If, anything justified can only be conscious.
And, matter is not conscious.
Then, matter cannot be justified.
All of our senses just do their thing. They don’t work within a restricting paradigm of justified and unjust.
According to our senses, matter does exist, at least sensationally.
Why couldn’t you conclude that matter is conscious?
If horses are cats
and cats are airplanes
then horses are airplanes.
Therefore, I agree with the OP in some sense.
I can justify an argument, an observation, or a column of text; none of which are conscious, to the best of my knowledge.
Or all of which are, to the best of gib’s. 
I Think you mean consciousness not conscious.
So how do you justify the first statement?
Though they would be dependent on consciousness (or being conscious, if that is really what the OP meant). There are these facets of consciousness we label ‘an argument’ etc.
In that case, matter is conscious. Unless we’re made of something else.
I actually didn’t mean either conscious or consciousness but rather an instance of conscious experience or an instance of consciousness.
I don’t mean to say, as you think I do mean to say, that justification can only occur for all of consciousness but rather that justification occurs for all or parts of all of consciousness.
Let’s start with my definition of justification.
Justification is the sense that something supports something else.
Wet mud with a shoe impression in it in the house supports someone having walked through house recently.
In this example, there “is the sense that something supports something else” namely the muddy shoe print supporting someone recent walking through the house.
So, you ask, how do I support the claim, “Anything justified can only be a part or all of consciousness.”?
Something that is being justified must be part or all of consciousness because if it wasn’t we would know what the thing was that we were supporting and if we didn’t know what we were supporting we couldn’t know whether the evidence that we were using to support the thing we didn’t know would lend support to it.
The muddy footprint in the house, for example, can’t support something that we are not consciously aware since we wouldn’t be able to know whether that would be the sort of thing that would derive support or wouldn’t derive support from the muddy footprint since we have no conscious awareness of that sort of thing.
That seems correct.
Yes, sensations do not justify other sensations. However, experiencing certain sensations make us feel justified in thinking other ones will follow. For example, dark clouds overhead justify it raining soon.
Yes, by that definition matter exists.
I don’t think matter exists it is not a conscious type of matter as you have mentioned.
If you say that every horse is a cat that is just saying all of the things that are one thing is another thing. You don’t actually have the experience of all of those things that you have called horses also being called cats you are just hypothetically putting it forward that everything that is called a horse, whatever this might be, could also be called a cat, whatever this might be.
Matter could have consciousness, if say, sensations and ideas are matter.
Matter might be defined as something not having consciousness if it is something occupying space without sensation.
Whether matter is real or fantasy is not the main issue of life. It’s a trivial statistic.
Ethics, values, morality, virtue, wisdom, etc. That is what matters in life. Some will disagree. I think most people disagree because they are either morally “blind” or morally confused. Even suggesting that trivial things exist is a moralism. True and false are also moralisms, in many cases. Not always, but usually. who will face up to that?
So something like idealism.
I don’t Think the first part of this is what I meant and I am nto sure what you mean by the second part.
Let’s start with my definition of justification.
I assume what I bolded should have been ‘wouldn’t’. I Think the tricky part of the justification so far is the phrase ‘part of consciousness’. (and I Think a better Word would be ‘experience’.) In realism one is conscious of something or we experience something. The something being something outside of us that we perceive in some way. Now I am not saying that realism is right, but I Think you will need to justify that unification of subject and object. Or say, for example, that the burden is on the realist to separate them.
I am not sure what you mean here. If I see muddy footprints of what looks like the talons of a 7 taloned bird - which I am presuming we have not seen, I may not have justification for saying a bird walked through my living room, but I do for something having walked through the living room even if I have never seen whatever it actucally is.
Dan: Whether matter is real or fantasy is not the main issue in life. It’s a trivial statistic
Rackedrick: In your opinion the question of whether matter is real or fantasy might be trivial but in my opinion it might not be trivial.
D: Ethics, values, morality, virtue, wisdom, etc. That is what matters in life. Some will disagree.
R: As discerned from the context in which you stated the above, you seem to be saying that other people should think that the list of five that you mentioned is what matters in life.
D: I think most people disagree because they are either morally “blind” or morally confused.
R: What is it that makes them morally “blind” or morally confused? Is the answer to this question that such individuals don’t see some sort of objective reality that is there to see or in the case of being morally confused take the reality that they are seeing as not being the most important reality, whereas in fact it is, or is there, rather, no objective reality and such individuals are merely blind or confused about the importance of your point of view which they either don’t see or if they do see it confuse it as being unimportant?
D: Even suggesting that trivial things exist is a moralism.
R: From my experience, I think that oftentimes, though probably not usually and most certainly not always, moralism is at the root of trivial assertions in my conception of what trivial assertions are.
D: True and false are also moralisms, in many cases. Not always, but usually. Who will face up to that?
