Maybe another way of looking at this for discussion:
I define truth as an object, a real thing (real in its base sense) that has properties (objective truth). It’s properties are harmony, accord, propriety, unity, correspondence, union, etc. Falsity, also objective, has properties like discord, conflict, impropriety, disconnection, etc. Falsity, while objective, can never be absolute because its nature is toward chaos and disintegration. Degeneration can’t reach the absolute state. Descent into nothingness is the natural outcome of falsity unchecked. Truth qua truth, on the other hand, is the only real absolute. There is no possible world in which it is always absolutely better to attain to higher truth states because the ultimate truth state is absolute perfection. (More discussion points)
It seems to me the naturalist would claim that truth as a purely subjective entity is itself only a property of other things.
Btw, by ‘base sense’ I mean existents are made out of information. On this view, James Saint’s affectance would be raw [unformed] information or being in my world, though he may disagree with this notion from his point of view. Information can be objects or subjects, things or attributes. Anything capable of supplying information to the ‘living information’ of a mind for apprehension has reality of some sort. These are presuppositions I use but not necessary to the idea of truth as an objective thing.