Ive never been able to figure out what the idea behind the attack on Pearl Harbor was. It doesn’t seem, like a very strategic sort of thing to do. The Japanese didn’t have the manpower or intention to overrun the American continent, so what else does an attack like this do but infuriate an immensely rich neutral party? What possible benefit could there have been for the Japanese in the long run?
By the way Im hanging out in the place of a Crowleyite who is descendent of the French crown. He says. He’s always burning rods in honor to Mars and shit like that, very cool.
“The best models of English writings are Shakespeare and the Old Testament, especially the Book of Job, the Psalms and Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Song of Solomon. It will be a very good thing for you to commit as much as you can both of these books and of the best plays of Shakespeare to memory, so that they form the foundation of your style. In writing English, the most important quality that you can acquire is style. That makes all the difference to anyone who reads what you write, whether you use the best phrases in the best way. You will have to devote some time to grammar and syntax, and also to logic. Logic is the science and the art of using words, and it teaches you to think correctly without making blunders in reasoning, which nowadays everyone is liable to do just because they have not got the training which I am proposing to give you.” - Crowley
Good advice to follow.
I’ve thought a lot about this, I guess we all have, and I have not reached a firm conclusion. But where I am at is this:
If an ambush goes well, it’s great profit. If it goes wrong, it’s great loss, of military advantage as much as face. And even though the Japanese may have preferred the gringos out, and there were no open hostilities, from what I understand, there was a kind of cold war over shipping routes, with commercial ships being sunk on both sides, but more on the Japanese side. The US represented a significant strategic disruption. If the US spy machine had not been sharp, and them not known about the attack before hand, the attack might have been enough of a coup to give them the upper hand and make it a war not about national conquest but naval domination of the Pacific, where they were likely to sue for peace once the area they desired was secured, or if Germany and Turkey were successful continue the war and in the end split the US a little like they ended up doing with Germany.
Also, and I don’t want to make all this thread about war, though considering Crowley’s career it might do him honor, the main concrete victory of the Nazis may have been what became of the Muslim world. Even though Britain was nominally awarded the area, the Muslim nationalist movements that followed were all direct descendants of the Nazi regime. With the exception of the saner ones, which of course the democrats made sure to get rid of.
It does seem like some such would have to have been on their mind. Still it would have been a radical long shot.
Today during a walk I was wondering if not perhaps the whole enterprise can be seen in light of a psychological or rather physiological situation - the Japanese Empire had been crumbling in its ethics for a long time - the movie The Last Samurai, another very watchable film with Tom Cruise in it, suggests this decay began with the introduction of the machine gun, which makes a lot of obvious and perhaps too obvious sense - and an attack on such a Behemoth enemy as the US might have been compelling to the Japanese warrior class purely in terms of, well, war. Satisfying the old instincts. That may have played a part in drawing them into this enterprise. What did they have to lose? A national kamikaze.
A similar desperate physiology could be interpreted into the German efforts to invade Russia, an enterprise which was almost equally devoid of chances of success, regardless of what the Americans are apparently still being taught. That decision too is baffling from a military point of view, as, like the Japanese vs the US - even if successful, the consolidation of such success and further on the maintenance of the consolidated state would have certainly drained the national resources (I mean: popular will to sacrifice) in the long run. Maybe they had some sort of dream of a Roman styled colony, but they showed nothing of Roman carefulness, discipline and foresight; the way the Germans operated in Russia is hardly comparable to the way Roman armies operated, with their city-like fortifications. If Germany had operated like that theyd have advanced a lot slower, in any case, and would have taken decades to reach Moscow.
That seems to add up.
Its definitely true that nazoid tastes in domineering (I wont say government because it doesnt add up to that exactly) appeal to factions that dont have a lot of perspective. Its like, lets get as much perverse pleasure out of this limited frame weve been given.
Again a matter of physiology, of despair, rather than of strategy.
In Iran’s case, it does apply to government.
See it.
Hitler was a madman, that’s clear.
But also a scaredy cat. He took France in two days because of Rommel, and then he put a leash on Rommel. He had no clue how actually his victories were gained.
If he had relied on his generals, the smart ones, Russia was not entirely out of reach a priori.
But that’s neither here nor there.
Let them all rot in the hells that have been alloted to them.
Also, the SS in the Muslim world actually went to some trouble to develop an islamic nazi ideology, with islamic SS cadres. That linear and literal tradition never ended.
It’s socialism, it’s all still socialism, so it’s spinal chord is still revenge.
lords: create society
socialists: hate lords
also socialists: love society