Animal Rights

Here is an article by Peter Singer that basically outlines his views on animal rights. I found it very interesting and implore you all to read through it. It’s fairly lengthy so you might want to print it out. Let me know what you think. After reading it, I had to change a lot of my beliefs and perspectives on the subject. Enjoy! :smiley:

[size=150]ALL ANIMALS ARE EQUAL[/size]


Ira. W. DeCamp Professor of Bioethics, University Center for Human Values, Princeton University

by Peter Singer

In recent years a number of oppressed groups have campaigned vigorously for equality. The classic instance is the Black Liberation movement, which demands an end to the prejudice and discrimination that has made blacks second-class citizens. The immediate appeal of the black liberation movement and its initial, if limited, success made it a model for other oppressed groups to follow. We became familiar with liberation movements for Spanish-Americans, gay people, and a variety of other minorities. When a majority group—women—began their campaign, some thought we had come to the end of the road. Discrimination on the basis of sex, it has been said, is the last universally accepted form of discrimination, practiced without secrecy or pretense even in those liberal circles that have long prided themselves on their freedom from prejudice against racial minorities.

One should always be wary of talking of “the last remaining form of discrimination.” If we have learnt anything from the liberation movements, we should have learnt how difficult it is to be aware of latent prejudice in our attitudes to particular groups until this prejudice is forcefully pointed out.

A liberation movement demands an expansion of our moral horizons and an extension or reinterpretation of the basic moral principle of equality. Practices that were previously regarded as natural and inevitable come to be seen as the result of an unjustifiable prejudice. Who can say with confidence that all his or her attitudes and practices are beyond criticism? If we wish to avoid being numbered amongst the oppressors, we must be prepared to re-think even our most fundamental attitudes. We need to consider them from the point of view of those most disadvantaged by our attitudes, and the practices that follow from these attitudes. If we can make this unaccustomed mental switch we may discover a pattern in our attitudes and practices that consistently operates so as to benefit one group—usually the one to which we ourselves belong—at the expense of another. In this way we may come to see that there is a case for a new liberation movement. My aim is to advocate that we make this mental switch in respect of our attitudes and practices towards a very large group of beings: members of species other than our own—or, as we popularly though misleadingly call them, animals. In other words, I am urging that we extend to other species the basic principle of equality that most of us recognize should be extended to all members of our own species.

All this may sound a little far-fetched, more like a parody of other liberation movements than a serious objective. In fact, in the past the idea of “The Rights of Animals” really has been used to parody the case for women’s rights. When Mary Wollstonecraft, a forerunner of later feminists, published her Vindication of the Rights of Women in 1792, her ideas were widely regarded as absurd, and they were satirized in an anonymous publication entitled A Vindication of the Rights of Brutes. The author of this satire (actually Thomas Taylor, a distinguished Cambridge philosopher) tried to refute Wollstonecraft’s reasonings by showing that they could be carried one stage further. If sound when applied to women, why should the arguments not be applied to dogs, cats, and horses? They seemed to hold equally well for these “brutes”; yet to hold that brutes had rights was manifestly absurd; therefore the reasoning by which this conclusion had been reached must be unsound, and if unsound when applied to brutes, it must also be unsound when applied to women, since the very same arguments had been used in each case.

One way in which we might reply to this argument is by saying that the case for equality between men and women cannot validly be extended to nonhuman animals. Women have a right to vote, for instance, because they are just as capable of making rational decisions as men are; dogs, on the other hand, are incapable of understanding the significance of voting, so they cannot have the right to vote. There are many other obvious ways in which men and women resemble each other closely, while humans and other animals differ greatly. So, it might be said, men and women are similar beings and should have equal rights, while humans and nonhumans are different and should not have equal rights.

The thought behind this reply to Taylor’s analogy is correct up to a point, but it does not go far enough. There are important differences between humans and other animals, and these differences must give rise to some differences in the rights that each have. Recognizing this obvious fact, however, is no barrier to the case for extending the basic principle of equality to nonhuman animals. The differences that exist between men and women are equally undeniable, and the supporters of Women’s Liberation are aware that these differences may give rise to different rights. Many feminists hold that women have the right to an abortion on request. It does not follow that since these same people are campaigning for equality between men and women they must support the right of men to have abortions too. Since a man cannot have an abortion, it is meaningless to talk of his right to have one. Since a pig can’t vote, it is meaningless to talk of its right to vote. There is no reason why either Women’s Liberation or Animal Liberation should get involved in such nonsense. The extension of the basic principle of equality from one group to another does not imply that we must treat both groups in exactly the same way, or grant exactly the same rights to both groups. Whether we should do so will depend on the nature of the members of the two groups. The basic principle of equality, I shall argue, is equality of consideration; and equal consideration for different beings may lead to different treatment and different rights.

So there is a different way of replying to Taylor’s attempt to parody Wollstonecraft’s arguments, a way which does not deny the differences between humans and nonhumans, but goes more deeply into the question of equality and concludes by finding nothing absurd in the idea that the basic principle of equality applies to so-called “brutes.” I believe that we reach this conclusion if we examine the basis on which our opposition to discrimination on grounds of race or sex ultimately rests. We will then see that we would be on shaky ground if we were to demand equality for blacks, women, and other groups of oppressed humans while denying equal consideration to nonhumans.

When we say that all human beings, whatever their race, creed, or sex, are equal, what is it that we are asserting? Those who wish to defend a hierarchical, inegalitarian society have often pointed out that by whatever test we choose, it simply is not true that all humans are equal. Like it or not, we must face the fact that humans come in different shapes and sizes; they come with differing moral capacities, differing intellectual abilities, differing amounts of benevolent feeling and sensitivity to the needs of others, differing abilities to communicate effectively, and differing capacities to experience pleasure and pain. In short, if the demand for equality were based on the actual equality of all human beings, we would have to stop demanding equality. It would be an unjustifiable demand.

