Freewill exists

[Ecmandu]

Silhouette,

You need to read something like this before you hinge your whole argument on it:

https://www.mytutor.co.uk/answers/10942 ... -fatalism/

And you're whole thing about needing to lie to communicate... why isn't that a lie? If that is a lie, by its own axiom, then that means that you don't have to lie to communicate.

[promethean75]

so what was i saying before i was so rudely interrupted by my job, earlier. oh yeah... i remember.

okay so to be a self cause, a thing's existence must pertain to the essence of its being such that it can be conceived of through itself... or as spinz puts it: 'that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.'

what the heck does that mean? well it kinda means only a thing that has to exist is not dependent or constrained by anything else in order to exist... that is, it cannot be said to be an effect of any other cause because it's existence is not granted or determined by anything else. it's very nature involves existence, and this is not compelled or brought into being by anything. he goes on to say:

'That thing is called free, which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is determined by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing is necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of existence or action.'

human beings are one such 'thing'. their essence does not involve existence - they don't have to exist - and they can be thought of as a particular mode or modification of that thing which has as its essence it's very existence. spinz calls it 'substance', and this exists prior to any of its modifications. a particular modification is causally necessary, but contingent insofar as it is not its own cause, i.e., it depends on something other than itself to exist. namely, the particular modification nature takes in the event that a human being comes into being. human beings are therefore posterior to substance and cannot be self-caused, since only substance, which has as it's essence its very existence, cannot exist as part of something else... as an effect of something else.

this basically means that if a thing can be conceived of as non-existent, its essence does not involve existence. because we can't conceive of nature (substance) as not existing, at least one thing has no cause prior to itself which brought it into being... while the human being, on the other hand, does not have to exist, and is neither its own cause, or free from being caused by something other than itself. ergo; there is no freewill.

i will now take your questions (which i probably won't answer).

[Silhouette]

Silhouette,

You need to read something like this before you hinge your whole argument on it:

https://www.mytutor.co.uk/answers/10942 ... -fatalism/

And you're whole thing about needing to lie to communicate... why isn't that a lie? If that is a lie, by its own axiom, then that means that you don't have to lie to communicate.

Lol, thanks for providing a link to an explanation that pretty much exactly re-iterates my points

I mean, the clue is in the website pathing: "A-Level". This may not be known to everyone here, but that's the UK equivalent of high school juniors and seniors in the US - so one of the most basic of philosophical distinctions.

Why are you recommending I read something that says what I'm already saying? Or are you not reading what I'm saying?

And the "lie to communicate" thing, as I just explained in my response to barbarianhorde is a means not ends thing. The means are a lie, the ends can result in truth - just like all stories.

[Artimas]

so what was i saying before i was so rudely interrupted by my job, earlier. oh yeah... i remember.

okay so to be a self cause, a thing's existence must pertain to the essence of its being such that it can be conceived of through itself... or as spinz puts it: 'that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.'

what the heck does that mean? well it kinda means only a thing that has to exist is not dependent or constrained by anything else in order to exist... that is, it cannot be said to be an effect of any other cause because it's existence is not granted or determined by anything else. it's very nature involves existence, and this is not compelled or brought into being by anything. he goes on to say:

'That thing is called free, which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is determined by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing is necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of existence or action.'

human beings are one such 'thing'. their essence does not involve existence - they don't have to exist - and they can be thought of as a particular mode or modification of that thing which has as its essence it's very existence. spinz calls it 'substance', and this exists prior to any of its modifications. a particular modification is causally necessary, but contingent insofar as it is not its own cause, i.e., it depends on something other than itself to exist. namely, the particular modification nature takes in the event that a human being comes into being. human beings are therefore posterior to substance and cannot be self-caused, since only substance, which has as it's essence its very existence, cannot exist as part of something else... as an effect of something else.

this basically means that if a thing can be conceived of as non-existent, its essence does not involve existence. because we can't conceive of nature (substance) as not existing, at least one thing has no cause prior to itself which brought it into being... while the human being, on the other hand, does not have to exist, and is neither its own cause, or free from being caused by something other than itself. ergo; there is no freewill.

i will now take your questions (which i probably won't answer).

Are you saying humanity is separate from nature? If you imply so then no, we weren’t self caused. We are nature, conscious of itself, how is that not self causation? I am the very cause and effect of nature itself and it’s millions of years of trial and error of which bred more and more complexity. What’s consciousness if not conceived from itself and the levels of unconscious/subconscious? The idea is only labeled an idea to the conscious state of which was inevitable. We named what already had existed after it existed. Language doesn’t dictate that we were not indeed self conceived by nature itself, of which we are.

We are an infinitely long string of which is the self causation of nature, the inverting of consciousness, the mirror, the loop.


Ok and consciousness /has/ to exist for there to be an observable will, of which was self causation through nature itself. Yes, nature is a collection of different levels of consciousness, how do I know this? Well what are we, are you asserting there is no sub/unconscious state to man?


So explain, what’s external to nature and it’s layers of overlapping un/sub/conscious? Nature determined itself free, hence, consciousness.. I really don’t understand how this is missed and why the separation of man and nature is still conflated or missed.


Human beings may not have to exist, but consciousness does due to its being inevitable to a timeless reality/existence of ever evolving complex change. So tell me, did man not come from nature or did it? Even if not human being, consciousness would have been manifested through nature, what are other species if not? What’s existence at all, if not progressive complexity in and of itself?


