often say that judgment caterogizes assumptions i.e. it decides for each assumption the category in which to be placed, these categories being the category ârealâ and the category âunrealâ.
Finally, notice that assumptions are imaginary. Thinking that it will rain on Friday is not the same as seeing that it rains on Friday.
Again, language is flexible.
âThe rock is realâ is a sentence.
Your thought that you saw a rock is an assumption.
You seeing a rock is a fact.
The word ârealâ applies to the assumption and not to the fact.
And it certainly does not apply to the sentence.
And I get that. Youâre trying to argue from within a subjectivist framework, and in that framework, the statement that X is true independently of what anyone thinks is more or less meaningless (or incoherent). Iâm just used to trying to find the context in which the things people say makes sense (usually people are pretty simple so it tends to be easy; there usually is a âdefaultâ context that I can reliably fall back on).
Yes, the meaning of words requires context in order to recognize their meaning. But itâs an amazing fact about human nature that we are usually able to figure out the context of the person using those words while speaking (even if we get the wrong context, itâs still a context in which there is a meaning). But still, I get it: youâre trying to stick to a particular context, which means the phrase ââŚindependently of what anyone thinks,â might be meaningless (or incoherent).
Well sure, but I still donât see how that doesnât apply to ââŚindependently of what anyone thinks.â I think itâs trivially obvious (given that most people are objectivists) that the person uttering this expression means something by it.
Well, if you really think thatâs what people mean, then weâll run with that (but letâs remember weâve entered a new context here). As a subjectivist, if I were to say âtruth is dependent on what people think,â I wouldnât deny that evidence has a strong influence on what people think. Evidence is just as subjective as thought. The presentation of evidence before me counts as reality just as much as thought. It happens to have a very strong trumping power over previously held thoughts (which canât be said about everybody). In other words, in this context which you bring up, the equating of ââŚindependent ofâŚâ and ââŚin the fact of contradictory evidenceâ is the same for both objectivists and subjectivists. Itâs true that some subjectivists might conclude that simply thinking something that seems absurd (for example, that I am really a talking rhinoceros in a pink tutu) makes it true, even in the face of contending evidence, but Iâm not that kind of subjectivist. Iâm just an observer of how the mind worksâmine as a subjectivist and others as objectivists (easy since itâs not that hard to fall back into the frame of mind of an objectivist, which is the default way any mind, including my own, works)âand I observe that Iâm convinced mostly by evidence. So then I guess if there is any difference between the phrase ââŚindependently of what anyone thinksâ and ââŚdepends on what someone thinksâ in this context (which is shared by objectivists and subjectivists alike, at least my kind of subjectivist), it would be that the self-proclaimed objectivist thinks of the truth as dependent on the evidence rather than his thoughts which are based on the evidence, whereas the subjectivist still sees the truth as dependent on his thoughts even though those thoughts in turn depend on the evidence.
Again, it depends on the context. For objectivists, referring to things beyond experience is the norm. Most of them will, of course, be a bit more conservative about knowledge which is a bit more complex than meaning, so I donât think theyâd say they can know a whole lot that lies beyond experience, but just to refer to something beyond experience is, to an objectivist, not only simple but one of the basic functions of consciousness. You see, when it comes to the difference between objectivism and subjectivism, weâre not just talking about two different theories of truth (i.e. what itâs based on), but two different theories of consciousness. To the subjectivist, consciousness functions as a veil standing between the self and the outer world (if the outer world exists⌠their are solipsists after all). To the subjectivist, experience is all we can know. Consciousness, to them, is a system of experiences that come across as reality (and for all intents and purposes are reality). But to the objectivist, consciousness is an entirely different thingâit is what I call a âwindow to realityââthat is, they see consciousness as something that allows us to see reality for what it is, to know it in its true form. To them, the things out in reality can easily be referred to because the whole function of consciousness is to allow for that to happen. Sure, they still need experience to know about it, or to know about the things used to know about (i.e. evidence and such), but to the objectivist, a reference to something is not a reference to the mind, or anything therein, but a genuine connection to the outer world. â So itâs in this context that it makes sense to talk about referring to things beyond experience without saying those things are meaningless.
