The “Epistemology, old Father Christmas, and Nah” thread gave me the idea for this post.
What if I had twins that were both my brother, Jon and Ben, who had been randomly switching places back and forth for many years, going back to be before I was born. So over the years I assumed I learned to know them and distinguish between them very well, from the way they dressed and acted. I have what I think are distinct memories of each respective person. Later they’re both decide to move away and stop talking to me (let’s say to a small island with no phone or internet). Before they leave they tell me what they’ve been doing all along.
Would there be any use in trying to sort out who was who? Maybe if I was studying acting or the psychology of personalities, but otherwise it wouldn’t matter. The distinctions I remembered wouldn’t needed to be analyied to fit “reality”.
That was an extreme example, but I think it helps show how the identity of others is completely relative and how any idea distinction, whether it be between people, things or concepts/ideas, can be turned into nothing through enough abstract examples.
If there’s any objections based on the idea that there’s an objective difference between the twins in a corporeal sense, then I’ll take the example even farther. You only need to apply what I guess would be called the “gestalt” to the situation. The twins are people that are completely intertwined within the world like everyone else, the distinction we make between them and anyone else corporeally is artificial.
If there are still objections let me take the example further. Say there was a strange form of intelligent life, where one’s offspring consisted of two different heads each with a brain and a detached body which they had to take turns sharing. Let’s say that the head that happened to be detached at any given time would be self sustaining, but “asleep”. Now take the twin example I gave, it would only come down to wondering who’s head it was in any given situation.
To go even further. Let’s say that the body already has an incomplete head with an incomplete brain with significant neurologic functions that must be supplemented when connected to one of the two seperate heads, which are also incomplete. Say that the heads don’t fit into the body’s head in a simple way, but as an extremely integrate 3d puzzle piece. Let’s say all three incomplete heads, the two initially separate ones and the one perpetually attached to the body, had the same mass and volume, when one of the separate heads connects to the body’s head the now interconnected head has the same volume but twice the mass. This is an integration of heads would be very difficult to untangle and understand.
If one still wishes to object saying that there are still three pieces and two different physical combinations, I guess I could take the example as far as you want, but I would think one could already anticipate what I might say when pushing the example further.