Still, one might cling to the view that the demand for equality among human beings is based on the actual equality of the different races and sexes. Although humans differ as individuals in various ways, there are no differences between the races and sexes as such. From the mere fact that a person is black, or a woman, we cannot infer anything else about that person. This, it may be said, is what is wrong with racism and sexism. The white racist claims that whites are superior to blacks, but this is false—although there are differences between individuals, some blacks are superior to some whites in all of the capacities and abilities that could conceivably be relevant. The opponent of sexism would say the same: a person’s sex is no guide to his or her abilities, and this is why it is unjustifiable to discriminate on the basis of sex.

This is a possible line of objection to racial and sexual discrimination. It is not, however, the way that someone really concerned about equality would choose, because taking this line could, in some circumstances, force one to accept a most inegalitarian society. The fact that humans differ as individuals, rather than as races or sexes, is a valid reply to someone who defends a hierarchical society like, say, South Africa, in which all whites are superior in status to all blacks. The existence of individual variations that cut across the lines of race or sex, however, provides us with no defense at all against a more sophisticated opponent of equality, one who proposes that, say, the interests of those with I.Q. ratings above 100 be preferred to the interests of those with I.Q.s below 100. Would a hierarchical society of this sort really be so much better than one based on race or sex? I think not. But if we tie the moral principle of equality to the factual equality of the different races or sexes, taken as a whole, our opposition to racism and sexism does not provide us with any basis for objecting to this kind of inegalitarianism.

There is a second important reason why we ought not to base our opposition to racism and sexism on any kind of factual equality, even the limited kind which asserts that variations in capacities and abilities are spread evenly between the different races and sexes: we can have no absolute guarantee that these abilities and capacities really are distributed evenly, without regard to race or sex, among human beings. So far as actual abilities are concerned, there do seem to be certain measurable differences between both races and sexes. These differences do not, of course, appear in each case, but only when averages are taken. More important still, we do not yet know how much of these differences is really due to the different genetic endowments of the various races and sexes, and how much is due to environmental differences that are the result of past and continuing discrimination. Perhaps all of the important differences will eventually prove to be environmental rather than genetic. Anyone opposed to racism and sexism will certainly hope that this will be so, for it will make the task of ending discrimination a lot easier; nevertheless it would be dangerous to rest the case against racism and sexism on the belief that all significant differences are environmental in origin. The opponent of, say, racism who takes this line will be unable to avoid conceding that if differences in ability did after all prove to have some genetic connection with race, racism would in some way be defensible.

It would be folly for the opponent of racism to stake his whole case on a dogmatic commitment to one particular outcome of a difficult scientific issue which is still a long way from being settled. While attempts to prove that differences in certain selected abilities between races and sexes are primarily genetic in origin have certainly not been conclusive, the same must be said of attempts to prove that these differences are largely the result of environment. At this stage of the investigation we cannot be certain which view is correct, however much we may hope it is the latter.

Fortunately, there is no need to pin the case for equality to one particular outcome of this scientific investigation. The appropriate response to those who claim to have found evidence of genetically- based differences in ability between the races or sexes is not to stick to the belief that the genetic explanation must be wrong, whatever evidence to the contrary may turn up: instead we should make it quite clear that the claim to equality does not depend on intelligence, moral capacity, physical strength, or similar matters of fact. Equality is a moral ideal, not a simple assertion of fact. There is no logically compelling reason for assuming that a factual difference in ability between two people justifies any difference in the amount of consideration we give to satisfying their needs and interests. The principle of the equality of human beings is not a description of an alleged actual equality among humans: it is a prescription of how we should treat animals.

Jeremy Bentham incorporated the essential basis of moral equality into his utilitarian system of ethics in the formula: “Each to count for one and none for more than one.” In other words, the interests of every being affected by an action are to be taken into account and given the same weight as the like interests of any other being. A later utilitarian, Henry Sidgwick, put the point in this way: "The good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other.‘’ [1] More recently, the leading figures in contemporary moral philosophy have shown a great deal of agreement in specifying as a fundamental presupposition of their moral theories some similar requirement which operates so as to give everyone’s interests equal consideration—although they cannot agree on how this requirement is best formulated. [2]

It is an implication of this principle of equality that our concern for others ought not to depend on what they are like, or what abilities they possess—although precisely what this concern requires us to do may vary according to the characteristics of those affected by what we do. It is on this basis that the case against racism and the case against sexism must both ultimately rest; and it is in accordance with this principle that speciesism is also to be condemned. If possessing a higher degree of intelligence does not entitle one human to use another for his own ends, how can it entitle humans to exploit nonhumans?

Many philosophers have proposed the principle of equal consideration of interests, in some form or other, as a basic moral principle; but, as we shall see in more detail shortly, not many of them have recognized that this principle applies to members of other species as well as to our own. Bentham was one of the few who did realize this. In a forward-looking passage, written at a time when black slaves in the British dominions were still being treated much as we now treat nonhuman animals, Bentham wrote:

The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been witholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognized that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sarrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reasons nor Can they talk? but, Can their suffer? [3]

In this passage Bentham points to the capacity for suffering as the vital characteristic that gives a being the right to equal consideration. The capacity for suffering—or more strictly, for suffering and/ or enjoyment or happiness—is not just another characteristic like the capacity for language, or for higher mathematics. Bentham is not saying that those who try to mark “the insuperable line” that determines whether the interests of a being should be considered happen to have selected the wrong characteristic. The capacity for suffering and enjoying things is a prerequisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in any meaningful way. It would be nonsense to say that it was not in the interests of a stone to be kicked along the road by a schoolboy. A stone does not have interests because it cannot suffer. Nothing that we can do to it could possibly make any difference to its welfare. A mouse, on the other hand, does have an interest in not being tormented, because it will suffer if it is.

