Into The Mind of Satan (Pt. 4): META-CONCEPT...META-BELIEF

INTO THE MIND OF SATAN: BEHIND THE PSYCHOPATH, A PHILOSOPHER

-PART FOUR (PRE-CONCLUSION)-

OF META-PERCEPTUAL CONCEPTS AND META-PERCEPTUAL BELIEFS: MAKE-BELIEVE UNDER THE DELUSION IT “REVEALS” THE NATURE OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD

The cold hard truth is that objects, environments, and bodies of persons only appear, and have only ever appeared, when you were present to experience them, and disappear when you no longer experience them. The idea they have independent existence or continue to exist when you no longer experience of them is nothing more than something you imagine. You have no evidence they continue to exist when you no longer experience them; you are merely super-convinced they exist, when in fact there is no evidence for their existence save when they appear when you are present and experience them.

Existence provides no other evidence for the existence of things save a person and that which the person experiences. Everything other than a person and that which the person experiences cannot be experienced, as they are not the person nor anything the person experiences, regardless of the conceptual fact that it is conceded, to avoid solipsism, that an external object or event may coincidentally exist outside the consciousness of a subject. Even here, the coincidental existence is never something that can be proven, as it exists outside and is not part of one’s consciousness: it can only exist to the subject as something the subject creates with one’s consciousness, something the subject arbitrarily invents with one’s mind.

-Author

There are inescapable logical conclusions one must face regarding consciousness and its relation to the external world if one believes in godless death. If consciousness is unambiguously defined by David Chalmers in The Problem of Consciousness as experience, and if the invariably observed structure of consciousness is the first-person experience of a person and that which the person experiences (that only exists in the form of how it appears to the subject’s point of view), and if consciousness at first does not exist before coming into existence and ceases to exist at death, it logically follows the world experienced by the subject, if it ceases to exist at death, is only composed of subjective experience, i.e. the subjective experience of the subject.

That is, if in godless death the subject and the world it experiences ceases to exist, by logical extension the world the subject experiences must be made out of the same substance as the subject; the subject’s subjective experience as the world the subject experiences is not one and the same as the world in the absence of or that remains in the advent of the sudden non-existence of the subject, as the former ceases to exist upon cessation of function of the brain and the latter is not a creation of the brain and cannot cease to exist (or come into existence from previous non-existence) due to the 1st Law of Thermodynamics.

The word “creation” suggests a creating agency as well as a process in which something new is being produced. And the traditional theological assertion of divine creation out of nothing makes two further claims: (1) Before the created objects existed, the only entity that existed was God. In short, there was nothing besides God. (2) God was the agency responsible for the change from the so-called state of “nothing” to the state in which other sorts of entities existed. These notions are conveyed by the theological overtones of the term “creation.” In English at least, this term is also used in other contexts in which it conveys the formation of something new, but need not suggest that the new object came from “nothing.” But especially in the description of processes that conform to energy-conservation laws, the use of the terms “creation” and “annihilation” can be very misleading.

Take, for example, the phrases “pair creation” and “pair annihilation,” which are familiar from the theory of particle reactions. In that theory, these phrases are employed to describe energy-conserving processes featuring the inter-transformation between radiation and a particle-pair consisting of one kind of particle and its anti-particle. Thus, when an electron and a positron collide, their rest-mass is converted into two photons of gamma radiation, which do carry energy. While the rest-mass of these photons may well be zero, this gamma radiation is obviously much more than just “nothing.” Nevertheless, even the distinguished philosopher of physics Hans Reichenbach wrote (1956, p. 265) that the particle and its anti-particle disappear “into nothing.” Evidently, the phrase “pair annihilation” obscures the fact that the energy of the original positive rest-mass of the particles reappears in the resulting gamma radiation, although the term “annihilation-radiation” is not similarly misleading. Corresponding remarks apply to the transformation of gamma radiation into an electron-positron pair: Such pair-production is certainly not a case of pair-“creation” out of nothing.

-Adolf Grunbaum, The Pseudo-Problem of Creation in Physical Cosmology

Belief in godless death forces the logical conclusion (whether or not godless death exists) that consciousness is an independent entity from everything else in infinity, as it comes into existence from previous non-existence and ceases to exist after previous existence. It cannot therefore be derived from the external world and its content is not derived from the external world or objects or substances in the external world (as consciousness first does not exist and must come into existence from non-existence and does not, therefore, “come out of” or “is broken off from” the external world).