Consciousness is nature. Man is nature caused by itself.... did we not /cause/ our own survival by adaptation and endurance? If not self caused, why not extinction? Like we haven’t seen other species perish?

The Simplest mistake can form an entire opposition. Man is not separate from nature, it is in itself conscious.

[Urwrongx1000]

Nature doesn't plan or foresee anything... but causation does not need these things to exist.

I agree, and that means "Determinism" is Unnatural.

[Ecmandu]

Silhouette,

You need to read something like this before you hinge your whole argument on it:

https://www.mytutor.co.uk/answers/10942 ... -fatalism/

And you're whole thing about needing to lie to communicate... why isn't that a lie? If that is a lie, by its own axiom, then that means that you don't have to lie to communicate.

Lol, thanks for providing a link to an explanation that pretty much exactly re-iterates my points

I mean, the clue is in the website pathing: "A-Level". This may not be known to everyone here, but that's the UK equivalent of high school juniors and seniors in the US - so one of the most basic of philosophical distinctions.

Why are you recommending I read something that says what I'm already saying? Or are you not reading what I'm saying?

And the "lie to communicate" thing, as I just explained in my response to barbarianhorde is a means not ends thing. The means are a lie, the ends can result in truth - just like all stories.

I have absolutely no clue why you're LOLing this… by multiple definitions, the distinction that this essay and dictionaries try to make is that fatalism still allows choice, even though the end result is the same… it's a form of theistic molonism.

determinism means that there is no choice whatsoever, all actions human and otherwise are predetermined at every point.

It was the definition of determinism that I was using when stating that it's unfalsifiable.

You had inverse definitions for fatalism and determinism, when you stated, in argument to this point, that you weren't a fatalist but rather a determinist.

Your LOL here is bizarre.

Your waffling on the lie to tell a truth doesn't work when the truth is not speaking at all. You are now flailing at this point, and it looks more pathetic as each additional post comes.

[promethean75]

I agree, and that means "Determinism" is Unnatural.

right, and impossible, because nature isn't a 'determiner'. but this is no refutation of causality. it seems like it is because of the way you understand the word 'determine'. it's become a linguistic habit in philosophy to equivocate the words 'cause' and 'determine'. first look at this excellent post:

Ok, here is my summary [of my ideas on 'determinism'], but comrades should not expect a water-tight solution to such a knotty problem in a few paragraphs. I am only posting this because I was asked to do so.

[I will however be publishing an essay specifically about this in the next few years, where I will substantiate what I have to say below far more fully.]

This issue has always revolved around the use of terminology drawn from traditional philosophy (such as "determined", "will", "free", and the like), the use of which bears no relation to how these words are employed in ordinary speech.

For example, "determine" and its cognates are typically used in sentences like this "The rules determine what you can do in chess", "The time of the next train can be determined from the timetable", or "I am determined to go on the demonstration" and so on. Hence this word is normally used in relation to what human beings can do, can apply, or can bring about.

As we will see, their use in traditional thought inverts this, making nature the agent and human beings the patient. No wonder then that the 'solution' to this artificial problem (i.e., 'determinism' and 'free will') has eluded us for over 2000 years.

To use an analogy, would we take seriously anyone who wondered when the King and Queen in chess got married, and then wanted to know who conducted the ceremony? Or, whether planning permission had been sought for that castle over in the corner? Such empty questions, of course, have no answer.

To be sure, this is more difficult to see in relation to the traditional question at hand, but it is nonetheless the result of similar confusions. So, it is my contention that this 'problem' has only arisen because ideologically-motivated theorists (from centuries ago) asked such empty questions, based on a misuse of language. [More on this below.]

When the details are worked out, 'determinism', for instance, can only be made to seem to work if nature is anthropomorphised, so that such things as 'natural law' 'determine' the course of events -- both in reality in general and in the central nervous system in particular -- thus 'controlling' what we do.

But, this is to take concepts that properly apply to what we do and can decide, and then impose them on natural events, suggesting that nature is controlled by a cosmic will of some sort. [Why this is so, I will outline presently.]

So, it's natural to ask: Where is this law written, and who passed it?

Of course, the answer to these questions is "No one" and "Nowhere", but then how can something that does not exist control anything?

It could be responded that natural law is just a summary of how things have so far gone up to now. In that case, such 'laws' are descriptive not prescriptive -- but it is the latter of these implications that determinists need.

Now, the introduction of modal notions here (such as 'must', or 'necessary') cannot be justified from this descriptive nature of 'law' without re-introducing the untoward anthropomorphic connotations mentioned above.

So, if we say that A has always followed B, we cannot now say A must follow B unless we attribute to B some form of control over A (and recall A has not yet happened, so what B is supposed to be controlling is somewhat obscure). And if we now try to say what we mean by 'control' (on lines such as 'could not be otherwise', or 'B made A happen') we need to explain how B prevented, say, C happening instead, and made sure that A, and only A took place.

The use of "obey" here would give the game away, since if this word is used with connotations that go beyond mere description, then this will imply that events like A understand the 'law' (like so many good citizens), and always do the same when B beckons, right across the entire universe --, and, indeed, that this 'law' must exist in some form to make things obey it. Of course, if it doesn't mean this, then what does it mean?