If a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration. No matter what the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that its suffering be counted equally with the like suffering—in so far as rough comparisons can be made—of any other being. If a being is not capable of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or happiness, there is nothing to be taken into account. This is why the limit of sentience (using the term as a convenient, if not strictly accurate, shorthand for the capacity to suffer or experience enjoyment or happiness) is the only defensible boundary of concern for the interests of others. To mark this boundary by some characteristic like intelligence or rationality would be to mark it in an arbitrary way. Why not choose some other characteristic, like skin color?

The racist violates the principle of equality by giving greater weight to the interests of members of his own race, when there is a clash between their interests and the interests of those of another race. Similarly the speciesist allows the interests of his own species to override the greater interests of members of other species. [4] The pattern is the same in each case. Most human beings are speciesists. l shall now very briefly describe some of the practices that show this.

For the great majority of human beings, especially in urban, industrialized societies, the most direct form of contact with members of other species is at mealtimes: we eat them. In doing so we treat them purely as means to our ends. We regard their life and well-being as subordinate to our taste for a particular kind of dish. l say “taste” deliberately—this is purely a matter of pleasing our palate. There can be no defense of eating flesh in terms of satisfying nutritional needs, since it has been established beyond doubt that we could satisfy our need for protein and other essential nutrients far more efficiently with a diet that replaced animal flesh by soy beans, or products derived from soy beans, and other high-protein vegetable products. [5]

It is not merely the act of killing that indicates what we are ready to do to other species in order to gratify our tastes. The suffering we inflict on the animals while they are alive is perhaps an even clearer indication of our speciesism than the fact that we are prepared to kill them. [6] In order to have meat on the table at a price that people can afford, our society tolerates methods of meat production that confine sentient animals in cramped, unsuitable conditions for the entire durations of their lives. Animals are treated like machines that convert fodder into flesh, and any innovation that results in a higher “conversion ratio” is liable to be adopted. As one authority on the subject has said, “cruelty is acknowledged only when profitability ceases.” [7] . . .

Since, as l have said, none of these practices cater for anything more than our pleasures of taste, our practice of rearing and killing other animals in order to eat them is a clear instance of the sacrifice of the most important interests of other beings in order to satisfy trivial interests of our own. To avoid speciesism we must stop this practice, and each of us has a moral obligation to cease supporting the practice. Our custom is all the support that the meat-industry needs. The decision to cease giving it that support may be difficult, but it is no more difficult than it would have been for a white Southerner to go against the traditions of his society and free his slaves: if we do not change our dietary habits, how can we censure those slaveholders who would not change their own way of living?

The same form of discrimination may be observed in the widespread practice of experimenting on other species in order to see if certain substances are safe for human beings, or to test some psychological theory about the effect of severe punishment on learning, or to try out various new compounds just in case something turns up…

In the past, argument about vivisection has often missed the point, because it has been put in absolutist terms: Would the abolitionist be prepared to let thousands die if they could be saved by experimenting on a single animal? The way to reply to this purely hypothetical question is to pose another: Would the experimenter be prepared to perform his experiment on an orphaned human infant, if that were the only way to save many lives? (I say “orphan” to avoid the complication of parental feelings, although in doing so l am being overfair to the experimenter, since the nonhuman subjects of experiments are not orphans.) If the experimenter is not prepared to use an orphaned human infant, then his readiness to use nonhumans is simple discrimination, since adult apes, cats, mice, and other mammals are more aware of what is happening to them, more self-directing and, so far as we can tell, at least as sensitive to pain, as any human infant. There seems to be no relevant characteristic that human infants possess that adult mammals do not have to the same or a higher degree. (Someone might try to argue that what makes it wrong to experiment on a human infant is that the infant will, in time and if left alone, develop into more than the nonhuman, but one would then, to be consistent, have to oppose abortion, since the fetus has the same potential as the infant— indeed, even contraception and abstinence might be wrong on this ground, since the egg and sperm, considered jointly, also have the same potential. In any case, this argument still gives us no reason for selecting a nonhuman, rather than a human with severe and irreversible brain damage, as the subject for our experiments).

The experimenter, then, shows a bias in favor of his own species whenever he carries out an experiment on a nonhuman for a purpose that he would not think justified him in using a human being at an equal or lower level of sentience, awareness, ability to be self-directing, etc. No one familiar with the kind of results yielded by most experiments on animals can have the slightest doubt that if this bias were eliminated the number of experiments performed would be a minute fraction of the number performed today.

Experimenting on animals, and eating their flesh, are perhaps the two major forms of speciesism in our society. By comparison, the third and last form of speciesism is so minor as to be insignificant, but it is perhaps of some special interest to those for whom this article was written. I am referring to speciesism in contemporary philosophy.

Philosophy ought to question the basic assumptions of the age. Thinking through, critically and carefully, what most people take for granted is, I believe, the chief task of philosophy, and it is this task that makes philosophy a worthwhile activity. Regrettably, philosophy does not always live up to its historic role. Philosophers are human beings, and they are subject to all the preconceptions of the society to which they belong. Sometimes they succeed in breaking free of the prevailing ideology: more often they become its most sophisticated defenders. So, in this case, philosophy as practiced in the universities today does not challenge anyone’s preconceptions about our relations with other species. By their writings, those philosophers who tackle problems that touch upon the issue reveal that they make the same unquestioned assumptions as most other humans, and what they say tends to confirm the reader in his or her comfortable speciesist habits.

I could illustrate this claim by referring to the writings of philosophers in various fields—for instance, the attempts that have been made by those interested in rights to draw the boundary of the sphere of rights so that it runs parallel to the biological boundaries of the species homo sapiens, including infants and even mental defectives, but excluding those other beings of equal or greater capacity who are so useful to us at mealtimes and in our laboratories. l think it would be a more appropriate conclusion to this article, however, if I concentrated on the problem with which we have been centrally concerned, the problem of equality.