Godless death is the best logical tool one can use to expose the conceptual fact that a person and the world the person experiences is an artificial reality or “Matrix” that is not one and the same as the external world (Death, it turns out, embarrassingly defeats Direct Realism). One cannot logically confuse that which ceases to exist when the brain ceases to function with that which does not originate from the brain and does not cease to exist in response to cessation of brain function (for those believing the brain produces consciousness).

The subject and that which the subject experiences, which if one believes in godless death does not exist before coming into existence and ceases to exist after having existed and as such does not derive from the external world, is the Perceptual Sphere of Existence or The Percept.

In terms of knowing whether or not something exists, the Percept is the only thing of which the subject can have direct, certain knowledge:

[T]rue philosophy must at all costs be idealistic; indeed, it must be so merely to be honest. For nothing is more certain that that no one ever came out of himself in order to identify himself immediately with things different from him; but everything of which he has certain, sure, and therefore immediate knowledge, lies within his consciousness. Beyond this consciousness, therefore, there can be no immediate certainty. There can never be an existence that is objective absolutely and in itself; such an existence, indeed, is positively inconceivable. For the objective always and essentially has its existence in the consciousness of a subject; it is therefore the subject’s representation, and consequently is conditioned by the subject, and moreover by the subject’s forms of representation, which belong to the subject and not to the object.

-Arthur Schopenhauer, The World As Will And Representation


META-PERCEPTUAL CONCEPT

If existence only appears or manifests in the form of a person and that which the person experiences and if in godless death a person and that which the person experience ceases to exist, anything that exists outside the “Matrix” of the Percept, from the perspective of the person that is the center of the Percept, anything that exists outside consciousness can only exist to the person in the form of a fiction as defined in 1a of its entry in the Merriam-Webster Dictionary:

fic•tion noun ˈfik-shən

1a : something invented by the imagination or feigned; specifically: an invented story

The dictionary definition may be amended in the interest of metaphysics to state that while reality outside a person and that which the person experiences only exists to the person in the form of something the person invents within one’s mind, the imagination is usually not a deliberately invented fantasy conceived as something distinct from reality but a sober proposition of the nature of non-person reality.

Reality as it may or may not exist outside the consciousness of a person, therefore, only exists to a person in the form of a Meta-Perceptual Concept: a person’s idea of what reality outside one’s consciousness might be like. Hume beautifully explains what actually occurs when someone uses one’s consciousness to describe what is not one’s consciousness, that may or may not exist outside one’s consciousness:

But to convince us that all the laws of nature, and all the operations of bodies without exception, are known only by experience, the following reflections may, perhaps, suffice. Were any object presented to us, and were we required to pronounce concerning the effect [my interjection: the presented object], which will result from it [my interjection: an external world process or “cause” that produced the “effect” of the presented object], without consulting past observation; after what manner, I beseech you, must the mind proceed in this operation? It must invent or imagine some event which it ascribes to the object as its effect; and it is plain that this invention must be entirely arbitrary.

The idea that it is something other than itself or how it appears, then, can be nothing more than something the philosopher imagines, something that arbitrarily springs to mind, as a concept that in reflection reveals itself to consist of the very thing it attempts to convince others is something other than the thing itself.

-David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding


VERIDICAL AND NON-VERIDICAL META-PERCEPTUAL CONCEPTS

Contents of consciousness

There is much more to consciousness than the mere state of being conscious, or the background state of consciousness. Arguably the most interesting states of consciousness are specific states of consciousness: the fine-grained states of subjective experience that one is in at any given time. Such states might include the experience of a particular visual image, of a particular sound pattern, of a detailed stream of conscious thought, and so on. A detailed visual experience, for example, might include the experience of certain shapes and colors in one’s environment, of specific arrangements of objects, of various relative distances and depths, and so on.
Specific states like these are most often individuated by their content. Most conscious states seem to have some sort of specific representational content, representing the world as being one way or another.

Much of the specific nature of a visual experience, for example, can be characterized in terms of content. A visual experience typically represents the world as containing various shapes and colors, as containing certain objects standing in certain spatial relations, and so on. If the experience is veridical, the world will be the way the experience represents it as being. If the experience is an illusion or is otherwise misleading, the world will be other than the experience represents it as being. But either way, it seems that visual experiences typically have detailed representational content. The same goes for experiences in other sensory modalities, and arguably for many or most nonsensory experiences as well.

-David J. Chalmers, What Is A Neural Correlate of Consciousness?