Now, I maintain that any attempt to fill in the details here will introduce notions of will and intelligence into the operation of B on A (and also on C) -- and that is why theorists have found they have had to drag in anthropomorphic concepts here (such as 'determine', 'obey' 'law' and 'control') to fill this gap, failing to note that the use of such words does indeed imply there is a will of some sort operating in nature. [But, note the qualification I introduce here, below. There were ideological reasons why these words were in fact used.]

If this is denied then 'determine' (etc.) can only be working descriptively, and we are back at square one.

Incidentally, the above problems are not to be avoided by the introduction of biochemical, neurological, and/or physiological objects and processes. The same questions apply here as elsewhere: how can, for example, a certain chemical 'control' what happens next unless it is intelligent in some way? Reducing this to physics is even worse; how can 'the field' (or whatever) control the future? 'The field' is a mathematical object and no more capable of controlling anything than a Hermite polynomial is. Of course, and once more, to argue otherwise would be to anthropomorphise such things -- which is why I made the argument above abstract, since it covers all bases.

This also explains why theorists (and particularly scientists who try to popularise their work) find they have to use 'scare quotes' and metaphor everywhere in this area.

As I noted earlier, this whole way of looking at 'the will' inverts things. We are denied a will (except formally) and nature is granted one. As many might now be able to see, this is yet another aspect of the alienating nature of traditional thought, where words are fetishised and we are dehumanised.

And this should not surprise us since such questions were originally posed theologically (and thus ideologically), where theorists were quite happy to alienate to 'god' such control over nature and our supposedly 'free' actions'. Hence, we too find that we have to appropriate such distorted terminology if we follow traditional patterns of thought in this area.

okay so you got all that figured out now and the word 'determine' is out of the way forevermore. but can the same be said about what 'cause' means, and whether or not such a thing can be attributed to nature... and not just a 'little', but absolutely and completely.

the next step is to recognize the difference in meaning of the words 'cause' and 'reason'. this is another linguistic habit that contributes to a misunderstanding of causality. we tend to think of them as the same, but they aren't. only in the case of a deliberating determiner can there be a 'reason'; urwrong finds himself at the mall and remembers that he wanted to go shopping. he then thinks of his reason for being at the mall as the cause for him being at the mall... but it's not. not metaphysically, anyway. urwrong's intention has no causal agency; it doesn't make things happen in the physical world. the thought 'i'd like to go to the mall' corresponds with the action of going, but doesn't cause it, because thoughts can't be causes. and yet you're certain that your reason for going was also the cause of your going. this is not your fault, but rene's (descartes).

so since nature doesn't determine anything, it has no reasons... and since urwrong is a determiner who doesn't cause anything, he has only reasons... which, incidentally, he mistakes as causes.

are you picking up what i'm puttin' down, dude?

[Ecmandu]

I agree, and that means "Determinism" is Unnatural.

right, and impossible, because nature isn't a 'determiner'. but this is no refutation of causality. it seems like it is because of the way you understand the word 'determine'. it's become a linguistic habit in philosophy to equivocate the words 'cause' and 'determine'. first look at this excellent post:

Ok, here is my summary [of my ideas on 'determinism'], but comrades should not expect a water-tight solution to such a knotty problem in a few paragraphs. I am only posting this because I was asked to do so.

[I will however be publishing an essay specifically about this in the next few years, where I will substantiate what I have to say below far more fully.]

This issue has always revolved around the use of terminology drawn from traditional philosophy (such as "determined", "will", "free", and the like), the use of which bears no relation to how these words are employed in ordinary speech.

For example, "determine" and its cognates are typically used in sentences like this "The rules determine what you can do in chess", "The time of the next train can be determined from the timetable", or "I am determined to go on the demonstration" and so on. Hence this word is normally used in relation to what human beings can do, can apply, or can bring about.

As we will see, their use in traditional thought inverts this, making nature the agent and human beings the patient. No wonder then that the 'solution' to this artificial problem (i.e., 'determinism' and 'free will') has eluded us for over 2000 years.

To use an analogy, would we take seriously anyone who wondered when the King and Queen in chess got married, and then wanted to know who conducted the ceremony? Or, whether planning permission had been sought for that castle over in the corner? Such empty questions, of course, have no answer.

To be sure, this is more difficult to see in relation to the traditional question at hand, but it is nonetheless the result of similar confusions. So, it is my contention that this 'problem' has only arisen because ideologically-motivated theorists (from centuries ago) asked such empty questions, based on a misuse of language. [More on this below.]

When the details are worked out, 'determinism', for instance, can only be made to seem to work if nature is anthropomorphised, so that such things as 'natural law' 'determine' the course of events -- both in reality in general and in the central nervous system in particular -- thus 'controlling' what we do.

But, this is to take concepts that properly apply to what we do and can decide, and then impose them on natural events, suggesting that nature is controlled by a cosmic will of some sort. [Why this is so, I will outline presently.]

So, it's natural to ask: Where is this law written, and who passed it?

Of course, the answer to these questions is "No one" and "Nowhere", but then how can something that does not exist control anything?

It could be responded that natural law is just a summary of how things have so far gone up to now. In that case, such 'laws' are descriptive not prescriptive -- but it is the latter of these implications that determinists need.

Now, the introduction of modal notions here (such as 'must', or 'necessary') cannot be justified from this descriptive nature of 'law' without re-introducing the untoward anthropomorphic connotations mentioned above.