In that case, what you are saying is that âtruth is independent of what anyone thinksâ = âtruth is dependent on evidence, and even though that goes through human judgement to become truth, it starts with evidence.â But at the same time, it means âsince evidence goes through human judgement to become truth, truth is dependent on human judgement.â So two seemingly contradictory statements actually meaning the same thing. The contradiction seems to come from a disagreement over which out of the twoâevidence or human judgementâare we to say truth depends on. Obviously, if evidence â human judgement â truth, then itâs both (one more directly than the other), but if we have to pick one, then I guess those who pick evidence are the objectivists, and those who pick human judgement are the subjectivists.
To come to the point, I think both your statements could be true if we acknowledge that youâre switching contexts between the two.
Ok, but how literally do you take that? I mean, do you actually believe there are these things called âassumptionsâ floating around out there? Is it anything like Platoâs forms?
Yes indeed, Anderson, yes indeed.
^ Right, the sentence is just a gizmo in the process of communication.
The assumption that the rock is real involves the concept of ârealâ (or the word ârealâ if we are speaking). I mean, itâs right there in âthe assumption that the rock is realâ. The assumption is us telling ourselves that what we experienced was real. Itâs true that telling this to ourselves is not the same thing as seeing it, but thereâs a reason we tell ourselves that what we experienced is real. And if we dig into my subjectivist theory of consciousness, Iâd even say that the realness in the experience is what leads us to make the assumption. We experience the rock as real, and the realness in that experience is why we draw the assumption that the rock is real. So even though the two are different, the assumption is usually right.
I wouldnât call it a subjectivist framework. Members of Vienna Circle werenât subjectivists. Ernst Mach and Bertrand Russell werenât subjectivists. Heisenberg wasnât a subjectivist. Yet, they all declared that there is nothing beyond experience, that metaphysics and ontology are nonsense, that physical objects do not exist as things-in-themselves but merely as groups of sensations, that theories are merely âeconomic summaries of factsâ, that there is no a priori knowledge that wasnât first discovered a posteriori, that we should stick to the facts instead of going beyond them (Occamâs razor) and so on and so forth. The correct name would be a phenomenalist framework (specifically that of Ernst Mach.) Ernst Mach wasnât an idealist. He explicitly stated that those who think heâs an idealist are very far from understanding his position.
Realists, who are under attack in this thread, can only make sense if you understand that they do not understand the origin of their a priori knowledge. They donât see how itâs derived from experience. Why? Because it is not them but their ancestors who derived it. Thatâs why they think that a priori knowledge has nothing to do with experience. Since they donât understand how concepts of space, time and cause are derived from experience, they have no choice but to conclude that these concepts are not derived from experience.
They deny what is evident. Thatâs how you can identify them. They deny instrumentalism i.e. that theories are merely devices that generate predictions. Instead, they claim that theories are attempts to explain the universe (i.e. to find the underlying truth about the world.) They deny empiricism i.e. that theories are derived from experience. Instead, they claim that theories are conjectures formed independently from experience.
Truth depends on human judgment which may or may not depend on evidence. Subjectivists are people whose judgment about whatâs going to happen does not depend on evidence but on what they want to happen e.g. I donât want to die within next 500 years so I predict that I wonât die within next 500 years. Objectivists, on the other hand, are people whose judgment about whatâs going to happen depends on evidence. So even if evidence suggests something unpleasant they accept it. Thatâs the real difference. As you can see, they both use human judgment albeit in a different way. You can say they use different methods of judgment. One is using preference-based judgment and the other evidence-based judgment.
I am not a subjectivist. I am an objectivist. But that does not mean I am a realist. I am an instrumentalist and a phenomenalist.
No, they are not floating around and they have nothing to do with Platoâs forms. Oneâs assumptions manifest through oneâs behavior. By looking at how someone behaves you can tell what heâs assuming. Though you need a bigger picture than that, at the bottom, thatâs how it works.