Following David J. Chalmer’s statement that visual experiences can be veridical (representing the actual state of the external world) or non-veridical (not representing the external world, re: hallucinations), there are two types of Meta-Perceptual Concept:

  1. Veridical Meta-Perceptual Concepts

  2. Non-Veridical Meta-Perceptual Concepts

VERIDICAL META-PERCEPTUAL CONCEPT

A Veridical Meta-Perceptual Concept is a concept of the external world that envisions the external world mimicking the content of visual perception as the external world in terms of appearance and behavior is believed to inform the content of visual perception. There is only one Veridical Meta-Perceptual Concept, the idea that the appearance and behavior of the external world is replicated in the content of consciousness according to the Process of Perception:

The process of perception begins with an object in the real world, known as the distal stimulus or distal object. By means of light, sound, or another physical process, the object stimulates the body’s sensory organs. These sensory organs transform the input energy into neural activity—a process called transduction. This raw pattern of neural activity is called the proximal stimulus. These neural signals are then transmitted to the brain and processed. The resulting mental re-creation of the distal stimulus is the percept.

To explain the process of perception, an example could be an ordinary shoe. The shoe itself is the distal stimulus. When light from the shoe enters a person’s eye and stimulates the retina, that stimulation is the proximal stimulus. The image of the shoe reconstructed by the brain of the person is the percept.

-Wikipedia, Perception

All other Meta-Perceptual Concepts are Non-Veridical.

The only “strength” of the Veridical Meta-Perceptual Concept is that out of any imagination of the nature of the external world, the external world is imagined to share or mimic the appearance and behavior of the content of visual perception, and parts of the external world that are not visually perceived (such as areas of and objects in deep space that have yet to appear in telescopes) or parts of the external world that will never be visually perceived (such as areas of and objects in deep space that shall forever elude the human eye) nevertheless qualify as “Neo-Veridical Meta-Perceptual Concepts” given that they will be seen in the future or if never perceived, would have been perceived in different circumstances or are never perceived due to physical or visual limitation.

The illusion of “fact” or “truth” hangs onto the Veridical Meta-Perceptual Percept because the Veridical Meta-Perceptual Percept utilizes the content of visual perception for its imaginary content. Linking the “appearance” of the external world to the appearance of visual perception lends a faux credence and “weight” to the objective truth of the existence of an external world that does nothing but mimic and inform the nature of visual consciousness.

Upon simple scrutiny that doesn’t “drink the kool-aid” of blind belief in the objective truth of the Veridical Meta-Perceptual Concept, one can see that the Veridical Meta-Perceptual Concept is fundamentally just an idea invented in the mind of the person regarding the appearance and behavior of the external world. Given that a person can only experience one’s consciousness and not that which is not one’s consciousness/that which lies outside one’s consciousness, the Veridical Meta-Perceptual Concept if the Percept is irrationally believed to be the objective form of the Veridical Meta-Perceptual Concept or, as Direct Realism states, can look directly into the Veridical Meta-Perceptual Concept, godless death reveals the objective form of the Veridical Meta-Perceptual Concept and the ability to peer from the Percept into the Veridical Meta-Perceptual Concept is an illusion of the Percept itself, as it is consciousness deluding itself into thinking it experiences something that is not the consciousness itself, or deludes itself into thinking the external world has a rigid, inflexible obligation to share the appearance of consciousness.

NON-VERIDICAL META-PERCEPTUAL CONCEPTS

Every Meta-Perceptual Concept save the Veridical Meta-Perceptual Concept underlying the process of perception is a Non-Veridical Meta-Perceptual Concept.

Every tale in every comic book ever drawn and written, and every tale in every fictional television show and movie ever produced, are Non-Veridical Meta-Perceptual Concepts. Non-comic/television/movie versions of Non-Veridical Meta-Perceptual Concepts are the imaginations of every type of theistic religion: the Afterlife in Judeo-Christian (and non-Christian) religious belief, i.e. the nature of Heaven described in the Book of Revelation and the Non-Veridical Meta-Perceptual Concept of Biblical Hell. Secular Non-Veridical Meta-Perceptual Concept include the appearance, behavior, and interactions between atoms and sub-atomic particles, or the appearance and behavior of astronomical objects that have yet to appear (or that shall never appear) to visual perception through the mediums of telescopic or robotic photography.