So, if we say that A has always followed B, we cannot now say A must follow B unless we attribute to B some form of control over A (and recall A has not yet happened, so what B is supposed to be controlling is somewhat obscure). And if we now try to say what we mean by 'control' (on lines such as 'could not be otherwise', or 'B made A happen') we need to explain how B prevented, say, C happening instead, and made sure that A, and only A took place.

The use of "obey" here would give the game away, since if this word is used with connotations that go beyond mere description, then this will imply that events like A understand the 'law' (like so many good citizens), and always do the same when B beckons, right across the entire universe --, and, indeed, that this 'law' must exist in some form to make things obey it. Of course, if it doesn't mean this, then what does it mean?

Now, I maintain that any attempt to fill in the details here will introduce notions of will and intelligence into the operation of B on A (and also on C) -- and that is why theorists have found they have had to drag in anthropomorphic concepts here (such as 'determine', 'obey' 'law' and 'control') to fill this gap, failing to note that the use of such words does indeed imply there is a will of some sort operating in nature. [But, note the qualification I introduce here, below. There were ideological reasons why these words were in fact used.]

If this is denied then 'determine' (etc.) can only be working descriptively, and we are back at square one.

Incidentally, the above problems are not to be avoided by the introduction of biochemical, neurological, and/or physiological objects and processes. The same questions apply here as elsewhere: how can, for example, a certain chemical 'control' what happens next unless it is intelligent in some way? Reducing this to physics is even worse; how can 'the field' (or whatever) control the future? 'The field' is a mathematical object and no more capable of controlling anything than a Hermite polynomial is. Of course, and once more, to argue otherwise would be to anthropomorphise such things -- which is why I made the argument above abstract, since it covers all bases.

This also explains why theorists (and particularly scientists who try to popularise their work) find they have to use 'scare quotes' and metaphor everywhere in this area.

As I noted earlier, this whole way of looking at 'the will' inverts things. We are denied a will (except formally) and nature is granted one. As many might now be able to see, this is yet another aspect of the alienating nature of traditional thought, where words are fetishised and we are dehumanised.

And this should not surprise us since such questions were originally posed theologically (and thus ideologically), where theorists were quite happy to alienate to 'god' such control over nature and our supposedly 'free' actions'. Hence, we too find that we have to appropriate such distorted terminology if we follow traditional patterns of thought in this area.

okay so you got all that figured out now and the word 'determine' is out of the way forevermore. but can the same be said about what 'cause' means, and whether or not such a thing can be attributed to nature... and not just a 'little', but absolutely and completely.

the next step is to recognize the difference in meaning of the words 'cause' and 'reason'. this is another linguistic habit that contributes to a misunderstanding of causality. we tend to think of them as the same, but they aren't. only in the case of a deliberating determiner can there be a 'reason'; urwrong finds himself at the mall and remembers that he wanted to go shopping. he then thinks of his reason for being at the mall as the cause for him being at the mall... but it's not. not metaphysically, anyway. urwrong's intention has no causal agency; it doesn't make things happen in the physical world. the thought 'i'd like to go to the mall' corresponds with the action of going, but doesn't cause it, because thoughts can't be causes. and yet you're certain that your reason for going was also the cause of your going. this is not your fault, but rene's (descartes).

so since nature doesn't determine anything, it has no reasons... and since urwrong is a determiner who doesn't cause anything, he has only reasons... which, incidentally, he mistakes as causes.

are you picking up what i'm puttin' down, dude?

Oh my goodness, this is one of the lamest arguments I've seen in a long time.

This entire post is moot if anyone just adds the word "non anthropomorphic" before they use one of these words.

[Urwrongx1000]

I wanted to go to the mall be-CAUSE of two main reasons:

1) A movie
2) Go to a favorite restaurant for their pot-stickers

The movie wasn't that great, but I had to see it anyway. The pot-stickers were delicious though, always a big treat, and made the whole trip worthwhile.


Pot-stickers were the first cause, the Prima Causa, the driving-force for going to the mall. To eat. To live. To add to my Will-To-Power.

[promethean75]

This entire post is moot

Nuh-uh. your mom is moot.

[Artimas]

I wanted to go to the mall be-CAUSE of two main reasons:

1) A movie
2) Go to a favorite restaurant for their pot-stickers

The movie wasn't that great, but I had to see it anyway. The pot-stickers were delicious though, always a big treat, and made the whole trip worthwhile.


Pot-stickers were the first cause, the Prima Causa, the driving-force for going to the mall. To eat. To live. To add to my Will-To-Power.

And even on top of your want and desire or attributing value to the cause of going, you could have subconsciously wanted to go as well, which al it of times people subconsciously do things or something surfaces from that aspect of mind to the conscious mind, there’s multiple causations I’d say, in reality.

[Silhouette]

Sillouette,

I just have a general statement for you that might not seem relevant ... I'm saying this with all of your posts here swirling in at the same time:

"I am speaking", is a phrase where reference and that being referred to, co exist, they overlap.

You tend to assume a law of mutual exclusivity, when there are in fact verifiable convergences.

Just because words can refer to their means of communication, doesn't mean the words aren't still separate from their means of communication.