It is significant that the problem of equality, in moral and political philosophy, is invariably formulated in terms of human equality. The effect of this is that the question of the equality of other animals does not confront the philosopher, or student, as an issue itself—and this is already an indication of the failure of philosophy to challenge accepted beliefs. Still, philosophers have found it difficult to discuss the issue of human equality without raising, in a paragraph or two, the question of the status of other animals. The reason for this, which should be apparent from what I have said already, is that if humans are to be regarded as equal to one another, we need some sense of “equal” that does not require any actual, descriptive equality of capacities, talents or other qualities. If equality is to be related to any actual characteristics of humans, these characteristics must be some lowest common denominator, pitched so low that no human lacks them—but then the philosopher comes up against the catch that any such set of characteristics which covers all humans will not be possessed only by humans. In other words, it turns out that in the only sense in which we can truly say, as an assertion of fact, that all humans are equal, at least some members of other species are also equal—equal, that is, to each other and to humans. If, on the other hand, we regard the statement “All humans are equal” in some non-factual way, perhaps as a prescription, then, as I have already argued, it is even more difficult to exclude non-humans from the sphere of equality.

This result is not what the egalitarian philosopher originally intended to assert. Instead of accepting the radical outcome to which their own reasonings naturally point, however, most philosophers try to reconcile their beliefs in human equality and animal inequality by arguments that can only be described as devious.

As a first example, I take William Frankena’s well-known article “The Concept of Social Justice.” Frankena opposes the idea of basing justice on merit, because he sees that this could lead to highly inegalitarian results. Instead he proposes the principle that

all men are to be treated as equals, not because they are equal, in any respect, but simply because they are human. They are human because they have emotions and desires, and are able to think, and hence are capable of enjoying a good life in a sense in which other animals are not. [8]

But what is this capacity to enjoy the good life which all humans have, but no other animals? Other animals have emotions and desires and appear to be capable of enjoying a good life. We may doubt that they can think—although the behavior of some apes, dolphins, and even dogs suggests that some of them can—but what is the relevance of thinking? Frankena goes on to admit that by “the good life” he means “not so much the morally good life as the happy or satisfactory life,” so thought would appear to be unnecessary for enjoying the good life; in fact to emphasize the need for thought would make difficulties for the egalitarian since only some people are capable of leading intellectually satisfying lives, or morally good lives. This makes it difficult to see what Frankena’s principle of equality has to do with simply being human. Surely every sentient being is capable of leading a life that is happier or less miserable than some alternative life, and hence has a claim to be taken into account. In this respect the distinction between humans and nonhumans is not a sharp division, but rather a continuum along which we move gradually, and with overlaps between the species, from simple capacities for enjoyment and satisfaction, or pain and suffering, to more complex ones.

Faced with a situation in which they see a need for some basis for the moral gulf that is commonly thought to separate humans and animals, but can find no concrete difference that will do the job without undermining the equality of humans, philosophers tend to waffle. They resort to highsounding phrases like “the intrinsic dignity of the human individual”; [9] they talk of the “intrinsic worth of all men” as if men (humans?) had some worth that other beings did not, [10] or they say that humans, and only humans, are “ends in themselves,” while "everything other than a person can only have value for a person.‘’ [11]

This idea of a distinctive human dignity and worth has a long history; it can be traced back directly to the Renaissance humanists, for instance to Pico delta Mirandola’s Oration on the Dignity of Man. Pico and other humanists based their estimate of human dignity on the idea that man possessed the central, pivotal position in the “Great Chain of Being” that led from the lowliest forms of matter to God himself; this view of the universe, in turn, goes back to both classical and Judeo-Christian doctrines. Contemporary philosophers have cast off these metaphysical and religious shackles and freely invoke the dignity of mankind without needing to justify the idea at all. Why should we not attribute “intrinsic dignity” or “intrinsic worth” to ourselves? Fellow-humans are unlikely to reject the accolades we so generously bestow on them, and those to whom we deny the honor are unable to object. Indeed, when one thinks only of humans, it can be very liberal, very progressive, to talk of the dignity of all human beings. In so doing, we implicitly condemn slavery, racism, and other violations of human rights. We admit that we ourselves are in some fundamental sense on a par with the poorest, most ignorant members of our own species. It is only when we think of humans as no more than a small sub-group of all the beings that inhabit our planet that we may realize that in elevating our own species we are at the same time lowering the relative status of all other species.

The truth is that the appeal to the intrinsic dignity of human beings appears to solve the egalitarian’s problems only as long as it goes unchallenged. Once we ask why it should be that all humans—including infants, mental defectives, psychopaths, Hitler, Stalin, and the rest—have some kind of dignity or worth that no elephant, pig, or chimpanzee can ever achieve, we see that this question is as difficult to answer as our original request for some relevant fact that justifies the inequality of humans and other animals. In fact, these two questions are really one: talk of intrinsic dignity or moral worth only takes the problem back one step, because any satisfactory defence of the claim that all and only humans have intrinsic dignity would need to refer to some relevant capacities or characteristics that all and only humans possess. Philosophers frequently introduce ideas of dignity, respect, and worth at the point at which other reasons appear to be lacking, but this is hardly good enough. Fine phrases are the last resource of those who have run out of arguments.

In case there are those who still think it may be possible to find some relevant characteristic that distinguishes all humans from all members of other species, I shall refer again, before I conclude, to the existence of some humans who quite clearly are below the level of awareness, self-consciousness, intelligence, and sentience, of many non-humans. l am thinking of humans with severe and irreparable brain damage, and also of infant humans. To avoid the complication of the relevance of a being’s potential, however, I shall henceforth concentrate on permanently retarded humans.