META-PERCEPTUAL BELIEF

Persons claiming to “know” or “understand” the nature of the external world invariably sustain or have settled upon a Meta-Perceptual Belief regarding a Meta-Perceptual Concept. Meta-Perceptual Beliefs evolve from fiction as defined in 2a of its entry in the Merriam-Webster Dictionary:

fic•tion noun [i]\ˈfik-shən[/i]

2a: an assumption of a possibility as a fact irrespective of the question of its truth <a legal fiction>

If a Meta-Perceptual Concept arouses a psychological state in the form of a powerful suspicion that the Meta-Perceptual Concept objectively exists irregardless of the fact the objective existence of the concept is inaccessible to consciousness, the psychological “sand and water” of suspicion mutates into the psychological “concrete” of conviction, which drives, based merely upon its presence, the delusion that the conviction indicates the objective existence of the Meta-Perceptual Concept. The conviction then hardens into the “statue”, perhaps carried forever within the mind of a person, of Meta-Perceptual Belief, which vies for equality with direct experience as certain knowledge.


“I know there’s a lot riding on it but it’s all psychological.”

-Ace Ventura: Pet Detective (film)

But when it comes to Meta-Perceptual Concepts and Meta-Perceptual Beliefs, “…there’s a lot riding on it but it’s all psychological”. A person only has evidence—independent of imagination, speculation, and non-experientially supported belief in the existence of something outside consciousness— of the existence of Russellian acquaintance “[that] assures us of the existence of our thoughts, feelings, and sense-data”. Everything that is not a person and that which the person experiences is prima facie fictional, as it only exists to the person in the form of a concept, an arbitrarily formed imagining of the nature of the external world.

Thus the objective existence of Meta-Perceptual Concepts that are “supported” by Meta-Perceptual Beliefs is “supported” only by psychological states that “pseudo-indicate” or “pseudo-verify” the objective existence of the referents of Meta-Perceptual Concepts. The psychological states underlie or evolve into Meta-Perceptual Beliefs, that are believed to “indicate” and “verify” the objective existence of a particular Meta-Perceptual Concept, are the “truth-hinting” feelings of suspicion and conviction.

Aside from these “truth-discovering” or “truth-verifying” feeling-states, there is nothing that demonstrates nor can demonstrate the objective existence of any Meta-Perceptual Concept, precisely because Meta-Perceptual Concepts exist outside consciousness and conscious beings can only experience that which lies within consciousness (negatively proven [conceptually] by the concept of godless death).


Russellian Inference

This brings us to the second way, according to Irem Steen and Bertrand Russell, in which one can know of the existence of something:

There are only two ways in which we can know the existence of something: “(1) immediate acquaintance, which assures us of the existence of our thoughts, feelings, and sense-data, (2) general principles according to which the existence of one thing can be inferred from that of another.” (Russell 1912a, p. 80)

The bridge which relates the physicist’s sense-data to matter must correspond to one of these ways of knowing that something exists. If our knowledge of matter can be reduced to what we know by acquaintance, then matter should be understood as a logical construction out of sense-data. Otherwise, it must be by inference that we know the existence of matter. So, according to Russell, the bridge between sense-data and matter is either inference or logical construction. (Russell 1912a, pp. 84-85)

-Irem Kurstal Steen, Russell On Matter And Our Knowledge Of The External World

In other words, according to Russell there are clues in the existence or nature of (1) [direct acquaintance] that indicate the existence of (2) [that which is not a person and that which the person experiences, and exists outside and independent of the consciousness of all persons].

Even if one accepts this, Russellian Inference does not nor cannot rationally refer to any Meta-Perceptual Concept that shall ever form within the mind of any human being that shall ever exist. One may even, if one believes in the existence of the relevant beings, extend this rational exclusion to any Meta-Perceptual Concept in the mind of Satan and any version of the Judeo-Christian God (in the case of the Pantheopsychic God, there are no Meta-Perceptual Concepts as the God is an infinite Percept: the case that Russellian inference cannot rationally refer to Meta-Perceptual Concepts in the Pantheopsychic God may be transformed into the irrationality of Russellian inference of Intra-Perceptual Concepts such as sub-dimensional beings).

Why?

Because one cannot rationally infer the form of a Meta-Perceptual Concept from the form of personal experience, as existence has only ever appeared and manifested in the form of a Percept and a Meta-Perceptual Concept, as the name implies, is something that if it objectively exists, exists outside of as it is not part of the Percept. One cannot, therefore, rationally observe the Percept and infer the non-Percept existence of a Meta-Perceptual Concept (as the Meta-Perceptual Concept exists within the Percept only in the form of an idea invented within a person’s mind).