In computer programming, you have values but you also have addresses to where said values are stored in memory. You can create "pointers" to values, which hold value addresses as their value instead of the value itself, but pointers have their own address different to the address of the value, and you have to "dereference" them recall the actual value. Now, you might equally try to create a pointer to point to its own address (analogous to "I am speaking", or any tautology) but even if compilers let you do this, the pointer value and the pointer address would give you the same value but this doesn't mean values are addresses.

Overlap/coexist doesn't mean convergence into the same thing. Operational equivalence isn't complete equivalence: a good example that's on topic is that Fatalism and Determinism could both be used to predict the future, so they are operationally equivalent, but they aren't the same thing because how you get there makes all the difference. It's like two routes of the same length to the same destination are not the same route: "I am speaking" is not the same as I am speaking (without inverted commas).

Your last two challenges have been fun! I had to give them some thought, keep 'em coming.

I have absolutely no clue why you're LOLing this… by multiple definitions, the distinction that this essay and dictionaries try to make is that fatalism still allows choice, even though the end result is the same… it's a form of theistic molonism.

Do you mean Molinism?

I "loled" because it's like me recommending that you go read something that you were saying in much the same words anyway - like telling a teacher to go to one of his own classes. I don't think it's bizarre to lol at something like that.

Yes Fatalism would allow choice and Free Will, and all kinds of feel-good stuff that isn't actually true - it's like a botch attempt to reconcile things like Free Will with the fact that things can be totally predictable (by Determinism), just for the sake of holding onto the feel-good stuff. Fatalism fits all the criticism said to be against Determinism, because Free Will advocates like the feeling of being in control, having a prima causa self that can decide ex nihilo, but under Fatalism it wouldn't matter - which is demoralising <sad face>. Determinism does away with the feel-good stuff by sticking to hard truths that can be reliably and repeatedly tested, which just so happens to fit perfectly with the fact that things can be predicted - even complex things.

determinism means that there is no choice whatsoever, all actions human and otherwise are predetermined at every point.

There's still choice in Determinism, but you need to examine what you mean by choice. I still choose to write this post instead of do something else that I want to do, but it's because the four fundamental forces resulting in me choosing that - not because my prima causa self decided ex nihilo. Even if Free Will could be true, you still only ever choose one choice just the same as under Determinism, except under Free Will you "could have" just as easily chosen to do some other thing instead, even though you didn't. It seems like you could have, and yet you didn't for a reason, and no evidence that you could have chosen otherwise at that point in time will ever occur again because the time has gone. Choosing something different at a later point in time is not the same thing as choosing it at the previous time, because the determining factors have changed. Even if you could go back in time to choose the other choice, the determining factors would have changed. If you went back in time and had no recollection of it, and all determining factors and reasons reset as well, the reasons for you choosing your choice would be no different, so you'd still choose the same thing that you had your reason to choose just the same.

This is all Determinism really requires for you to get to grips with: a proper examination of terminology and what terms really mean (like "choice").

But if all proper examination and use of examples to prove my point is "waffle" to you then stay in the dark all you like. Determinism is still the best model of what's going on and Free Will is still full of contradictions. You're just being determined to side with the contradictions at this point. It could change, given the right reasons being determined - but with incomplete information of exactly what's stopping you, we'll just have to find out. If anyone was able to follow the complexity of what's determining each neuron in your brain to not see sense then it would be perfectly possible to figure out how to get you up to speed - difficult technology would be needed but it would be perfectly possible.

More interesting questions arise here though - what happens when such technology is possible and the exact complexity of Determinism behind people's thoughts is cleared up? The potential for misuse is scary, but it seems this is most likely our future. On the positive side, we wouldn't need to dance around in circles if a machine could simply process "oh this is the reason he doesn't understand".

[Ecmandu]

Sillouette,

I just have a general statement for you that might not seem relevant ... I'm saying this with all of your posts here swirling in at the same time:

"I am speaking", is a phrase where reference and that being referred to, co exist, they overlap.

You tend to assume a law of mutual exclusivity, when there are in fact verifiable convergences.

Just because words can refer to their means of communication, doesn't mean the words aren't still separate from their means of communication.

In computer programming, you have values but you also have addresses to where said values are stored in memory. You can create "pointers" to values, which hold value addresses as their value instead of the value itself, but pointers have their own address different to the address of the value, and you have to "dereference" them recall the actual value. Now, you might equally try to create a pointer to point to its own address (analogous to "I am speaking", or any tautology) but even if compilers let you do this, the pointer value and the pointer address would give you the same value but this doesn't mean values are addresses.

Overlap/coexist doesn't mean convergence into the same thing. Operational equivalence isn't complete equivalence: a good example that's on topic is that Fatalism and Determinism could both be used to predict the future, so they are operationally equivalent, but they aren't the same thing because how you get there makes all the difference. It's like two routes of the same length to the same destination are not the same route: "I am speaking" is not the same as I am speaking (without inverted commas).

Your last two challenges have been fun! I had to give them some thought, keep 'em coming.

I have absolutely no clue why you're LOLing this… by multiple definitions, the distinction that this essay and dictionaries try to make is that fatalism still allows choice, even though the end result is the same… it's a form of theistic molonism.

Do you mean Molinism?

I "loled" because it's like me recommending that you go read something that you were saying in much the same words anyway - like telling a teacher to go to one of his own classes. I don't think it's bizarre to lol at something like that.