Philosophers who set out to find a characteristic that will distinguish humans from other animals rarely take the course of abandoning these groups of humans by lumping them in with the other animals. It is easy to see why they do not. To take this line without re-thinking our attitudes to other animals would entail that we have the right to perform painful experiments on retarded humans for trivial reasons; similarly it would follow that we had the right to rear and kill these humans for food. To most philosophers these consequences are as unacceptable as the view that we should stop treating nonhumans in this way.

Of course, when discussing the problem of equality it is possible to ignore the problem of mental defectives, or brush it aside as if somehow insignificant. [12] This is the easiest way out. What else remains? My final example of speciesism in contemporary philosophy has been selected to show what happens when a writer is prepared to face the question of human equality and animal inequality without ignoring the existence of mental defectives, and without resorting to obscurantist mumbo jumbo. Stanley Benn’s clear and honest article "Egalitarianism and Equal Consideration of Interests’’ [13] fits this description.

Benn, after noting the usual “evident human inequalities” argues, correctly I think, for equality of consideration as the only possible basis for egalitarianism. Yet Benn, like other writers, is thinking only of “equal consideration of human interests.” Benn is quite open in his defence of this restriction of equal consideration:

. . . not to possess human shape is a disqualifying condition. However faithful or intelligent a dog may be, it would be a monstrous sentimentality to attribute to him interests that could be weighed in an equal balance with those of human beings . . . if, for instance, one had to decide between feeding a hungry baby or a hungry dog, anyone who chose the dog would generally be reckoned morally defective, unable to recognize a fundamental inequality of claims.
This is what distinguishes our attitude to animals from our attitude to imbeciles. It would be odd to say that we ought to respect equally the dignity or personality of the imbecile and of the rational man . . . but there is nothing odd about saying that we should respect their interests equally, that is, that we should give to the interests of each the same serious consideration as claims to considerations necessary for some standard of well-being that we can recognize and endorse.

Benn’s statement of the basis of the consideration we should have for imbeciles seems to me correct, but why should there be any fundamental inequality of claims between a dog and a human imbecile? Benn sees that if equal consideration depended on rationality, no reason could be given against using imbeciles for research purposes, as we now use dogs and guinea pigs. This will not do: “But of course we do distinguish imbeciles from animals in this regard,” he says. That the common distinction is justifiable is something Benn does not question; his problem is how it is to be justified. The answer he gives is this:

The final sentence of this passage gives the argument away. An imbecile, Benn concedes, may have no characteristics superior to those of a dog; nevertheless this does not make the imbecile a member of “a different species” as the dog is. Therefore it would be “unfair” to use the imbecile for medical research as we use the dog. But why? That the imbecile is not rational is just the way things have worked out, and the same is true of the dog—neither is any more responsible for their mental level. If it is unfair to take advantage of an isolated defect, why is it fair to take advantage of a more general limitation? I find it hard to see anything in this argument except a defense of preferring the interests of members of our own species because they are members of our own species. To those who think there might be more to it, I suggest the following mental exercise. Assume that it has been proven that there is a difference in the average, or normal, intelligence quotient for two different races, say whites and blacks. Then substitute the term “white” for every occurrence of “men” and “black” for every occurrence of “dog” in the passage quoted; and substitute “high l.Q.” for “rationality” and when Benn talks of “imbeciles” replace this term by "dumb whites"—that is, whites who fall well below the normal white l.Q. score. Finally, change “species” to “race.” Now retread the passage. It has become a defense of a rigid, no-exceptions division between whites and blacks, based on l.Q. scores, not withstanding an admitted overlap between whites and blacks in this respect. The revised passage is, of course, outrageous, and this is not only because we have made fictitious assumptions inour substitutions. The point is that in the original passage Benn was defending a rigid division in the amount of consideration due to members of different species, despite admitted cases of overlap. If the original did not, at first reading strike us as being as outrageous as the revised version does, this is largely because although we are not racists ourselves, most of us are speciesists. Like the other articles, Benn’s stands as a warning of the ease with which the best minds can fall victim to a prevailing ideology.


NOTES

The Methods of Ethics (7th Ed.), p. 382.
For example, R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (Oxford, 1963) and J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard, 1972); for a brief account of the essential agreement on this issue between these and other positions, see R. M. Hare, “Rules of War and Moral Reasoning,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 1, no. 2 (1972).
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. XVII.
I owe the term speciesism to Richard Ryder.
In order to produce 1 lb. of protein in the form of beef or veal, we must feed 21 Ibs. of protein to the animal. Other forms of livestock are slightly less inefficient, but the average ratio in the United States is still 1:8. It has been estimated that the amount of protein lost to humans in this way is equivalent to 90 percent of the annual world protein deficit. For a brief account, see Frances Moore Lappe, Diet for a Small Planet (Friends of The Earth/Ballantine, New York 1971), pp. 4—11.
Although one might think that killing a being is obviously the ultimate wrong one can do to it, l think that the infliction of suffering is a clearer indication of speciesism because it might be argued that at least part of what is wrong with killing a human is that most humans are conscious of their existence over time and have desires and purposes that extend into the future see, for instance, M. Tooley, “Abortion and Infanticide,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol . 2, no. I (1972). Of course, if one took this view one would have to hold—as Tooley does— that killing a human infant or mental defective is not in itself wrong and is less serious than killing certain higher mammals that probably do have a sense of their own existence over time.
Ruth Harrison, Animal Machines (Stuart, London, 1964). For an account of farming conditions, see my Animal Liberation (New York Review Company, 1975) from which “Down on the Factory Farm,” is reprinted in this volume.
In R. Brandt (ed.), Social Justice (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1962), p. 19.
Frankena, op. cit. p. 23.
H. A. Bedau, “Egalitarianism and the Idea of Equality,” in Nomos IX: Equality, ed. J. R. Pennock and J. W. Chapman, New York, 1967.
C. Vlastos, “Justice and Equality,” in Brandt, Social Justice, p. 48.
For example, Bernard Williams, “The Idea of Equality,” in Philosophy, Politics, and Society (second series), ed. P. Laslett and W. Rundman (Blackwell, Oxford, 1962), p. 118; J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 509—10.
Nomos IX: Equality; the passages quoted are on p. 62ff.

that said he would kill his own mother once she was old? Isn’t he the abortionist and euthanasiast?