One can, however, observe the Percept and infer—if one does not believe Percepts magically pop into existence from previous non-existence—not objects and events in the external world but the material substance of the external world from the material substance of the Percept.


The Only Rational Form of Russellian Inference

Matter is to be understood as that which physics is about. So, matter must be such that the physicist can know its existence. In other words, what physical science is concerned with and makes discoveries about must be a function of the physicist’s sense-data. What could that function be? There are only two ways in which we can know the existence of something. “(1) immediate acquaintance, which assures us of the existence of our thoughts, feelings, and sense-data, (2) general principles according to which the existence of one thing can be inferred from that of another.” (Russell 1912a, p. 80)

The bridge which relates the physicist’s sense-data to matter must correspond to one of these ways of knowing that something exists. If our knowledge of matter can be reduced to what we know by acquaintance, then matter should be understood as a logical construction out of sense-data. Otherwise, it must be by inference that we know the existence of matter. So, according to Russell, the bridge between sense-data and matter is either inference or logical construction. (Russell 1912a, pp. 84-85)

-Irem Kurstal Steen, Russell On Matter And Our Knowledge Of The External World[/b]

Bertrand Russell’s inference as the second way in which one can know the existence of something (in the absence or impossibility of direct experience), is, again, ultimately only a psychological state formed from consciousness that seems to “pick up on” or “discerns” the nature or existence of something that exists outside that consciousness. Russellian inference fails (though the subject may be deluded in its belief inference succeeds) to discern the existence of the structure and behavior of the external world, and most importantly, certainly fails to discern the existence of non-experience: that which is not/ is other than first-person subjective experience.

As stated (too many) times before, that which is not subjective experience, given that it is something that is not subjective experience, cannot rationally have anything to do with the existence and content of subjective experience. For that which is not subjective experience to have anything to do with the existence of subjective experience, an arbitrary, probably logically and metaphysically impossible magic must occur:

(1) that which is not/is other than subjective experience must possess the magic of creation ex nihilo (the ability to communicate with and cause something that does not exist to come into existence)

(2) that which is not/is other than subjective experience, given that it is not subjective experience, can only derive subjective experience (if not through creation ex nihilo) by ceasing to be something that is not/is other than subjective experience to magically transform into a person and that which the person experiences.

If Russellian inference, the second way in which one is believed to be able to know the existence of something, fails when it comes to the “appearance” and “behavior” of the external world and fails when it comes to the existence of that which is not/is other than a person and that which a person experience and subjective experience itself, is there anything Russellian inference can rationally discern the existence of, in the absence of direct and certain knowledge that only comes through direct experience?

Russellian inference is essentially the method of observing the existence of one’s consciousness, rationally noting that one’s consciousness is and just consists of first-person subjective experience, and given the evidence of the existence of consciousness “guessing” the probable nature of the external world as consciousness does not rationally exist in a vacuum but “comes from” the external world.

If one does not rationally “guess” the existence of non-experience from the existence of experience or “guess” the existence of Meta-Perceptual Concepts (particularly Non-Veridical Meta-Perceptual Concepts) from the existence of consciousness, one can only rationally infer or “guess” the probable existence of the substance making up the external world from the existence of consciousness:

If consciousness or first-person subjective experience does not exist in a vacuum but “comes from” or is derived from the external world, the external world can only rationally (eschewing the magic of creation ex nihilo and magic of the transformation of something into something it is not) be composed of first-person subjective experience.

FIRST-PERSON SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE AS THE ONLY RATIONAL FORM OF MATTER

Descartes also wrote a response to skepticism about the existence of the external world. He argues that sensory perceptions come to him involuntarily, and are not willed by him. They are external to his senses, and according to Descartes, this is evidence of the existence of something outside of his mind, and thus, an external world. Descartes goes on to show that the things in the external world are material by arguing that God would not deceive him as to the ideas that are being transmitted, and that God has given him the “propensity” to believe that such ideas are caused by material things.

-Wikipedia, Rene’ Descartes

But the only rational “material” making up things in the external world, if consciousness or first-person subjective experience does not exist in a vacuum but is something formed from the external world, is the same substance that makes up a person and that which the person experiences: first-person subjective experience.