Yes Fatalism would allow choice and Free Will, and all kinds of feel-good stuff that isn't actually true - it's like a botch attempt to reconcile things like Free Will with the fact that things can be totally predictable (by Determinism), just for the sake of holding onto the feel-good stuff. Fatalism fits all the criticism said to be against Determinism, because Free Will advocates like the feeling of being in control, having a prima causa self that can decide ex nihilo, but under Fatalism it wouldn't matter - which is demoralising <sad face>. Determinism does away with the feel-good stuff by sticking to hard truths that can be reliably and repeatedly tested, which just so happens to fit perfectly with the fact that things can be predicted - even complex things.

determinism means that there is no choice whatsoever, all actions human and otherwise are predetermined at every point.

There's still choice in Determinism, but you need to examine what you mean by choice. I still choose to write this post instead of do something else that I want to do, but it's because the four fundamental forces resulting in me choosing that - not because my prima causa self decided ex nihilo. Even if Free Will could be true, you still only ever choose one choice just the same as under Determinism, except under Free Will you "could have" just as easily chosen to do some other thing instead, even though you didn't. It seems like you could have, and yet you didn't for a reason, and no evidence that you could have chosen otherwise at that point in time will ever occur again because the time has gone. Choosing something different at a later point in time is not the same thing as choosing it at the previous time, because the determining factors have changed. Even if you could go back in time to choose the other choice, the determining factors would have changed. If you went back in time and had no recollection of it, and all determining factors and reasons reset as well, the reasons for you choosing your choice would be no different, so you'd still choose the same thing that you had your reason to choose just the same.

This is all Determinism really requires for you to get to grips with: a proper examination of terminology and what terms really mean (like "choice").

But if all proper examination and use of examples to prove my point is "waffle" to you then stay in the dark all you like. Determinism is still the best model of what's going on and Free Will is still full of contradictions. You're just being determined to side with the contradictions at this point. It could change, given the right reasons being determined - but with incomplete information of exactly what's stopping you, we'll just have to find out. If anyone was able to follow the complexity of what's determining each neuron in your brain to not see sense then it would be perfectly possible to figure out how to get you up to speed - difficult technology would be needed but it would be perfectly possible.

More interesting questions arise here though - what happens when such technology is possible and the exact complexity of Determinism behind people's thoughts is cleared up? The potential for misuse is scary, but it seems this is most likely our future. On the positive side, we wouldn't need to dance around in circles if a machine could simply process "oh this is the reason he doesn't understand".

It's amazing that you wrote this immense post(which I enjoyed) without responding to the fact(in a previous post of mine (that determinism is by definition not falsifiable.))

You actually never quoted, nor have directly responded to that post. The post is here: viewtopic.php?f=1&t=194947&start=250#p2728904

I take that back.. silhouette, you posted a snippet of it and then argued your definitions of determinism and fatalism in reverse

[Silhouette]

It's amazing that you wrote this immense post(which I enjoyed) without responding to the fact(in a previous post of mine (that determinism is by definition not falsifiable.))

You actually never quoted, nor have directly responded to that post. The post is here: viewtopic.php?f=1&t=194947&start=250#p2728904

Oh ok.

Well to determine if something is falsifiable, you have to be able to devise a test that could show that it could be wrong.

To do that for Determinism, you need to define exactly what constitutes evidence that shows Determinism is not causing an effect: namely that effects are occurring for certain without cause.

This is problematic because the intention here is to not only prove a negative, but also to prove a negative in a general case rather than just a specific one. I suppose you could try, for example, to find certain circumstances where none of the fundamental forces show their expected effects, and you'd have evidence that in that specific case, Determinism doesn't model what's going on. But for the general case you'd need to show the fundamental forces don't work anywhere - despite the evidence being overwhelmingly strong to support the theory that they do operate everywhere we test them. Determinism is getting proven all the time, even as we speak, but that's not to say it's impossible to prove it isn't.

There could be proposed a new theory that supercedes Determinism, which would partially disprove it in the same way that general relativity disproves that time and space are absolutes, even though in everyday conditions you can explain things very accurately even if you assume they are absolutes.
But if you wanted to prove that Free Will was going on in special cases like the mind, as a better explanation than Determinism, you would have to prove that, given a reason to choose one way over another, the outcome was no greater than random. Experiments show that not only can choices be influenced, the illusion that you were making the choices yourself remains in tact. You could try and trick this experiment, and choose as randomly as you can, in spite of having a reason to choose one way over another, but then you would also have to prove your impetus to trick was similarly not caused by prior conditions to any degree more than random chance - because your impetus to trick becomes your new reason to choose how you do. So Determinism catches everything here.
Basically, even if something superceded Determinism, it wouldn't be Free Will to any degree, and if indeterminacy was going on in specific circumstances alongside Determinism, it won't falsify Determinism. But that's not to say you couldn't find evidence that Indeterminacy was actually going on everywhere and the seeming Determinism was all an illusion.

So given all of the above, it should be clear that it's perfectly possible to falsify Determinism in certain ways, but even if you did you would not be proving Free Will in its stead - to any degree. It would be some "God-of-the-gaps" argument to try and say, given any lack of Determinism modelling what's going on, that we can safely fall back on a predecessor model instead. That would be fallacious, resembling the False Dilemma fallacy.

This is why, given the perfect falsifiability of Determinism as I've just demonstrated, I only give credence to indeterminacy in its stead, and even then only in specific situations alongside Determinism. If Determinism ever is falsifiable, it will be to yield to the next evolution up from Determinism, whatever that may be, but it won't be a step back down to Free Will to any degree.

