The point is that there are numbers larger than 0.999~ but smaller than 1. For example, 0.FFF~ (in hexadecimal system) is larger than 0.999~ but smaller than 1. In base-20 system, we have 0.JJJ~ which is larger than both hexadecimal 0.FFF~ and decimal 0.999~.
This thread is only about base I0 Magnus and so talking about other bases or systems is not relevant here
Also all the relevant arguments have already been made which is why the thread stopped two years ago
When I was reading through this, I noticed the following that seems to bring it all to a salient conclusion.
It makes sense that “0.999…” is just an expression signifying that some ratio cant be expressed by a fixed number of digits (unlike 1). It isn’t actually a number. And neither are all of those other expressions that end with “…”. And apparently that is why the Wikipedia proofs are misleading.
I am not sure why you think it’s not a number i.e. a symbol representing some quantity. It appears to me that it clearly is. It has many properties that numbers have e.g. it’s greater than some numbers and less than others.
What it isn’t is a finite quantity, that’s for sure, and that’s why it can’t be 1.
The whole question boils down to a confusion between the qualitative and the quantitative.
“1” is clearly a precise quantity, but as soon as you profess 0.(9) you add in the quality of “endlessness” to describe the repetition of the quantity of “9” for each decreasing power of 10 (or whatever base you’re using).
0.(9) is an attempt to restate the quantity “1” in a way that involves endlessness. As is 0.(3) to restate 1/3 when one divides 1 by 3. It’s an admission that one cannot denote 1/3 etc. entirely quantitatively without the use of the quality of endlessness. Multiplying 1/3 again by 3 is obviously 1 (3/3), yet multiplying 0.(3) by 3 is not so obviously 1 (0.(9)) precisely because of the injection of the qualitative into the otherwise entirely quantitative.
Subtracting 0.(9) from 9.(9) to get the exact quantity of 9 requires the same confusion.
As soon as you allow the notion of the qualitative into the quantitative you invite possibilities such as ε as an epsilon number and so on.
This is the same kind of mistake that every extended or “new” number set allows - much to the advancement of mathematics and other utilities… but not truths. Experientialism highlights the distinction.
So we see how useful it is to make particular types of mistakes that are not true, but are useful: such as the notion that 1 =/= 0.(9)
Is it really? No.
But that’s the wrong question.
The more useful question is whether any new knowledge can be gleaned from the possibility that 1 =/= 0.( 9)