A free will, a relatively free will, or an unfree will?

Do human beings have a free will, a relatively free will, or an unfree will?

  • Free will.
  • Relatively free will.
  • Unfree will.
  • I do not know.
0 voters

Do human beings have a free will, a relatively free will, or an unfree will?

None of the above? Are those even real questions? I think causality removes any possibility of anything being by philosophical definition ‘free’, but I also think posing the alternative answer in deterministic terms is also confused.

By definition there are merely three possiibilities for the will: (1) to be free, (2) to be relatively free, (3) to be unfree. Most humans know that there is a will, and even those who do not know it but know the word “will” ask themselves or others whether the will is free, relatively free, or unfree.

This is my answer:

I can only support my vote of ‘unfree will’, by the claim of logical incongruity between freedom and will.

The choice is always there, and the will always has to be paired with some action or thing, where even not to will becomes a choice. The will is nothing unless a ‘to’ is attached to it, whether it be to power,mot love, to murder, or whatever. that whatever becomes that by which the will is bound. Even if, that , call it X, has a potential of either / or, or a 50% opportunity of expression. A pure will, without representation, is an existential nothingness. Nietzhche perhaps saw this coming, a nihilistic duality unexpressed, still harbors that existential choice: to be, or not. being or nothingness. That is the most founde mental choice, pre existing the will. This is why the most basic tenet here is the will to exist, or will to be.

It is a basic given, prior to that the question. An not be given, guessed , or even entertained. At some point of our existence, we can ask the question about the will to live, whether we have it , it superceeds, the question of whether we want it. Our will is bound
by modal schema of pre-existence, and is moved toward it. The basic modality of the will to exist is unfree to overcome this modality. It is bound and trapped by it. Hence the problems of overcoming the either/or, by the power of a will, a will defanged by its own modality.

Therefore I voted ‘the will is unfree’.

The will is almost unfree but it will be always almost, not completely. There will always be a hint of free will in it.

Having said that, the ratio of the freeness in the will be very seriously minor. I cannot put on my finger to a precise number but my guess is that cannot be in the double digit percentage.

With love,

Free will is a learned thing.

We have the ability in our subjectivity to observe, and to make a thing become the object to the observation.

Meanwhile causality is happening and its trying to drive the will. As we grow up that drive becomes part of us as its our knowledge-base, and infants require the ability to evade predators and danger generally. This has to be pre-programmed, and only through a process of observation [growing-up] can free will be attained. I think for most of us full free will doesn’t fully occur until late in life ~ we have to ‘know’ what it is. Maybe e.g. the buddha achieved it at 35yrs [his spiritual liberation], and jesus around a similar age, but compared to now i didn’t know jack shit when i was 35yrs. so i don’t know how much any human can know in that time?

Answered ‘relatively free will’.


on the tone of will-to-power… what do you think of my last post on the matter here…


It depends on which kind of “free” you are talking about. Free from what? Free from oppression? Free to make life choices? Free from social manipulation? Free from causality?

free choice I’d say. decision making ~ irrespective of concerns to make a thing happen in the world. inner decision making we could say.

I am just out the door as i caught this, Amorphos, but my reply would not give justice to the above blog, in which I did not participate.

Just off the cuff, I would say, there has been a shift away from cognoscenti toward behavior , consequentially, what we do, seems to predicate how we think we excercised our will. In this sense, the effect predisposes the affect, as to how we prejudice out thoughts on this matter.

it may very well be the case, that we would like to think we have the freedom of will, and put back man’s consciousness back on the pre-existential pedestal, but , it doesn’t work this way.

In reply to Zinnatt inbound say, the odds are very much tilted away from our conscious decision making, toward it’s built in applied conformed link to it’s doing. A few degrees of difference between the one and the other, make it effectively a doing process.

Free from all, so that you can say: “one is free, because one can do what one will.

But you can also do what Kant did: divide the world into two parts, one for the senses and one for intelligibility. According to the first part humans have an unfree will, thus no free will, because they are slaves of the causality; but according to the second part humans have a free will.

Nothing is free from causality (else you are stuck with the “something from nothing” theory).