[Urwrongx1000]

the intention here is to not only prove a negative, but also to prove a negative in a general case rather than just a specific one

Good, so you admit that Determinism is unfalsifiable by your own admission here.

Anything else...??

[promethean75]

Yeah one more thing. Freewill is unfalsifiable too, and the principle of parsimony would lead us to avoid it in theory. It's much, much more complicated than the theory of determinism. Occam wouldn't shave with it, I can assure you.

[Artimas]

Yeah one more thing. Freewill is unfalsifiable too, and the principle of parsimony would lead us to avoid it in theory. It's much, much more complicated than the theory of determinism. Occam wouldn't shave with it, I can assure you.

How is the ability to attribute value from understanding/wisdom more complicated than cause and effect?

[Silhouette]

Freewill is unfalsifiable too

Why do you say "too"? Do you think Determinism is unfalsifiable?

What about the points I raised in my last post? I show quite clearly that you can falsify Determinism, even if it's not without difficulty.
Like all things, you can prove outcomes that do not abide the by a theory, or better, you replace it with something else, which explains both what the previous theory explains but also what it doesn't. This is what Determinism did to Free Will, and maybe one day something else will do it to Determinism but it won't be Free Will.

It would be possible for an idiot to take my post to mean you can't falsify Determinism (they'd be saying you can't falsify anything if they tried to pull that one), but you've proven yourself to be far from idiotic, promethean.

Free Will is also falsifiable, you just show everything thought to be Free isn't free - like Determinism did.

[Urwrongx1000]

Free Will is not un-falsifiable because I can prove that some organisms are freer than others.

An Olympic athlete can high jump 8 ft. Most humans, most animals, cannot. The Olympic athlete is freer than most others.


I can give millions and millions of other examples.

Silhouette, cannot give one example of his claims.

[Artimas]

Free Will is not un-falsifiable because I can prove that some organisms are freer than others.

An Olympic athlete can high jump 8 ft. Most humans, most animals, cannot. The Olympic athlete is freer than most others.


I can give millions and millions of other examples.

Silhouette, cannot give one example of his claims.

I was thinking the same thing, the method in which depicting some organisms more free than others.

[Karpel Tunnel]

Free Will is not un-falsifiable because I can prove that some organisms are freer than others.

An Olympic athlete can high jump 8 ft. Most humans, most animals, cannot. The Olympic athlete is freer than most others.

That kind of freedom has nothing to do with free will. The moon can't send out solar flares. Is the Sun more free? The range of capabilities one has has nothing to do with the kind of freedom talked about in free will. Free will is not being controlled by the domino sequence of internal and external causes. To have an uncaused cause, so that something that might never have happened could happen. No one has given a clear indication of what that process would be like. As said, I black box the issue and see problems with both free will and determinism positions, but this repeatedly framing the issue in ways that are category errors
just feed the determinists.
Silhouette, I think, is too confident in his determinist position and the problems of thinking dterminism and thinking one is rational. But at least he would understand the differences between the types of freedom: the one relevent to free will and the one that is relevent to the capabilities or qualities of an organims or thing. The latter having nothing to do with free will.

So he will just, and rightly so, come back and present his case, because your argument here has nothing to do with free will.

nothing.

[Artimas]

Free Will is not un-falsifiable because I can prove that some organisms are freer than others.

An Olympic athlete can high jump 8 ft. Most humans, most animals, cannot. The Olympic athlete is freer than most others.

That kind of freedom has nothing to do with free will. The moon can't send out solar flares. Is the Sun more free? The range of capabilities one has has nothing to do with the kind of freedom talked about in free will. Free will is not being controlled by the domino sequence of internal and external causes. To have an uncaused cause, so that something that might never have happened could happen. No one has given a clear indication of what that process would be like. As said, I black box the issue and see problems with both free will and determinism positions, but this repeatedly framing the issue in ways that are category errors
just feed the determinists.
Silhouette, I think, is too confident in his determinist position and the problems of thinking dterminism and thinking one is rational. But at least he would understand the differences between the types of freedom: the one relevent to free will and the one that is relevent to the capabilities or qualities of an organims or thing. The latter having nothing to do with free will.

So he will just, and rightly so, come back and present his case, because your argument here has nothing to do with free will.

nothing.

I don’t think it’s a categorical error to compare between states of consciousness. The moon and sun is not conscious, so it’s sending out a solar flare could happen if the correct variables and time are present, this isn’t Conscious decision of the sun to do such, which means it is innocent if it were to. There is no intent because there is no conscious value attribution.

Comparing an unconscious state to a conscious state is the very proof of different states. Not sure how it is a categorical error. It doesn’t need to be “free” of cause and effect because it is the very ability to understand cause and effect of which that ability is not confined in the first place, using that understanding to cause an effect, willingly.. you know, choose ones own fate? That is freedom.

It’s funny how some people say the matrix is a good movie yet miss the entire sentiment of what it is about, that entire movie is about determinism vs free will and guess what, neo used his free will and that’s why he won because determinism by itself is what? Predictable in states of unconscious/subconscious, which is absolute determinism.

We’re we too not once unconscious and then subconscious? So again, so is comparing between conscious states to depict a lesser and higher a categorical error? The same distinction of consciousness can just as easily be made for society and there being a higher and lower in awareness and wisdom.