Hey Travis,

Actually no, just the opposite. If we are unwilling to afford animals equal rights, then it only makes sense that senile, elderly people and mentally retarded infants should have no more rights than animals.

Singer’s argument for animal equality is based on criteria that considers sentience and feeling. All beings that have the potential to feel pain or pleasure deserve the equal right to demonstrate that pleasure. The counter argument is, of course, that Human Beings are somehow more significant than animals. We have the ability to be self-aware, look forward into the future, and have rational thought. (To be honest, I’m not completely sure that these sentiments are entirely correct but for the most part, we don’t know of any animals that are attributed with all of these characteristics.)

Well Singer, again, refutes the idea that these characteristics set us entirely apart from animals. If we were to say that we have the right to kill animals because they are lesser beings (due to their lack of self-awareness, future planning, and rational thought) then we must also say that that the mentally handicapped, Alzheimer’s victims, etc. could rightfully be exterminated as well.

I know it seems, at first, to be extremely out of line, but if you examine the argument, it is a very rational conclusion. We once oppressed women, blacks, homosexuals, etc, but we have now learned that was only a gesture of our ignorance. Is it possible that we are making the same mistake with animals? Will future beings a hundred years from now look back on our primitive ways with flagrant disgust?

Over all I found this to be a very interesting and well-written article. I agree that animals have rights yet only up to a point, but I do believe that anything that can experience pain should not be tormented where possible. His argument has a fundamental flaw that I’ll come to by the end of this reply.

Why draw the line there, plants live, plants know which direction to grow to get to the sunlight. Why is it okay to eat plants, and not animals? The Venus Flytrap show’s a form of intelligence when it closes its trap on a fly. Just because a plant can’t growl or scream when its in pain, how do we know that it cannot experience a form of pain. We are being just as elitists by saying animals have rights but not vegetation.

He talks of Morality as an Ideal. What is an ideal?

It’s the most suitable or perfect way. We do not live in a perfect world, but we try to live our life to a higher Rule that is not always possible to live up to. And this is how we advance. This Ideal of Rights and Morality has advanced in parallel with are intellectual abilities. Meaning when we where cavemen we didn’t understand why we shouldn’t kill each other, or why we shouldn’t just take what we wanted. Morality and Rights come as a consequence of Intellect. They don’t exist without a form of higher thought. I’m not saying this is a necessity to have access to a Right, just a fact that to have a right at all requires someone with the mental capacity to understand why a Right is a Right. Or to put it another way, at least one person with the power to make rules must have the ability to see where there are unfair injustices being committed. This judgement requires a form of Moral imperative.

So to understand where a Right comes from we must first have a basis for Morality. To keep my reply short I’m just going to give my definition of Morality. If you disagree with my view then we should, using one of the many Morality based topics discuss conflicting views, and not take this topic off course.

Morality is an Ideal, only at times can it be lived up to. Because at sometime or another everybody is a hypocrite. Like, why should I not eat animals, but plants are okay. Is the fact that they both express a form of life, not enough to imply both should have the Right to life?

This introduces a need for Practical reason. In a perfect world there would be no need for Practical reason, as the feasibility of the perfect way would exist without question. An example of Practical reason in action is the food chain. Stronger animals eat weaker animals and plants. Why is this so, it’s because all animals have been designed with a need for food to continue living. Each animal then based off this need and it’s ability to control its own environment, then goes on to hunt whatever it is capable of successfully killing and eating. This is the rule of Survival of the Fittest. This rule to us, as a being capable of moral reason, seems unfair, as the only crime the weak has committed is being weak. The strong shouldn’t express their strength just because they are stronger. But this is a Moral belief, not one based on the fact of existence taken without contemplation of what is fair. Some pragmatics might believe that it’s unfair to limit the abilities of the strong just because of the weak. But no matter what way we view the situation someone will always feel there is unfair treatment on one of the party’s involved.

So it can be seen animals have a Right to life, up to the point it’s practical. Then the rule of strength takes over. Meaning if you have enough people calling for animals right to life always, and they have the power to enforce this, it then becomes so. If they don’t have the power to enforce it then animals die when it’s deem practical. But in both cases, and this is the important point, it’s the rule of the strong that sets the precedent. Morality is only an aid to guide, up to the point of what’s practical. This means as time passes humanity is capable of increasingly listening to its own Moral guidance, because with each advancement what was once seen as impractical now becomes a possibility.

Mr. Singer made one fatal mistake in his argument; he forgot to take into account the reality of existence in an imperfect world. I would love to live in a world where all life no matter how small or weak was cherished. But unfortunately this is just not possible yet. By leaving out the practical consequents of living a life in such a way it fundamentally weakens his opinions and his overall argument. I believe all life has the right to live in peace and without undue suffering, but this believe is just not practical in the world as it currently is. But as time moves on and humanity’s ability to control the environment improves, maybe one day we can live, as Peter would like us to.

Pax,

Singer would agree with you. For instance, hypothetically you have 3 young men and a dog in a sinking raft. One entity must be sacrificed in order for the rest to live. As yourself and Singer would agree, the dog must go. So, he does differentiate a level of value between species, based on the complexity of sentience. Another scenario might have three young men and their grandfather (whom is in the last stages of Alzheimers) in the raft. Someone has to drown or they all die. Who do you choose?

