And it is not coincidental that it is almost always that the social immunity fails at the darkest hour.
The Black Death was a sign of a time of total negation of the eclipse of light proceeding the fall of grace. It did prove a good sign, as MagsJ is prone to point out : there always is sunshine after a storm.
1918, the onslaught of the coming of dialectical furor that foreshadowed an an antichrist : the Fuhrer.
Marx was a diversion to Romantic idealism.
Art was burned by the the absurdists, as a reply to the proclamation: 'art for art’s ’ sake for trying to ground it pertinent, analytically .
Resulting in pure constructionist abstractions, viewing with socially authoritative elementary naive realism.
Pure foundemental , ‘progressive’ conceptual installations, , partially differentiated associations; cut ups, alienated typographies, hiding missing elemental escapism, to Herald in the possibilities for the transference from Freudian analytical salons, through the recurrent personality problems hawking emerging trends, to the finality of unabashed madness of the continuum of war from. 1848 through WW1-WW2-and today’s precipice.
There is the old sceptre hanging today, it really never went anywhere, the myth of illness does not define it, it only bursts out against the suppressed hostility of matter over form.
Ref: Georg Lukacs : Soul and Form
“The aim of the present chapter is to determine the character or nature of
(theoretical) nihilism. To do this, we will have to take up some complex
questions concerning being and knowledge. We will touch upon both of
them, and then seek to broaden and deepen our understanding in the fol‑
lowing chapters of this first part.
Can nihilism be considered the “normal” condition of humanity today?
Rather than trying to give a complete answer to this question, I intend to
focus on a fundamental dimension of nihilism: namely, the theoretical one.
Despite the myriad of analyses, can we really say that the essence of nihilism
is immediately clear for us? This is highly doubtful. On the other hand, E.
Jünger makes the particularly germane observation that “[d]efining nihilism
is not unlike identifying the cause of cancer. The identification of the cause
is not itself a cure but is preliminary to a cure. . . . To a large degree, to
understand nihilism means to understand it as a historical process.”1
Jünger
makes several notable assertions here: there is still no adequate definition
of nihilism; a definition needs to be sought; perhaps nihilism is a sickness
akin to cancer, but hopefully can be cured; and its process is historical and
universal.
Heidegger’s diagnosis is drastic inasmuch as he claims that metaphys‑
ics has always failed in its attempt to individuate the nature of nihilism:
“Nietzsche never recognized the essence of nihilism, like every other meta‑
physics before him.”2
Heidegger’s position only appears similar to Jünger’s,
insofar as he claims to have already reached what Jünger only hopes to”
© 2014 State University of New York Press, Albany