R: From my experience, I think that oftentimes, though probably not usually and most certainly not always, moralism is at the root of true and false assertions in my conception of what true and false assertions are.
The below is divided into different parts that are self-contained and labeled with numbers.
Dicussion 1
R: I actually didn’t mean either conscious or consciousness but rather an instance of conscious experience or an instance of consciousness.
M: So something like idealism.
R: I would say that that roughly characterizes my position.
Dicussion 2
R:
If, anything justified can only be conscious.
And, matter is not conscious.
Then, matter cannot be justified.
M: I Think you mean consciousness not conscious.
R: I don’t mean to say, as you think I do mean to say, that justification can only occur for all of consciousness but rather that justification occurs for all or parts of all of consciousness.
Moreno: I don’t think the first part of this is what I meant…
Rackedrick: My reasoning for why I thought this is what you thought I was saying is below. You have the option think it is worth it to read this and understand better some of the basic thought processes that lead me to think this is what you were thinking when you said what you said or the option to not read why I thought that this is what you were saying.
Here is the reasoning that leads me to conclude that this is what I thought that you meant when you said what you said.
As I understand it, consciousness is typically, philosophically speaking, used as a catch-all term which encompasses sensations as perceived through five senses, and ideas and feelings of many sorts and I thought you were using it in this fashion.
If it seems that this is what you meant when you used it then, when you said, “I think you mean consciousness not conscious.” when referring to my syllogism or argument that goes,
If, anything justified can only be conscious.
And, matter is not conscious.
Then matter cannot be justified.
then by plugging in consciousness for conscious in the first premise or sentence of the argument or syllogism the first premise or sentence would read, “If anything justified can only be consciousness.” which would be what I claimed I thought you understood, it seems falsely, myself to be saying.
Dicussion 3
R: …justification occurs for all or parts of all of consciousness.
M: … and I am nto sure what you mean by the second part.
R: To help in recalling, the second part goes, “…justification occurs for all or parts of all of consciousness.”
To begin with, I think that it is appropriate to say that the explanation that follows, I think, will not be sufficient to clarify an understanding of the word or term justification and how it is being used which, I think, is likely at the source or root of explaining or conveying an understanding of what is meant by the part of the sentence with a subject and predicate or clause that is stated above. So, if you find no value or purpose in reading the somewhat off topic or tangential thinking that follows I will attempt to not take offense if you so choose to not read it. If I justified all of consciousness, then I would be giving some explanation, reason, argument, or evidence for why all of consciousness is a certain way. I might have a theory, if I was not an idealist, for instance, that all of consciousness is the result of the movement of a certain group or set of fundamental constituents of matter that completely explain or have total causal implication in the production of conscious experience. Returning to understanding and definition of justification mentioned previously, through my definition of justification and example of the muddy shoes may help you to discern or recognize the meaning of what I am saying. As the previous definition of justification given attempted to make clear, justification can be understood as support. Support, in this context, is being used as basically synonymous or as having the same meaning as justification. It was thought that perhaps the reader would have familiarity with the meaning of the term support and that this would be useful for acquiring the meaning of the word justification upon the terms being specified as synonymous or alike in meaning. If the reader did not have an understanding of the word support in the repertoire or skill base of theirs by which to identify an interpretation of the meaning that the term could sensibly or reasonably be thought to have in the context then the understanding of the meaning of justification appears improbable. If this method of discerning the meaning of the term failed the example of the muddy shoes was another attempt to explain the meaning of term justification.
Dicussion 4
M: I assume what I bolded should have been ‘wouldn’t’.
R: I appreciate the correction from would to wouldn’t as wouldn’t is what I think I meant when I wrote it.
Dicussion 5
M: I Think the tricky part of the justification so far is the phrase ‘part of consciousness’. (and I Think a better Word would be ‘experience’.)
I may be mistaken but I think that the term consciousness is often used to describe the totality of experiences so part of consciousness would be just be some of these experiences. So I think that if experience is better it is better than the phrase I gave it seems like it would be important only from the standpoint of convention and that there is not a difference in meaning.
Dicussion 6
M: In realism one is conscious of something or we experience something. The something being something outside of us that we perceive in some way. Now I am not saying that realism is right, but I Think you will need to justify that unification of subject and object. Or say, for example, that the burden is on the realist to separate them.