Good question! How do we know rocks don’t feel pain when we drop them on the ground or automobiles when we wrap them around a pole at 80mph. There are natural requirements for pain: sensory organs, nervous system, brain, etc. Plants have none of those. Plants grow towards sunlight based on innate reflexes. Same with the venus fly trap. Plants have no sentience.

I don’t think that he means for us to change instantly or to always do the right thing. Sure, we would all love to live in a world without murder, starvation, oppression, etc. but we should be striving for these as an ideal. If we believe that killing animals is murder, then we will strive to sustain from such action. The problem is that the status quo presumes killing animals is not immoral.

Another good point. Singer actually refrains from using the word “rights” because he does not believe in the concept. But that is a whole other discussion. Anyways, this brings to mind the question of whether animals exhibit ethical actions? We might be able to vocalize and rationalize our ethical beliefs but I would suggest that some animals have the same ability to exhibit ethical behavior. For instance, a pack of wolves protect each other when they are threatened by an outside danger. I’ll have to think of a better example than that but I think you see what I’m saying. However, what do we say to the lion hunting his prey? You’re going to have to start eating tofu because hunting game is unethical. I’m not too sure the lion would be interested in our ethical arguments. :laughing:

Not if everyone is fat and happy. The question is how do we satisfy everyone?

I agree and that is how history portrays the situation as well. However, it is our moral duty to do what our intellect and rationale tell us is right. That is, if it is in our capability. I am not a vegetarian nor vegan and to tell you the truth I have taken no steps in the direction of conserving animal life. Of course, now that I am becoming aware of the situation, I am slowly beginning to feel an obligation to respond.

I would disagree. As I said before, I don’t think Singer is asking for anything miraculous. Currently, the majority of the worlds population feels no ethical obligation to the conservation of animal life. Singer as well as myself only want to see this change, just as we have seen equal rights arise among our own species. Eastern philosophers have presupposed animal equality for thousands of years and now we have the science and understanding to back that up. Life without meat is possible and even practical. We only need spread the word.

True, but they are still a form of life. The point I was trying to get across is life in its self should be enough to give you a right to life, without another taking your life. Intelligence should not be a factor, as then we are discriminating just because of intellect.

When I talked about Morality it was the fact it is an impossible ideal to live up to. We say that we should never kill another human, but at times some would say its moral to do so, like in defence. Therefore the act of killing in itself is not immoral, but it’s the reason for killing that makes it so. My argument is that to kill for food is moral, and animals only have a right to life if humans don’t require them as a source of food. Just as it’s moral to kill to survive it’s also just as moral to kill animals for food to survive, and so it comes back to the rule of survival of the fittest. Also put the other way if the animal required us as a food source and had the ability to eat us, it would do so. The only way you can make a case for morality is if it’s reciprocal. Simply put: if I’m kind to you, you must be kind to me, if you violate this trust I will retaliate. Animals can’t partake in any such agreement, so morality towards animals is only possible when we choose to ignore their inability to act in a human defined moral way.

Ethics is morality, and animals don’t have this higher brain function. Animals live by the laws of survival. Like your example, it’s in the packs interest to protect its own. There’s almost a pack consciousness, a group brain where it sees individual members of the pack as apart of the hole, so each must be protected. It’s like a human national identity, like if you called an Englishman a German they would be upset.

Again when it comes to survival morality takes a backseat. Morality is a luxury we have bought through the ability to co-operate. Society needs morality to exist just as much as morality requires a society to exist. This is the reason why laws and morality are always violated if it’s in the best interests of the individual for survival.

Morality is a luxury of our excess. We have more then we need to live so living a moral life becomes a possibility. This in turn means we don’t have to fight to get want we need to survive. Life is all about survival, if we forget this we die. Animals don’t really care what type of animal they kill to get their food, although most animals won’t kill their own kind, yet if required they will. A hungry man won’t think twice about stealing to satisfy the hunger. A drug addict needs drugs to survive, so will steal to feed the craving. Morality to the addict is not an option, has he must have his drugs to survive. This is why I believe morality is a luxury of excess. If the drug addict had the money to buy the drugs he wouldn’t steal. Our intellect and rationale will always take a backseat to your need to survive. It could be said it goes against our intellect and rationale not to want to survive.

To be honest I think this has more to do with their belief in reincarnation; then loving animals for the sake of equality. They believe all life is holy, and that all living things share in the same mystery of life. Meaning the soul of an animal is just the same as a human’s but in a different state of perfection. They believe we become animals if we live evil lives as humans, it’s a form of punishment. They don’t see equality; they see inequality, yet still believe in the potential of the soul to be raised on the next reincarnation.

Yes, I would say this is because people believe it’s an animal’s duty or purpose to provide a source of food. As far back as humanity can see we have always looked upon animals as a source of food. This is also how animals view other animals. It’s our intellect, which has created morality, and the fact that we now understand so much about other forms of food; we can be selective about what we wish to eat. Again it comes back to, out of our abundance of food we have the luxury to choose what we wish to eat.

Farming in arid climates is very difficult and at times the only plants that grow will only be good for feeding animals. This is why people have reared cattle and other forms of livestock. It’s like we transform incompatible plant food into animals, which in turn we can eat. We turn the plant into animal fat, and the animal fat into human fat. This is why I talk about the practicality of not eating animals. Morally speaking it might make sense, but practically speaking it’s way off for some parts of the world. This is something that is completely missing from is argument, and it’s a fundamental point when talking about the eating of animals. Only in parts of the world where there are plenty of different food sources can we talk about animal equality.