So Kant also said that nothing is free from causality, thus also human beings are not free from causality; but he said humans have an intelligible freedom, thus they have a free will according to their intelligibility. In other words: Kant was both a determinist and an indeterminist, because he said humans have an unfree will because of the causality, but they have a free will because of their intelligibility. Therefore he demanded: “You shall because you can!” (loosely translated).

What he seems to be calling “intelligible freedom” can only refer to a greater degree of freedom to decide on life choices (intelligence and available opportunities), freedom from oppression (legalistic traps), or freedom from social manipulations (disinformation, limited information, hypnosis, chemicals/medications, radiology,…).

What many people seem to believe is that the human will is free from causality. That is entirely irrational.

A) there is never freedom from causality
B) other types of freedoms are circumstantial.

SAM provides the greatest degree of stable social freedom.

I concur, Kant did try to blend the two ways of determinism with the opposite, the major theme recurring here, imbues the political-social philosophy from him and unward. That Nietzche tried to nihilize the attempt at resucecting a proto idealism, and as
was observed in another blog, he was notman existentialist. Existentialism was the cure for a failed attempt at that type of resurrection. A political tour
de force, to to undercut the failed synthesis, by
destroying the ideal. That it was a reversely psychological attempt, to furnish impetus, to avoid that, makes his attempt ironic, an act of sophistry. Niertzche wanted the opposite, he wanted a reaction
to prevent the very thing he was advocating.

I am taking this opportunity to express this thought,
because i think it is of significance vis a vis, our

discussion about Kant, and the question of the will, and freedom thereof.

The French needed a method, the way of Descartes,
a saving grace, and it once try to dominate the
intellectual focus of Europe. The method was phenomenological, and not ontological, exhibiting the very reversal Nietzche was wrestling with, but via a
transcendental poesy. Niertzche was reversing, in

order to liberate the will, by an apriori approach, while Sartre was reversing by way of method.

The Schopenhaurian representation was put before
the will, reduced to the basic of social contract. The
war was lost after all, the ideal was not liberated, as
France was , that being an irony in its self. There could not be an apology, only some reason could be
found, ideologically speaking, to butress the
reduction from sinking into total annihilation.

The will was supported by social reinterpretation of
the social contract, another French idea, and
communism was embraced, a winner in the conflict.

As this had also failed, leads back into another kind
of nihilism, the material taking over and replacing the
ideologically possible. The ongtologiclly valuable. At seems Kant lost the battle, Arminius, facts speak louder then words.


Doesn’t there first come a time of consciousness, prior to doing or even thinking? Or otherwise is the subjective observer not primary to experience? The very act of being subjective draws the focus of the perception to an extended viewpoint, thus making the objective world and its respective thought informations, into the object in its eye or field of view.
The consciousness and all its functions are at work too ~ in decision making.

for me it’s a 50/50 balance in adults. but one has to learn how the causal info is working in order to subjectively see it.

Yes, and according to Kant this is because of the second part of the human world, the “intelligible world” of the humans.

Yes, and that is what Kant said as well.

Let’s say that they are embedded in causality, but beings like the human beings tend to power, thus they want to dominate the nature with its causality as well, The accent here is on the word “tend”, because they never can be free of causality. But according to their thoughts (=> intelligibility) they are capable of doing anything what they will, although they are not capable of doing anything what they will when it comes to causality.

Therefore the conclusion must be that humans have a relatively free will.

Okay, but providing and holding a promise are not the same.

Of course, Amorphos, however primal consciousness does not preclude shifts between ideologies. In the evolution of consciousness, it is once ideology, or its revision or nihilization whichn predominates. Some political pundits can nihilize prior impressions by disregarding prior convictions. They just leave it out of practica political agendae. What happens then, is no longer an ontologically certainty, suc as the will toward some systematic application of reasonable machinestions of power man ipulation in the formr regard, but shaking and moving via manipulation by way of impressing power motives as a way of defanging social values. Of course the primordial origon of ontological values is there, butmit has been revised by onticm considerations. The will has always been a tool, a political tool to implement certain so called inalianable rights to pursue personal power.

Sorry, due to tech. problems, can’t correct misspelled words.

??? “holding”, means what here??