Whatâs the difference? I know phenomenalism as the position that things are as they seem. Phenomenalism can be a form of subjectivism/idealism, but it neednât be. The window-to-reality view of consciousness (i.e. niave realism) could also posit that reality is just as it seems. Is this what you mean by phenomenalism?
Do you mean that they are taught these concepts from their ancestors but they donât remember it? I agree that certain universal concepts arenât learned from particular experiences, like in the way we might learn the concept of a tree by having experiences of trees (whereas an alien on another planet where there are no trees would not learn this concept), but I think it requires experience in general to learn any concept. Thatâs not to say that the concept is based on experience, but that the mere fact of having experience is necessary to form concepts period. The brain does not develop unless there is incoming information to stimulate growth. There are ample studies to support this. If I were to offer an analogy, maybe the following would work: experience is like the electric current flowing into a computer, and the concepts we acquire are like programs that are infused into the computer. Both require electrical input from the same source. But that source, the inflow of electric current, is sometimes used as input into the program (that is, as specific information that the computer interprets and processes) but sometimes used just to power the computer, making the programming of the computer possible in general.
Iâm not a Kantian, at least not in the sense that we are born with a priori knowledge, as if the computer comes prepackages with a suite of programs (the OS notwithstanding), though I do believe we are all born with the potential to develop so-called âa prioriâ knowledge.
Why canât theories be both? Attempts to explain the universe and devices that generate predictions?
As a subjectivist myself, I can tell you that isnât true. I have not been able to convince myself that disease doesnât exist though I wish it were true (though I canât speak for all subjectivists). Subjectivism is more the position that reality is based on experience than that reality is based on what one wants to be true. As I said earlier, I am an observer of how the mind works. I observe that the mind is sometimes convinced by evidence and at other times by desires for what one wishes were true (and also by reason and the words of authority figuresâthe big 4 ). Observing that this is the way the mind works has convinced me that reality is first and foremost based on subjective experience, but at the same time, it has not changed the way my mind works. It hasnât made it so that I am no longer convinced by evidence. It hasnât made it so that I am any more capable of believe things just because I want them to be true. Believing that reality is based on experience hasnât given me the ability to create reality out of the things I wish were true. Iâm still aware that disease exists even though I wish it werenât true, and even if I try to convince myself that disease doesnât exist, I find that I still need evidence or reason (or the words of a trusted authority figure). This is hardwired into the brain, an immutable way it worksâadopting this or that âismâ doesnât change this. Being a subjectivist isnât magic; it doesnât give you a different brain.
Well, then you really need to explain to me the difference between phenomenalist and subjectivism.
Ok, so when you say that we âselectâ assumptions as opposed to âcreatingâ assumption, you mean we apprehend them in others first before we adopt them for ourselves. â Is that correct?
The difference is that subjectivism is an epistemologically meaningful term. In that sense, I am not a subjectivist. Metaphysically speaking, I am not so sure. What does metaphysical subjectivism mean? That the events that take place outside of our brains are entirely caused by the events that take place inside our brains? If so, I am not a metaphysical subjectivist either.
No windows. I take windowless approach. Somewhat similar to Leibnizâs windowless monads. Unlike Leibniz, I donât think there is a harmony that is pre-established by God. I do agree that there is harmony (i.e. the appearance of monads interacting with each other) but I donât think this harmony has been pre-established by some central force such as God. Also, I donât think that monads themselves are the cause of their own behavior. I do agree that there is no communication, interaction or perception between these monads but I take this further and say that there is also no communication, interaction or perception within monads themselves i.e. one monadâs past self does not cause one monadâs present or future self.
Another way to put it, and a much simpler way to put it, is that the universe is a mass of particulars that are related to each other in a specific way. Interaction, in this view, is a reference to a specific kind of relation between particulars.
I mean that these concepts were created by their ancestors, and while they have a memory of these concepts, they have no memory of how and why these concepts were created.