Then there comes the case for becoming a quasi-vegan. Not so much why should we not use animal milk, but why should we eat things like, chicken eggs or any other animal eggs for that matter, as eating the egg is the same as eating a chicken, etc. Not to eat animals is actually contrary to human nature. Likewise much of morality is also contrary to our base emotions. If we’re hit, we immediately want to strike back. These rules are pre-programmed into our psyche for survival. I can envision a day where all animals are protected.

but it is not an argument that considers either basic life or intellect. The argument is entirely based on awareness, specifically, the awareness of pleasure/ pain. Therefore plants are exluded, as are rocks, worms, insects, etc.

Sure, an ethical or moral imperative is in most cases relative to the situation, but the point that Singer and myself are trying to establish is that we should ideally try and conserve animal life.

I would agree and this relates back to the raft situation. On the other hand, we don’t require animals as a source of food, so your argument is a non-sequitur.

hmmm . . . so are you suggesting that animals should be denied the right to pleasure based on the premise that we have a higher form of rationale and intellect, and furthermore the ability to communicate. Doesn’t seem very fair to me. Animals don’t have the choice to become rational, intelligent beings; however, they still fear pain and seek pleasure, just as we do. Yes?

Again, I will agree with you in the sense that personal survival is of our utmost interest. It’s called the self-interest theory, but again I will deny that we require animal life to survive. I would argue that the pleasure and utility that we gain from animal life is the luxury. Not only is it entirely unwarranted, but apathetically stolen. The animal deserves to enjoy it’s life just as do you and I. Did the African slave deserve to devote his life to the wealthy plantation owners pleasure? No. It was unwarranted and ultimately stolen. How would you like it if your pleasure or your potential for pleasure was stolen from you?

Why can’t we wear cotton and eat tofu?

-Skep

Yes, if you can afford not to eat animals then great. But there are lots of people both in First and Third world countries that can’t afford to, or just don’t have the knowledge needed to eat healthy by eating vegetables alone. While a good case can be made for not eating animals an equally strong case can also be made for eating animals, even if it’s only because we like the taste and texture of animal flesh. My argument for eating or not eating is, as you and Peter would probably see it, a species argument. It’s based off the Strong do what they wish rather then what they should. This is the same reason morality is a luxury that only those of wealth (in a general sense) can afford. This affect humans just as much as animals.

No, not because we have a higher form of rationale and intellect, but the fact that we can! Quite simply put, I have the ability to kill animals, I can then eat these animals therefore I will if I want to. It’s a selfish argument based off me being in the position of power. It’s not fair, but when has the world ever been fair? Fairness is a word that relates to morality, and in my opinion is the flagstone and foundation of all morality. Fair is about being Just, while the world is about getting what we want in anyway we can get away with. Fair doesn’t even enter the equation, that’s why we have laws to rule us.

It’s not an animal’s life we want, well maybe in the case of cats and dogs it is. But it’s there death, not needless death, as I do see this as a form of cruelty. We all have pains in life, we all suffer, and suffering is a constant part of our existence. What makes suffering good or bad is its outcome. If it’s just for another’s amusement then that suffering is morally wrong, because we don’t want to suffer as another person’s plaything. A cat will play with a mouse and kill it for fun, it mightn’t even eat the mouse, just kills it for fun. I reckon some animals that are reared for food live a more comfortable life. Cows get medicine to protect them from diseases that might otherwise kill them in a slow and painful way. They don’t have to worry about when their next meal is, as the farmer takes care of this. Even when then die, it’s done in a “humane” way. Childbirth for animals is also safer for them, as they will have a watchful farmer making sure everything goes accordingly.

It’s true they don’t have the same freedom to walk where they want or go where they want to go. In the case of some chickens they live their life in cages never seeing sunlight. I know this is wrong. But I also by close made by sweatshop workers, why? Because it’s cheap or I didn’t know. When I see a dead chicken I don’t see a life wasted living in a cage, I only see dinner. Heartless and maybe even crewel, but that’s life, sometimes I eat free ranged chicken if I can afford the extra money it costs. But if I’m feeling greedy it can be a needless cost to pay; the price of my foods freedom to run in the sun for it’s short life.

Yes it does deserve to enjoy its life. Teachers deserve more money then they’re paid, so do nurses and many other jobs. But we live in a world where ‘deserve’ is only an ideological idea. Do football players deserve 10’s of millions of dollars, or CEO’s?

Also there is a difference between Africans on plantations and animals! Africans can kick your ass! Animals can’t! That’s part of the reason they got their freedom. It was also their intellect and rationale that bought there freedom. It was the ideology of seeing all men as equal initially, which then in turn, saw all people, men and women as equals. Animals won’t win equality, because they’re not equal. Just because you suffer in life doesn’t mean your going to get special treatment. If it did then it would be better to be an animal, then it is for those people who live below the bread line. It really ticks me off when people are kind to animals and crewel to people. I know a woman who would do anything, and I mean anything. I’ve seen her bring stray cats to the vet to get shots that cost real money. But the same woman would give to bits about a homeless person. I think animals only have the right not to suffer after us humans have found away to stop our own suffering.

There’s also the problem where are these animals going to live? If they’re not being reared for food then most people won’t want them on their land. And I’m pretty sure most people won’t give up their land for the sake of the animals. Just look at places like the rainforest as an example. The urban sprawl of humanity is like, as Agent Smith in the Matrix puts it, a Virus. It could be argued that humanity is a virus, we eat almost everything, but what do we give back? Yes we have a culture, but it’s only a culture that humans enjoy. Its true we have the potential to make life easy for the animals, and ourselves. But first we must conquer our own animal instincts of which human greed is the most deadly.

So, where does that leave us? I agree animals shouldn’t suffer needlessly, as for food I think they’re there to eat if I want to, because I can. Until there is enough public support for the banning of animals as food, then people will keep on eating animals. But realistically I think it will always just be a personal decision, or at least I hope so.

if you ask me i dont think humans should have ‘rights’ so animals having rights is just as bad.