[Karpel Tunnel]

Free Will is not un-falsifiable because I can prove that some organisms are freer than others.

An Olympic athlete can high jump 8 ft. Most humans, most animals, cannot. The Olympic athlete is freer than most others.

That kind of freedom has nothing to do with free will. The moon can't send out solar flares. Is the Sun more free? The range of capabilities one has has nothing to do with the kind of freedom talked about in free will. Free will is not being controlled by the domino sequence of internal and external causes. To have an uncaused cause, so that something that might never have happened could happen. No one has given a clear indication of what that process would be like. As said, I black box the issue and see problems with both free will and determinism positions, but this repeatedly framing the issue in ways that are category errors
just feed the determinists.
Silhouette, I think, is too confident in his determinist position and the problems of thinking dterminism and thinking one is rational. But at least he would understand the differences between the types of freedom: the one relevent to free will and the one that is relevent to the capabilities or qualities of an organims or thing. The latter having nothing to do with free will.

So he will just, and rightly so, come back and present his case, because your argument here has nothing to do with free will.

nothing.

I don’t think it’s a categorical error to compare between states of consciousness. The moon and sun is not conscious, so it’s sending out a solar flare could happen if the correct variables and time are present, this isn’t Conscious decision of the sun to do such, which means it is innocent if it were to.

IN both jumps, there is a conscious decision to jump. It is not more free will to jump higher. His example.

But further, the issue is why the consciousness would choose X or Y. And it begs the question to say that jumper B can jump in a wider range of heights. That's a category error. Does his choosing have more freedom - in the free will sense of not being caused by what went before - then the jumper who can't jump as high? I see no argument anywhere to support that an olympic jumpers choosing is

less
free
from
past causes.

None.

Category error.

Jimmy can jump between 0 feet and 2 feet. The olypic jumper can jump between 0 and five or whatever it is.

that
has
nothing
to do
with whether each is choosing
freely.

The olympic jumper is not suddenly freer in relation to utter causation because his range is larger. He just has more options to choose from. But his choosing is either caused utterly by what went before or not.

Category error.

Range of options confused with being free from causation.

And note that everyone who chooses will tell us why they chose. Conscious and unconscious desires and external factors will either inevitably lead to the choice or not.

Dominoes or not.

The choices come from the previous state or not.

This has nothing to do with more options.

Or we gained more free will because now we can buy more brands of sneakers.

And we did not get granted more free will because we can choose between more type of sneakers. Cause that is not an ontological difference. It's just a greater range of choices, that were either utterly determined or not.

A category error.

And note how careful I am being not to say that determinism is the case. I don't know and frankly I don't care, because it does not change my day and what I will struggle to do. I am saying that this defense of free will - which note does not explain it in any way, does not show in any way how causation no longer applies - is a category error.

And if somehow you are not choosing based on training, learning, desires (conscious and not conscious)
is it really you who chooses?

If you are choosing based on your values - which are learned and based on desires and temperment - and desires, then it is caused by what you were that moment before the choice. IOW determined.

Unless there is something you guys have not mentioned.

You just keep repeating and celebrating arguments that are category errors.

[Artimas]

IN both jumps, there is a conscious decision to jump. It is not more free will to jump higher. His example.

But further, the issue is why the consciousness would choose X or Y. And it begs the question to say that jumper B can jump in a wider range of heights. That's a category error. Does his choosing have more freedom - in the free will sense of not being caused by what went before - then the jumper who can't jump as high? I see no argument anywhere to support that an olympic jumpers choosing is

less
free
from
past causes.

None.

Category error.

So what’s the past have to do with the present moment of choosing to practice jumping higher? Value must be attributed before attainment of higher skill or understanding.. it’s about utilizing and understanding the system, not escaping it. A determined state in absolute form is not able to willingly utilize it as we have, proof is in society being. And if he chooses not to jump at all? If he chooses to set a goal to jump higher than the other has no effect on if he jumps higher? If he consciously practices such specifically for an targeted effect out of cause? The entire point is /choosing/ cause to have an effect by value, value is what destroys the “confinement” that is trying to be demonstrated.

[Karpel Tunnel]

So what’s the past have to do with the present moment of choosing to practice jumping higher? Value must be attributed before attainment of higher skill or understanding.

Yup, listed value and desire in the post above. And these are caused by temperment and experience.

it’s about utilizing and understanding the system, not escaping it.

It would be about not being utterly caused by the previous moment, period.

A determined state in absolute form is not able to willingly utilize it as we have, proof is in society being.

That sentence makes no sense to me.

Adxnd if he chooses not to jump at all?

Then he desired not to do it. And this desire caused that choice. And other desires and experiences caused that choice or the desire to do soemthing instead of jumping.

If he chooses to set a goal to jump higher than the other has no effect on if he jumps higher?

Oh, jeez. come on. It's whether that choice to set that goal and not some other is determined.

If he consciously practices such specifically for an targeted effect out of cause? The entire point is /choosing/ cause to have an effect by value, value is what destroys the “confinement” that is trying to be demonstrated.

It might, except values and desires are utterly caused
or
you will demonstrate how they are not.

and if they are not

then they have nothing to do with me and my desires

and what value is would that be?

It's the same category error and I even talked about values and desires. Now I have had to repeat myself.

You don't focus on the problem the free will believer has. You are making up other issues.