Thatâs correct. A concept is nothing more than a range of particulars that have some specific effect. I show you a bunch of images and you immediately identify each one of them with a word. Those images that are identified with the same word immediately form a concept. Based on these images alone you cannot form any kind of concept. However, when you relate them to some other kind of particular, such as for example words, concepts are immediately formed.
Itâs pretty clear to me that we are born with a priori knowledge. At least in the sense that we acquire it almost instantly soon after we are born. I donât ever recall having to learn facial recognition, for example. I always knew what a face is.
They can be both provided that you agree that what it means to explain the universe is nothing more than to form a theory based on as many observations as possible. The problem is that they deny this just as they deny that the most significant purpose of theories is to generate predictions.
Thatâs metaphysical subjectivism.
On the lowest level of abstraction, there is neither âselectionâ nor âcreationâ. There is merely occurence. There are facts. You take a look at the facts and then you interpret them. You take a look at how someone acts. You take a look at how that someone acted in the past. You take a look at what happened around that someone in the past. Then you make connections. At the end of your intellectual journey, you arrive at the conclusion that that someone is assuming this or that. You come up with assumptions that have the potential to influence his behavior. You then separate these assumptons into a group of those that are actively shaping his behavior and a group of those that will shape his behavior if this or that happens. All other assumptions that you can imagine are then considered to have no potential to shape his behavior. Thatâs all there is to it.
Of course! Being a subjectivist, to me, doesnât mean denying the existence of the objective. It just means that the subjective aspect takes primacy, and that we can only have objectivity within a great subjective context.
No. We can only have subjectivity within a great objective context. The objectives ground reality otherwise we live only in our heads, projecting a reality or at least trying to, a reality that is ideal over real.
And how do you know about this objective reality? Doesnât it start from in your head? Or if you like, from experience?
And youâre confounding âin the headâ with âunrealâ. Yes, I am saying that everything is ultimately âin the headâ but I donât think that makes it unreal. I think the idea that the mental = unreal is a legacy of Cartesian dualism. Heâs the one who convinced everyone that if itâs mental, its reality canât be trusted.
The problem is that too much consideration of subjectivity can lead to extreme subjectivism, thus solipsism. Accoding to a solipsist, the subjective I (self, ego) with its conscious contents is the only reality.
The problem is that creating disagreement is the purpose (obfuscation, misdirection, and extortion).
If everyone has their own ârealityâ, then nothing and everything can be said to be real. That makes all history and facts questionable, and thus changeable. And manipulated change is the goal. Why allow people to restrain you with Truth?
Both you of, those are known as the âslippery slopeâ fallacy: X canât be true because bad things would happen if it were true. Wanna be comfortable, better not seek out the truth.
Arminius, some people might take subjectivism to its solipsistic extremes, but not I. Take the issue up with them.
James, like it or not, we already do live in our own ârealitiesââI call them subjective realities, everyone else calls them objective realities and thinks everyone else is wrongâat least with subjectivism, we can adopt relativism, which nicely qualifies the reality to a specific person or point of view, and thereby makes all such descriptions of reality consistent after all. Differences are resolved in the usual mannerâempirical testing, and if that doesnât work, reason and negotiation. Being a subjectivist doesnât change this; it doesnât change the way the brain fundamentally works.
I suspect that you donât understand what we each said, but perhaps you merely misunderstand the âslippery slopeâ fallacy.
We were not saying that âX is true because if notâŚâ. Arminius was saying that too much is too much. And I was saying that too much is intentional, to serve a purpose. Neither of those constitute a âslippery slopeâ fallacy.
No. You simply do not understand the words.
You are conflating a perception of reality with reality itself, the âmap vs terrainâ fallacy, when you say that âeveryone lives in their own realityâ. Everyone lives in their own perception of reality.
Then you compound the fallacy by conflating perspective with perception with reality itself. Everyone has their own perspective of reality, their own perception of reality, and even their own situation within reality, but only one shared actual reality.
The âobjectivistsâ know this. The subjectivists continue conflating concepts and words such as to create the liberal chaos used to manipulate Man into a new beast.