R: I tend to think that the burden is on the realist to separate physical or material and mind or consciousness. The modern period which spans philosophically speaking, I think, rather strangely, given our as I take it typical understanding of the term modern as meaning the current time period we are living in, the time period of roughly 1600-1800, claims among it the revered or reviled and prototypically idealist philosopher Kant, but perhaps unjustifiably prototypically idealist, as Berkeley was his predecessor unbeknownst to Kant, the equally, among those who know of him, if not more revered and reviled, mostly reviled, I take it, philosopher Berkeley. Berkeley, who’s most well known philosophical doctrine, his doctrine of idealism, as you took my position roughly speaking correctly to be, according to some, atleast, is most convincingly and eloquently espoused in his dialogue Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, Bertrand Russell in his History of Modern Western Philosophy, if I remember correctly, seemed to think so at least. In Berkeley’s the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous the idealist philosopher Philonous questions the dualist or realist (one who believes in mind and matter) philosopher Hylas. As I said previously, this questioning of the realists seems especially suitable, amenable, expedient or otherwise useful in a conversation that an idealist might have for the purposes of clarifying the claims that are being made. It might seem as though the idealist in a self-serving way assumes a position similar to the sort that might be assumed be an overbearing, domineering, debater, which unfortunately, seems to be a ploy enthusiastically and self-servingly employed by debates in the debate arena. In the case, Philonous and Hylas and any idealist philosophical debate, however, it seems that such positioning is not only not domineering and self-interested but probably, in my assessment at least, the most reasonable and fair way to conduct a discussion. The views of the atheistic philosopher Anthony Flew would if true, I think, be rather readily applicable to the argument that such a relationship in debate between the idealist and realist is most reasonable. The basic view that Flew promulgates is that in the debate between theistic and atheistic or agnostic individuals the onus or burden of proof for the existence of God lies on the theistic rather than an onus or burden lying on the side of the atheist or agnostic. He argues that in all cases where a dispute occurs between two sides one of which makes a positive assertion of something being true or the case and one of which makes a claim which is the denial of this positive assertion the onus of proof lies on the side that makes the positive assertion. It seems, that if Flew is right, that in this case the realist would have the burden of proof and that the idealist’s responsibility in a reasonable debate would be to deny that the evidence that the realist gives is sufficient for the claims that he is making.
Duscussion 7
R: “The muddy footprint in the house, for example, can’t support something that we are not consciously aware since we wouldn’t be able to know whether that would be the sort of thing that would derive support or wouldn’t derive support from the muddy footprint since we have no conscious awareness of that sort of thing.”
M: I am not sure what you mean here. If I see muddy footprints of what looks like the talons of a 7 taloned bird - which I am presuming we have not seen, I may not have justification for saying a bird walked through my living room, but I do for something having walked through the living room even if I have never seen whatever it actucally is.
R: Right, so we don’t know whether it is a bird for sure, so the footprint might not support this, but surely it must be something even if we can’t see the thing it must be you say. True, but I don’t think that was my point, even if I happen to find the misinterpretation quite interesting. The problem with your interpretation, I think, stems from replacing the phrase, “no conscious awareness” with “never seen”. If I’ve “never seen” the animal that caused the footprint I can still think of some abstract idea of an animal, whatever it may be, as walking through my house and make the claim that this footprint justifies that abstract ideas as being true. On this I think we are largely in agreement. But if, no conscious awareness crosses my mind, that is, if my mind draws a total blank I can in no way support that which inherently is not thought just like a column can’t support a vacuum and needs something on top of it to support to be supporting anything. That’s the problem, as in physical support where there are two things necessary when it comes to mental support there are also two things necessary. The only difference is the nature of the things not the number of them.
OK. I would use the term consciousness differently, but now I know what you mean, so I can work with that.
(I read all that was prior to this, by the way)
I would say Occam’s Razor, which realist philosohers like to whip out quite a bit, would lead them to Think they had this burden also.
Agreed. I Think the issue is more complex than this and that the OR and other burden formulations are not simply misused - interpreted often as meaning that the answer with less entities is more true or more likely to be true or just plain old better (read:ontological rather than methodological)- but are confused because they presume some as if neutral starting Point AND similar experiences. It works very well for those with the same paradigms and methodologies, however. BUT, given that realist are wont to use the OR…they have made their bed.
Not quite sure what you mean. Could you explain using the footprints?
Do you mean that when you see the footprints, you merely see marks on the floor or even more vaguely darker regions of something (shadows, Eye floaters, hallucination) but do not register it as footprints, having no experience of such things?
(I figure this is Another misinterpretation, but what the heck, I’ll triangulate)
As an aside, I am sort of rooting for you here. I am not quite an idealist. I suppose in some way I am both a realist and an idealist and do not find these mutually exclusive. But I Think the way matter is conceived is ridiculous and so subjective it is humorous that physicalists associate Everything is matter with obectivity.
Only consciousness can justify something.
Matter does not exist according to our senses but according to the inferences we draw about sensations. If you were a neutrino, would you perceive matter?
Exactly.
If I were a neutrino, I would be matter.
But more to the point, I don’t think we infer the existence of matter when we see it. I think it’s being matter is part of the sensation. That’s not to say we don’t infer anything about it. For example, I personally infer about an instance of matter that I might see that it is made of molecules. But as for its being matter, that just something we perceive like its being blue or big or over there, etc.