David Hume beautifully explains the logic of a material symmetry between the substance of consciousness and the substance of the external world (and makes a beautiful argument against belief in the existence of something that is not/is other than subjective experience):

First, it must be allowed that, when we know a power, we know that very circumstance in the cause, by which it is enabled to produce the effect: for these are supposed to be synonymous…Or in other words where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed. The appearance of a cause always conveys the mind, by a customary transition, to the idea of the effect [my interjection: Hume’s statement in this sentence makes sense if one posits the idea as opposed to the appearance of a cause when it comes to something in the external world believed to create or contribute to the existence of consciousness].

But still I ask: Why take these attributes for granted, or why ascribe to the cause any qualities but what actually appear in the effect? Why torture your brain to justify the course of nature upon suppositions, which, for aught you know, may be entirely imaginary, and of which there are to be found no traces in the course of nature?

In such complicated and sublime subjects, every one should be indulged in the liberty of conjecture and argument. But here you ought to rest. If you come backward, and arguing from your inferred causes, conclude, that any other fact has existed, or will exist, in the course of nature, which may serve as a fuller display of particular attributes [my interjection: statements of “we don’t know now, but may know given the advent of science in the future that x exists (x=the existence of non-experience or that brains create consciousness)”]; I must admonish you, that you have departed from the method of reasoning, attached to the present subject, and have certainly added something to the attributes of the cause beyond what appears in the effect; otherwise you could never, with tolerable sense or propriety, add anything to the effect in order to render it more worthy of the cause.

-David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding


Meta-Perceptual Concept and Meta-Perceptual Belief underlies all religion and (Meta-Perceptual) philosophy and are often “supported” by delusion and willful ignorance—the “Sith Lords” opposing the “Jedi Knights” of philosophical honesty and faith.

The joke behind metaphysical philosophy is that for everyone save the philosophically honest and faithful, any conscious being regardless of whether or not that person is a human, God, or Satan himself is ultimately just a Percept, and any truth that can or might exist to a Percept must be derived only from the subjective experience that makes up the Percept and the experiences within the Percept; that is, any truth that can be certainly known can only be that part of reality that is and appears within the Percept.

The relevance of Meta-Perceptual Concepts and Meta-Perceptual Beliefs lie in their existence in the Meta-Perceptual Concepts of the minds of God and Satan. Despite the fact that “there’s a lot riding on it” for both beings, it nevertheless is “all psychological.”

Why?

Because even if Pantheopsychic Christianity objectively exists and the relevant Satan is a conscious Satan born from the substance of the subconscious portion of the Infinite Percept of the Judeo-Christian God, Satan’s Blood of Psyche, arguably motivated by a need for equivalence to and independence from God, remains a Meta-Perceptual Concept as unfalsifiable as that of Pantheopsychism.

The only “advantage” of Pantheopsychism over the Blood of Psyche lies in the conceptual asymmetry behind the idea of the external world as an infinite ocean of “psychic liquid” or “psychic blood”, and the circumscribed “blood bubbles” of person-consciousness that coalesce and bounce above the waves before either breaking (death) or holding firm for all eternity (immortality).

The asymmetry lies in Satan’s invention of a Meta-Perceptual Concept in which consciousness begins in his tale of the origin of things as something other than a person, such that you have something that from the very beginning is not a person but is nonetheless composed of first-person subjective experience. From the starting point of non-person consciousness, according to Satan, persons later develop. This cosmogony denies the eternity of the manifest: i.e. the way in which existence has always been known to appear and manifest—as a person.

Conversely rests God’s symmetry of Pantheopsychism, in which for all eternity existence and the substance of existence–first-person subjective experience–has only ever existed in the form of a person (and persons). Pantheopsychism and Pantheopsychic Christianity are Meta-Perceptual Concepts that satisfy Occam’s Razor by positing the non-collocational simplicity of an eternity of persons in which Psyche, rather than being an infinite ocean or assuming any other non-person form such as particles of consciousness, has only ever existed in the form of a person (and persons) in the immutable structure of an infinite Person in which dwells smaller variations of the Person that reflect or oppose its indigenous mentality.

Regardless, if truth only exists or can only be certainly known not from the mythologies of Meta-Perceptual Concepts but from the Percept and that which actually appears and occurs within Percepts, whether or not one follows Satan’s Blood of Psyche or God’s Pantheopsychism the result is the same: Existence is an inexorable machine mass-producing a single entelechy of first-person subjective experience. Truth is only revealed in the Percept: regardless of what Satan or God believes about the external world, their individual fates are ultimately determined by Psyche (the God-Substance in former writings), that through Blood of Psyche or Pantheopsychism decides the winner of universal supremacy.