There are two broad distinctions in epistemology - the rationalists and other metaphysicians, and the empiricists. The first group require some type of a priori knowledge - knowledge that is already in some way extant and from which we may deduce further knowledge - and in fact must deduce anything that can be considered certain. The second group believes that experience alone is the seat of knowledge.
This picture is painted in broad strokes, admittedly, but is a fair enough starting point, I believe.
My thesis is this - if Hume has disallowed causation, from a roughly empiricist starting point, then even empiricist epistemology must be considered metaphysics. While science has followed the empiricist tradition, and produces predictable results, without physical causation, we still have no right to call these results participant in certainty, even as we enjoy the technology that they are responsible for. Epistemic questions no longer obtain - science, without claims to unshakeable truth, produces better answers than do epistemic questions - empiricist questions have been superceded by scientific ones.
Empiricist philosophy has given way to science - knowledge is seen now as a practical matter, and not a philosophical one.
Epistemology has suffered two losses - causation is dead, and so is God. What is left?
Obviously, given that it is a form of meta understanding - even science is implicated by epistemological questions, so I’m not really sure I see your point.
Still, I think the distinction needs to be made between the metaphysics of epistemology (i.e. what we say about knowledge) and the science that it gives way to (i.e. the production and use of knowledge). Science does what it does, and it is as successful as its past records proves. The scientist has no need for a theory of epistemology in order to conduct his practice successfully, even though the epistemologist might have a thing or two to say about his practice, which could go for or against it.
Only the paternal Christian God – the loving, benevolent, vengeful arbiter in the sky – has died… ‘God’ is in the mirror, along with his many devils, concealed behind a myriad of masks.
Philosophical knowledge is self-knowledge, which comprises both empiricist and rationalist elements in formulating an agent’s conception of himself and his infinitely complex and ever-changing relationship to the ‘external’ world – and ultimately yes, this too is metaphysics.
I forget who it was, but there’s a quote that goes something like “The scientist needs a philosophy of science [epistemology] as much as a bird needs the physics of aerodynamics in order to fly.”
In other words, the scientist just does science; he doesn’t need to justify how science yeilds true knowledge. Of course, he does take it for granted that it does, but that is not the business he involves himself in. His method is something he practices; it has nothing to do with a theory of knowledge (or nothing that makes a difference anyhow).
matty - I agree that it’s obvious. The last time I brought this up, it was considered ridiculous. I post it as an OP to see if I can get a more deteiled response as to why it’s ridiculous. It seems that not everyone shares our view.
I don’t even understand what this is supposed to mean, well I do, but it doesn’t make a bit of sense. It’s like saying “the mechanic doesn’t need to know what an engine is or what it’s for, all he needs to know is how to replace the manifold”. Sure, if the mechanic is a monkey, but he’s not. He’s a human and implicit within his workings is a goal - a working engine - everything he does is value laden, every task he performs is directed… Without this he is not a mechanic, he is a robot. You and Faust have taken the humanity out of what is a strictly human question, you offer a philosophy of the robot - a philosophy for the unconscious.
What’s more is that it’s an epistemology itself precisely because you are human - it is value laden. I have no idea why one would want to dehumanize oneself to such an extreme degree.
I would argue that he does need to justify it if he wants it to be anything other than his own discrete understanding. Also, I think the likes of Bachelard, Koyre, Kuhn, Feyerabend and Lakatos have shown that practices are far from purely logical within scientific communities.
We’re not talking about the human: the scientist, the epistemologist, the layman, etc. - we’re talking about the subject matter: science, epistemology, etc.
Well, you have a point in that epistemology has to figure into the scientist’s career somewhere, but it comes after he has produced the raw data - that’s where science ends and interpretation begins. The interpretation requires some sort of epistemological presuppositions. But even then, one has to be careful with the use of that word: “epistemology”. Everyone has a “default” epistemology. It’s called naive realism. What you see is what you get. But this is hardly a commitment to some abstract academia. It hardly requires calling yourself an X-ist (as in, an empiricist, a skeptic, a metaphysicist, etc.) It’s more the basic manner by which the human mind works. The human mind is convinced by what it sees. The scientist is no exception to this - and this is my point - that he is convinced by the data he amasses. This has nothing to do with any particular epistemological theory he holds, but squarely with the nature of his own mind, a nature he shares in common with everyone else.
This sounds like a very interesting discussion but I am afraid it has gone right over my head. Faust are you basically saying that modern science in general feels no great need for metaphysical inquiry and knowledge and can get along very well without us?
Gib, I appreciate that the epistemology is far from explicit in the majority of scientific practice, but the way you make it sound it as if the scientist wanders out into his garden and starts categorising his observations, when this is manifestly not the case: the scientist has to be educated in the rules of the various social contexts in which he operates and then undertakes his scientific observations within a particular institutional framework, and that’s without making explicit the whole thorny issue of language. Just because it’s “naive” doesn’t make it pure.
I never said it was pure. Obviously the typical scientist is going to be familiar with the basic schools of epistemology in his own culture, and he’s probably going to be partial to some over others. But like I said to Sittlichkeit, it’s the subject matter I’m talking about, not the person who involves himself in it. I’m point out that science and epistemology are two different sphere’s of thought.
Sure, one is knowledge and the other is knowledge about knowledge (physics and metaphysics), but you can’t isolate the knowledge from the knower; I agree with Faust’s original assertion, as we’ve established, but it doesn’t mean that I think epistemology disappears once you stop thinking about it nor that it doesn’t have important insight into the actual practice of science.
I’ll agree with this. The distinction between science and epistemology I wanted to make was in light of Faust’s assertion “Epistemology is metaphysics”. I think the distinction needs to be made because as much as this may be true, it doesn’t make science metaphysics. That’s all.
