Even the vague thing summoned by the name, long worn out, subjectivity: is subjective. Thus, the marvelous abyss.
On an interesting side note, in the university, there is an authoritative myth that subjectivity is distinguishable from an earnestly-believed-in god called âobjectivityâ. Ergo, the speed of certain objects when they fall, and other such matters, are less âsubjectiveâ according to this habit of the abiotic coming forth of all things.
Human beings, so called, donât act out of reason any more than did the earthquake of Lisbon strike in order to signal a taking of sides in the Catholic Protestant debate, then richly topical and consuming all hearts and minds.
Point being that unless there are some objective standards, how can one know where a subjective statement lies on the âspectrumâ? Might be nonsense, might be âGodâs own truthâ. It would be impossible to function effectively with only subjectivity.
Jester: âmy choice of words is better than your choice of words!â
Fool: âoh yeah? how would you describe this situation?â
Jester: âusing the same mental acrobatics I did before, of course!â
Fool: âyou rapscallion, that would imply x, y and z, which is sillyâ
Jester: âaha, but I have redefined x, y and z and therefor itâs not silly at allâ
Fool: âyou canât just redefine x, y and z, they have a meaning, itâs in the dictionaryâ
Jester: âI can and I have, if you were not such a slave to authority you would think for yourself and agree with me!â
Fool: âIâm going to think by myself, good day sir!â
This reminds me of the phrasing âbut x is only a theoryâ.
The layman uses the term âtheoryâ as conjecture, or at best âhypothesisâ. Of course in the scientific world, there are many steps to take before even considering something to qualify highly enough as âtheoryâ. Even a hypothesis isnât simply a guess, it has to be founded on something⌠but when the layman sees that term âtheoryâ in the scientific context, they take it in their own context and dismiss it easily thusly - when that is the last thing they ought to be doing.
âBut x is just subjectiveâ.
As above the layman understands âsubjectiveâ much the same as âarbitraryâ. One may dismiss the arbitrary on the grounds that it may just as validly be thought of differently, with no reason to pick one over the other. But of course, the philosopher isnât using the term âsubjectiveâ in this same way. Subjective merely implies the dependence of e.g. some phenomena on a person or consciousness for it to take the form that it takes - for instance qualia. Without human consciousness, what is the experience of yellowness but an electromagnetic wave frequency? All human knowledge, even, is human knowledge - requiring or at least involving a human to found it and take it to the point that passes for knowledge. Even if it is resolved that the inclusion of the human does not ultimately appear to be necessary for such a thing to be known - such as with âobjectiveâ knowledge that seems to happen regardless of there being anyone there to perceive it. In such a case we have subjective methodology to potentially result in objective conclusions through a dialectic interaction between human understanding and that which humans are understanding: a subject-object interaction no less. There is quite clearly a presence of both.
Isnât it then so convenient a toy for the layman or even the sophomore to play with: the phrase âbut thatâs just subjectiveâ - being either not wiling or able to appreciate the meaning of the word in its appropriate context?
Youâre not worthless, Ecmandu, but what you are resorting to here is truly facile and deserving of its treatment as such. You should be ashamed of resorting to such low depths, and correct yourself as quickly as possible.
Iâm guilty of no underhandedness, but what does criticizing someoneâs means of conveyance say about you? Well, I guess it depends whose microscope youâre under.
âYour argument about [personal, etc.] subjectivity, is on the meta-subjective level.â
At the meta-subjective level we bring out all the relevant tools of philosophy to extract what is objectivity from intersubjectivity.
Therefore our argument about subjectivity [or anything else] can be made objective when we rely [via intersubjective consensus] on philosophy-proper and its tools to infer whatever as objective.
Note scientific theories are claimed to be the most objective [relative] of all human knowledge at present, BUT note, according to Popper [as implied] scientific theories are at best, merely polished [via intersubjective consensus] subjective conjectures.
It is equivocation.
You are using different concepts of âsubjectivityâ in the same sense, i.e.
Subjective as in one personâs subjective judgment
Subjective as in many subjects arriving at intersubjective consensus
You are equivocating and conflating 1 and 2.
Objectivity is always reducible to subjectivity, i.e. intersubjectivity consensus by many subjects but not to the view of one subject [which is also subjective].
Why canât objects exist without subjects? How do subjects observe them if they donât exist?
Hereâs what subjectivists look like to objectivists:
Some of the best proofs we have are called inferential proofs.
The most popular one is the well ordered set of counting numbers, which we will never count all of, so how can we know that itâs a complete ordered set. We just do.
So, in comes the subjectivist, and says itâs not a well ordered set, prove it, count them all.
Objectivists understand that you can make this argument, but it is absurd.
Thatâs how a subjectivist looks to an objectivist
To me it sounds like this argument relies on distinguishing between the quale and the object, which would mean it hangs on the distinction between objects and experience of objects. Itâs not that I see realism as without problems. I just find it odd that there is a sudden defense of pure subjectivism where I wouldnât expect it: in you and Seredipper. Though I am more surprised but you.
I havenât followed the whole debate, but it seems to me that here you are focusing on knowledge whereas Serendipper is working at a deeper ontological level. There are no things beyond experience, he seems to be saying. You might be being Wittgensteinien and saying that we cannot speak of those things, or our knowledge always has subjective aspects. He seems to be going beyond that and making a quite different ontological claim. Not external reality, perception, fallible and filtered knowledge and beliefs of subjects, but something closer to pure idealism.
I mean, Iâm a pantheist, so I have little problem with his position. Iâm just surprised it seems to be his and, then, yours.
I get it, you are not ruling out degrees of justification. Fine, no surprise there. I get the âjust a theoryâ comparison.
But thatâs in the knowledge of what is out there. Serend is saying there is no out there.
If you take away all realism, this becomes a reasonable response. If one argues that our knowledge will always be via our experience, and so the knowledge is tailored to how we experience things, and hence our knowledge helps us to have certain specfic experiences and is not a perfect image of the ding an sichâŚpeachy. But once you get to what I think Serendipperâs position is, you are into idealism. Not aspects, but just subjectivity. There need be no connection between what is called knowledge and what it is about. In fact it is not about anything.
This is old old old to me. I started this as kid when I first heard of âsubject and objectâ then wondered what the heck it could possibility mean (without reading the ownerâs manual, mind you). I simply thought âWell, if subjectivity has a subject observing an object, then objectivity must be void the subject. What else could it possibly mean?â Then I was done with it and put it on a shelf until now. Iâm actually surprised there is so much debate and pretty much figured it was common knowledge contained in any philosophy textbook⌠like a definition. Iâll concede that conceptualizations of subjectivity and objectivity can be terribly difficult to get oneâs head around, but if I have any advantage itâs just that the idea has been rattling around my head for many years, which doesnât warrant any parades in my honor.
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I am not sure what the Sâ> O means. It seems to me ideas about what objectivity is include the existence of subjects. That objectivist scientists would not claim they have something that completely eradicates a perceiver with a point of view, but that some things are more objective than others. And also that there is something out there that affects what subjects experience. Like your posts do. Or mine. Of course they are experiences via consciousness, but they limit those consciousnessesâ options for experiencing them.