Yay!
Mind you, the will to change the title to “self” will is not so yay, but I’m proud o’you, buddy. I took the liberty of fully correcting the title for just my post
I dunno, man. We covered the difference between seeming overlap and actually converging “to the same thing” (think back to the computer programming analogy). There are no doubt plenty of circumstances where fallacies are less clearly being committed, but the distinctions remain - they don’t disappear just because the line between fallacy and non-fallacy is approached more closely. And edge-cases such as these certainly don’t bring into question the validity of fallacies in general!
I’ll explain how this applies to the examples you brought up:
This isn’t a logical fallacy “falling apart at convergence”, it’s a misapplication of a logical fallacy that doesn’t “fall apart at convergence”.
Consider “an argument that relies on the goodness of your character” - sticking to the logic of why someone’s character leads to a certain conclusion is fine if their reasoning for this conclusion is their goodness of their character. This remains within the premise(s)->conclusion structure being argued.
By contrast - not addressing the logic of why someone’s character leads to a certain conclusion, but instead attacking someone’s character as means to invalid their argument, irrespective of their logic of why it leads to their conclusion - that’s committing an Ad Hominem fallacy.
At the very best, the consequence of committing this fallacy might challenge the soundness of its premises, but the major issue is that it does not challenge the validity of the argument.
But even for the soundness of an argument - intention matters, and where the focus is being drawn to. If the intention is solely to challenge the soundness of the premise, you’re not committing a fallacy even if technically you’re attacking someone’s character, provided someone’s character is their premise. If your intention is to attack the person to undercut the argument prior to engagement at all with even the soundness of its premises, the fact that you would be unintentionally challenging its premises is incidental.
So as before, you’ve shown an instance where fallacy and non-fallacy come close, where the distinction is not as obvious, but the distinction doesn’t disappear.
By this, do you mean that someone making an argument may not realise the relevance of a counter argument, and mistakenly call said counter argument a Straw Man?
Sure, in which case it’s not a valid accusation of committing a fallacy. The person calling Straw Man is not committing a fallacy, they are simply mistaken. The correct and incorrect application of the fallacy remains in tact, even if someone does not realise whether it is appropriately applied or not.
Another example of where fallacies don’t actually converge, and certainly don’t lose their fallaciousness.
I don’t see how this guy’s use of “logical fallacy” applies here - “absolute non-existence” of what?
I’ll let you elaborate on what he meant by his comment here, if you also want me to show how there still won’t be any convergence point where fallacies lose their fallaciousness.
It’s entirely possible, and seems likely, that he’s just using the term logical fallacy incorrectly here.
My brain is fine, thanks for your concern
I just don’t agree with your point that logical fallacies have self-referential convergence points - not in any way that undermines their fallaciousness that is. There can be self-reference to the extent that your examples exemplify, it’s just not a problem if there is any such “self-reference”.
So that’s a nope in the “major problems” department.
There’s a major problem with this though, if I’m understanding what you mean correctly.
Compatibilism between two types of argument is a monad? Are you implying that because the synthesis (of the thesis and antithesis of Free Will and Determinism) into Compatibilism can now be summed up in one term, that it then qualifies as a monad? It retains aspects of both its ingredients without really adding anything additional - surely Compatibilism is the dyad. I was under the impression that monads are indivisible, and Compatibilism is divisible. Perhaps what you want to emphasise is that its incorporation of two sides to a story makes it resemble a totality, but source matters from what I know about monads. Compatibilism is secondary, relying on its two ingredients - it is not singular and primary in its source.
Continuous Experience would be an example of a monad, and Discrete Experience a dyad. Determinism and Free Will are models of the latter, just as Compatibilism is. Experience itself, the singular fundamental substance with no other substances besides, is an example of Monism. Free Will requires Dualism, as I explained. I’m a Monist and the mind-body problem of substance Dualism is as insurmountable as any equivalent problem would be for any kind of substance Dualism - hence my 2nd argument against Free Will.
Again, I’m so relieved you’ve come around on this one. That’s one less Free Will advocate to deal with.